

1 Tuesday, 14 May 2019
 2 (10.30 am)
 3 (In Open Session)
 4 THE CHAIR: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to Day 2 of
 5 this two-week public hearing.
 6 Ms Carey?
 7 MS CAREY: Thank you, chair. We're firstly going to hear
 8 this morning from IN-H1. I ask that she now be sworn,
 9 please.
 10 WITNESS IN-H1 (affirmed)
 11 (Evidence given via videolink)
 12 Examination by MS CAREY
 13 MS CAREY: IN-H1, good morning. I'm going to ask you some
 14 questions, please, about your witness statement that
 15 I hope you have in front of you.
 16 **A. I do.**
 17 Q. I think, as you know, we're going to refer to your son
 18 and daughter as IN-A1 and IN-A2.
 19 **A. I do.**
 20 Q. If it helps you, rather than give their name, if you
 21 want to just say "My son said this" or "My daughter said
 22 that", then that's absolutely fine; all right?
 23 **A. Thank you.**
 24 Q. Before we turn to hearing what you have to say about how
 25 you found out about what happened to them, I just want

Page 1

1 why she went on BearShare. So we know a little bit
 2 about her background.
 3 **A. (Nodded assent).**
 4 Q. Your son is your youngest son; is that right?
 5 **A. He is, yes.**
 6 Q. He suffers from ADHD and learning difficulties?
 7 **A. He does.**
 8 Q. I think you said that you had to fight to get
 9 a statement of educational needs for him when he was
 10 young?
 11 **A. I did, yes, I had to fight for everything, yes.**
 12 Q. Okay.
 13 So that's just a little bit of a background to your
 14 two children.
 15 What I'd like to ask you about is laptops and the
 16 access that they had to them. Is this right, I think in
 17 Christmas 2010, you and your partner got both your son
 18 and daughter laptops as their Christmas presents; is
 19 that right?
 20 **A. We did, yes.**
 21 Q. At that time, both of them, I think, were under 13 years
 22 of age?
 23 **A. Yes.**
 24 Q. Did you also have any other computers in the house?
 25 **A. We had a computer in the front room, yes.**

Page 3

1 to ask you a little bit about your two children,
 2 starting with your daughter, please, and at
 3 paragraph 20, chair, in the witness statement.
 4 IN-H1, is this right? That, sadly, your daughter,
 5 when she was younger, aged 5, was sexually abused
 6 herself at that age?
 7 **A. She was.**
 8 Q. I think it happened at a time when you were away for
 9 a week and it was whilst you were away that the abuse
 10 happened?
 11 **A. It did.**
 12 Q. I think the person that did that was arrested but
 13 nothing further happened to him; is that right?
 14 **A. Yes, that's true.**
 15 Q. And as well as dealing with that, your daughter was
 16 bullied at school, she became a little bit of a bully,
 17 you said; is that right?
 18 **A. Yes, that's true.**
 19 Q. In due course, we're going to come on to hear about how
 20 what Mr O'Connor did to her affected her, but she was
 21 a very vulnerable young girl, wasn't she?
 22 **A. She was.**
 23 Q. So that you know, H1, the chair and panel heard her
 24 statement read out yesterday, in which she said to them
 25 that she was depressed and that was one of the reasons

Page 2

1 Q. Had they used that before they got their laptops?
 2 **A. They did, but there was always arguments because they**
 3 **both wanted to use it at the same time, hence why we got**
 4 **them the laptops.**
 5 Q. Right. Just thinking back to when they got their
 6 laptops, did you have any rules in the house as to how
 7 long they could go on the laptops for?
 8 **A. Yes, they used the laptops after school for doing their**
 9 **homework and research and for music, then, when it**
 10 **was -- about an hour before bedtime, the laptops were**
 11 **turned off and put in the front room.**
 12 Q. Right. So you didn't allow them to have their laptops
 13 in the bedroom?
 14 **A. No, no.**
 15 Q. Did you set any rules about the kind of things they
 16 could use the laptops for?
 17 **A. Yes, they was only supposed to use it for their homework**
 18 **and for music. They were told not to go into any chat**
 19 **rooms, not to do anything that -- you know, I told them**
 20 **about what happened on the internet and, you know, that**
 21 **it's not safe always. They had all the protection on**
 22 **there that they needed and their -- their history was**
 23 **looked at all the time.**
 24 Q. Okay. Who looked at their history, was that you or was
 25 that your partner?

Page 4

1 **A. My partner, because he is more educated than me.**
 2 Q. All right.
 3 You just told us that they weren't allowed their
 4 laptops in their bedroom at night, but is it --
 5 **A. No.**
 6 Q. -- right that sometimes they would come downstairs at
 7 night and use them whilst you were asleep?
 8 **A. Yes.**
 9 Q. Yes.
 10 **A. Yeah, yeah, that happened, yes.**
 11 Q. Do you know what your son and daughter were taught at
 12 school about online safety?
 13 **A. No.**
 14 Q. You didn't get any leaflets coming home saying, "The
 15 kids are gonna learn this tomorrow, or that next week"
 16 or anything like that?
 17 **A. No.**
 18 Q. Did they ever tell you about a lesson they'd had that
 19 taught them about online safety?
 20 **A. No.**
 21 Q. And what about you, yourself, had you ever had any
 22 education about online safety?
 23 **A. No, I didn't have any education, but it's obvious**
 24 **there's gonna be stuff on there that's wrong, because**
 25 **look at the world we live in, you know.**

Page 5

1 **A. And I -- yeah -- I opened the file and it took me to**
 2 **a site called BearShare.**
 3 Q. Was he still logged into that site?
 4 **A. He was, yes --**
 5 Q. So you could --
 6 **A. -- that (overspeaking) --**
 7 Q. Yes, so you could see what he was looking at?
 8 **A. Yes.**
 9 Q. When you looked at that BearShare website, what did you
 10 actually see?
 11 **A. There was lots of people he was trying to add, there**
 12 **were rude photographs and pictures and -- and it just**
 13 **didn't look like a site he should've been on.**
 14 Q. When you say "rude pictures", was that of adults or
 15 children?
 16 **A. Adults, you know, people that was trying to add him.**
 17 Q. Right. As you were looking at what he'd been viewing,
 18 did a box pop up on that website?
 19 **A. Yes, a box popped up asking who this is.**
 20 Q. Right. So what did you do when the box popped up?
 21 **A. I asked who they were. At the time, I heard my daughter**
 22 **leave her bedroom and go and check on her brother and**
 23 **then a message come back saying, "Who the hell is this?**
 24 **Because I know it's not my brother, because he's in**
 25 **bed", so I put "Mum", I put "Mum", and I told my**

Page 7

1 Q. So you set the rules. Occasionally, the children broke
 2 them?
 3 **A. Yes.**
 4 Q. But, essentially, you were trying to use their laptops
 5 to help them with their homework, education, that kind
 6 of thing?
 7 **A. Yes.**
 8 Q. All right.
 9 Now, I'd like to ask you a little bit about a couple
 10 of years later and April 2012. And I'm looking, chair,
 11 now at paragraph 2 onwards in the statement.
 12 I just want to deal with how you came to find out
 13 about what had been happening to them; all right?
 14 **A. Okay.**
 15 Q. Now, I understand that it was on 9 April 2012 that you
 16 woke up early one morning because you couldn't sleep?
 17 **A. I did, yes.**
 18 Q. What time are we talking about?
 19 **A. It was about three or four in the morning.**
 20 Q. Did you then decide to go onto your son's laptop in your
 21 bedroom?
 22 **A. I did, yes.**
 23 Q. When you looked at his laptop, what did you find, H1?
 24 **A. I found a file marked "stuff".**
 25 Q. Stuff.

Page 6

1 **daughter to -- to come and see me --**
 2 Q. Right.
 3 **A. -- with her laptop.**
 4 Q. With her laptop, okay, so now you had both your son and
 5 your daughter's laptop?
 6 **A. Yes.**
 7 Q. When she came in to see you, did you ask her what the
 8 BearShare website was?
 9 **A. I did, yes. She said it was a music site.**
 10 Q. Was that something you knew that she'd been looking at
 11 or that your son had been looking at?
 12 **A. No.**
 13 Q. So this came as a bit of a surprise to you, I suspect?
 14 **A. A big shock.**
 15 Q. And I think then, did your partner get involved, and he
 16 started checking --
 17 **A. Yes.**
 18 Q. -- your son's computer; is that right?
 19 **A. He did, yes.**
 20 Q. And I think your partner told you that in fact he had
 21 previously deleted BearShare from the computer a couple
 22 of months ago?
 23 **A. He did, yes. He did, yes.**
 24 Q. But, obviously, one or other of them had got back on to
 25 BearShare then, by the looks of things?

Page 8

1 **A. Yes, they did.**
 2 Q. Now did your partner then start looking at your
 3 daughter's computer and reading some of the messages?
 4 **A. I gave the laptop to my partner because he's more -- he**
 5 **can read and write better than me, so he was sat there**
 6 **reading it. And he wasn't very impressed with what he**
 7 **saw.**
 8 Q. No.
 9 **A. It was very -- very rude, very disgusting.**
 10 Q. Yes. There were sexual messages, were they?
 11 **A. Lots.**
 12 Q. All right. And I think the messages were coming from
 13 someone who called themselves "Susan", but we now know
 14 was in fact a man called Anthony O'Connor?
 15 **A. That's correct.**
 16 Q. Were there also messages from other people but the
 17 content of those other messages was not sexual?
 18 **A. That's correct, yes.**
 19 Q. As all the checking of the computer was going on, did
 20 a message pop up from Susan?
 21 **A. A message did, yes, she wanted to know if they was going**
 22 **to talk.**
 23 Q. Right. And I think your partner messaged back, "Who is
 24 this?" Is that right?
 25 **A. He did, yes.**

Page 9

1 officers came, in fact, to your house later that
 2 morning?
 3 **A. Yes, they did.**
 4 Q. And one of the officers looked at your daughter's
 5 computer, and looked at the kind of messages that had
 6 been saved on there.
 7 **A. (Nodded assent).**
 8 Q. Did your daughter want to talk to the police about what
 9 had happened to her?
 10 **A. No, she didn't, she didn't want to talk about anyone,**
 11 **she was -- she just wanted to curl up and disappear.**
 12 Q. At that point when the police were there, did you know
 13 the precise detail of what had happened between your
 14 daughter and Susan and your son?
 15 **A. No.**
 16 Q. No. Did you know that something had happened?
 17 **A. I knew that something had happened, but I didn't know**
 18 **the full extent of what happened.**
 19 Q. All right.
 20 I think, did your son also talk to the police?
 21 **A. Yes, my son turned around and told the police that he**
 22 **made them do things, he made them touch each other in**
 23 **places they shouldn't have done.**
 24 Q. Right. All right. We heard yesterday from themselves
 25 about what happened, so I'm not going to ask you about

Page 11

1 Q. And Susan wanted to know who they were messaging, and
 2 your partner ended up telling Susan, "It's the
 3 children's dad that's online". Is that right?
 4 **A. He did, yes, but the person didn't believe him.**
 5 Q. Yes. Well, that's what I was going to ask you about.
 6 So when Susan found out that the partner, your partner,
 7 was online, how did Susan react?
 8 **A. Not very nice, he used words like, "Temper, temper",**
 9 **"Talk about incest, your children have shamed you good",**
 10 **he was a very nasty, manipulative -- he turned my**
 11 **children against me.**
 12 Q. Yes.
 13 **A. They didn't trust me because of this person.**
 14 Q. Yes, well, we're going to come on, H1, to look at the
 15 effect it's had on your two children, but did Susan --
 16 I think, did your partner accuse Susan of being
 17 a paedophile and then Susan messaged back accusing your
 18 son of being a paedophile?
 19 **A. He did, yes.**
 20 Q. So hearing Susan talk like that about your children and
 21 seeing those messages, did you and your partner decide
 22 that the police should be involved?
 23 **A. Oh, yes, I phoned the police straight away. Yes.**
 24 Q. All right.
 25 I think, if we look at your paragraph 7 onwards, the

Page 10

1 that, H1.
 2 But just finishing off dealing with the police, did
 3 you say this in your statement, that you actually spoke
 4 very highly of how the police officers were involved in
 5 your case, and how they responded once they'd found out
 6 what had happened?
 7 **A. They were amazing. The police -- all the police**
 8 **involved, they were all amazing, yes.**
 9 Q. We know that in due course Mr O'Connor received
 10 a sentence of over 14 years for what he did to both your
 11 children -- all right? --
 12 **A. He did.**
 13 Q. -- so I won't ask you any more about that.
 14 **A. Okay.**
 15 Q. I'd like to ask you just a little bit, though, about the
 16 impact that the abuse has had on both your children.
 17 Shall I break them down? Just firstly --
 18 **A. Please.**
 19 Q. -- in your own words, H1, just tell us how this has
 20 impacted on your daughter?
 21 **A. My daughter's terrified of everybody. She started**
 22 **self-harming, overdosing, starving herself, she wouldn't**
 23 **leave the house. She was aggressive, violent. She --**
 24 **she didn't want to be around me or talk to me. She**
 25 **couldn't handle -- she couldn't handle anything.**

Page 12

1 She overdosed about 20/30 times. She has scars all
 2 over her body from self-harming. And she don't trust
 3 people, she don't trust anyone. I mean, I'm lucky,
 4 because she trusts me now, again, but from what that
 5 person did to my kid, he turned my children against me.
 6 And they lost -- they lost -- they lost everything.
 7 And if you haven't been through this, you have got
 8 no idea of the impact on the whole family or how it --
 9 it -- it's -- it's horrific. It is --
 10 Q. Just pause yourself there for a moment.
 11 Obviously, these things happened now some many years
 12 ago, and it's 7 years since you found out what had
 13 happened. How is your daughter getting on now? She's
 14 in her early twenties, is it still having an impact on
 15 her?
 16 A. She still doesn't trust people. She doesn't like going
 17 out. She doesn't like being by herself. She just --
 18 she -- she just hates the world --
 19 Q. Yes.
 20 A. -- because of what had happened, she ...
 21 Q. It's difficult. All right. Well, let me ask you
 22 a little bit about your son, who is a couple of years
 23 younger. How did he react and what kind of impact did
 24 it have on him when this all came out?
 25 A. My son, he was very distant, he wouldn't -- wouldn't go

Page 13

1 Q. He's gone inwards, all right.
 2 Now, you told us a moment ago that, actually, you
 3 thought very highly of how the police dealt with you.
 4 Can I just ask you a little bit about the Criminal
 5 Injuries Compensation Authority, the CICA, as we call
 6 them. Did both your children make claims for
 7 compensation arising out of what had happened?
 8 A. They did, yes.
 9 Q. Is it right that they have been refused compensation, as
 10 far as you understand it?
 11 A. They've been refused compensation because the incident
 12 didn't take place face-to-face.
 13 Q. Yes.
 14 A. Apparently, it -- it -- yeah, they are still asking for
 15 evidence.
 16 Q. Right, so the claims are ongoing, are they?
 17 A. And -- the claims are ongoing. They're still asking for
 18 medical evidence when they've got all the evidence they
 19 need to give my children compensation.
 20 But because it didn't happen in the same room, they
 21 don't think they warrant compensation, and I think it's
 22 disgusting how my two children are being treated.
 23 Q. All right.
 24 Well, that brings me on to the final topic, H1, and
 25 just looking at your paragraph 24, and perhaps trying to

Page 15

1 anywhere unless [redacted] was with him. If [redacted]
 2 was going -- sorry.
 3 MS CAREY: Can I pause you there? It's not a problem. Just
 4 stay there for one moment, H1. We'll just take a break
 5 with the live link and then I'll come back to you in one
 6 moment.
 7 (Pause)
 8 MS CAREY: Chair, may I ask that you make a restriction
 9 order covering the partner's name?
 10 H1, don't worry; all right?
 11 You were telling us a little bit about your son,
 12 though, and the terrible impact this has had on him.
 13 How is he doing now?
 14 A. He is -- he is very vulnerable. He's always been very
 15 vulnerable. He -- he's very quiet. He -- he just wants
 16 to forget it ever happened.
 17 He is -- he just distances himself from everybody,
 18 he doesn't trust people. He clings to his dad a lot,
 19 because he knows he's protected -- do you know what
 20 I mean?
 21 Q. Yes.
 22 A. But he doesn't -- he doesn't like being around people.
 23 He suffers really bad with anxiety if he's in a crowd.
 24 Q. Okay. That --
 25 A. He just went inwards.

Page 14

1 think about what we could do in the future to try and
 2 prevent something like this happening to anyone else's
 3 children.
 4 I would just like your evidence, please, on what you
 5 think should be done, perhaps, to educate people better,
 6 and to stop this kind of thing happening. Are you able
 7 to help us with that?
 8 A. I am, yes.
 9 I feel very strongly that the people who created the
 10 websites or the chat room should take responsibility for
 11 that. It's -- it's -- it's -- they've created it, it's
 12 their baby, you know? It's just like having a child,
 13 you're responsible for that child. They should be
 14 maintaining it, they should be making sure everybody who
 15 is in there is safe, everyone whose in there is age
 16 appropriate. And not only that, if -- you know, it's --
 17 it's -- it's their thing that they've created, they
 18 should be the ones paying the compensation to my
 19 children, because it's not the ICA that govern, it's the
 20 internet and, because of the internet, I failed as
 21 a parent, and that is their fault. That isn't my fault,
 22 that's theirs, because my children were at home, in
 23 their rooms, in their house where they were safe, but
 24 because of the internet and all this stuff that's out
 25 there, they weren't safe.

