

The Internet and Child Sexual Abuse - Phase 2

Opening statement by Lead Counsel to the Inquiry Jacqueline Carey

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Introduction

1. I appear today on behalf of the Chair and Panel along with junior counsel, Eesvan Krishnan. May I introduce counsel on behalf of the core participants:
 - Mr Will Chapman and Kieran Chatterton on behalf of the complainant core participants IN-A1, IN-A2 and IN-A3
 - Mr Peter Alcock on behalf of the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF)
 - Mr Neil Sheldon on behalf of the National Crime Agency (NCA)
 - Ms Debra Powell QC and James Berry on behalf of the National Police Chief's Council (NPCC)
 - Mr Nicholas Griffin QC and Amelia Walker on behalf of the Home Office (HO)
 - Mr Christopher Butterfield on behalf of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis also referred to as the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS).

2. The hearings this fortnight will be considering the adequacy of the response of the internet industry and of government to online facilitated child sexual abuse, including consideration of government policy relevant to the protection of children from this form of sexual abuse.

3. Child sexual abuse facilitated by the internet manifests itself in a variety of ways. Child sexual abuse includes forcing or enticing a child or young person to take part in sexual activities. It includes contact abuse and non- contact abuse such as involving children in looking at sexual images, or in the production of sexual images, watching sexual activity, encouraging children to

behave in sexually inappropriate ways or grooming a child in preparation for abuse including via the internet.

4. For the purposes of this Investigation, the Inquiry has adopted a broad definition of what industry means so as include companies that provide products and services that can enable and/or facilitate online child sexual abuse. 'Industry' therefore includes, by way of example, the internet service providers and communication service providers (such as BT), software companies (such as Microsoft), social media platforms (such as Facebook), providers of search engines (such as Google) and those who provide email and messaging services and cloud storage (such as Apple).
5. This public hearing is the second phase of the Inquiry's Internet Investigation. In January 2018, you considered evidence relating to law enforcement's response to online facilitated CSA.
6. When I opened the January 2018 hearing, you will recall I provided you with figures relating to children's usage of the internet. Those figures were based on the 2016 Ofcom reports and included reports that in 2016, 12-15 year olds spent an average of 20 hours and 6 minutes online per week, up from over 18 hours the year before. The 2018 Ofcom figures suggest a further rise whereby 99% of 12-15 year olds go online for 20 ½ hours per week. 83% of 12-15 year olds have their own smartphone.
7. In 2016, 3-4 year olds spent an average of 8 hours and 18 minutes online per week. The 2018 figures suggest have increased to an average of nearly 9 hours per week and whilst one would not expect children of that age to have a smartphone, Ofcom reports that 19% of 3-4 year olds have their own tablet, and that 47% of 8-11 year olds have their own tablet.
8. Whilst the statistics are a useful tool by which to assess the daily impact that the internet has on children's lives, and the benefits that access to the internet

can bring, it highlights just how easily accessible children are to those intent on causing children harm. In 2018, the IWF confirmed criminal CSA content in over 105,000 reports made to them - a 32% increase from 2017. The NSPCC asked the police to provide them with the number of recorded offences of an adult sending a sexual message to a child - part of the grooming process. This offence came into force in April 2017 when s. 15A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 was enacted. Between April 2017 and April 2018, 3171 offences were recorded - that equates to between 8 or 9 offences per day. Law enforcement still considers that there could be as many as 100,000 people in the UK involved in the downloading and sharing of indecent imagery.

IN-A3

9. One must never forget that behind all the statistics and recording tools is real harm being caused day in, day out, by those who use the internet to search for IIOC, who groom children to take such imagery of themselves or to live stream such abuse, who use the internet to befriend children to seek to meet them to sexually abuse them.

10. You will hear from IN-A3. IN-A3 had a difficult upbringing and like many teenagers aged 14/15 she got herself a job in a local B&B, working weekends, some evenings after school and school holidays. Over time, the owner, Laurence Glynn (a man in his 60s), started to groom her and one of the other girls who worked there. He made inappropriate comments about her figure, gave her money to buy matching outfits for work. This became taking photographs of her on his camera. Facial shots and poses that were seemingly innocent, clothed photographs of her sitting down on the steps, but in reality allowed him to see her underwear.