Page 16

1 **And because of what I went through as a child, the**
2 **only thing I wanted to do was be a perfect -- you know,**
3 **the best mother in the world -- right? -- and look after**
4 **my kids. And I did that. But because of the internet,**
5 **they made me fail as a parent and, unless you have been**
6 **through this, you've got no idea how that impacts on**
7 **you.**
8 **And it's their -- it's their responsibility to look**
9 **after it, it should be their responsibility to pay**
10 **compensation for anything that goes wrong, and not only**
11 **that, it should be their responsibility to get my kids**
12 **the help and support they need to get through this**
13 **because, if they created the problem, they should fix**
14 **it.**
15 Q. All right. Can I pause you there, because I'm sure that
16 the chair and panel will listen to what you've just said
17 and I just want to ask you about one other thing.
18 You said in that paragraph that you thought there
19 should be more and better education for children and
20 parents. I wanted to ask you, from your perspective, is
21 there anything that you would like to have been told to
22 try and help keep your children safe?
23 **A. Well, all the safety stuff that my kids had on the**
24 **computer, this nasty person showed them a way around**
25 **that so I couldn't see what was going on.**

Page 17

1 that concludes your evidence this morning.
2 Chair, may I ask that we take a short pause now
3 while we rearrange the room and move on to some other
4 evidence? Thank you very much.
5 THE CHAIR: Yes.
6 (10.55 am)
7 (A short break)
8 (11.10 am)
9 MS CAREY: Chair, we're turning to the first of our
10 witnesses from industry. Can I ask please the witness
11 is sworn.
12 MS JULIE DE BAILLIENCOURT (affirmed)
13 Examination by MS CAREY
14 MS CAREY: Your full name for the inquiry, please?
15 **A. I am Julie de Baillencourt.**
16 Q. Ms de Baillencourt, I hope you have in front of you
17 a bundle containing your statement and a number of
18 exhibits we're going to look at. Exhibits are also
19 going to be put up on the screen next to you, if it's
20 easier to have your statement in front of you and look
21 at the exhibits off the screen.
22 Can I start please with your role in Facebook, what
23 is your official title with the company?
24 **A. My current official title is senior manager for the**
25 **global operations team.**

Page 19

1 **So there needs to be more security and parents and**
2 **children need educating on the security, but it needs to**
3 **be a security that can't be tampered with, you know,**
4 **because when your children are at home, you should be**
5 **safe.**
6 **All these bad people out there that want to hurt**
7 **kids, they know -- they know the ways around all -- you**
8 **know, they know how to manipulate the children so that**
9 **children do stuff and they know how to create back doors**
10 **into the internet and, you know, to hide what the**
11 **children are doing from the parents.**
12 **So a lot -- lots of protection needs to be put into**
13 **place, but protection that can't be messed up, that**
14 **can't be messed with --**
15 Q. All right.
16 **A. -- you know?**
17 MS CAREY: H1, thank you very much. That's all the
18 questions that I wanted to ask you this morning. Just
19 wait there, though, and I'll see if either the chair or
20 any of the panel have any questions?
21 THE CHAIR: No, we have no questions, but I would like to
22 thank the witness very much. We're grateful for your
23 evidence and especially for your thoughts about how
24 things could be improved. Thank you.
25 MS CAREY: Thank you very much. H1, thank you very much,

Page 18

1 Q. I think, at the time you made your statement, you were
2 what was described as the global safety policy manager,
3 is that a slightly different role to the one that you're
4 now currently in?
5 **A. It is slightly different organisation within Facebook.**
6 Q. You've been working for Facebook since June 2010 and are
7 based in their office in Dublin?
8 **A. That's true.**
9 Q. Prior to starting your work with Facebook, did you have
10 any previous work experience that was related to online
11 safety?
12 **A. Yes. Some online safety exposure, primarily around**
13 **mental wellbeing and suicide prevention, but none**
14 **specifically on child safety.**
15 Q. And none specifically on child sex abuse?
16 **A. No.**
17 Q. Can you help us, please, with a summary of what your
18 role entails?
19 **A. My past role or my current role?**
20 Q. Well, I'm using your statement from December 2018 and it
21 might be easier to deal with what you did when you
22 prepared the statement and then you can update it with
23 any other evidence you wish to give.
24 **A. Sure.**
25 **In my past role, I was the global safety policy**

Page 20

1 **manager for Facebook, primarily engaging with experts,**
 2 **with NGOs as well as internal teams, engineering teams,**
 3 **content policy, product policy and others on a number of**
 4 **topics, including child safety, women's safety and**
 5 **suicide prevention.**
 6 Q. I think you said that, prior to working on the safety
 7 policy, you spent almost five years managing a number of
 8 the community operations teams, which we're going to
 9 come on to look at in Dublin and you were part of the
 10 core team that helped set up PhotoDNA on Facebook in
 11 2011?
 12 **A. That's correct.**
 13 Q. Again, we're going to look at PhotoDNA a little bit
 14 later on.
 15 Some background, please, about Facebook for those
 16 who don't know. It was founded in 2004. Can you help
 17 with the number of UK people using Facebook every month?
 18 **A. Sure, the number that I have is an approximate number,**
 19 **about 40 million users in the UK.**
 20 Q. So that we're clear, is that 40 million separate
 21 Facebook accounts?
 22 **A. Mm --**
 23 Q. Or are accounts and users two different things?
 24 **A. They may be two different things. According to our**
 25 **terms of use and our policy, we strongly recommend that**

Page 21

1 the world using Facebook?
 2 **A. That's correct.**
 3 Q. May we start with how you create an account. I'm
 4 looking at your paragraph 3.1 and perhaps can we firstly
 5 deal with who is not allowed to have an account?
 6 **A. Sure. Our terms of use in our policies define that you**
 7 **must be over the age of 13 to create an account. It's**
 8 **something that we are enforcing as much as possible.**
 9 **Other members of the public who may not create**
 10 **an account include registered and convicted sex**
 11 **offenders.**
 12 Q. I'd like to look at both of those groups in turn --
 13 **A. Sure.**
 14 Q. -- please, but to have an account with Facebook, is it
 15 a requirement that they -- the user provides accurate
 16 information about themselves?
 17 **A. Yes. We -- one of our core policies is the fact that we**
 18 **expect people to come and connect using the -- the name**
 19 **that is known to their friends and family, so we have**
 20 **a strong focus on authenticity of -- of one's account,**
 21 **so we do expect, when people come and connect, that they**
 22 **create an account using the name that is known and, you**
 23 **know, real information.**
 24 Q. Right. Can I ask, please, that you look behind tab B,
 25 divider 1, and can we call up on screen FBK000005_003.

Page 23

1 **people only have one account.**
 2 **But, yes, when we say "users", we would count**
 3 **a person coming to Facebook to connect with their**
 4 **friends and family.**
 5 Q. I think Facebook is what you describe as "home to
 6 a family of applications", obviously Facebook itself,
 7 Instagram, Messenger and WhatsApp?
 8 **A. Yes, that's correct.**
 9 Q. In terms of employees, does Facebook have a base in the
 10 UK?
 11 **A. We do indeed, we have an office in London and I think**
 12 **the latest employee count is approximately 2,300**
 13 **full-time employees.**
 14 Q. At the time you wrote your statement, there was,
 15 I think, about 1,800 full-time employees and you said
 16 there were plans to increase the workforce to about the
 17 2,300. What brought about the decision to increase the
 18 workforce?
 19 **A. It's not necessarily information that I would have.**
 20 **I guess, as part of our growth in the UK, there's**
 21 **a constant investment in making sure that we have the**
 22 **right amount of staff across a number of teams and**
 23 **organisations.**
 24 Q. Turning to a wider context, I think you said in your
 25 statement there are more than 2 billion people all over

Page 22

1 Could we enlarge it a little, please?
 2 This is a page taken from the Facebook terms of
 3 service, and it sets out, at paragraph 3, those people
 4 who can use Facebook. I wonder if we can enlarge it
 5 slightly more? If not, we can use the hard copy in our
 6 bundle.
 7 Not the data policy, the next block down, please,
 8 thank you.
 9 According to the terms of service, someone who can
 10 use Facebook must use the same name that you use in
 11 everyday life, as we've just discussed, provide accurate
 12 information about yourself, create only one account and
 13 use your timeline for personal purposes, don't share
 14 your password ... but you cannot use Facebook if you're
 15 under 13, a convicted sex offender, have previously had
 16 your account disabled or you're prohibited from
 17 receiving products under applicable laws.
 18 When one tries to set up an account, where are those
 19 terms of service set out on the Facebook page?
 20 **A. I think, as part -- I haven't created an account in**
 21 **a while and I know we continuously improve the**
 22 **registration process. I understand that in order to**
 23 **complete the registration, you must confirm that you**
 24 **have read or abide by these terms.**
 25 Q. The sanction for breach of those terms of service, what

Page 24

1 sanction is there, if any?

2 **A. It depends based on the -- you know, the type of**

3 **behaviour that we see, but for these specifically, which**

4 **is holding an account if you're under the age of 13,**

5 **there would be a permanent deletion of the account and**

6 **immediate removal from the platform.**

7 Q. When one signs up to an account, the Facebook page asks

8 for a date of birth. And if a user tried to put in

9 a date of birth that made them under 13, would

10 an account be created?

11 **A. No. We have added some barriers and hurdles at the**

12 **registration point, both on mobile and on desktop, to**

13 **prevent people who may enter a date under the age of 13**

14 **from completing the registration.**

15 Q. What, though, prevents a user just putting in a false

16 date of birth to make themselves 13? How does Facebook

17 guard against that?

18 **A. It is possible that someone may create an account**

19 **evading some of our -- our technical hurdles and**

20 **successfully create the account; however, we do have**

21 **other means later on to try and detect, for example,**

22 **fake accounts. We do have, also, the ability for people**

23 **to report accounts that they believe would be**

24 **inauthentic or may have a fake name, so there's a human**

25 **review where our reviewers would look at these reports**

Page 25

1 of birth 1 January and makes them 12, they won't be

2 allowed an account; if, a minute later, they amend the

3 date of birth to 1 January and make themselves 13, will

4 they be able to set up the account if they've gone

5 through that process?

6 **A. No, they won't. There is a slightly different**

7 **mechanism, depending on which surface or device you use**

8 **to access the -- you know, the Facebook, but we would**

9 **put reasonable blocks in place to make sure that, once**

10 **we have this knowledge that they may be under the age of**

11 **13, that they won't be able to create the account, even**

12 **if they state, "Actually, I'm not 12, I'm 14".**

13 Q. In the scenario that I just posited, it was a very short

14 time span between the fake date of birth being put in

15 and the one that made them 13. What about if someone

16 came back a month or a year later and tried the same

17 tactic, is there any block put on by Facebook if there's

18 a large time span between the two accounts being set up?

19 **A. To the best of my knowledge, on desktop there is. Where**

20 **we're able to -- unless the person has cleared their**

21 **cache or their cookie, we're able to understand that**

22 **this is the same user trying to create an account and**

23 **potentially not giving correct information on their date**

24 **of birth.**

25 **On mobile, it might be a little bit more complex**

Page 27

1 **as well as a technical understanding of some of the**

2 **signals that we may know associated to be with fake**

3 **accounts.**

4 Q. What I am trying to understand is, what's to prevent

5 a 13 -- sorry a 12- or 11-year-old just making

6 themselves one or two years older, amending the date of

7 birth and ending up with a Facebook account when you're

8 trying to prohibit that, how are you practically dealing

9 with that probably everyday scenario?

10 **A. Yes, I think if they -- if this particular child manages**

11 **to evade some of the blockers that we have, both on**

12 **desktop and on mobile, it is possible that they would**

13 **succeed in creating this account.**

14 Q. So essentially, the provision of the date of birth is

15 dependent on the user being truthful?

16 **A. Yes.**

17 Q. When one puts in a date of birth to set up an account,

18 is there any method that Facebook uses to try and verify

19 the age of the person?

20 **A. At this point in time, no. However, if the first date**

21 **of birth entered by the person indicates that they are**

22 **volunteering the information that they are under the age**

23 **of 13, we will prevent them from creating the account**

24 **even if they come back to change this date of birth.**

25 Q. Right. So to give an example, if someone puts in a date

Page 26

1 **from a technical perspective, but I'm not sure how far**

2 **we go here.**

3 Q. Assuming the user has got through the age initial check,

4 does Facebook employ any way of determining whether that

5 data is accurate?

6 **A. I mean, yes. If -- if we look at names or -- or the --**

7 **I guess the pattern of behaviour associated with the**

8 **account, that may indicate that it is a fake account and**

9 **behaving like a fake account. Then our systems would**

10 **likely catch it. We've done some significant work here**

11 **in the last few years and are able to proactively remove**

12 **quite a large number of accounts on an ongoing basis**

13 **proactively. If we're looking purely as -- at the date**

14 **of birth, it would be difficult for us to differentiate**

15 **between a 14-year-old and a 12-year-old, near**

16 **impossible. That said, we are now taking some initial**

17 **steps in looking at technology to improve the**

18 **effectiveness of our mechanism to make sure that we can**

19 **provide young people with the experience that is**

20 **appropriate for their age.**

21 Q. At any stage in the process of setting up an account, is

22 the user required to provide any identification to

23 Facebook to verify that what they're putting in is

24 accurate?

25 **A. Not at this point in time, no.**

Page 28

1 Q. Do you know the number of accounts attempted to be set
 2 up by UK users who are in fact under 13?
 3 **A. I don't know this number. Because we have some**
 4 **technical hurdles preventing young people from creating**
 5 **an account, when we believe that they may be under the**
 6 **age of 13, so we have a number of blocks at this stage**
 7 **and we also have means for people to report those**
 8 **users -- so whether they are teachers or parents or**
 9 **family members -- we have a contact form in our help**
 10 **centre where people can come and flag those accounts to**
 11 **us.**
 12 Q. I think you're talking about reporting an underage child
 13 mechanisms?
 14 **A. Mm.**
 15 Q. Can we have a look, please, at tab 3 and at
 16 FBK000018_001.
 17 This is a screenshot, effectively, of the reporting
 18 page for someone who wants to report an underage user.
 19 I think you said in your statement that -- you see
 20 there, you just ask a couple of questions, "This will
 21 help us take action", so you want the URL, effectively
 22 the address of the Facebook website, the age of the
 23 child, any other details, and the contact email address
 24 of the person reporting it.
 25 Does that have to be filled in, the contact of the

Page 29

1 **permanently wipe out any data potentially related to the**
 2 **account of a child under the age of 13 quite swiftly.**
 3 **So when we remove an account from the platform, we**
 4 **remove any associated data with this. And I think this**
 5 **makes it quite difficult for us to -- you know, to get**
 6 **an idea of the scale.**
 7 Q. Can I break that down into a number of sections, please,
 8 because the deletion of the data may be one thing, but
 9 what I wanted to understand about is what Facebook does
 10 to understand the scale of the number of underage users
 11 and one of the ways of verifying that would be to know
 12 how many underage reports you received, for example.
 13 Why is that information not retained, irrespective
 14 of what the account actually shows, just the number of
 15 underage reports received?
 16 **A. I think, in the course of normal business, this is not**
 17 **something that we were retaining. And also, while I'm**
 18 **touching on the deletion procedures, they do have**
 19 **an impact on -- on what our team do, because we have**
 20 **committed to deleting those accounts really quickly.**
 21 That said, in the context of my preparation for this
 22 inquiry, we have been discussing internally whether this
 23 is something that would be useful and is something that
 24 some of our teams are looking into.
 25 Q. Presently, it sounds like there is no way of Facebook

Page 31

1 person reporting it?
 2 **A. It's a good question, I'm not 100 per cent sure. I'd**
 3 **imagine that for us to be able to come back to the**
 4 **person and maybe seek additional information, it would**
 5 **be useful to have this, but I'm not sure if it's**
 6 **a mandatory -- I think we can double-check and come back**
 7 **to you at a later stage today.**
 8 Q. It may be possible to anonymously report. Equally,
 9 there may be a parent, for example, who is reporting,
 10 who may want to know that you've taken action and
 11 deleted the account?
 12 **A. I believe, though, looking at the screen, that if it was**
 13 **a mandatory field, we would probably highlight it at**
 14 **this stage, but I'm not 100 per cent sure.**
 15 Q. In your statement, you say that the majority of underage
 16 reports are viewed and actioned within 24 hours.
 17 Do you keep data on how many underage reports you
 18 receive per annum from the UK?
 19 **A. We don't. I think because those reports -- well,**
 20 **because we can get a flag related to potential underage**
 21 **users through various means, so it can be through this**
 22 **contact form, it can be through the police or an NGO**
 23 **contacting us, it is difficult to keep a tab on this**
 24 **information. One of the hurdles that we have had is**
 25 **also that, under COPPA, Facebook is required to**

Page 30

1 knowing how big or small or whatever the scale is, the
 2 problem is, of underage users?
 3 **A. True, I think the numbers may not be accurate and**
 4 **I think we'd need to have further thoughts on how to**
 5 **aggregate this information and understand where all of**
 6 **the entry points for these reports, in order to provide**
 7 **accurate numbers, which we don't have as of today.**
 8 Q. You spoke a moment ago about the need for Facebook to
 9 delete the account and I just want to go over that
 10 please. Why is that a step that Facebook takes? Is
 11 that a legal requirement or a policy that Facebook
 12 itself has imposed?
 13 **A. I understand that this is a legal requirement.**
 14 Q. Do you know how quickly it is after receiving
 15 an underage report that the account is deleted?
 16 **A. I know that the review from our team related to these**
 17 **reports is very quick and swift. I gave the number of,**
 18 **you know, under 24 hours; I think it may be sooner in**
 19 **many instances. As for the deletion process, I know it**
 20 **is quick, but considering how information is stored on**
 21 **Facebook servers, I wouldn't be in a position to give**
 22 **an exact number on the time frame, but I know those are**
 23 **priority cases where we have to delete the information**
 24 **really quickly.**
 25 Q. I understand from your statement that a parent or legal

Page 32

1 guardian can request information from their child's
 2 account before you delete it by using what is called the
 3 child data request form.
 4 **A. Yes.**
 5 Q. Again, do you have any figure of how many request --
 6 child data request forms have been generated in the UK,
 7 for example, in the last year?
 8 **A. I don't. I was hoping to have some numbers to share**
 9 **with you, but I don't have these.**
 10 Q. So is that a figure that might be available?
 11 **A. I'm not sure. Again, as I was preparing for today's**
 12 **hearing, I was looking to see whether we could get this**
 13 **information, but I haven't got any conclusive**
 14 **confirmation that this is, one, tracked or, two, that**
 15 **the numbers would be accurate.**
 16 Q. May I ask you this at the outset. I'm obviously
 17 concentrating on data that emanates and relates to the
 18 UK. Do you know if these are the kind of statistics and
 19 reports that are available for other countries and that
 20 the UK is in a different category, or is it Facebook,
 21 across the board, can't say how many underage users
 22 there are worldwide?
 23 **A. These are across the board, so the UK is not in**
 24 **a separate category.**
 25 Q. If at any stage giving your evidence the UK does fall

Page 33

1 intelligence to see whether we can have a better,
 2 accurate -- accurate understanding of the age of users
 3 on our platform.
 4 I think this a huge component that is related to
 5 awareness, that these guidelines are in place and that
 6 accounts of children under the age of 13 will be
 7 permanently removed. We've done a lot of work with our
 8 partners on the safety side to share, you know, the fact
 9 that we do not allow this, and also make sure that
 10 parents and teachers and, indeed, other family members
 11 understand that they can report these to us.
 12 I do have to add as well, that in the course of our
 13 regular content review, if our reviewers have good
 14 reasons to believe that someone reported for something
 15 else, for example, may be under the age of 13, we also
 16 do have processes here to take action or try and get to
 17 the appropriate outcome.
 18 Q. You go on in your statement to deal with people using
 19 authentic -- their real identity and, occasionally,
 20 Facebook requests the identity to be verified. Can
 21 I ask you about that, please.
 22 Ordinarily, when setting up an account, we've just
 23 looked at the date of birth, does any other information
 24 need to be provided to verify that you are the person
 25 you say you are?

Page 35

1 into a separate category, will you let us know so we can
 2 deal with that as a separate topic?
 3 **A. I will indeed.**
 4 Q. So does it come to this, that, essentially, you're
 5 dependent on the user putting in accurate information,
 6 and that, at present, Facebook does not track how many
 7 underage reports they've got, be that from the underage
 8 reporting system, law enforcement or any other way you
 9 have of determining an underage user?
 10 **A. It is correct.**
 11 Q. I ask you about this, Ms de Bailliencourt, because the
 12 panel have already heard from a witness who simply
 13 subverted the process by just -- she was 12 and she set
 14 up an account by putting in a date of birth to say she
 15 was 13. She told us it took a matter of seconds.
 16 So although your terms of service say you can't be
 17 under 13, actually, the question is, what is Facebook
 18 doing to try to enforce that and ensure under
 19 13-year-olds don't have a Facebook account?
 20 **A. Yes, I think this is something that we have been**
 21 **thinking about for -- for quite some time. I'm not sure**
 22 **there is one -- one solution that would -- that would**
 23 **solve this. I think, as I've mentioned, from**
 24 **a technical perspective, we are in the early stage of**
 25 **using technology, such as machine learning or artificial**

Page 34

1 **A. Not in terms of the -- the authenticity of the account**
 2 **itself, until we get to such point where either our**
 3 **systems would flag that this is, you know, a fake**
 4 **account, or someone in our team would look at the**
 5 **account and believe that this may not be a real account,**
 6 **but a lot of this relies on the users telling us**
 7 **"I don't believe this person is using their real name",**
 8 **for example.**
 9 Q. Can you give us some examples of why it might be that
 10 Facebook may check a name against an ID and ask for the
 11 ID to be provided?
 12 **A. Sure. Well, I think when people contact us to say "I do**
 13 **not believe this person is who they say they are", our**
 14 **team will take reasonable steps to make sure we can**
 15 **confirm this.**
 16 Sometimes it could be that the person has
 17 an authentic account, but is using a name that is either
 18 not necessarily plausible, or may be quite unique and,
 19 in that case, we will contact them and try and -- to
 20 confirm the name that they're using.
 21 So I want to make a difference between an authentic
 22 name versus an authentic account, because these are two
 23 different things.
 24 Q. Can we have a look, please, behind tab 2 and at
 25 FBK000008_001.

Page 36

1 So in the event that Facebook does require
 2 identification to be verified, you've set out there the
 3 types of ID that Facebook accepts. And it's grouped
 4 into two separate -- group 1 and group 2 it's described
 5 in the exhibit. I just want to ask you about why there
 6 is a distinction between group 1 and group 2 and what
 7 that is meant to signify?

8 **A. Yes, I think the type of IDs that we would require some**
 9 **users to provide to us has grown over the years and**
 10 **I guess there is a lot of complexity, when we are**
 11 **a global platform like Facebook, in trying to verify**
 12 **people's identity based on certain documents that may be**
 13 **readily available in certain countries but not others.**

14 **We have also faced some challenges when people are**
 15 **in unique situations, such as, for example, in the**
 16 **process of transitioning from one gender into another,**
 17 **or may have other circumstances that would explain why**
 18 **they're using one name on their account which may not be**
 19 **the name on their birth certificate, for example.**

20 **So our teams have worked to identify what type of**
 21 **official or semi-official IDs we could gather to help**
 22 **some of these users regain access to their account, but**
 23 **still have reasonable indication that, you know, they**
 24 **are who they say they are.**

25 Q. Ordinarily, then, a teenager, do I take it, would

Page 37

1 **as well as, for example, the ability for someone to**
 2 **contact them directly.**

3 Q. That's what I wanted to ask you about, because your
 4 statement says that for those who are under 18, you
 5 limit the interactions from adults who are not already
 6 known to them. How does that work in practice?

7 **A. In practice -- I wouldn't want to reveal the exact**
 8 **details of how we implement this --**

9 Q. I understand that --

10 **A. -- for sensitivity reasons. In practice, an adult who**
 11 **is not connected to a particular child would not be able**
 12 **to find them, you know, using the Facebook search, and**
 13 **readily message them. So there are hurdles in**
 14 **discovering the account in the first place and then**
 15 **hurdles in connecting with the person through messages,**
 16 **for example.**

17 Q. Right. That looks at it from the adult who is seeking
 18 out the child. Is there anything to prevent the child
 19 seeking out interactions with adults?

20 **A. No. I don't think there would be.**

21 Q. I think you said finally you caution children before
 22 making public posts. In what way, how do you convey the
 23 message that they should be cautious in this regard?

24 **A. By default, children -- and, later on, actually, all**
 25 **users; we extended this to anybody coming to Facebook --**

Page 39

1 probably not be asked to verify their age or their other
 2 account details when setting up an account?

3 **A. Not at the account registration point. There may be**
 4 **moments where, if our team believe that there is**
 5 **a potential that they may be under the age of 13, we may**
 6 **remove the account, but allow the person to come back if**
 7 **they can prove that they are not otherwise under the age**
 8 **of 13.**

9 Q. In your statement you set out that there are stricter
 10 default privacy settings for those in Facebook who are
 11 under 18 years of age. I'm looking at paragraph 3.2, if
 12 that assists. Can you give us a sort of a practical
 13 example of what are the stricter default privacy
 14 settings that are applicable to those who are under 18?

15 **A. Sure, one of them may touch on sensitive information**
 16 **like a mobile number, or the school the child is going**
 17 **to, we would not show this information to people who are**
 18 **not friends with this person.**

19 Q. So it's an ability for them to keep that kind of
 20 personal information private, unless they have accepted
 21 the other user as a friend, is that it?

22 **A. Yes, there are a number of things that we are doing**
 23 **behind the scenes to make sure that we keep those teens**
 24 **safe, and the safeguards that we can have touch on**
 25 **privacy, can touch on the discoverability of the account**

Page 38

1 **by default your -- your posts are going to be to friends**
 2 **only. And if children wanted to post publicly, we walk**
 3 **them through a series of educational messages so that**
 4 **they understand what posting publicly means and how to**
 5 **change this, if they were changing their mind. We have**
 6 **a number of kind of proactive educational means to reach**
 7 **people on the platform to make sure they really**
 8 **understand what public posting entails.**

9 **For example, if you had been posting to your friends**
 10 **only, for quite some time and then were suddenly**
 11 **switching to public posting, it is very likely that**
 12 **you'd get a message from Facebook indicating that you**
 13 **have now switched to a different audience and**
 14 **highlighting what this means for you as a person.**

15 Q. We've been looking at a single user setting up
 16 an account, but there are also Facebook accounts for
 17 running a scout group or a football team. I think in
 18 your statement you say that there is ordinarily a page
 19 administrator or an admin who is responsible for the
 20 administration of those more group accounts, if I can
 21 call them that.

22 **Who's responsibility is it, if there is a group**
 23 **page, to ensure that those on it are over the age of**
 24 **13 -- or 13 and over, I should say, and that there is no**
 25 **other breach of any other Facebook term of service?**

Page 40

1 **A. I think we are -- over time, we have given page admins**
 2 **and group admins a number of tools at their disposal to**
 3 **make sure that they can enforce who is part of their**
 4 **group, the content share and take action. With regards**
 5 **to pages, we offer the ability for people to limit the**
 6 **visibility of the page, depending on geographical**
 7 **location as well as the age.**
 8 **So, for example, if a -- if a known alcohol company**
 9 **wanted to have a presence on Facebook with a number of**
 10 **business page admins, for example, they'd have the**
 11 **ability to ensure that this content would not be visible**
 12 **by under 18s on the platform by restricting this**
 13 **audience.**
 14 Q. I think you said that the page admins are responsible
 15 for keeping the content and their interactions in line
 16 with the community standards, so there is
 17 a responsibility on the company that might be seeking to
 18 advertise, but also on the page admin themselves. Would
 19 that include ensuring there was no one under age within
 20 the group?
 21 **A. Yes, I think setting the -- having the ability to set**
 22 **the audience for a page at the admin level ensures, as**
 23 **much as possible, that this is the case.**
 24 Q. Before we take our mid-morning break, the other group of
 25 people that are prohibited from having a Facebook

Page 41

1 sex offender register within the UK, and so,
 2 effectively, you're dependent on either law enforcement
 3 telling you public reporting and saying they've seen
 4 an article about X, "Did you know that they have been
 5 recently convicted of a sex offence?" or even if the
 6 person themselves declares it in that unlikely event.
 7 Do Facebook take any checks to ensure that someone
 8 setting up the account is not a registered sex offender
 9 by doing open source research, for example?
 10 **A. Not -- not that I know of. I think in the US where some**
 11 **of this information is more readily available, even so**
 12 **it is not in a form that would be easily ingestible,**
 13 **I guess, by online services. So -- and that's in the US**
 14 **where the situation is slightly different. So we don't**
 15 **make this check at this time.**
 16 Q. If you're able to answer this, were there to be a way of
 17 Facebook accessing the sex offender register, would it
 18 be a sensible way of trying to run a check between the
 19 person setting up the account and seeing whether they
 20 were, in fact, on that register?
 21 **A. It would be hard to say, I don't know how -- you know,**
 22 **how large the -- the number of people who are on this**
 23 **registry is. I think, putting this in comparison to the**
 24 **40 million people in the UK who may be using our**
 25 **services, you know, might -- you know, we may have some**

Page 43

1 account you told us were registered sex offenders.
 2 Can I ask you, please, about paragraph 3.7 in your
 3 statement. There is obviously that prohibition that we
 4 looked at on the terms of service and I think you said
 5 that a report that someone is a registered sex offender
 6 may come in from a member of public, or a report may be
 7 made by law enforcement who have dealt with that
 8 offender.
 9 Do you keep data on how many public reports are made
 10 in relation to registered sex offenders --
 11 **A. We don't.**
 12 Q. -- or how many times UK law enforcement have reported to
 13 Facebook that this person is a registered sex offender?
 14 **A. No. Again, as I was preparing for today, we've looked**
 15 **at this and I was unable to get an accurate number**
 16 **related to this.**
 17 Q. Does Facebook then have any idea about how many
 18 potential registered sex offenders might be using or
 19 seeking to use Facebook to have an account?
 20 **A. No, and I think one of the difficulties -- and that's**
 21 **really related to the UK -- is the fact that this**
 22 **registry is not open to the public, so I would hazard**
 23 **that law enforcement may be best placed to understand**
 24 **the scope.**
 25 Q. I want to ask you about that because there is no open

Page 42

1 **thoughts on whether this is feasible or not, but I think**
 2 **one of the core goals for our law enforcement outreach**
 3 **team dedicated to the UK is to make sure that UK police**
 4 **forces know how to contact us, understand this policy**
 5 **and that we can probably pick things up a little bit**
 6 **more from here.**
 7 MS CAREY: Can I come on to look at that, I think, a little
 8 bit later on in your evidence?
 9 Chair, would that be a convenient moment for our
 10 break?
 11 THE CHAIR: Yes. We'll return at 5 minutes past.
 12 MS CAREY: Thank you very much.
 13 (11.52 am)
 14 (A short break)
 15 (12.05 pm)
 16 MS CAREY: Ms de Bailliencourt, we were looking this morning
 17 at the terms of service. If those terms are breached,
 18 what is the sanction that is imposed by Facebook?
 19 **A. It depends on the severity and the type of abuse or**
 20 **abusive behaviour that we see.**
 21 **For something that would be quite lightweight**
 22 **I would say, it may be removal of the content, the**
 23 **abusive content, and an educational message, explaining**
 24 **to this person why what they posted is against our**
 25 **community standards with clarity on what may happen**

Page 44

1 next.

2 **If it was for something -- if it was a more severe**

3 **abuse, usually, it would be removal from the platform**

4 **and, in the case of child sexual exploitation, reporting**

5 **to NCMEC, who would then filter to law enforcement.**

6 Q. We're going to come on to that, actually, in this next

7 session, but I just want to make sure I understand you

8 correctly. If the person is under 13, there will be no

9 account to be able to set up or, if you find out they're

10 under the age of 13, will the account be deleted?

11 **A. Yes.**

12 Q. Equally, if the person turns out to be a registered sex

13 offender, their account will be deleted; is that right?

14 **A. (Nodded assent).**

15 Q. In the case of where someone provides inaccurate

16 information about themselves, is that an automatic

17 deletion or is that one of those areas where it depends

18 on what the information is that's been provided?

19 **A. I think it depends on what the information is.**

20 **Typically, our team will seek to get the exact**

21 **information from the user in question. If we believe**

22 **that the account is authentic and if it's not something**

23 **that was removed by our systems, in all cases we provide**

24 **people with the ability to appeal our decision, so even**

25 **in the event that we removed an account from someone**

Page 45

1 is indecent or isn't?

2 **A. If I take a typical case, because that's what we see at**

3 **scale, let's say someone had tried to upload an image of**

4 **an illegal nature and this was flagged by our system,**

5 **such as PhotoDNA, the process is very quick, the removal**

6 **of the account is also very quick, and the person has**

7 **the ability to appeal.**

8 **Our team is just going to check why was this person**

9 **disabled. We have a huge focus internally on having the**

10 **right amount of quality investment in our bank's**

11 **PhotoDNA hashes, but the person will still double-check**

12 **that the removal was correct and, in that case, we will**

13 **communicate back to the user with our final response on**

14 **whether they can access their account or not.**

15 Q. And in the event that it was decided by Facebook that

16 the image was illegal, would that result in the deletion

17 of the account in a child sex abuse case?

18 **A. I think, again, just to set context, we have --**

19 **according to our community standards, we have quite**

20 **strict guidelines on things that are not necessarily**

21 **illegal, but that we would consider harmful, so if we**

22 **felt that an account had posted content that was**

23 **abusive, we would then remove the account, which would**

24 **not be publicly consulted by anybody, so the account**

25 **would be removed from view by the public, the content**

Page 47

1 **that may have been reported to us for being a registered**

2 **sex offender or for someone who may have tried to upload**

3 **some illegal material, we still allow the person the**

4 **ability to appeal our decision, which will then be**

5 **reviewed by another person in our team to confirm that,**

6 **indeed, the decision was correct.**

7 Q. In the event that there is someone suspected of

8 uploading indecent images of children on to Facebook,

9 does the account remain live until the appeal process

10 is finished or is it disabled until such time as the

11 appeal process is concluded?

12 **A. It's immediately disabled, I think -- I want to make**

13 **a distinction between disabling, deleting and**

14 **deactivating: deactivating is something the user does**

15 **themselves, if they want to take a break from Facebook;**

16 **disabling is something Facebook does, so we remove an**

17 **account -- it doesn't mean the data is gone, at least**

18 **not immediately; and then deleting would be permanent**

19 **removal of the account.**

20 Q. In the event that there was suspicion of child sex abuse

21 material being found on an account, the account would be

22 disabled in the first instance -- we'll deal with the

23 reporting to NCMEC as a separate topic -- but if the

24 user wished to appeal and say, "Actually, that's not

25 an indecent image", who, ultimately, decides whether it

Page 46

1 **would be deleted and then the appropriate process would**

2 **take place.**

3 **We still retain information about the account for**

4 **some time, more to give law enforcement the ability to**

5 **contact us, if they need to, to get some of this data**

6 **too, because it is important for people who are removed**

7 **from the platform to still have this ability to appeal**

8 **and for us to really make sure that our decision was the**

9 **right one, particularly when it comes to child sexual**

10 **exploitation, because the consequences are obviously**

11 **warranted. We want to make sure that our report was**

12 **a high-quality one.**

13 Q. You're talking about the report there to NCMEC?

14 **A. Exactly.**

15 Q. Right. Can I just go back a stage, though, to deal with

16 the community standards, because, is there

17 a distinction, then, between a breach of a term service

18 and potentially a breach of a community standard?

19 **A. I think our terms of service highlight that the content**

20 **that we deem to be acceptable on the platform are**

21 **governed by the community standards. Our terms of**

22 **service would address, I think, additional elements, but**

23 **the community standards really touch on content, yes.**

24 Q. All right.

25 Now, the community standards are essentially, is

Page 48

1 this right, a set of rules that Facebook have devised to
 2 help the user understand what can and cannot be shared,
 3 I'd like to have a look, please, at the one that is most
 4 pertinent to this inquiry. If we may call up, please,
 5 FBK000002 and it's behind, chair, tab 4.
 6 This is the community standard that's entitled
 7 "Child nudity and sexual exploitation of children". At
 8 the outset it says:
 9 "The policy rationale is we do not allow content
 10 that sexually exploits or endangers children."
 11 "When we become aware of apparent child
 12 exploitation, we report it to the National Centre for
 13 Missing and Exploited Children known as NCMEC in
 14 compliance with applicable law. We know that sometimes
 15 people share nude images of their own children with good
 16 intentions. However, we generally remove these images
 17 because of the potential for abuse by others and to help
 18 avoid the possibility of other people reusing or
 19 misappropriating the images."
 20 Are you thinking there about an innocent example of
 21 a parent sharing a child nude in the bath, for example?
 22 **A. (Nodded assent).**
 23 Q. So in that instance, if a parent wanted to share
 24 an image of their own child in that circumstance, do
 25 I understand that, nonetheless, that would be removed as

Page 49

1 **pretty clear-cut, the process is always to refer to**
 2 **NCMEC and delete the content. I do have to bring**
 3 **forward a narrow carve-out in our policy: we have seen**
 4 **in the last few years that sometimes people share this**
 5 **type of content in outrage or to raise awareness around**
 6 **the situation or try and identify and safeguard a child.**
 7 **Their intentions are obviously -- are mainly wholesome,**
 8 **but, you know, we want to make them aware that by**
 9 **sharing this type of information, that may -- is usually**
 10 **illegal -- that there are some severe consequences.**
 11 **So in terms of processes behind the scenes, it is**
 12 **still the same, deleting the content, reporting to**
 13 **NCMEC, but we have had alongside, I think, others in the**
 14 **industry to look at this type of outrage sharing from**
 15 **people who mean well, but may really overstep grossly in**
 16 **terms of the content that they're sharing. So here**
 17 **we'll show an educational message indicating that, if**
 18 **there is another occurrence, the account will be**
 19 **permanently removed.**
 20 Q. That's what I was going to ask you, if there is
 21 a situation where perhaps the first step by Facebook is
 22 to send a warning message, an educational message,
 23 saying, "This is potentially in breach of our community
 24 standards", what if there is a user that has multiple
 25 breaches?