11. He began to show IN-A3 pictures of young girls in, what she describes as 'skimpy clothing'. The photos also included girls who were naked, sometimes in sexual poses. He told her he would like her to pose for him that way.
12. When she started working there he asked to become her Facebook friend. Little did she know, he obtained her account details because she logged on at work one day and he then began accessing her messages before she had read them. Although she changed her account details she said it didn't occur to her to report him to Facebook. He would message her on Facebook and Twitter, even though he had her mobile number. He told her he loved her.
13. The grooming behaviour continued. He took her and another girl out for dinner, he bought her clothes and said she didn't need to pay him back. Eventually, his wife became suspicious and she spoke with IN-A3 and IN-A3's parents and the police became involved. IN-A3 found the police interview difficult. Police told her they had found images of her on Glynn's laptop, including photos of her taken from a hidden camera in his bathroom.
14. What IN-A3 did not tell the police was that on one occasion, he actually sexually assaulted her on an evening when he had taken her and another girl out for a meal. They ended up staying over in one of the guest rooms and he came in and sexually abused her by touching her vagina over her clothing.
15. In due course, Glynn was sentenced to 2 years imprisonment for a number of offences including possession of IIOC. IN-A3 will tell you about the devastating effect the abuse had on her - how her school work deteriorated, the nightmares she suffers from, the worry about where the images of her might be now. It may also be interesting and informative to hear what she has to say about her own use of the internet and what she was taught at school about online safety.

The hearing

16. The purpose of this opening statement is to introduce some of the themes, topics and issues that the investigation will ultimately ask the panel to consider. In doing so, I hope to familiarise you with some of the terminology and technology that is most likely to be encountered when considering the evidence.
17. To assist the panel in its consideration of the role of industry and government, you will be hearing evidence from a number of sources including witnesses from industry, the Home Office, the third sector and senior police officers. Some evidence will be called live – where a live witness is called, their evidence will be focussed on the most salient aspects of their testimony. It will not be possible to ask each and every witness about all of the documentary evidence that either they produce or that the investigation has gathered. Some statements and exhibits will be read or summarised into the record of these proceedings. The live feed to those watching the internet investigation is subject to a 3 minute time delay.
18. All core participants have been sent the proposed witness timetable. All core participants have had an opportunity to make requests under rule 10 of the Inquiry Rules 2006 to question witnesses. In line with the presumption in the Rules, it is expected that most of the questioning will be conducted by Inquiry counsel, but if there are any questions core participants want to raise for clarification then they may seek permission as the hearing proceeds. Documents will be referred to by their unique relative reference number and put up on the screen so that those members of the press and public who are present can follow the proceedings.
19. Some of these documents have been subject to redactions for reasons of data protection and/or sensitivity. It will be appreciated that the investigation of online child sexual abuse involves a variety of detective techniques, many of which are highly sensitive. The Inquiry has actively sought to ensure that, wherever possible, as much information as possible is publically available

about how law enforcement and industry detects and prevents online facilitated CSA without compromising the sensitive nature of the work. In order to fully explore the use and efficacy of these sensitive matters, the panel will be hearing evidence in closed sessions from which the public and press will be excluded. Those closed sessions will of course be recorded but the transcript will not be publically available.

Summary of Phase 1

20. It may assist though if I summarise some of the evidence heard in the law enforcement phase of this Investigation.

21. In the mid 2000s, the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP) was established as the national law enforcement agency responsible for tackling CSA and, in particular, online CSA. At that time, CEOP was affiliated to, but independent of, the Serious and Organised Crime Agency. In 2013, SOCA was abolished and the NCA was established. CEOP and tackling online CSEA now came within the NCA's remit. Since that time, combating CSEA has remained part of the Government's policy in tackling Serious and Organised Crime and when the Inquiry hears from Christian Papaleontiou, Head of the Unit at the Home Office which deals with CSEA, the Inquiry will look at some of the policies that underpin the Government's response to this form of abuse.

22. There are three main ways in which online facilitated CSA can most easily be identified and understood:

- IIOC - downloading and possession of such material, sometimes distribution of this imagery;

- Grooming - this can involve sexual communication with a child, arranging and in some cases meeting a child following such communication;
- Live streaming of CSA.