Page 51

1 being visible?
 2 **A. Yes, I think it depends on the type of image and the**
 3 **type of -- you know, how the child would be seen and**
 4 **body parts being seen on screen, but, yes, we don't**
 5 **allow those bathtub images, even though they may be**
 6 **innocently shared. It's still against our guidelines.**
 7 Q. You set out there working with experts dealing with this
 8 area, and then underneath it says:
 9 "Do not post content that depicts participation in
 10 or advocates the sexual exploitation of children,
 11 including, but not limited to, engaging in sexual
 12 activity with minors ..."
 13 Setting out there a number of examples so that one
 14 can understand what should or should not be shared.
 15 What I want to try and understand is you've spoken
 16 about potentially a grey area or context in seeing, is
 17 the image just a nude child in a bath, which might fall
 18 at one end of the extreme, to, the other end of the
 19 extreme, an obviously indecent image of a child being
 20 abused.
 21 If there is found on Facebook that obvious extreme
 22 image of abuse, is there a grey area there or should not
 23 be the case that the account is disabled and then
 24 deleted?
 25 **A. When we talk about extremely severe material, it's**

Page 50

1 **A. They would lose their account.**
 2 Q. How many goes do you get, to put it colloquially?
 3 **A. I don't think you get many goes. I think this is,**
 4 **again, the only exception -- one of the only exceptions**
 5 **that I'm aware of when it comes to warning users to the**
 6 **type of content that they are posting. Usually, people**
 7 **will post because they may like the content and it's**
 8 **a very different context and decision, you know, with**
 9 **regards to the termination of the account.**
 10 **We're really talking about something that has been**
 11 **emerging over the last few years and that we have seen**
 12 **as a -- somehow puzzling for someone who had been**
 13 **working on these topics, that people would believe that**
 14 **this is okay to share, but nonetheless a trend that**
 15 **people meant well.**
 16 Q. So in the case of a user who shares an indecent image to
 17 provoke discussion, to want to extort outrage at it,
 18 they might be someone whose account you might not
 19 immediately go to deletion with, but if they did it
 20 repeatedly -- I want to try and understand where
 21 Facebook would say, "I'm sorry, we've warned you once,
 22 we've warned you twice, you can't keep sharing that kind
 23 of material"; where is the line drawn?
 24 **A. Yes, I'm pretty sure that this would come -- there would**
 25 **be no second chance. If there's another type of abusive**

Page 52

1 **content posted, they'd be removed. I can double check.**
 2 Q. Thank you. Irrespective of the user's intention, if
 3 there is indecent imagery shared on Facebook would
 4 reports still, nonetheless, be made to NCMEC?
 5 **A. Absolutely.**
 6 Q. Right.
 7 Looking at your paragraph 5.2, you state there that
 8 every piece of content published on Facebook can be
 9 reported to the community operations team, and you say
 10 there are multiple reporting links available on the
 11 site.
 12 The community operations team, I just want to
 13 understand their remit. Are they the team that are
 14 responsible for dealing with underage reports or
 15 verifying the identification of a user?
 16 **A. As well, yes.**
 17 Q. Yes. And they would be responsible for doing ID checks
 18 were Facebook to ask for that.
 19 The community operations team, I think you said, as
 20 at February of 2018, there were 7,500 moderators.
 21 I just want to make sure that is -- are moderators the
 22 same as those in the community operations team or two
 23 separate teams?
 24 **A. They're the same, we'd refer to them internally as**
 25 **content reviewers, but, yes, the team has grown quite**

Page 53

1 **on keeping the community safe, so safety and security.**
 2 **This may include teams like data scientists, engineers,**
 3 **and then we wanted to make sure we provided a separate**
 4 **number for content reviewers so that people get a sense**
 5 **for the size of this team. So right now, the updated**
 6 **number is 30,000 people working across safety and**
 7 **security and, out of these, 15,000 would be dedicated to**
 8 **reviewing content and supporting through different**
 9 **flows.**
 10 Q. On any view, during 2018, there was an increase between
 11 the 7,500 as at February and now we stand at 15,000
 12 today.
 13 What brought about that decision to increase the
 14 number of moderators?
 15 **A. I think the numbers that you are referring to are**
 16 **obviously public and were shared by a number of**
 17 **executives at Facebook, but I have seen -- being**
 18 **employed by the company, I have seen the size of this**
 19 **team grow from year to year. So I don't think there was**
 20 **anything specifically that triggered this particular**
 21 **investment, I think the company, as a whole, is**
 22 **incredibly dedicated to making sure that we have the**
 23 **right amount of people able to review content, alongside**
 24 **deploying some really smart automation and the**
 25 **investment in those teams is just on par with keeping up**

Page 55

1 **significantly. When we started sharing numbers --**
 2 **I think we've made the first number public -- it was**
 3 **around 3,500 people working in these teams, I believe**
 4 **this was April 2017, and since then we have shared**
 5 **updated numbers, so 7,500. We're now at 15,000**
 6 **dedicated reviewers in community operations.**
 7 Q. Right. Can I ask you about that, then, because in your
 8 paragraph 6.1 you state there that, as at February '18,
 9 it was 7,500 people moderating. Is that across the
 10 worldwide number of Facebook users?
 11 **A. So the 7,500 number is for 2018.**
 12 Q. Yes.
 13 **A. Yes.**
 14 Q. That was worldwide?
 15 **A. It was worldwide, yes.**
 16 Q. You go on in that paragraph to state that:
 17 "Mark Zuckerberg shared a post in November of 2018
 18 that the number of people working across safety,
 19 security and content review now amounts to almost 30,000
 20 people."
 21 I want to understand, is that the up-to-date number,
 22 because you mentioned a moment ago 15,000 and I want to
 23 get our figures clear?
 24 **A. Yes. When we communicate the numbers now, we make**
 25 **a distinction between people within the company who work**

Page 54

1 **with, you know, being able to support people who need**
 2 **our help.**
 3 Q. Are you aware of whether there are any plans to increase
 4 the number of moderators as we move on throughout 2019
 5 and into 2020?
 6 **A. I'm not privy to the planned numbers, but I would be**
 7 **surprised if we weren't continuing to increase as the**
 8 **business would dictate.**
 9 Q. One of the questions that a layperson might want to ask
 10 is, how do you know that 15,000 moderators is enough?
 11 **A. I think we tend to focus -- let me rephrase it this way.**
 12 **When I speak to experts in this area, they often**
 13 **focus really on the number of people. We don't tend to**
 14 **look at it this way, we tend to think of the speed of**
 15 **our response and the adequacy of our response.**
 16 **We do this by using automation, machine learning,**
 17 **AI, as well as people. Those two combined we think are**
 18 **the right model. If we had reasons to believe that we**
 19 **were lagging behind or not good enough or taking too**
 20 **long to respond to a particular challenge, this is where**
 21 **I have seen investment in new teams, new technology, new**
 22 **expertise brought in on certain topics.**
 23 Q. Can I ask you about the cost of financing the community
 24 operations team.
 25 Are you able to provide us with a figure of how much

Page 56

1 that costs Facebook per annum, for example?

2 **A. I'm able to provide some financial information, the**

3 **number I have is in -- in this year, 2019, the company**

4 **would spend 3.7 billion in investing in people's safety**

5 **and security.**

6 **This number was shared by our CEO Mark Zuckerberg**

7 **early February, when he mentioned we were now spending**

8 **more, planning to spend more, this year in this area**

9 **than our whole revenue the year before we IPO'd. This**

10 **revenue would've been 2011.**

11 Q. That 3.7 -- I think, billion, did you say?

12 **A. Yes.**

13 Q. Is clearly across a number of harms and a number of

14 areas where people are needed to be kept safe, is there

15 a specific child safety budget?

16 **A. I don't think we would have a unique child safety**

17 **budget; however, the way our teams are structured and**

18 **considering the nuanced type of abuse we're dealing**

19 **with, we have a number of expert teams working on**

20 **this -- so, again, from engineers to community**

21 **operations to child safety experts. So we're touching**

22 **on lots of different teams with lots of different**

23 **budgets.**

24 Q. Does it follow from that that there is no specific child

25 sexual abuse material budget earmarked for trying to

Page 57

1 currently employs?

2 **A. I think, depending on the type of abuse we're dealing**

3 **with, we're at a different stage of sophistication of**

4 **our machine learning detection. For example, we've been**

5 **working on spam and fake accounts for a really long**

6 **time, and are able to detect and remove this content**

7 **I think way beyond 99 per cent, quite large numbers.**

8 **Our work on child sexual exploitation is not new, so**

9 **we implemented it back in, probably, 2011, and therefore**

10 **I think we've made some good progress here, but as we**

11 **take on more nuanced type of abuse or more sophisticated**

12 **type of abuse where we need to invest more into the**

13 **technology and then see how we can combine this with the**

14 **teams. But, generally, we would have systems that would**

15 **detect, with high probability, that something concerning**

16 **may be happening -- I'm really looking at behavioural**

17 **issues here -- and this would be reviewed by someone in**

18 **our team for further check.**

19 Q. Presumably by the moderators?

20 **A. Yes.**

21 Q. I want to focus on suspected child sexual abuse

22 material, though.

23 I think you said that you have within Facebook

24 specially trained teams, with backgrounds in law

25 enforcement, online safety, analytics and forensic

Page 59

1 combat prevention, detection, reporting?

2 **A. Not that I'm aware of, but, again, we have dedicated**

3 **teams who work on these -- you know, child sexual**

4 **exploitation alongside teams who may come in for**

5 **specific projects.**

6 Q. The community operations teams I think are based in

7 several locations across the globe; is that right?

8 Where are they based?

9 **A. There are some based in the US, some based in Dublin,**

10 **where I'm also based, we have -- all across the world.**

11 **We also use some additional help from some of our**

12 **vendors and external partners who have a number of**

13 **offices across the world, and we've found that this --**

14 **having the teams broken down by -- on different sites**

15 **allows us a speed of response, kind of follow the same**

16 **model that would not be practically implementable if we**

17 **were just in one location.**

18 Q. I think those teams are available 24/7 you say in your

19 statement?

20 **A. Yes.**

21 Q. Across a number of languages?

22 **A. Mm-hm.**

23 Q. You referred a moment ago to the use of machine learning

24 or AI, call it what you will, how does that interact

25 with the number of human moderators that Facebook

Page 58

1 investigations, who are tasked with reviewing suspected

2 child sex abuse material and potentially reporting it to

3 NCMEC.

4 In the first instance, if an indecent image is

5 reported to a moderator, do they look at it and deal

6 with it or do they immediately refer it on to, perhaps,

7 those who are more familiar with looking at that kind of

8 material?

9 **A. I would say that the vast majority of those images would**

10 **be, or the content would be, forwarded to our expert**

11 **teams. The way we have developed our content review**

12 **system and all of the processes that we have developed**

13 **means that, you know, many people -- probably everybody**

14 **in the team -- who looks at content understands what**

15 **child sexual exploitation material could look like, and**

16 **would be escalating this content quite quickly to the**

17 **appropriate teams.**

18 **There are subsequent steps that need to be taken**

19 **when we find this content: reporting to NCMEC, as you've**

20 **mentioned, but also adding potential new content to**

21 **PhotoDNA and this type of task needs to be done by**

22 **people who really understand the content in depth.**

23 Q. In the first instance, are you able to give us

24 an indication of how many people there are within the

25 specially trained teams that look at this type of

Page 60

1 indecent material?

2 **A. I don't have exact numbers to share, I think it's made**

3 **more complicated by the fact that we have lots of**

4 **different teams working across this issue in a number of**

5 **locations.**

6 Q. Are those working in the specialist trained teams also

7 dealing with other types of illegal content? I'm trying

8 to understand if there is a specific team that will deal

9 with child sex abuse and maybe a specific team that will

10 deal with terrorist content?

11 **A. There are separate teams.**

12 Q. There are separate teams.

13 And the specialist team, once they consider that it

14 is a child sexual abuse image, they then report it to

15 NCMEC; is that right?

16 **A. They do, there are others in the company before we go**

17 **into those really expert teams who have the ability to**

18 **take action on the content, so I don't want to make it**

19 **sound like only this team is able to take action on, you**

20 **know, removing an account. Anybody in our team can do**

21 **this, but we need to make sure that the appropriate**

22 **processes and steps are followed. And because of the**

23 **impact of such a -- of a tool such as PhotoDNA, we need**

24 **to make sure that this is handled with care.**

25 Q. In the event that someone reports a suspected image to

Page 61

1 uploaded to to tell them that there may be

2 an investigation pending or that there is suspected

3 child abuse on their account?

4 **A. Absolutely not. And I believe we have kind of created**

5 **a message that is intentionally vague, mentioning**

6 **"a breach of our terms", but that we really don't want**

7 **the person to have any indication that there might be**

8 **an investigation or, indeed, to destroy evidence, or**

9 **cause further harm to a child. So intentionally, these**

10 **messages are quite short and vague.**

11 Q. Designed not to alert the user to the fact that there is

12 law enforcement becoming involved?

13 **A. Absolutely.**

14 Q. I understand.

15 In your statement you deal with, at paragraph 5.6,

16 people who post abusive content or behave in an abusive

17 way. I just want to make sure there is no

18 misunderstanding. I assume, in that paragraph, you're

19 not talking about those who post illegal, indecent

20 imagery?

21 **A. I just want to read over the paragraph.**

22 Q. Do.

23 **A. Yes, absolutely. Here I think I wanted to provide more**

24 **context for the type of interactions that we have with**

25 **users who may be behaving in an inappropriate way, but**

Page 63

1 the moderators and it is confirmed that it is, in fact,

2 an illegal image, does the person that reported that get

3 notified of the outcome of the investigation, to call it

4 that?

5 **A. My short answer is no, but let me break down your**

6 **question into two.**

7 **So we communicate back to the user who reported the**

8 **content, as well as the user whose content was reported**

9 **and/or removed.**

10 **We communicate back through what we call the support**

11 **inbox, which is a place in your Facebook account where**

12 **there's a trace of the reports that have been made and**

13 **we try and provide information on the action that we**

14 **have taken. These updates come realtime, and we try and**

15 **provide as much kind of useful information as possible,**

16 **including when we don't take action on the content. We**

17 **want to be really transparent here.**

18 **If content flag was related to child sexual**

19 **exploitation, I haven't seen the messaging that we**

20 **provide but -- in a long time, but I'm pretty sure that**

21 **it would be limited in thanking the user for their**

22 **report and indicating that we have taken the appropriate**

23 **action, but we're obviously not in a position to go into**

24 **the details of what happened next.**

25 Q. Is any message posted on the account where the image was

Page 62

1 **not, you know, to the level, you know, that we're**

2 **talking about here when it comes to child sexual**

3 **exploitation.**

4 **A good example may be someone who has posted, for**

5 **example, an image at -- of adult nudity, absolutely**

6 **consensual, at a party, let's say, a stag party**

7 **somewhere, the type of content that we think is not**

8 **suitable for the platform but would not warrant the**

9 **removal. If this person was persisting in posting**

10 **content that we are getting sent to us, reviewing and**

11 **removing, we may at some stage maybe understand that**

12 **they are -- you know, they could take a break from using**

13 **certain parts of the service, such as uploading a photo.**

14 Q. Reporting to NCMEC. Clearly, you report using the

15 CyberTipLine that the -- I think the panel have heard

16 about.

17 Where a child is believed to be in immediate or

18 imminent danger, as well as the report to NCMEC, do

19 Facebook take any action in relation to notifying law

20 enforcement?

21 **A. Yes. So we routinely report to NCMEC anything that**

22 **would be indicative of exploitation of a child.**

23 **I believe those reports then turn into cyber tips when**

24 **law enforcement receive them.**

25 **We have the ability, when we understand that**

Page 64

1 **the child is in further immediate danger -- so, for**
 2 **example, new content is being generated or there's**
 3 **potentially the intention for an adult to meet a child**
 4 **for sexual gratification -- we have the ability to**
 5 **proactively disclose some information to law enforcement**
 6 **and we do this very regularly.**
 7 Q. Are you able to give us an idea of, when you say "very
 8 regularly", how many reports you may govern "immediate
 9 danger", whether it's child-sex-abuse-related -- or
 10 perhaps suicide is another obvious example -- how many
 11 reports like that Facebook make?
 12 **A. I think when it comes to suicide, there were some**
 13 **numbers shared, maybe 18 months ago, pointed to 3,500**
 14 **welfare checks that were done. This is a global number.**
 15 **I do, however, have for you a UK only number, which is**
 16 **that I think, roughly, in the last year, we would have**
 17 **proactively contacted UK law enforcement in 35 distinct**
 18 **cases.**
 19 Q. Is that across a number of different harms and dangers
 20 not solely --
 21 **A. Child safety.**
 22 Q. Child safety danger but not solely related to child
 23 sexual abuse?
 24 **A. I've had a very quick look at the list, I think it's**
 25 **related to child sexual exploitation and grooming.**

Page 65

1 Q. If one takes the geography and the location out of it,
 2 though, does Facebook keep data on how many referrals it
 3 makes to NCMEC globally?
 4 **A. It is likely that we do.**
 5 Q. Is that a figure that you would be able to provide to us
 6 if granted more time to be able to seek that information
 7 out?
 8 **A. I believe we haven't, as a company, shared this number.**
 9 **We have referred people to NCMEC for further**
 10 **information.**
 11 Q. Is the reason behind the fact that it's not been shared
 12 because the number is large and you don't want Facebook
 13 to be exposed as potentially a home for people who
 14 perpetrate this kind of abuse?
 15 **A. I actually don't know the reason behind us not sharing**
 16 **this information.**
 17 Q. Right.
 18 You mentioned earlier a reference to the
 19 transparency reports, in essence setting out some of the
 20 steps that Facebook has taken in relation to data that
 21 can be provided, and I'd like to just ask you about --
 22 behind tab 5, please. I'm moving into tab 6. If we can
 23 call up, please, FBK000039_005.
 24 I just want to go through this in stages. This
 25 is a community standards enforcement report, but

Page 67

1 Q. Perhaps that's a figure that you would be able to check
 2 for us, because I don't want there to be any
 3 misunderstandings about whether that's more general
 4 child safety concerns that you've reported or child sex
 5 abuse concerns that you've reported from Facebook. So
 6 perhaps you'd come back to us on that?
 7 **A. Okay.**
 8 Q. Generally speaking, though, does Facebook keep data of
 9 how many UK-based account holders are reported to NCMEC,
 10 let's say, per annum?
 11 **A. No, we don't.**
 12 Q. Why is that data not kept?
 13 **A. It's difficult for a number of reasons. We understand**
 14 **that there is appetite to better understand and to get**
 15 **some data at the country level on a different range of**
 16 **abuse. We started sharing a year ago, for the first**
 17 **time, data related to a number of abuse, such as adult**
 18 **nudity, hate speech, counter-terrorism and all this,**
 19 **where we provided a global number of content removal.**
 20 **It is difficult to ascertain where someone may be**
 21 **based, they may have a stated location on their profile,**
 22 **they may have an IP address. These may not necessarily,**
 23 **you know, work and if people have, let's say, business**
 24 **travel, or a holiday somewhere, this may also change the**
 25 **information.**

Page 66

1 essentially the transparency report, I think, that came
 2 out in May of last year and there was an update
 3 in November of last year.
 4 **A. Mm.**
 5 Q. If we turn over the page in our bundles to page 6 and
 6 call up page 6 on the screen, it sets out there that
 7 this was your first community standards enforcement
 8 report in May 2018. It included data from October '17
 9 through to March '18 and it set out there the kind of
 10 categories that you were looking at and trying to
 11 provide the data on.
 12 Interestingly in that first block of what was looked
 13 at, child sexual abuse or child sexual exploitation does
 14 not appear at all. Why, in that first set of data, was
 15 child sexual abuse not included?
 16 **A. The amount of work and effort required to -- to produce**
 17 **these numbers has been quite large and we've been**
 18 **seeking input as well from measurement experts and**
 19 **academics to help us validate the numbers, and we wanted**
 20 **to make sure that when we shared some information, it**
 21 **was accurate, and that we could not only stand behind it**
 22 **but provide updates from then on as we updated the**
 23 **transparency reports.**
 24 **These were deemed to be the first six set of**
 25 **categories we could get to, but our goal was always to**

Page 68

1 **provide additional new numbers or additional categories**
 2 **of abuse, which is why, in October/November, we then**
 3 **updated with the -- with the numbers related to**
 4 **exploitative content.**
 5 Q. If we scroll down on the page on the screen, we can see
 6 there that those two additional categories were added --
 7 sorry up a tiny bit, thank you -- including bullying,
 8 harassment, and there we see child nudity and sexual
 9 exploitation of children.
 10 The actual report itself is behind your tab 6 and
 11 can we put on screen, please, INQ004287.
 12 I think this is a number of three pages pulled off
 13 from the transparency report focusing solely on the
 14 category of child nudity and sexual exploitation.
 15 Facebook says there at the outset that it doesn't
 16 tolerate that kind of content, but does this also
 17 encompass the more innocent end of child nudity, like
 18 the baby in the bath image?
 19 **A. I believe it does.**
 20 Q. Right. So we're not talking about wholly illegal, there
 21 may be a different form of content as well here. All
 22 right.
 23 You set out there that where you find exploitative
 24 content, the account is disabled and, where it's child
 25 exploitation, the report is made to NCMEC.