23. In examining the evidence from the witnesses this week, it may be useful to consider the industry and government response to these three areas of harm. However, that is not to say these three harms are independent of each other. There is evidence that grooming can lead to a child being asked to take indecent photos of themselves or for sexual acts to be video recorded. Often those perpetrators who come before the criminal courts for CSA contact offences, are found to be in possession of IIOC. There can be considerable overlap between these three forms of abuse.

IIOC

24. In relation to indecent imagery, you will recall the NCA receives referrals from the National Centre for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). NCMEC is a non profit organisation based in the USA. NCMEC's aims include reducing CSE. NCMEC has a reporting system called the CyberTipline, which enables the public, companies etc to report suspected CSE including indecent images.

25. In the USA, companies who provide an electronic communications service or a remote computing service to the public are under an obligation to report CSAM to NCMEC, as soon as is reasonably practicable, where they establish actual knowledge of the facts or circumstances of such material. The information reported to NCMEC must include the mail address, the IP address (i.e. the address that identifies a device using the internet), geographical location, the time stamp and any other information. NCMEC filter referrals to ascertain which IP addresses are attributable to UK users and NCMEC then disseminate this information in a referral to the NCA.

26. A single NCMEC referral could contain up to 5000 images linked to a single account and/or contain thousands of IP addresses that could relate to a single offender or victim using multiple devices. The referral may contain multiple suspects and victims.

27. **Show on screen NCA000363_010 and 011.** Re: UK industry reports.

28. Whilst there is no UK legislation equivalent to the American requirement to report CSAM once they have knowledge of that material, there is the 2000 e-commerce directive which protects a platform from legal liability for any content they host (rather than create) until they have actual knowledge and fail to act expeditiously to remove it or prevent access to it. In other words, they are not liable for a piece of user generated CSAM content until they have received notification of its existence, or their technology has identified such content, and have subsequently failed to remove it from their services in good time.

29. What this directive does not do is require companies to take proactive action to identify and remove content.

30. Prevention and detection of this material is a matter of considerable importance. Some of the evidence you will hear this week will focus on the various pre-screening technologies that are currently utilised by industry. In 2009, Microsoft developed PhotoDNA. PhotoDNA creates a unique digital signature (aka hash) of an image which is then compared with hashes of other known illegal photos to find copies of the same image. When matched with a database containing hashes of previously identified illegal images, PhotoDNA identifies the illegal image and is an important tool in detecting indecent imagery.

31. This technology has recently been expanded by Microsoft to include PhotoDNA for video and is used by both law enforcement and industry.

Google uses its own hash matching technology to identify CSAM images and videos.

32. You will also hear about the Child Abuse Image Database (aka CAID). Prior to the development of CAID in 2014, each police force was responsible for analysing potentially indecent images found on a suspect's computer. This was a time consuming and inefficient process and led to a duplication of work by the different forces across England and Wales. CAID is a single secure database. Once an image is confirmed to be indecent, the image is hashed and entered into the database. CAID can be used by the police to identify which devices contain indecent imagery, identify the imagery and even help identify victims.

33. As part of its work, the IWF captures the indecent images and videos, grades them and assigns a hash. These hashes are fed into the CAID.

34. The IWF has created a number of lists that are available to its members to try and prevent the indecent material being uploaded and accessible in the first place.

- Hash list to help industry prevent the imagery being uploaded in the first place.
- URL list. A URL is a Uniform Resource Locator - in other words the address of a webpage. The URL list ensures that once a web page has been identified by the IWF as containing CSAM, public access to the webpage can be blocked until such time as the illegal content has been removed and the webpage is then removed from the URL list. This list is updated by the IWF twice a day.
- Keywords list - this list contains keywords used by people looking for this child abuse imagery and enables companies to help moderators, filter results on search engines and check for files and domain names that might contain illegal content.