Page 69

1 **We have been working with the, I think, Data**
 2 **Transparency Advisory Group which is based in Yale and,**
 3 **as I mentioned, those experts, which come from a range**
 4 **of universities who are experts in measurement, are also**
 5 **here to help us understand how to express this**
 6 **prevalence and whether we are approaching it in the**
 7 **right way.**
 8 Q. But looking at it simplistically, wouldn't one of the
 9 easiest ways of trying to assess prevalence be to say,
 10 "We made X number of reports to NCMEC last year"?
 11 **A. I don't think that necessarily it would be speaking to**
 12 **the prevalence, I think the number of reports of the**
 13 **take downs that we make are essential information. But**
 14 **we are trying to understand how much of this is there on**
 15 **the platform.**
 16 We could have a very high number of content removed
 17 with an equally high number of content remaining on the
 18 platform, which is the prevalence, and, therefore, both
 19 numbers together I think speak to our -- our efforts to
 20 remove the content but also looking at what's left that
 21 we may not have flagged.
 22 Q. What is it, then, that enables Facebook to assert there
 23 that the number of views of content that contains child
 24 nudity and sexual exploitation on Facebook is very low?
 25 **A. Because looking at the amount of content that we have**

Page 71

1 At the bottom of that page, please, the first
 2 question posed in the transparency report was how
 3 prevalent were child nudity and sexual exploitation
 4 violations on Facebook and it says, "We cannot estimate
 5 this metric":
 6 "We cannot currently provide this metric because we
 7 cannot reliably estimate it.
 8 "The number of views of content that contains child
 9 nudity and sexual exploitation on Facebook is very low."
 10 Firstly, why is it that that is not data that can be
 11 reliably estimated or provided?
 12 **A. Prevalence is, I think, an incredibly important measure**
 13 **of our success in a number of areas, but one that is**
 14 **difficult to obtain, if you were looking up prevalence**
 15 **around adult nudity content, we've tried to explain**
 16 **this, which is, by the way, more prevalent than,**
 17 **obviously, child sexual exploitation. We've tried to**
 18 **explain the prevalence by explaining that it would take**
 19 **someone to scroll through 10,000 pieces of content to**
 20 **potentially be exposed to, let's say, ten that would be**
 21 **of adult nudity.**
 22 **Adult nudity is more prevalent on the platform than**
 23 **child sexual exploitation, thankfully. However, we**
 24 **haven't managed to express the prevalence related to**
 25 **child sexual exploitation in a way that is accurate yet.**

Page 70

1 **removed of child -- of adult nudity, if you were**
 2 **comparing those numbers in terms of volumes, would**
 3 **indicate that it's not something that is very prevalent**
 4 **and looking also at -- this is more anecdotal, I guess,**
 5 **but having worked very closely with those teams, the**
 6 **amount of time our team may encounter child sexual**
 7 **exploitation versus other types of violating content is**
 8 **minimal compared to what we see happening on the**
 9 **platform.**
 10 Q. I understand that in comparison to other harms it may be
 11 minimal, but isn't there value in itself in knowing what
 12 exactly the figure is, irrespective of whether that
 13 compares favourably or unfavourably with other types of
 14 abusive content?
 15 **A. Absolutely, and I think it would be incredibly useful to**
 16 **have this prevalence number. Again, the way we work is**
 17 **we're putting out data that we know is accurate and that**
 18 **we can stand behind, but as we are updating our numbers,**
 19 **there are updates due in the next few weeks on our**
 20 **transparency report. Hopefully, as we develop and get**
 21 **more support, we will be able to provide additional**
 22 **numbers here.**
 23 Q. So I understand from that there's another transparency
 24 report coming out imminently?
 25 **A. Yes, I think it is usually May and November, so I would**

Page 72

1 **expect that it's coming.**
 2 Q. If you turn over your page Ms de Baillencourt and we go
 3 on to page 2 of this Relativity reference, the next
 4 section set out there states, "How much content did we
 5 take action on?".
 6 It is essentially, I think, 8.7 million pieces of
 7 content that were removed.
 8 Is that in the quarter from 2017 into May 2018 or
 9 does this cover a per annum?
 10 **A. This was just for one quarter, because we started --**
 11 Q. Is that the July -- sorry, it's my fault for not reading
 12 it properly. Is it the July '18 to September '18
 13 quarter?
 14 **A. Exactly, it would be Q3 of 2018.**
 15 Q. So within that three-month period, nearly 9 million
 16 pieces of content were removed, but I just want to be
 17 clear, does that include illegal and non-illegal
 18 imagery?
 19 **A. It does. I think the number that is also helpful is the**
 20 **fact that 99.2 per cent of this 8.7 million were**
 21 **automatically detected by Facebook. One could assume**
 22 **that PhotoDNA is one of the tools that was incredibly**
 23 **useful to get to this number, and -- but, for us, it is**
 24 **encouraging to see that, you know, our detection**
 25 **mechanism is working as it should and highlighting the**

Page 73

1 Q. Does Facebook keep, though, then, a set of figures,
 2 "That came from a public report" and "That came from
 3 an AI detection"; do they keep that kind of data?
 4 **A. I don't know if we do, but, again, reading the number**
 5 **and knowing how our systems function, I would imagine**
 6 **that the -- the 99.2 per cent again refers to PhotoDNA.**
 7 **It may refer to some of the newer classifiers that we**
 8 **have launched, our image classifiers to detect new,**
 9 **unreported images, and that the portion that is not**
 10 **proactively identified would refer to user reports from**
 11 **members of the public.**
 12 Q. Perhaps just before lunch we will look at PhotoDNA,
 13 certainly start on that.
 14 Now, you've told us that, I think, Facebook has been
 15 using PhotoDNA technology since 2011. If it helps you,
 16 I'm looking at paragraphs 8 onwards in your statement.
 17 I want to understand in practice how PhotoDNA
 18 operates on Facebook. Clearly we know that that
 19 matches -- if someone tries to upload an indecent image
 20 which has already been identified to be an indecent
 21 image, PhotoDNA can work to identify that and help you
 22 remove it and take it down.
 23 But I just want to understand, practically speaking,
 24 if someone wants to upload an indecent image which is
 25 known to be an indecent image, does it prevent the photo

Page 75

1 **vast majority of this content before anybody gets**
 2 **a chance to report it to us.**
 3 Q. Do you have any idea whether this quarter was -- is
 4 representative of the remainder of the year or stood out
 5 as being particularly high or particularly low?
 6 **A. I don't know, I think it was the first time that I saw**
 7 **this number. I think it will be interesting to see in**
 8 **the forthcoming months and years, you know, how the**
 9 **number will go, and, again, I think a measure of success**
 10 **would be to see whether our detection mechanism is able**
 11 **to get to even a higher percentage.**
 12 Q. Do you know, are there plans to try and disaggregate
 13 these figures so that one can see, on the one hand, this
 14 was the illegal content that was removed in relation to
 15 child sexual exploitation and, on the other hand, was
 16 the content that was removed in relation to child
 17 nudity?
 18 **A. I'm not sure whether there are any plans.**
 19 Q. The -- you mentioned there that that is potentially that
 20 8.7 million figure in part brought about by images that
 21 were matched using PhotoDNA. Would it also include,
 22 though, people reporting that kind of content to the
 23 moderators or via the community operations team?
 24 **A. Yes, absolutely. I think the percentage expressed that**
 25 **isn't proactive detection is user reports.**

Page 74

1 being uploaded on to the Facebook account?
 2 **A. Not to the best of my knowledge, but I do have to caveat**
 3 **that I'm not an engineer. But I think, in order for us**
 4 **to compare the digital fingerprint of the new photos**
 5 **versus the hashes that we have in our databank, we need**
 6 **to have sufficient information to make this match and**
 7 **conclude that the person uploaded this particular photo.**
 8 Q. If that's right, it may follow that the indecent image
 9 is available for a period of time on the Facebook
 10 account?
 11 **A. Yes.**
 12 Q. Once PhotoDNA has satisfied itself that there is
 13 a match, how long does it take for the photo to be
 14 removed?
 15 **A. I think in my statements I provided an average time of**
 16 **a few minutes. I have seen this take action much**
 17 **faster, actually in terms of seconds after the upload**
 18 **from the user, so confident that it's working at speed.**
 19 Q. And where the PhotoDNA finds that there is a match, the
 20 photo is deleted. And the report then made to NCMEC.
 21 How long does it take for the report to be made?
 22 **A. So the steps include deleting the image, which is pretty**
 23 **much immediate, as -- as soon as we have flagged that**
 24 **this is a PhotoDNA match. Removing the account is also**
 25 **automatically happening. This is all in very fast**

Page 76

1 sequence.

2 **The reporting to NCMEC, I don't know whether this is**

3 **immediate or how long it would take to then, but**

4 **I believe it would be, again, within 24 hours or so.**

5 Q. Now PhotoDNA only operates on a known child sex abuse

6 image, what does Facebook do where someone tries to

7 upload a previously unidentified indecent image?

8 **A. It's something that we felt very strongly we needed to**

9 **take action on and work on, and we announced this year**

10 **a new image-based classifier, and the objective of this**

11 **classifier is to determine whether an image may contain**

12 **child sexual exploitation and, if we have a high**

13 **certainty or, you know, idea that this is the case, it**

14 **would then be reviewed by someone in our team.**

15 **I guess the difficulty in flagging new potential**

16 **material that may not have been hashed previously -- as**

17 **you know, we have to delete any such content as soon as**

18 **we're made aware of it and, when it comes to technically**

19 **developing new technologies, learning from existing**

20 **content, it has been a technical hurdle. But the new**

21 **classifier estimates that something may be exploitative**

22 **and, therefore, I think it's a very important step in**

23 **our arsenal to make sure we flag this type of content.**

24 Q. So where the classifier thinks that an image may be

25 indecent or may contain child nudity, is, nonetheless,

Page 77

1 Q. One of the national National Crime Agency's asks of

2 industry in this area is to prevent this imagery being

3 uploaded at the outset. Not on there for a minute or

4 two until PhotoDNA kicks in or until the classifier has

5 alerted you to a potential image.

6 What steps, if any, are Facebook taking to prevent

7 the image being uploaded at the outset?

8 **A. Well, I think the -- we didn't develop PhotoDNA, you**

9 **know, Microsoft developed the technology, so they may be**

10 **better placed to provide additional insights here.**

11 **I know the way it is working on the platform would**

12 **generally move so quickly that it's really a matter of**

13 **seconds before its removal. I think we still need to be**

14 **able to conclude that the person uploaded the photo --**

15 **you know, considering that this is quite a severe**

16 **consequence, for someone to have their information**

17 **passed on to NCMEC and to have law enforcement knocking**

18 **on their door, I think we need to make sure that we have**

19 **reasonable conclusion that the content was uploaded and**

20 **is indeed matching any of the hashes that we have.**

21 MS CAREY: Thank you.

22 Chair, may I make a suggestion that's a suitable

23 time for lunch?

24 THE CHAIR: Thank you, yes, we'll return at 2.00.

25 (1.00 pm)

Page 79

1 the image still available to be viewed until such time

2 as it has been reviewed and actually been deemed to

3 contain child nudity?

4 **A. I'm actually not sure, I think there might be different**

5 **thresholds -- it's something that we can check and I can**

6 **come back to you.**

7 Q. What I'm trying to understand is -- the chair and panel

8 may well have an image of a known CSAM image being

9 uploaded and removed within a couple of minutes, but,

10 for all the images that currently haven't been hashed,

11 how long it takes for them to work out that it is

12 an indecent image and remove it, because there are many

13 more unknown indecent images than there are known hashed

14 images?

15 **A. Again, I can come back to you with a more definite**

16 **answer. Knowing how we operate in this space, it is**

17 **always our objective to make sure that the content is**

18 **removed as quickly as possible and we would not deploy**

19 **something with the goal of leaving this content sitting,**

20 **you know, for any length of time. So the reason why we**

21 **increase the size of our teams and that we have**

22 **technology working hand in hand with people is to make**

23 **sure that we get the best from both, but our objective**

24 **here would never be to leave content sitting for -- you**

25 **know, as long as up until we can review it.**

Page 78

1 (The short adjournment)

2 (2.00 pm)

3 MS CAREY: Thank you, chair.

4 Ms de Baillencourt, just one matter that arose from

5 something you said before lunch. You told us about

6 a new image classifier that Facebook uses to try and

7 detect unknown or previously unidentified child sex

8 abuse imagery.

9 Is that technology something that you would share

10 with other industry companies or is that just unique to

11 Facebook?

12 **A. I'm not sure, I think we're always willing to evaluate**

13 **what can be done to, you know, further our -- our common**

14 **progress in this area, but I'm happy to follow up**

15 **afterwards.**

16 Q. Fine, thank you very much, all right.

17 In addition to images, which we were discussing

18 before lunch, I think you also say, at paragraph 8.1(b)

19 in your statement, that videos uploaded to Facebook are

20 scanned to identify any matches against your own bank of

21 known child sexual exploitation videos.

22 You say that you ingest hashes on a weekly basis

23 from NCMEC and the Internet Watch Foundation, which you

24 bank to prevent the future upload of those images.

25 Does Facebook have its own bank of hashes?

Page 80

1 **A. We do, we have several banks of hashes.**
 2 Q. Do you share those hash banks with anyone else in
 3 industry or with law enforcement?
 4 **A. We share with NCMEC.**
 5 Q. With NCMEC.
 6 In addition, in your witness statement you said this
 7 at the time of drafting, that you were currently working
 8 on taking the IWF URL list and hope to have that work
 9 completed by early 2019.
 10 Are you able to give us an update on where Facebook
 11 is with the adoption of that list?
 12 **A. Sure. We've been discussing the taking of the URL list**
 13 **with IWF for a number of months. Right now, it's**
 14 **sitting between our lawyers and the IWF legal team, and**
 15 **I have good hope that we can make this happen. We**
 16 **believe it would be tremendously useful for Facebook to**
 17 **have access to this list, and hopefully it's something**
 18 **that we can implement speedily.**
 19 Q. It's aimed at preventing what, in terms of Facebook?
 20 Someone sending a link that contains such imagery via
 21 Facebook Messenger, for example?
 22 **A. I think our ability to block certain links from**
 23 **returning results is where this particular list would**
 24 **have great use. There may be other uses of the list**
 25 **which we'd need to evaluate as soon as we have it.**

Page 81

1 Q. That, to some extent, looks at Facebook's response to
 2 the problem of indecent imagery, but I want to look with
 3 you now, please, at the position with grooming and at
 4 your paragraph 8.1(h) onwards.
 5 How is it that Facebook are trying to combat the
 6 problem of people using Facebook Messenger, for example,
 7 to identify and groom a child?
 8 **A. I think we felt, since 2012 -- this is one of the**
 9 **earlier dates that I remember us working on this -- we**
 10 **felt that, with the high probability of children not**
 11 **reporting these types of abuse voluntarily, in the event**
 12 **that they were successfully groomed or too frightened to**
 13 **do this, that we needed to take a further step to**
 14 **identify this type of behaviour regardless of a user**
 15 **report.**
 16 **We have been working hard in improving some of this**
 17 **detection mechanism. The -- the technology that we used**
 18 **in 2012 seems quite rudimentary compared to what our**
 19 **current teams are using and, thankfully, as machine --**
 20 **machine intelligence and -- artificial intelligence,**
 21 **rather, as this technology evolves, it provides us with**
 22 **new opportunities that did not exist a number of years**
 23 **ago.**
 24 Q. In addition to any artificial intelligence that's being
 25 used to try and identify, perhaps, inappropriate

Page 83

1 Q. You said that you have been discussing with the IWF for
 2 a number of months. In your statement, you said you
 3 began conversations with the IWF in 2014 about the use
 4 of such information. Why is it that, five years on,
 5 this technology still hasn't been resolved such that you
 6 can use that kind of list?
 7 **A. Yes, I think it's one of our UK-based employees who**
 8 **started or initiated these conversations and we've been**
 9 **having some back and forth. At some time, there were**
 10 **other projects which were implemented ahead of the list,**
 11 **and, as we got better, I guess, in our detection**
 12 **mechanism and understanding what else we can do, we felt**
 13 **that the need to take the list would be important for**
 14 **us, so I reinitiated those conversations, probably**
 15 **a year and a half ago, and we have been working on**
 16 **making this happen.**
 17 **I think the way the -- the terms of use for this**
 18 **particular list were developed for ISPs or search**
 19 **engines and, because of the nature of our service, there**
 20 **might be some tweaks that need to be made from a legal**
 21 **perspective to satisfy both parties.**
 22 Q. I think, finally, on this topic, that any
 23 newly-generated child sexual exploitation imagery is
 24 hashed by Facebook and banked by them as well?
 25 **A. Yes.**

Page 82

1 conversations between an adult user and a child user,
 2 what about human moderators?
 3 **A. Yes, I mean, people can report grooming to us and we,**
 4 **indeed, have a great network of safety partners, such as**
 5 **the UK Safer Internet Centre the NSPCC and many others**
 6 **across the world who can also contact us in the event**
 7 **that they get phone calls from a child or from concerned**
 8 **parents, the same thing with law enforcement, and CEOP**
 9 **may want to flag some of these to us.**
 10 **I do want to provide more detail on this classifier.**
 11 **It is a behavioural classifier, so we're really looking**
 12 **at patterns of behaviour that may indicate that someone**
 13 **is trying to approach, or behaves in a predatorial way**
 14 **towards children on the platform. So we're really way**
 15 **beyond any type of key word flagging detection; we're**
 16 **really looking at quite sophisticated pattern**
 17 **recognition.**
 18 Q. In the event that either the classifier or a moderator
 19 thinks that there is inappropriate interaction, what
 20 practically happens to step in to try and say, "Well, is
 21 this inappropriate or is there actually a legitimate
 22 reason for these two people to be having contact with
 23 each other"?
 24 **A. Yes, if we do have any -- any knowledge or if we see,**
 25 **through the course of reviewing a report, that there is**

Page 84

1 potentially something inappropriate, we do have clear
 2 processes in place. So, for example, an adult
 3 soliciting imagery from a child is enough to have the
 4 account deleted, or removed from Facebook rather than
 5 deleted, and this reported to NCMEC. So we have a clear
 6 threshold on what we think is appropriate and acceptable
 7 in terms of interactions.

8 Those accounts may also be -- may also be forwarded
 9 to our child safety team for further review to
 10 understand whether they may have been material produced
 11 by the child, whether there are other concerning
 12 indicators of abuse, so things like -- something that
 13 would warrant a speedier flag to law enforcement
 14 agencies beyond the pure NCMEC report.

15 Q. Are any educational messages or warning messages sent to
 16 the child if it's thought that they might be interacting
 17 inappropriately with an adult?

18 A. We do have some education before or when children
 19 interact with people they may not know through Messenger
 20 so there are a number of screens.

21 Beyond this, we do have -- I mean, our own detection
 22 mechanism. If we find that a child has been sending
 23 self-generated material, we do have some check points or
 24 some educational messages that are sent to the child to
 25 explain the risk that they may be taking, the legality

Page 85

1 doing to allay concerns that actually children are not
 2 being groomed over your platform?

3 A. I think, we -- through our policies, our detection
 4 mechanism, our partnership and our work with law
 5 enforcement in the UK and abroad, I think we have
 6 demonstrated that we are serious in being very
 7 aggressive and making our platform as inhospitable as
 8 possible to this type of behaviour.

9 I can't comment on the specific numbers. I know
 10 that we proactively contact the police when we have
 11 indication that such behaviour is happening and we
 12 report everything to NCMEC.

13 But beyond this, there are hundreds of people
 14 working at Facebook, whether on the constant review side
 15 or the engineering side, whose job it is to understand
 16 how we can do better, how we can deter and flag and
 17 report in order to make this type of behaviour not
 18 possible on our service.

19 Q. If one just works out the statistics, though, over that
 20 six-month period, it's roughly two incidents of sexual
 21 communication a day that's being used on Facebook. On
 22 any view, that's two children that are potentially being
 23 groomed, and that might indicate, might it not, that,
 24 actually, the response from Facebook to grooming isn't
 25 as sufficiently aggressive as it ought to be?

Page 87

1 of the conduct that they are engaging with.

2 I do have to explain as well here that this is
 3 purely for cases where this is a non-coerced, consensual
 4 sending of material, usually between teens who may be in
 5 a relationship.

6 Q. I ask about grooming because I want to ask about
 7 an article behind our tab 7. If we could look, please,
 8 at INQ004186_001, 002 and 003.

9 Just dealing with first page, this is
 10 an article that was on the BBC News on 1 March of this
 11 year and arising out of an NSPCC research. If one looks
 12 below the photograph on that page, police in England and
 13 Wales recorded 1,944 incidents of sexual communication
 14 with a child in the six months to September 2018.