35. You will hear from Susie Hargreaves, the IWF's Chief Executive, who will be able to tell you more about the work of the IWF in detecting CSAM, having such material removed and in trying to prevent the material being available on the internet.
36. The IWF has developed web crawling technology. The technology crawls websites and pushes the content into databases so that the content can be verified by an analyst as indecent. Once the image is confirmed to be illegal the site is notified with a view to having the imagery taken down.
37. You will also hear about Project Arachnid. Project Arachnid is a web crawler developed by the Canadian Centre for Child Protection. The Project started in 2016 and was initially designed to crawl links on websites that were known host CSAM and to detect where the material was being made available to the public. Removal notices are then sent to the provider hosting the content. Since then, Project Arachnid has evolved and, in 2017, the Home Office invested £600,000 to expand the crawler to increase its capacity. This has meant that twice as many web pages per second can be searched, resulting in more images being identified and removed. As of January 2019, the crawler is processing an average of 8000 images per second; more than 4000 notices are issued a day and the crawler has detected 7.4 million suspected IIOC.¹
38. One final aspect of the response to IIOC that you may wish to consider relates to underage sharing of sexual imagery, sometimes also referred to as self generated sexual imagery or 'sexting'. You will recall from the phase 1 hearing, that creating, possessing and distributing an indecent image of someone under the age of 18 is a criminal offence. There was concern that teenagers, for example a 15 or 16 year old as part of consensual relationship would share sexual imagery and potentially find themselves being criminalised.

¹ HOM003278 - for info only

39. Statistics contained in the 'Online Harms White Paper' suggest that between 26% and 38% of 14 to 17 year olds have sent sexual images to a partner, and between 12% and 49% have received a sexual image.
40. Chief Constable Simon Bailey, the NPCC lead for Child Protection and Abuse Investigations, gave evidence about the introduction of 'Outcome 21'. Outcome 21 is used in cases where sexual imagery is exchanged between teenagers and allows the police to record that a crime has been committed but ensures that the teenager who created or shared the image is not prosecuted. There are specific criteria that need to be met before Outcome 21 can be utilised, for example if the sharing of the imagery is used to blackmail the victim, then Outcome 21 cannot be used.
41. One of the areas you may wish to consider is what advice/guidance is being taught in schools and we will consider during the course of the evidence the briefing paper providing advice to schools for dealing with self generated imagery and, more generally, the Department for Education's draft guidance for 'Relationships Education, Relationships and Sex Education and Health Education.'

Grooming

42. As the NSPCC figures demonstrate in relation to the offence of sending a sexual communication to a child, the grooming of children online remains a very real and significant concern.
43. Tomorrow, you will hear accounts read from IN- A1 and IN-A2. A1 and A2 are brother and sister who were groomed by a 57 year old man called Anthony O'Connor who is now serving a 14 year prison sentence for his offending. O'Connor duped IN-A1 into having contact with him by pretending initially to be a 22 year old woman, called Susan. IN-A1 was 13 years old at the time;

she suffered with depression and, initially, Susan seemed nice and interested in A1 and her hobbies. IN-A1 introduced Susan to her younger brother IN-A2.

44. Susan's control over IN-A1 grew over time and such that when he revealed he was a man, IN-A1 was not able to break contact with him (which was mainly conducted over Skype). He began to threaten IN-A1 telling her that if she did not do as he asked, her family, including her younger brother, would get hurt. Eventually, he made IN-A2 (who was just 12 years old at the time) sexually touch his sister and even went as far as to suggest that IN-A2 should have sexual intercourse with his sister. After this incident, he told IN-A1 that she was his slave.

45. He told IN-A1 that he had photos of her and her family and that he had deleted the images. For a short period of time, she tried to stop contact, but then he got in touch to say that because she had ignored him, he hadn't really deleted the photographs. It is hardly surprising therefore that the Judge referred to his behaviour towards IN-A1 as "the grossest manipulation".

46. The impact of O'Connor's abuse can hardly be overstated. IN-A1's mental health has deteriorated, she has self harmed and has been admitted to hospital on occasion. IN-A2 suffers mood swings and night terrors. He finds it difficult to leave the house on his own and is highly suspicious of all unknown men. You will hear evidence from the siblings' mother who describes the "terrible impact" this has had on the family and how her children "both lost their childhood".

47. In relation to grooming, and online CSA more generally, the 2018 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy set out the Government's expectations of companies - **show on screen HOM003253_030.**

48. In November 2018, the Home Secretary convened a 'Hackathon' in the USA at which a number of industry organisations were present including Microsoft,

Facebook, Google, Twitter and Snapchat. The focus of the event was to prevent grooming. Engineers from industry worked for 2 days analysing tens of thousands of conversations to understand patterns used by perpetrators and to help develop technology which will automatically detect these patterns.

Live streaming

49. Detecting live streaming is, perhaps, the most significant challenge when it comes to responding to online facilitated CSA. Much of the abuse that is live streamed emanates from South East Asia with the footage being watched by a remote offender who is paying to view the abuse and sometimes even directs the abuse.

50. However, in 2018, the IWF, assisted by funding from Microsoft, published research examining the distribution of captures of live streamed CSA². The research found that more commonly encountered live streaming involved white girls, from seemingly comfortable Western backgrounds, often filmed in a home setting e.g. a bedroom. It would be wrong therefore to assume that live streaming is not a problem facing children in England and Wales.

51. You will hear evidence, that in respect of both grooming and live streaming, a key part of the response is the education of children to try and protect them and prevent them from being drawn into these forms of harm.

Research

52. As part of the Internet Investigation, the Inquiry has commissioned research from the University of Bedfordshire to explore children's perspectives about

² For info only IWF000010

being online, the risks of online sexual harm and what they thought about the education they had received and should receive. The final report will be published later this year but the preliminary findings have enabled the Inquiry to hear from children who participated in the research surveys and interviews. The research covered children in both primary and secondary schools within age range 10-18. The researchers were told that the move from primary school to secondary school marked a big step in children's lives, particularly their online lives, as the move to secondary school often marked the first time they had their own mobile phone. This echoes the Ofcom findings that 83% of 12-15 year olds had their own smartphone.

53. Inevitably, any research in this area, could never encompass every child in every school in England and Wales but the following initial findings have emerged:

- Children feel very strongly that being online is a positive feature of their lives - they consider that adults focus too much on the negative aspects of online activity not the positive. They consider that adults don't really understand children's online lives. Wanting 'likes', being part of communities, widening social circles is more of a lure than utilising the privacy settings;
- Children are taught and know not to talk to strangers but their response is 'but adults do';
- Children said that they know what the harms are - sexual, fake news, bullying, fraud and they know about this from as early as age 8/9, BUT that there was a gap between them saying 'I've heard about it' and really understanding what it means.
- This gap between the 'I've heard about it/I've learnt about it' and understanding what it really means is perhaps best exemplified by the

discussions the researchers had surrounding children's understanding of what is appropriate sexual activity and what is inappropriate and/or illegal and/or abusive sexual activity online. The research indicates that there may be a blurred understanding between consensual sharing of sexual photographs amongst teenagers and what is actually illegal.

- Children expressed a desire to learn more about why online CSA happens, the different forms it takes, how to identify it and what to do if it happens.
- The participants relayed a fear about what happens after reporting - they know how to report, but what happens thereafter? What are the consequences?
- The participants were asked what else should be done to help protect children. 83% of the secondary survey participants thought that online sites ought to do more to limit opportunities for risk e.g. limiting who can communicate with a user.³

Summary of Industry witnesses

54. Over the course of week one of this phase of the Investigation you will be hearing from a number of key industry organisations, including from Facebook, Apple, Google, Microsoft, BT and KIK. Inevitably, it is not possible or practicable to call every single organisation within industry and to consider, in detail, their response to online facilitated CSA. However, the witnesses who are giving evidence will be able to provide evidence on a number of key topics including:

³ FYI - see also page 87 of the White Paper

- Who has access to their services; the applicable age limits as far as children are concerned; parental controls; how reports of CSAM are made; the scale of CSAM on their service and how the company is structured to deal with this material; where applicable, any transparency reports published by the company;
- Prevention and Detection of CSAM, including any technology that has been or is being developed;
- Engagement with Law Enforcement inc responding to requests for data and preservation of data;
- Funding and support they may provide to third sector organisations, for research into educational programmes;
- To comment upon law enforcement's '3 asks' of industry. In 2018, the Director of the NCA gave evidence before both the Home Affairs Select Committee and the House of Lords Select Committee and identified 3 key asks of industry:
 - To develop pre-screening/pre filtering for known images and material thereby preventing known images being uploaded and downloaded;
 - Kitemarking those industry platforms who have the appropriate safeguards in place to protect children;
 - Industry members to ring-fence a proportion of their research and development budgets to designing safeguards into all their products.

Government response

55. The second week of the public hearing will examine how law enforcement interacts with Industry and go on to consider the Government's response to online facilitated CSA.

56. You may recall the evidence given in phase 1 of the hearing about the introduction of age verification requirements in the Digital Economy Act 2017. The Act is due to come into force in July this year and will require providers of online pornography to carry out age verification checks to ensure that users are 18 or over. Websites that fail to implement age verification technology may face having payment services withdrawn or the websites being blocked to UK users.