15 Clearly, they set out the figures there for
 16 Instagram use in almost a third of the cases; Facebook
 17 in 23 per cent of the cases, and so on. Crude maths,
 18 it's just under about 500 instances over that six-month
 19 period.

20 The article goes on to say:
 21 "Instagram and Facebook said they aggressively
 22 fought grooming, whilst Snapchat said it was
 23 unacceptable."

24 But looking at that level of offences recorded,
 25 I want to ask you, please, really, what is Facebook

Page 86

1 I want, really, you to explain to the chair and
 2 panel how they can have any confidence in what Facebook
 3 says about tackling the problem of online grooming.

4 A. Again, I think, as I've explained, we have invested and
 5 are and will continue to invest a huge amount in terms
 6 of human resource and technology to make this
 7 unacceptable.

8 Looking at this number here, I don't know, you know,
 9 which ones of these were provided through, like, cyber
 10 tips which may have come from industry, so we are
 11 definitely taking our responsibility here in making sure
 12 that we report any of these instances to the right --
 13 you know, to the right authorities.

14 I do have to say that in my course of working for
 15 Facebook in the field of child safety as well, there has
 16 been a welcome focus in acknowledging that certain
 17 behaviours towards children are unacceptable and should
 18 not be tolerated, and openly talking about these
 19 interactions and having parents engage with their
 20 children on the topic of online safety also has done
 21 a world of good in making sure that young people flag
 22 when they believe they are being engaged in
 23 an inappropriate way.

24 Q. On that point, if a 13- to 18-year old sets up
 25 a Facebook account, is there any message sent by

Page 88

1 Facebook to an adult in the same household that might
 2 share those IP addresses, for example?
 3 **A. No. There isn't, and we are bound by what we can share**
 4 **proactively with users and law enforcement. Nor would**
 5 **we know how people are necessarily connected. I think**
 6 **our goal is to make sure that we prevent any of these**
 7 **interactions in the first place through how the platform**
 8 **is constructed and the safeguards that exist, and then**
 9 **be very aggressive in those removals. Yes.**
 10 Q. The chair and panel heard from a witness this morning
 11 who spoke about the need to educate the parents.
 12 Now, if they have a Facebook account themselves,
 13 they may be aware of parental controls, but there may
 14 equally be mums and dads out there who don't have
 15 a Facebook account.
 16 What is Facebook doing to try and educate the
 17 uneducated, as far as Facebook is concerned, so that
 18 they know about parental controls and they can enforce
 19 their own boundaries at home? What's your kind of
 20 advertising campaign, if that be the right phrase?
 21 **A. Yes, we created a portal dedicated to parents in**
 22 **helping, hopefully, parents navigate the online space**
 23 **for their children.**
 24 **As a mother myself, I'm aware of some of the**
 25 **challenges related to this. I'm -- the biggest thing**

Page 89

1 **with a number of organisations in the UK. We've been**
 2 **working with the Diana Awards, in particular the**
 3 **anti-bullying ambassadors, for a number of years. We**
 4 **also have a strong partnership and programmes with**
 5 **Childnet, Childnet International, and then further**
 6 **partnership with internet matters and many others.**
 7 Q. As part of the response to grooming, is it right that
 8 Facebook participated in the Hackathon in November of
 9 2018, and, arising out of that, there is the potential
 10 for a prototype that might be able to detect grooming?
 11 Insofar as you are able, are you able to give us
 12 an update on how that prototype is coming along, if
 13 I can put it like that?
 14 **A. We did indeed participate, the Hackathon was**
 15 **co-organised by Microsoft in their premises. So we've**
 16 **actively supported the creation of this prototype.**
 17 **I understand there is a proof of concept and that, right**
 18 **now, The Tech Coalition, which is an industry grouping**
 19 **based in the US is looking for ways to find**
 20 **a distribution model to get this to smaller and**
 21 **medium-sized companies.**
 22 **So the tool I think was developed for maybe newer**
 23 **apps, newer services, but as far as I know, there is**
 24 **just a proof of concept. But Microsoft may be able to**
 25 **share more, if they have further information.**

Page 91

1 **that we've heard not from parents necessarily, but from**
 2 **children, they are sometimes afraid that speaking up**
 3 **about something that happens online may result in losing**
 4 **access to their device, and it looks for some of the**
 5 **younger generation that maintaining an online presence**
 6 **is really critical and sometimes would go against their**
 7 **ability to speak to bad behaviour.**
 8 **What we're really trying to do here is reassure**
 9 **parents, first and foremost, that we take our**
 10 **responsibility very seriously and that we have a number**
 11 **of things in place. This is not the wild, wild West and**
 12 **it's never been the case, and, secondly, that engaging**
 13 **in discussions with their own children, while they may**
 14 **not be experts in online services, would still create**
 15 **a climate of trust. For a parent being able to say to**
 16 **a child, "If there's ever something that happens to you,**
 17 **or ever something that makes you uncomfortable, please**
 18 **come and talk to me", is already a great, huge step in**
 19 **the right direction.**
 20 Q. Does Facebook take any steps in relation to providing
 21 educational tools at school, either at primary or at
 22 secondary level, to try and help educate the child about
 23 some of the dangers of being online?
 24 **A. Obviously, as a private company, we can't get into**
 25 **schools, but we have developed extensive partnerships**

Page 90

1 Q. Under the umbrella of Facebook comes WhatsApp, and
 2 I know that you are not a witness speaking on behalf of
 3 WhatsApp, but, nonetheless, are able to answer, I hope,
 4 some questions about that messaging service.
 5 Can I ask you please about your paragraph 8.1(k) at
 6 page 16 of your witness statement and explain, really,
 7 what the links are between Facebook and WhatsApp and
 8 what may or may not be shared between those two
 9 platforms, and how you are trying to prevent child
 10 sexual exploitation imagery being shared across Facebook
 11 and WhatsApp?
 12 **A. Sure, so paragraph 8(k) conflated some information which**
 13 **I'm going to pull apart. The first one is that while**
 14 **WhatsApp obviously is a completely different service,**
 15 **their teams have confirmed that PhotoDNA is running**
 16 **across all of the non-encrypted parts of WhatsApp that**
 17 **are available and, through this, the WhatsApp team have**
 18 **shared that they have been, for example, able to ban**
 19 **250,000 accounts each month suspected of sharing child**
 20 **sexual exploitation.**
 21 Q. Can I just pause you there, 250,000 out of how many?
 22 **A. I think there are over 1 billion users on WhatsApp.**
 23 Q. So that's worldwide?
 24 **A. Yes.**
 25 Q. Okay.

Page 92

1 **A. Yes, it would be.**
2 **One of the other elements mentioned in**
3 **paragraph 8(k) is actually just related to Facebook and**
4 **we talked a little bit about it earlier on, which is**
5 **this ability for us to educate people who may share**
6 **content shared in outrage, which is a narrow case for us**
7 **and educating on this.**
8 **The third one is related to having an account on**
9 **Facebook that may get disabled for sharing child sexual**
10 **exploitation, which in turn, if we have a high**
11 **certainty -- a high degree of certainty that this**
12 **account also has an associated WhatsApp account, we will**
13 **then ban the user, or the WhatsApp team will ban the**
14 **user, from WhatsApp as well.**
15 Q. So is it the position that Facebook can now proactively
16 prevent this kind of imagery being shared from between
17 Facebook to WhatsApp, have I got that the right way
18 around?
19 **A. I think the imagery detection works through PhotoDNA, so**
20 **this is in place anyway, but our ability to determine**
21 **that if somebody has breached our terms of use for**
22 **severe violation, like child sexual exploitation, that**
23 **we would ban them from WhatsApp or, rather, the WhatsApp**
24 **team would ban them on the basis of this information.**
25 Q. Clearly, the PhotoDNA, though, can only operate on the

Page 93

1 **A. Exactly.**
2 Q. I ask you about WhatsApp, Ms de Bailliencourt, because
3 there was an article earlier this year -- if we look,
4 please, behind your tab 9 and call up on screen
5 INQ004190 -- an article that appeared in The Telegraph
6 on 21 January of this year. The headline reads:
7 "WhatsApp is failing to stop paedophiles sharing
8 child abuse images, say the police."
9 When one turns over the page in your bundle and on
10 to page 2 of this reference, concern was expressed there
11 in the second paragraph by the National Police Chiefs'
12 Council, Chief Constable Simon Bailey, who, it says --
13 I'll read it:
14 "... singled out the Facebook-owned messaging app
15 after evidence that paedophiles have set up groups on
16 the site with titles such as 'Only child pornography',
17 'CP' and 'Gay kids, sex only'. "
18 On any view, they are titles that might cause alarm
19 bells, and should cause alarm bells, to ring.
20 What is WhatsApp doing to prevent such groups (a)
21 having a title such as that and (b) then, no doubt,
22 going on to use that group to share indecent imagery?
23 **A. The WhatsApp team has confirmed with me that they are --**
24 **so, as I mentioned, running PhotoDNA anyway, but also**
25 **looking at such group titles, and have some proactive**

Page 95

1 unencrypted part, so not on the message, which is
2 end-to-end encrypted, does it follow from that that
3 effectively you rely on users reporting indecent imagery
4 or indecent conversations when WhatsApp is being used?
5 **A. Reports from users to the WhatsApp team are important**
6 **and the WhatsApp team would -- I think it would**
7 **de-encrypt part of the conversation, allowing -- and**
8 **sometimes using screenshots as well, allowing the**
9 **WhatsApp team to take action.**
10 **Beyond this, the fact that WhatsApp, despite**
11 **end-to-end encryption, is still able to remove the**
12 **number that I've mentioned, 250,000 accounts every**
13 **month, without having access to content of messages, is**
14 **still a testament to some of the newer technology that**
15 **is emerging, looking at behavioural patterns.**
16 **One thing worth noting that the WhatsApp team wanted**
17 **me to state today is that they have a very strict**
18 **policy, if there is one person sharing this type of**
19 **content in the group, or if we can flag that this group**
20 **has a photo that is matched with PhotoDNA hashes, the**
21 **whole group will be taken down and every participant**
22 **will be banned from WhatsApp.**
23 Q. So it's not just the individual user who shared it, but
24 the entire group, which may run to many numbers of
25 participants?

Page 94

1 **detection mechanism in place to flag and pull down**
2 **anything that may -- that may appear to be of this**
3 **nature.**
4 Q. The article goes on to say that there were various ads
5 that were available on Google Play Store -- indeed,
6 Google will be a witness later on this week -- but that
7 the apps directed paedophiles to WhatsApp groups where
8 hundreds of paedophiles were sharing illegal child
9 pornography. So says the report by AntiToxin that is
10 quoted within the article.
11 I appreciate it's only two examples now, but we've
12 looked at the grooming problem in relation to the first
13 article. Here, now, potentially a problem on WhatsApp.
14 It might suggest to the outside observer that still
15 not enough is being done to prevent this kind of imagery
16 being used on either Facebook or WhatsApp?
17 **A. I think, due to the nature of people who are intent in**
18 **sharing content, or connecting with others, like-minded**
19 **individuals, I think we're facing people who are trying**
20 **to evade our systems, trying to evade any detection**
21 **mechanism that we have put in place and, therefore, we**
22 **need to shift and adapt our approach constantly.**
23 **This is never a battle that is ever fully won, but**
24 **we need to stay one step ahead, and every single of**
25 **these stories or every single one of these incidents is**

Page 96

1 also a source of the ability to look at, you know, what
 2 our teams are doing and how we can improve and do
 3 better. So I do accept there is content which shouldn't
 4 be there, which I think provides us with the ability to
 5 take further action.

6 On the WhatsApp question, the WhatsApp team told me
 7 that the ability to aggregate different group links into
 8 a new app is not allowed, so something that we remove --
 9 or that they remove, rather, and, as you mention,
 10 I presume other industry players may have to, or will be
 11 able to, share more information on their practices here.

12 Q. Since it is acknowledged that PhotoDNA and classifiers
 13 and the like are not able to detect imagery where
 14 there's end-to-end encryption, why is it, then, that
 15 in March of this year, your chief executive officer,
 16 Mr Zuckerberg, outlined Facebook's vision, and I quote:
 17 "... to such an extent that, in fact, you will be
 18 using more end-to-end encryption over Facebook."
 19 A. Yes, I think --

20 Q. Why is that deemed to be a sensible idea, given the
 21 difficulties law enforcement have with detecting this
 22 kind of illegal content?
 23 A. I think based on the feedback from what people expect
 24 from an online platform, we have looked into developing
 25 more end-to-end encryption -- encrypted parts into the

Page 97

1 into consideration input from people all around the
 2 globe. There are some great safety benefits as well in
 3 having some conversation encrypted, and we've heard from
 4 activists, we've heard from victims or survivors of
 5 domestic violence who speak to how important it is for
 6 them to be able to communicate with their loved one in
 7 a way that is secure.

8 After announcing that we were going to look at
 9 end-to-end encryption, our feedback has been incredibly
 10 positive from the communities and people who use our
 11 services. But we understand that we have a lot of work
 12 to do to make this happen and make this happen with the
 13 safety elements fully taken into account.

14 Q. The counter-balance to the positives that end-to-end
 15 encryption might bring, such as enabling, perhaps,
 16 someone to criticise in a less liberal country, surely
 17 need to be offset against the potential harm for
 18 terrorists or those intent on child sexual abuse using
 19 end-to-end encryption. Who is it who is going to decide
 20 where that balance is ultimately drawn?
 21 A. I'm not sure I can speculate or provide much more
 22 insights on this.

23 Q. Is Facebook engaging with law enforcement as to how they
 24 can address their concerns, which would no doubt be that
 25 this might lead to a proliferation of this kind of

Page 99

1 service, so it's not Facebook that would be end-to-end
 2 encrypted, but, rather, the Messenger part of Facebook.

3 We're in very, very early days in looking at how
 4 this may happen, and the objective of the company is
 5 really to make sure that we build a privacy-focused
 6 platform, but building all of the safety safeguards that
 7 we can, and we have been working on using feedback from
 8 experts and many others to understand what is feasible
 9 here.

10 Having seen some of the emerging technology and some
 11 of the things that I think will be doable and, I think,
 12 the behavioural classifiers that we have implemented
 13 also showcase that there are a number of exciting
 14 avenues that are possible without necessarily having to
 15 rely on the content of a message.

16 Q. Why is Facebook moving in the direction of
 17 a privacy-focused messaging and social networking
 18 platform? What's the rationale behind this?
 19 A. I think feedback from users and regulators and many
 20 others have indicated that creating a space where people
 21 can share, you know, their thoughts and views without
 22 fear of government interference or hacking or, indeed,
 23 Facebook having access to this is something that is
 24 important.
 25 As you know, we are a global platform, and we take

Page 98

1 imagery and abuse happening?
 2 A. We are engaging with a broad range of stakeholders
 3 across a number of disciplines and across the world, and
 4 I think would very much like to continue this
 5 conversation. The WhatsApp law enforcement outreach
 6 team has confirmed that they are currently in the
 7 process of hiring somebody who will be based either in
 8 Dublin or in the UK, who I think will be also a prime
 9 conduit for some of the law enforcement feedback on
 10 this.

11 Q. Just finally on this topic, can I ask you, please, to
 12 have a look behind your tab 10 and at our INQ004189_001,
 13 because, Ms de Bailliencourt, you've mentioned that
 14 there is certainly a group of people that have given
 15 positive feedback to this announcement, but equally, we
 16 see here in an article in March of this year, I think --
 17 sorry, January of this year -- in The Mail Online,
 18 making reference to the NSPCC here in the UK actually
 19 having real concerns about how Facebook's plans may be
 20 making it easier for child abusers to access young
 21 victims and groom them without being detected.
 22 So there clearly is, contrary to some positive
 23 feedback, real concerns certainly being expressed in the
 24 UK by the charity that is predominantly responsible for
 25 child protection and cruelty.

Page 100

1 What is Facebook doing to incorporate people like
 2 the NSPCC's views about this and allay any concerns that
 3 they may have?
 4 **A. Yes, we are obviously aware of some of the concerns over**
 5 **our key safety stakeholders. I think, at this stage,**
 6 **it's difficult for me to indicate, you know, what this**
 7 **will look like. I -- I do want to highlight that we're**
 8 **not, again, encrypting Facebook, we are just looking at**
 9 **end-to-end encryption on parts of the service, but all**
 10 **of the information that can be gained from pages and**
 11 **groups and news feed and people's profile, this is not**
 12 **going to be encrypted. Again, we can gain tremendous**
 13 **insight and some of our technological advances have at**
 14 **least provided me with good comfort that there are lots**
 15 **of things that can be done that may not rely on the**
 16 **content of messages.**
 17 Q. But it's the messages that are being used predominantly
 18 to groom, and so that's the concern, not that you're
 19 encrypting the entirety of Facebook, but the very harm
 20 that we've identified in grooming is actually going to
 21 be made easier by the end-to-end encryption rather than
 22 made worse.
 23 Can I move on, please, to live streaming and your
 24 paragraph 8.1(l), and ask you, please, to firstly set
 25 out, is there any knowledge or data held by Facebook as

Page 101

1 **with regards to live streaming, we have not seen those**
 2 **happening on the platform, at least not in a manner that**
 3 **would indicate that we have significant technological**
 4 **gaps.**
 5 **We do have in place reporting against live**
 6 **streaming, we do have teams reviewing very quickly the**
 7 **content. The same policies apply and we do apply**
 8 **technology to understand what is happening on live**
 9 **streams. Obviously, there is -- there are many more**
 10 **opportunities here to improve compared to what we have,**
 11 **but with regards to this child-safety-specific**
 12 **streaming, this is not something that we have seen**
 13 **happening on the platform too often.**
 14 Q. Is it the case that, where there is a live video, they
 15 are reviewed and prioritised ahead of posts?
 16 **A. Yes. In our prioritisation model, live -- live videos,**
 17 **while they're still live, are reviewed extremely quickly**
 18 **and the same -- again, the same policies and processes**
 19 **apply here. When a live video is over, it becomes**
 20 **a video, but would still be seen by our team very**
 21 **quickly.**
 22 Q. You said at paragraph 5 on page 17 in your statement
 23 that, since 2017, Facebook have used pattern recognition
 24 technology to detect posts or live videos in which
 25 someone might be expressing suicidal thoughts.

Page 103

1 to how prevalent or otherwise live streaming is over
 2 Facebook?
 3 **A. We don't tend to look at prevalence of abuse across the**
 4 **content types but, rather, across the platform. So if**
 5 **we're looking at child sexual exploitation, we will look**
 6 **at this across the whole spectrum, whether it is**
 7 **a comment, a video or a photo, rather than specifically**
 8 **looking at live.**
 9 Q. But is there any perception by Facebook about how common
 10 live streaming is on your platform?
 11 **A. I think --**
 12 Q. I'm trying to get an idea of the scale of the problem.
 13 **A. Of course.**
 14 **Live streaming is a popular product or popular**
 15 **feature, rather, for some of our users. Again, I can't**
 16 **comment on whether it's as popular or more popular than**
 17 **other parts of the service. I do want to add that in my**
 18 **work on child safety in the last few years, we have seen**
 19 **an increased number of conversations touching on live --**
 20 **live streaming. Obviously we did not invent live**
 21 **streaming, this is something that existed through many**
 22 **other services, but have been watching with caution and**
 23 **ensuring that we were well aware of the type of abuse**
 24 **that may develop on the platform.**
 25 **Some of the examples that are sometimes provided**

Page 102

1 And if there is technology available in relation to
 2 that form of harm, the question that follows is, why is
 3 there not technology in relation to streaming that might
 4 involve child sexual exploitation? Can you help with
 5 that?
 6 **A. Sure. I think the -- as I mentioned, this is late in**
 7 **2017, we shared some of the opportunities that machine**
 8 **learning provided us to detect whether someone who is**
 9 **broadcasting themselves live may be at risk. We have**
 10 **the made progress here and the beauty of machine**
 11 **learning is that, as it understands what is happening**
 12 **and as our team are feeding insights into it, it can get**
 13 **better. I think, as we become more sophisticated here,**
 14 **this could offer really interesting opportunities on the**
 15 **child safety side. Although, again, as I have**
 16 **mentioned, because live streaming of child abuse is not**
 17 **a very common undertaking, thankfully, you know, this**
 18 **may provide limits to the learning that we may get from**
 19 **such reports. But I think we're keen to understand**
 20 **where we can make best use of the technology that is**
 21 **deployed in one area of the company and adapt this to**
 22 **other types of abuse.**
 23 Q. Can I move on to law enforcement and Facebook's
 24 interaction and engagement with law enforcement.
 25 Obviously we have touched already upon Facebook's

Page 104

1 reporting to NCMEC. And clearly, if the report relates
 2 to a UK IP address, then it will be disseminated to the
 3 National Crime Agency here, but in addition to reporting
 4 to NCMEC, is it right that Facebook also receive
 5 requests from UK law enforcement authorities about
 6 Facebook accounts and messages and the like?
 7 **A. We do indeed.**
 8 Q. In 2017, did Facebook receive 46 legal requests from the
 9 National Crime Agency, and 2,898 legal requests from
 10 local police forces?
 11 **A. If this is a number from my witness statement --**
 12 Q. It is.
 13 **A. -- then it is correct, yes.**
 14 Q. You said that, to date in 2018, Facebook had received
 15 about 100 legal requests and your statement was made,
 16 I think, at the very end of last year, on 5 December.
 17 So it had increased since 2017. And that they had --
 18 you had received at Facebook 2,700 legal requests from
 19 local police forces in England and Wales.
 20 Did those requests come to the sort of the Dublin
 21 the local base or do they go to America?
 22 **A. I don't know for sure. I know we receive those requests**
 23 **through a dedicated portal for law enforcement agencies.**
 24 **We also have kind of designated staff who are liaising**
 25 **with law enforcement for a given country or a given**

Page 105

1 takes a long time to respond to a law enforcement
 2 request, which is why I asked about the funding provided
 3 to it. Why is it that it takes time to respond to a law
 4 enforcement request if they want to know whose is the
 5 address, who is the IP address, can they see the
 6 messages that pass between A and B?
 7 **A. Again, I'm not a lawyer, I just know that our team**
 8 **receives different types of legal requests and these,**
 9 **I think, need to tick a number of boxes from a legal**
 10 **perspective before we can comply.**
 11 **I know, based on some of the cases that I would have**
 12 **seen, that some requests may include basic subscriber**
 13 **information which can be provided very quickly and, in**
 14 **the cases that I have looked at, were provided very**
 15 **swiftly. Other cases -- you're mentioning content of**
 16 **messages, I think this may fall under MLAT --**
 17 Q. So the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty process?
 18 **A. Exactly. And again, not being at all an expert in those**
 19 **areas, but I understand here that we are bound by what**
 20 **the MLAT process sets out for us, but this not something**
 21 **that Facebook has explicitly created or indeed is, you**
 22 **know, delaying.**
 23 Q. In relation to financial considerations, I've asked you
 24 a number of questions about how various teams are
 25 financed. One of the National Crime Agency's three key

Page 107

1 **region. After that, I'm not sure how they are being**
 2 **evaluated, but I know we have a substantial amount of**
 3 **people working on those requests for each country that**
 4 **they cover.**
 5 Q. So it goes to, did you say, a dedicated law enforcement
 6 request team?
 7 **A. Yes.**
 8 Q. Are you able to provide the numbers that would -- that
 9 UK requests go to? What's the numbers of the team
 10 involved in dealing with UK requests?
 11 **A. I wouldn't know the number.**
 12 Q. Are you able to give us any indication of the cost of
 13 financing the law enforcement request team?
 14 **A. No, I don't have this number either.**
 15 Q. Is that a number that could be obtained?
 16 **A. I'm not sure, I would need to check with those teams.**
 17 Q. Because one of the concerns expressed by UK law
 18 enforcement is sometimes the length of time that is
 19 taken to respond to a law enforcement request.
 20 Now, can I make it clear at the outset there are
 21 those that are deemed to be immediate, where a life is
 22 in danger, and then there is less priority given to
 23 perhaps where there is a non-immediate risk, but
 24 certainly there is evidence before the inquiry that
 25 where the danger is not urgent or imminent, Facebook

Page 106

1 asks is for a portion of a budget to be ring-fenced for
 2 trying to combat the problem of imagery, grooming, live
 3 streaming. I don't even know if there is an R&D --
 4 research and design -- budget at Facebook, but I would
 5 like Facebook's comments on the NCA's ask?
 6 **A. Yes, I think based on my experience and having seen how**
 7 **the company has grown and developed, there is nothing**
 8 **here that would make me think that we're not committed**
 9 **to keeping an extremely strong investment in safety, in**
 10 **developing new technologies and in supporting people**
 11 **with -- you know, with real teams of humans.**
 12 **You know, because we're touching on so many teams,**
 13 **whether on the legal side, whether on the engineering**
 14 **side whether on the community operations side, I don't**
 15 **think there is one given line item for this, but**
 16 **I think, if you look at all of those teams, they have**
 17 **been growing, the scope of their work has been**
 18 **developing in complexity, and the numbers that we have**
 19 **shared over the last two or three years, at least on the**
 20 **community operations side, indicates that we are, you**
 21 **know, continuing to be ever more transparent on the**
 22 **number of people behind the scenes working on these**
 23 **topics, and our ongoing investment on this side.**
 24 **Just to add on the R&D budget, I saw we had**
 25 **announced or we had shared some public numbers on our**

Page 108

1 **investment in AI, which I think amounts to billions, and**
 2 **this is separate from any other financial number**
 3 **I would've given you. If you bear with me, I can give**
 4 **you the exact number.**
 5 Q. Yes, please.
 6 **A. Sorry, multibillion dollars annual investment in**
 7 **artificial intelligence.**
 8 Q. Do we take it that some of that would be artificial
 9 intelligence that would look at combating child sexual
 10 abuse?
 11 **A. I don't have more detail into the specific number, but**
 12 **what I have seen of technology is, once we develop**
 13 **somewhere, it's usually adapted, or can be adapted, in**
 14 **other areas, so it's not to say that something that may**
 15 **be developed for a particular part of the -- of our**
 16 **service, may not be used later for child safety.**
 17 Q. In your bundle behind tab 14, there is, in fact,
 18 an extract of a statement that the inquiry have obtained
 19 that says this:
 20 "Facebook is far ahead of other social media outlets
 21 with regard to safety options."
 22 That's the perception of a group that is currently
 23 trying to set up pseudonyms, set up fake accounts to
 24 detect groomers before handing them over to the police.
 25 But that statement goes on to say that there is

Page 109

1 Q. So one shouldn't deduce that just because the user A and
 2 B can't see it, that Facebook wouldn't be able to retain
 3 that data and hand it over to law enforcement if it were
 4 appropriate to do so?
 5 **A. Yes.**
 6 Q. All right.
 7 Final topic, please, Ms de Bailliencourt, and it's
 8 in relation to the UK Government's recently publicised
 9 White Paper on online harms.
 10 The inquiry appreciates that the consultation is
 11 still ongoing and is ongoing, I think, for a number of
 12 weeks yet, still, but insofar as you are able, Facebook,
 13 I think, having contributed to the Green Paper, the
 14 consultation that preceded this, are you able to say
 15 what Facebook's views or preliminary views are on the
 16 proposal there should be a regulatory framework?
 17 **A. Yes, I think we have said for quite some time that we do**
 18 **welcome, you know, further, you know, work with**
 19 **government and that the topic of online harm is**
 20 **an extremely difficult one and having further input from**
 21 **regulators would be welcome in this space.**
 22 **Obviously, the White Paper is very ambitious in its**
 23 **scope and covers a number of topics. We've been very**
 24 **clear that we welcome a more active role for government**
 25 **in this space, setting base line, and would welcome**

Page 111

1 a flaw with Facebook, in that they now allow messages to
 2 be removed from both sides of the chat by the sender.
 3 And that, for example, if person A sends a message
 4 to person B, person A can subsequently remove the
 5 message and it will be removed from both person A and
 6 B's devices:
 7 "Facebook should be asked whether a message removed
 8 from chat is logged within the database so it can be
 9 retrieved, if required, by law enforcement, for
 10 example."
 11 Firstly, is that assertion correct in that statement
 12 and, secondly, if so, what's Facebook's response to
 13 that?
 14 **A. Yes. So I think this is speaking to a feature that we**
 15 **rolled out. As far as I know, there are some limits to**
 16 **how this feature works and what can be removed.**
 17 **Messages removed by the sender can still be reported by**
 18 **the person. The entire thread can still be reported for**
 19 **review. Again, I'm not sure whether there is conflation**
 20 **between the fact that something may be not visible by**
 21 **a member of the public and equating this to not still**
 22 **held by the company provider.**
 23 **We do hold messages that have been removed by the**
 24 **sender for a number of days and would have thought of**
 25 **cases where the police may want to contact us as well.**

Page 110

1 **a new regulator as well.**
 2 Q. Within the broad range of harms that are addressed in
 3 that White Paper, though, there is a clear distinction
 4 in the government's mind between the harms that are not
 5 illegal, such as bullying, and harms that are obviously
 6 illegal, such as terrorist activity and, in fact, online
 7 child sexual abuse and exploitation.
 8 One of the suggestions is there should be a code of
 9 practice. Are you able to outline what Facebook's view
 10 may be on that proposal by the UK Government?
 11 **A. So based on, you know, my discussion with some of the**
 12 **team based here, the -- helping to standardise the**
 13 **approach across services is something that would be**
 14 **welcome, so establishing base lines, for example.**
 15 **I've talked a little bit earlier on about**
 16 **prevalence, whether we discuss prevalence, and we think**
 17 **this is a very important metric in understanding**
 18 **progresses made by companies towards keeping harm at**
 19 **a minimum on the platform.**
 20 **I do, however, have some concerns in this new**
 21 **category of content that would be not illegal, but**
 22 **harmful. You've mentioned bullying. One example that**
 23 **came to mind as I was thinking about today, was that**
 24 **bullying is very much felt by the person who is targeted**
 25 **by this, but not necessarily obvious to a third party.**

Page 112

1 **When we created our policies, we allow young people to**
 2 **report content that may seem innocuous to you and me but**
 3 **they may feel puts them at the centre of offline and**
 4 **online bullying. I think, with such regulation, we're**
 5 **going to very nuanced and very complex issues and --**
 6 MS CAREY: That's really why I wanted to focus on the child
 7 sexual exploitation element, which is in a different
 8 category, it being undoubtedly illegal and the very
 9 focus of the inquiry.
 10 Ms de Bailliencourt, that's probably all the
 11 questions I have for you, I'll just check in a moment.
 12 Whilst I do so, may I turn to you, chair, and ask if
 13 there are any questions from you or the panel for this
 14 witness?
 15 THE CHAIR: One question here.
 16 Questions by THE PANEL
 17 MS SHARPLING: Thank you, Ms de Bailliencourt. Just
 18 a couple of questions, if I may. There was
 19 an article in The Times on Sunday, I think, which
 20 discussed, amongst other things, the finding of indecent
 21 imagery of children which had been on Facebook in
 22 an open group where others could view it for at least
 23 three years. Can I just ask you for an explanation of
 24 what happened in that particular instance, so that
 25 I understand it better?

Page 113

1 **give us additional information that make their reports**
 2 **incredibly useful. We obviously try to rely on**
 3 **technology to flag this proactively without anybody**
 4 **having to report it to us. Would it be helpful if I was**
 5 **explaining to you how the image classifier works in**
 6 **layman's terms?**
 7 MS SHARPLING: Yes, please.
 8 **A. Okay.**
 9 **The image classifier that we have developed seeks to**
 10 **identify whether there may be a child pictured in**
 11 **a photo, alongside other signals that may indicate**
 12 **sexual activity. Let's imagine that our classifier**
 13 **could detect that there is the image of a young child**
 14 **but also detects that there is indication that there is**
 15 **an erect penis on the same photo. As you can imagine,**
 16 **this is highly likely that we may want to take a further**
 17 **look at this image to understand what it is and then**
 18 **take the appropriate action.**
 19 **As we've been working through developing these**
 20 **technologies, they get better over time and the initial**
 21 **stages are usually good but not as good as what it's**
 22 **going to be in the next few years. So the more eyes we**
 23 **have on this, the more teams feed into this effort, the**
 24 **higher quality this classifier will become and we'll be**
 25 **able to detect things with a much higher probability and**

Page 115

1 **A. Sure. I did seek input from some of our teams who**
 2 **worked on this, based on what I understand, the first**
 3 **knowledge we received related to those five links was**
 4 **through The Times themselves, so this content existed on**
 5 **the platform, I don't know how long it had been on the**
 6 **platform, but certainly had not been reported to us.**
 7 **So when the journalist flagged this and brought this**
 8 **to our attention, we obviously took very swift action**
 9 **and then our team are doing further kinds of deep dive**
 10 **to understand what else could have been done, why, you**
 11 **know, did some of this content evade some of our**
 12 **proactive detection, but sometimes, without an initial**
 13 **report from people on the platform, it can be difficult**
 14 **to get access to this.**
 15 MS SHARPLING: Which brings me on to my next question.
 16 I would like to better understand the distinction
 17 between somebody reporting the incidents of these abuse
 18 images and the ability of your technical interventions
 19 to discover them without it being reported, so I'm
 20 really trying to get at how effective those systems are
 21 or are you still dependent upon a human being telling
 22 you that such an image exists?
 23 **A. I think people reporting content to us is incredibly**
 24 **useful and always welcome. They may see things where we**
 25 **don't have a huge amount of context, or may be able to**

Page 114

1 **higher understanding of what's happening, and I think**
 2 **we'll be able to speed up our response towards this and**
 3 **not rely on people necessarily to flag it to us.**
 4 MS SHARPLING: Is that a worldwide application?
 5 **A. Yes, when we develop something like this, we want to**
 6 **make a point that, as we are a global platform, it needs**
 7 **to be rolled out everywhere, but we have teams working**
 8 **on improving this classifier and I'm sure others will**
 9 **come into place as well. But this is one way we have to**
 10 **flag new material and not store, you know, content which**
 11 **we can't due to the nature of those images.**
 12 MS SHARPLING: I see, thank you.
 13 THE CHAIR: Mr Frank?
 14 MR FRANK: I wonder if you can help us put in perspective
 15 some of the numbers you've given us this afternoon? You
 16 told us about 3.7 billion was invested apparently
 17 reported in 2019, is that right, for the -- for the
 18 safeguarding budget; is that right?
 19 **A. Yes, I think this came in the context of a post our CEO,**
 20 **Mark Zuckerberg, made in February to kind of showcase**
 21 **the investment and how seriously the company is taking**
 22 **our investment in keeping people safe, and he was**
 23 **putting the number that we're investing this year in**
 24 **keeping the community safe and comparing it to our whole**
 25 **revenue back in 2011.**

Page 116

1 MR FRANK: That's comparing it in 2011. If you were to
 2 compare it with the revenue for last year, which was
 3 540 billion -- now, that's in dollars, I don't know
 4 whether the figure you're quoting me of 3.7 was in
 5 dollars or in pounds or in euros, but --
 6 **A. It was in dollars. Now, the number that I have got in**
 7 **terms of revenue was \$55 billion for last year, for**
 8 **2018.**
 9 MR FRANK: I see.
 10 **A. I can probably confirm those numbers afterwards.**
 11 MR FRANK: That would be helpful. I'm quoting from
 12 an article from The New York Times, published about
 13 a week ago. It may be that can be clarified and, if it
 14 can be, then I would be grateful for it.
 15 In any event, I wanted to be clear that the figure
 16 of 3.7 billion, vast though it may seem to the average
 17 person, is a smaller proportion of the revenue of -- of
 18 Facebook than the stark figure itself might indicate.
 19 **A. I think the point that our CEO was trying to make is**
 20 **that those numbers have been impacting, I guess, our**
 21 **revenue, but that we feel this is a necessarily and**
 22 **absolutely essential investment that we need to make and**
 23 **continue making.**
 24 MR FRANK: Yes.
 25 **A. I do agree that if I -- looking at the number that you**

Page 117

1 draw matters to a conclusion, but they hadn't finally
 2 resolved them yet.
 3 I'm just wondering whether you can help us --
 4 I think it may have pertained to the roll-out of one of
 5 your safeguarding proposals more widely, sharing --
 6 MS CAREY: Can I assist you, Mr Frank, because it arose
 7 certainly in relation to the IWF URL list.
 8 MR FRANK: Yes.
 9 MS CAREY: Where the evidence was that the conversation
 10 began in 2014, I think you said was picked up more
 11 recently about 18 months ago and I suspect feeds into
 12 the fact that here we are now in 2019 and it's still not
 13 rolled out. I hope that assists.
 14 MR FRANK: It does, indeed. Thank you.
 15 Can you assist us on that? Is it because Facebook
 16 is so vast an enterprise it's taking a very long time to
 17 get things done?
 18 **A. No, this is not at all, I think, what happened.**
 19 **I think, because there are some contractual agreements**
 20 **related to taking such list -- and, again, not being**
 21 **a lawyer, I hope that both ourselves and IWF can, you**
 22 **know, work through whatever needs to be worked through,**
 23 **and make sure that we can take this list quite quickly.**
 24 **Again, I suspect that this was related to the nature**
 25 **of the contract for this particular URL list which was**

Page 119

1 **got from this article versus the one I have, it changes**
 2 **things slightly and -- but, hopefully, we can confirm**
 3 **that.**
 4 MR FRANK: We can clarify that, and I'm certainly not
 5 holding you to your figure and I hope you won't hold me
 6 to mine. So long as we clarify it, that's the main
 7 thing.
 8 The second thing I wanted to ask you is this, you've
 9 spoken about the number of initiatives that are
 10 apparently in the pipeline discussions that are going on
 11 which appear to be taking, well, some time. You
 12 initiated a discussion 15 months ago, I think it was, or
 13 a year and a half ago, and it's still not completed, and
 14 I think there are a number of teams involved in those
 15 discussions.
 16 Is the position that Facebook is just so big that it
 17 takes much longer than it should be doing in order to
 18 get a decision made and something done?
 19 **A. Could I just clarify which discussion you were referring**
 20 **to?**
 21 MR FRANK: I think you said you reinitiated a discussion
 22 last year in relation to one of the proposals that was
 23 made by somebody in the UK which fell into dis -- and
 24 you apparently reinitiated it. And I understand that
 25 there were a number of legal teams involved in trying to

Page 118

1 **drafted for services that are not Facebook, so applied**
 2 **to ISPs and search engines, and that, because of this**
 3 **request that came from us, we may have some things to**
 4 **work through, but there are many other initiatives where**
 5 **we have moved incredibly fast. I don't think we're too**
 6 **big for this, I think we're just pointing at one that**
 7 **may have dropped off the radar or definitely should not**
 8 **have taken as long as it is taking to get it done.**
 9 MR FRANK: Because one of your founders, Chris Hughes, is
 10 quoted as saying that he thought that Facebook was
 11 "a leviathan that destroys privacy and crushes
 12 competition". Do you agree with that?
 13 **A. I can't comment on Mr Hughes' thoughts. I don't agree**
 14 **with this personally, no.**
 15 MR FRANK: Thank you. The other thing I wanted to ask you
 16 finally is this, that in relation to whether or not
 17 there is a requirement for the verification of identity
 18 at the point of the registration of the creation of the
 19 account, you said that is, and I quote, "not required at
 20 this point in time," was your words.
 21 What I wanted to ask you about this is
 22 this: firstly, has there ever been a point in time when
 23 that was a requirement for Facebook?
 24 **A. No, it hasn't. I think when I mentioned "at this point**
 25 **in time", I meant that the -- if there is a requirement**

Page 120

1 to provide government ID, for example, it may come later
 2 than -- in the course of the life of an account on
 3 Facebook. With regards to age verification, which is
 4 what I think you're pointing to, we've been looking at
 5 this for quite some time and there are some additional
 6 constraints that we may have.