57. In April this year, the Government published its 'Online Harms White Paper' which sets out the Government's proposals for tackling online content or activity that harms users, particularly children. The paper acknowledges that, alongside combating terrorist activity, one of the most serious threats to children is the harm caused by online CSEA.

58. One of the main proposals is the establishment of a new regulatory framework for online safety underpinned by a statutory duty of care to make companies take more responsibility for the safety of their users and to tackle the harm caused by content or activity.

- An independent regulator will oversee and enforce compliance with the duty of care.
- The regulator will establish codes of practice which set out how the company is to fulfill its duty of care and in respect of online CSEA the Government proposes that the Government will have the power to direct the regulator in respect of the online CSEA codes of practice and that these codes must be signed off by the Home Secretary.
- The paper envisages that interim codes in respect of tackling terrorist and online CSEA activity will be published later this year. As the paper states *"For the most serious online offending such as CSEA and terrorism, we will expect companies to go much further and demonstrate steps taken to combat dissemination of associated content and illegal behaviours."*

59. In addition to hearing from the Home Office, evidence will be read from Dark Justice - an online organisation whose aim is to uncover those who groom children over the internet. You will also hear from witnesses from third sector organisations - John Carr OBE and Tony Stower. For a number of years now, John Carr has been heavily involved in work surrounding children's safety online and he is a member of the Children's Charities Coalition on Internet Safety and was formerly on the board of the IWF. Tony Stower is the Head of Child Safety Online at the NSPCC. Both witnesses may help to provide a different perspective on the efficacy of the response to online facilitated CSA.

Conclusion

60. One of the matters you may wish to consider when looking at the seeming increase in imagery and grooming offences, at the increase in the number of URLs taken down, at the increase in the number of images on CAID and increase in the number of hashes and keywords included in the IWF lists, is whether this indicates that the detection of online CSA has improved and/or whether it demonstrates an increase in the number of perpetrators intent on causing children harm.

61. It may be that the response to online facilitated CSA continues to progress and evolve but for all the efforts of law enforcement, industry and the UK government, the response does little to address the underlying problem namely that there still seems to exist a significant proportion of the population who have a desire to access such imagery and a desire to sexually groom and abuse a child.

62. Chair, it may be unrealistic and beyond the remit of this Investigation to begin to attempt to identify, and tackle the root causes of why a perpetrator wants to act in this way. One may need to ensure therefore that children's

understanding of online sexual harm, and their resilience to it, merits careful consideration by the Inquiry, not just in this Investigation but across the work of the Inquiry as a whole.

63. I finish with a focus on children because as you have heard, and as you will hear over the course of this public hearing, children as we speak are being abused online and are suffering the ongoing effects of online harm. You will doubtless recall Breck Bednar's story that his mother, Lorin La Fave, spoke about in the earlier hearing. How Breck, aged 14, was manipulated and groomed online by an 18 year old masquerading as a successful businessman and tech entrepreneur and how he was murdered when he went to meet up with his abuser.

64. In the IWF's 2018 annual report, reference is made to a young girl called Olivia. In 2013, Olivia, then aged 8, was rescued by police thereby bringing to an end 5 years of sexual abuse. She was raped, tortured and images and videos taken of this abuse. Her abuser was imprisoned but that has not brought matters to an end. On a daily basis the IWF see images of Olivia. Over a 3 month period, they counted the number of times they saw Olivia's image online - it was 347 times. An average of 5 times a day. This repeat victimisation is a constant and ever present worry for those victims who were either groomed into taking photos of themselves or who had such imagery captured when they were being physically abused.

65. You will hear from IN-A3 herself and the mother of IN-A1 and A2 about the harm that their abuse has caused them, how it blighted their childhoods and continues to affect their daily lives.

66. It is important, in my submission, to not lose sight of why the Inquiry was established - to ensure that children get the care and protection they need and deserve, now and in the future. To that end, it is hoped that by the end of the public hearings next week, the Inquiry will be better informed as to the

work being done to respond to, and combat, online facilitated CSA and be better able to consider the adequacy of this response and any steps which may be needed in the future to protect children from online harm.

67. Chair, you may now want to invite core participants to make their opening statements.

JACQUELINE CAREY
EESVAN KRISHNAN

XX May 2019