7 From a solutions perspective, there is no easy
 8 solution to implement age verification. You could look
 9 at collecting government IDs or credit cards. Looking
 10 at our engagement with experts on many of these topics,
 11 we understand that it may leave out the ability to
 12 confirm the account portions of -- indeed, children or
 13 people who may not have access to this.

14 It is also quite a substantial amount of information
 15 to process and, if we consider the implementation of
 16 GDPR last year, which aims to minimise the amount of
 17 data collected, it creates additional constraints.

18 I think the -- our solution that we have started to
 19 look into, as I mentioned, is to turn to image -- sorry,
 20 artificial intelligence, and to see whether there would
 21 be adequate detection mechanism and learning that we can
 22 draw to help us understand the potential age of someone
 23 on a platform.

24 MR FRANK: So in terms of the ideas that are being
 25 developed, do you know, or are you able to give the

Page 121

1 a child, it's a very difficult promise to make, but our
 2 promise is that we will put the manpower and the
 3 technology that we have at our fingertips to make this
 4 as difficult as possible.

5 MR FRANK: One of the things I suppose you could consider,
 6 bearing in mind that you're unable to guarantee that the
 7 children will not be groomed and abused, is to ensure
 8 that if, unfortunately, despite your best efforts, such
 9 things happen, the parents and children might be able to
 10 be compensated for the damage that they suffer and
 11 I wonder whether of the 55 billion-odd that you've
 12 spoken of by way of revenue, perhaps setting aside
 13 a billion dollars per year to compensate those who are
 14 injured in this way and, as we've heard, very seriously
 15 injured, does that seem to you a possibility?

16 A. I don't think I'm the right person to comment on this.
 17 I think we'll evaluate -- you know, we've heard a number
 18 of ideas and suggestions today, so I'm -- I'm taking
 19 notes and we'll relay this to the appropriate teams.

20 MR FRANK: Do you know who would be the right person to
 21 comment on that?

22 A. I'm not sure, I think it's the first time I've heard
 23 this, but --

24 MR FRANK: Thank you very much. That's all I ask.

25 THE CHAIR: Thank you. Just one last question from me,

Page 123

1 public some assurance, as to when it may be that parents
 2 can know that their children will not be able to open
 3 accounts below the age of 12 or 13?

4 A. I don't know at all, but I think this is something that
 5 we all need to work on together. I think parents
 6 talking to their children about this is important and
 7 sharing the right message that, you know, Facebook is
 8 not a service that is developed for kids under the age
 9 of 13, and that we all need to uphold this in our
 10 conversations.

11 MR FRANK: It follows, I think, from what you're saying that
 12 however much effort is being put in presently by
 13 Facebook, you're not able to guarantee that children
 14 will be safe using Facebook from the possibility, and
 15 indeed the reality, of being groomed and abused through
 16 your network. It's impossible to guarantee it. And
 17 you're working on processes to make it better, that's
 18 what I think you're saying?

19 A. I think we have a number of really solid processes in
 20 place, and some of which are more than solid, actually.
 21 I think we are -- we haven't waited for people to tell
 22 us that we should work on this, we've been working on
 23 this for a long time and we take our responsibility
 24 really seriously, but as to guaranteeing to parents that
 25 people may not, you know, attempt to groom or contact

Page 122

1 I assume Facebook has strategic priorities that are well
 2 worked out across the world; would that be correct?

3 A. Sorry, I'm not sure I understand your question.

4 THE CHAIR: The organisation, the company must have
 5 strategic priorities set for what it wishes to achieve.

6 A. Yes, of course.

7 THE CHAIR: Yes. And are these the same in every country as
 8 well as worldwide?

9 A. I think, depending on the teams working on different
 10 topics, they may have regional objectives or
 11 country-specific -- when you asked me the question,
 12 I assume you meant, do we have goals as a company and
 13 things we're striving for, which is what I know of, of
 14 course.

15 THE CHAIR: Can you give us any idea where, in its broadest
 16 sense, child protection, child safeguarding, comes
 17 amongst your priorities?

18 A. Well, I think for the people who work on these topics
 19 and, indeed, our senior leadership team, it comes very
 20 high. It would be difficult nowadays to have
 21 a conversation about Facebook or online platforms
 22 without putting centre of this conversation investment
 23 and efforts to keep people safe. So this is definitely
 24 something that is very much top of mind for everybody.

25 THE CHAIR: But if you were to describe it for the

Page 124

1 organisation as I'm asking you, where would it come? In
 2 the top five?
 3 **A. Yes, absolutely, I would say that --**
 4 THE CHAIR: What would be above it? What kind of things
 5 would be more important?
 6 **A. I -- I am finding it difficult to answer your question**
 7 **in absolutes, but I think, looking at recent posts or**
 8 **comments or interviews from our senior leadership team,**
 9 **safety is probably one of the top three things that they**
 10 **are focusing on, or want to focus on.**
 11 THE CHAIR: What are the other two, for example?
 12 **A. I -- I think -- privacy is also probably one of these**
 13 **concerns. After that, I don't know. You're asking me**
 14 **to be very specific and I'm not sure I can be at the**
 15 **moment.**
 16 THE CHAIR: Thank you. Thank you very much.
 17 MS CAREY: Chair, are there any other questions before we
 18 conclude?
 19 THE CHAIR: No.
 20 MS CAREY: May I just say this before we take the break, and
 21 we're going to reconvene in a moment for the first of
 22 the inquiry's closed sessions, but may I just make this
 23 clear at the outset: all witnesses are giving evidence
 24 in an open session. It is necessary to have some closed
 25 sessions to allow you, chair, and the panel, to hear

Page 125

1 Questions by THE PANE 126.....113
 (The court went into closed session)126
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
 10
 11
 12
 13
 14
 15
 16
 17
 18
 19
 20
 21
 22
 23
 24
 25

Page 127

1 evidence relating to sensitive matters that, if
 2 published, would enable offenders to evade detection.
 3 The restriction orders are available for anyone who
 4 wants to look at them, they are on the website, and they
 5 explain what has been applied for and why the order has
 6 been granted. I say that now as we embark on the first
 7 of our closed sessions after our afternoon break.
 8 THE CHAIR: Thank you.
 9 MS CAREY: Thank you.
 10 THE CHAIR: We'll return at 25 past.
 11 MS CAREY: Thank you, chair.
 12 (3.10 pm)
 13 (A short break)
 14 (The court went into closed session)
 15 (4.05 pm)
 16 (The hearing adjourned until
 17 Wednesday, 15 May 2019 at 10.30 am)
 18
 19
 20 I N D E X
 21
 22 (In Open Session)1
 23 WITNESS IN-H1 (affirmed)1
 Examination by MS CAREY1
 24
 25 MS JULIE DE BAILLIENCOURT (affirmed)19
 Examination by MS CAREY19

Page 126

1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
 10
 11
 12
 13
 14
 15
 16
 17
 18
 19
 20
 21
 22
 23
 24
 25

A				
abide 24:24	abused 2:5 50:20 122:15 123:7	40:16,20 59:5 85:8 92:19 94:12	addressed 112:2	aggregate 32:5 97:7
ability 25:22 38:19 39:1 41:5,11,21 45:24 46:4 47:7 48:4,7 61:17 64:25 65:4 81:22 90:7 93:5,20 97:1,4,7 114:18 121:11	abusers 100:20	105:6 109:23 122:3	addresses 89:2	aggressive 12:23 87:7,25 89:9
able 16:6 27:4,11 27:20,21 28:11 30:3 39:11 43:16 45:9 55:23 56:1 56:25 57:2 59:6 60:23 61:19 65:7 66:1 67:5,6 72:21 74:10 79:14 81:10 90:15 91:10,11 91:11,24 92:3,18 94:11 97:11,13 99:6 106:8,12 111:2,12,14 112:9 114:25 115:25 116:2 121:25 122:2,13 123:9	abusive 44:20,23 47:23 52:25 63:16,16 72:14	accurate 23:15 24:11 28:5,24 32:3,7 33:15 34:5 35:2,2 42:15 68:21 70:25 72:17	adequacy 56:15	aggressively 86:21
abroad 87:5	academics 68:19	accuse 10:16	adequate 121:21	ago 8:22 13:12 15:2 32:8 54:22 58:23 65:13 66:16 82:15 83:23 117:13 118:12,13 119:11
absolutely 1:22 53:5 63:4,13,23 64:5 72:15 74:24 117:22 125:3	accept 97:3	accusing 10:17	ADHD 3:6	agree 117:25 120:12,13
absolutes 125:7	acceptable 48:20 85:6	achieve 124:5	adjourned 126:16	agreements 119:19
abuse 2:9 12:16 20:15 44:19 45:3 46:20 47:17 49:17 50:22 57:18,25 59:2,11 59:12,21 60:2 61:9,14 63:3 65:23 66:5,16,17 67:14 68:13,15 69:2 77:5 80:8 83:11 85:12 95:8 99:18 100:1 102:3,23 104:16 104:22 109:10 112:7 114:17	accepted 38:20	acknowledged 97:12	adjournment 80:1	ahead 82:10 96:24 103:15 109:20
	accepts 37:3	acknowledging 88:16	admin 40:19 41:18 41:22	AI 56:17 58:24 75:3 109:1
	access 3:16 27:8 37:22 47:14 81:17 90:4 94:13 98:23 100:20 114:14 121:13	action 29:21 30:10 35:16 41:4 61:18 61:19 62:13,16 62:23 64:19 73:5 76:16 77:9 94:9 97:5 114:8 115:18	admins 41:1,2,10 41:14	aimed 81:19
	accessing 43:17	actioned 30:16	adult 39:10,17 64:5 65:3 66:17 70:15,21,22 72:1 84:1 85:2,17 89:1	aims 121:16
	account 22:1 23:3 23:5,7,10,14,20 23:22 24:12,16 24:18,20 25:4,5,7 25:10,18,20 26:7 26:13,17,23 27:2 27:4,11,22 28:8,8 28:9,21 29:5 30:11 31:2,3,14 32:9,15 33:2 34:14,19 35:22 36:1,4,5,5,17,22 37:18,22 38:2,2,3 38:6,25 39:14 40:16 42:1,19 43:8,19 45:9,10 45:13,22,25 46:9 46:17,19,21,21 47:6,14,17,22,23 47:24 48:3 50:23 51:18 52:1,9,18 61:20 62:11,25 63:3 66:9 69:24 76:1,10,24 85:4 88:25 89:12,15 93:8,12,12 99:13 120:19 121:2,12	active 111:24	adults 7:14,16 39:5,19	alarm 95:18,19
	accounts 21:21,23 25:22,23 26:3 27:18 28:12 29:1 29:10 31:20 35:6	actively 91:16	advances 101:13	alcohol 41:8
		activists 99:4	advertise 41:18	alert 63:11
		activity 50:12 112:6 115:12	advertising 89:20	alerted 79:5
		actual 69:10	Advisory 71:2	allay 87:1 101:2
		adapt 96:22 104:21	advocates 50:10	allow 4:12 35:9 38:6 46:3 49:9 50:5 110:1 113:1 125:25
		adapted 109:13,13	affirmed 1:10 19:12 126:22,24	allowed 5:3 23:5 27:2 97:8
		add 7:11,16 35:12 102:17 108:24	afraid 90:2	allowing 94:7,8
		added 25:11 69:6	afternoon 116:15 126:7	allows 58:15
		adding 60:20	age 2:6 3:22 16:15 23:7 25:4,13 26:19,22 27:10 28:3,20 29:6,22 31:2 35:2,6,15 38:1,5,7,11 40:23 41:7,19 45:10 121:3,8,22 122:3 122:8	alongside 51:13 55:23 58:4 115:11
		addition 80:17 81:6 83:24 105:3	aged 2:5	amazing 12:7,8
		additional 30:4 48:22 58:11 69:1 69:1,6 72:21 79:10 115:1 121:5,17	agencies 85:14 105:23	ambassadors 91:3
		address 29:22,23 48:22 66:22 99:24 105:2 107:5,5	Agency 105:3,9	ambitious 111:22
			Agency's 79:1 107:25	amend 27:2
				amending 26:6
				America 105:21
				amount 22:22 47:10 55:23 68:16 71:25 72:6 88:5 106:2 114:25 121:14,16
				amounts 54:19

109:1 analytics 59:25 and/or 62:9 anecdotal 72:4 announced 77:9 108:25 announcement 100:15 announcing 99:8 annual 109:6 annum 30:18 57:1 66:10 73:9 anonymously 30:8 answer 43:16 62:5 78:16 92:3 125:6 Anthony 9:14 anti-bullying 91:3 AntiToxin 96:9 anxiety 14:23 anybody 39:25 47:24 61:20 74:1 115:3 anyway 93:20 95:24 apart 92:13 app 95:14 97:8 apparent 49:11 apparently 15:14 116:16 118:10,24 appeal 45:24 46:4 46:9,11,24 47:7 48:7 appear 68:14 96:2 118:11 appeared 95:5 appetite 66:14 applicable 24:17 38:14 49:14 application 116:4 applications 22:6 applied 120:1 126:5 apply 103:7,7,19 appreciate 96:11 appreciates 111:10 approach 84:13 96:22 112:13 approaching 71:6	appropriate 16:16 28:20 35:17 48:1 60:17 61:21 62:22 85:6 111:4 115:18 123:19 approximate 21:18 approximately 22:12 apps 91:23 96:7 April 6:10,15 54:4 area 50:8,16,22 56:12 57:8 79:2 80:14 104:21 areas 45:17 57:14 70:13 107:19 109:14 arguments 4:2 arising 15:7 86:11 91:9 arose 80:4 119:6 arrested 2:12 arsenal 77:23 article 43:4 86:7 86:10,20 95:3,5 96:4,10,13 100:16 113:19 117:12 118:1 artificial 34:25 83:20,24 109:7,8 121:20 ascertain 66:20 aside 123:12 asked 7:21 38:1 107:2,23 110:7 124:11 asking 7:19 15:14 15:17 125:1,13 asks 25:7 79:1 108:1 asleep 5:7 assent 3:3 11:7 45:14 49:22 assert 71:22 assertion 110:11 assess 71:9 assist 119:6,15 Assistance 107:17 assists 38:12	119:13 associated 26:2 28:7 31:4 93:12 assume 63:18 73:21 124:1,12 Assuming 28:3 assurance 122:1 attempt 122:25 attempted 29:1 attention 114:8 audience 40:13 41:13,22 authentic 35:19 36:17,21,22 45:22 authenticity 23:20 36:1 authorities 88:13 105:5 Authority 15:5 automatic 45:16 automatically 73:21 76:25 automation 55:24 56:16 available 33:10,19 37:13 43:11 53:10 58:18 76:9 78:1 92:17 96:5 104:1 126:3 avenues 98:14 average 76:15 117:16 avoid 49:18 Awards 91:2 aware 49:11 51:8 52:5 56:3 58:2 77:18 89:13,24 101:4 102:23 awareness 35:5 51:5	18:9 26:24 27:16 30:3,6 38:6 47:13 48:15 59:9 62:7,10 66:6 78:6,15 82:9 116:25 background 3:2 3:13 21:15 backgrounds 59:24 bad 14:23 18:6 90:7 Bailey 95:12 Bailliencourt 19:12,15,16 34:11 44:16 73:2 80:4 95:2 100:13 111:7 113:10,17 126:24 balance 99:20 ban 92:18 93:13 93:13,23,24 bank 80:20,24,25 bank's 47:10 banked 82:24 banks 81:1,2 banned 94:22 barriers 25:11 base 22:9 105:21 111:25 112:14 based 20:7 25:2 37:12 58:6,8,9,9 58:10 66:21 71:2 91:19 97:23 100:7 107:11 108:6 112:11,12 114:2 basic 107:12 basis 28:12 80:22 93:24 bath 49:21 50:17 69:18 bathtub 50:5 battle 96:23 BBC 86:10 bear 109:3 bearing 123:6 BearShare 3:1 7:2 7:9 8:8,21,25	beauty 104:10 becoming 63:12 bed 7:25 bedroom 4:13 5:4 6:21 7:22 bedtime 4:10 began 82:3 119:10 behalf 92:2 behave 63:16 behaves 84:13 behaving 28:9 63:25 behaviour 25:3 28:7 44:20 83:14 84:12 87:8,11,17 90:7 behavioural 59:16 84:11 94:15 98:12 behaviours 88:17 believe 10:4 25:23 29:5 30:12 35:14 36:5,7,13 38:4 45:21 52:13 54:3 56:18 63:4 64:23 67:8 69:19 77:4 81:16 88:22 believed 64:17 bells 95:19,19 benefits 99:2 best 17:3 27:19 42:23 76:2 78:23 104:20 123:8 better 9:5 16:5 17:19 35:1 66:14 79:10 82:11 87:16 97:3 104:13 113:25 114:16 115:20 122:17 beyond 59:7 84:15 85:14,21 87:13 94:10 big 8:14 32:1 118:16 120:6 biggest 89:25 billion 22:25 57:4 57:11 92:22 116:16 117:3,7
---	--	---	---	--

117:16 123:13 billion-odd 123:11 billions 109:1 birth 25:8,9,16 26:7,14,17,21,24 27:1,3,14,24 28:14 34:14 35:23 37:19 bit 2:1,16 3:1,13 6:9 8:13 12:15 13:22 14:11 15:4 21:13 27:25 44:5 44:8 69:7 93:4 112:15 block 24:7 27:17 68:12 81:22 blockers 26:11 blocks 27:9 29:6 board 33:21,23 body 13:2 50:4 bottom 70:1 bound 89:3 107:19 boundaries 89:19 box 7:18,19,20 boxes 107:9 breach 24:25 40:25 48:17,18 51:23 63:6 breached 44:17 93:21 breaches 51:25 break 12:17 14:4 19:7 31:7 41:24 44:10,14 46:15 62:5 64:12 125:20 126:7,13 bring 51:2 99:15 brings 15:24 114:15 broad 100:2 112:2 broadcasting 104:9 broadest 124:15 broke 6:1 broken 58:14 brother 7:22,24 brought 22:17 55:13 56:22 74:20 114:7	budget 57:15,17 57:25 108:1,4,24 116:18 budgets 57:23 build 98:5 building 98:6 bullied 2:16 bully 2:16 bullying 69:7 112:5,22,24 113:4 bundle 19:17 24:6 95:9 109:17 bundles 68:5 business 31:16 41:10 56:8 66:23 <hr/> C <hr/> cache 27:21 call 15:5 23:25 40:21 49:4 58:24 62:3,10 67:23 68:6 95:4 called 7:2 9:13,14 33:2 calls 84:7 campaign 89:20 cards 121:9 care 61:24 Carey 1:6,7,12,13 14:3,8 18:17,25 19:9,13,14 44:7 44:12,16 79:21 80:3 113:6 119:6 119:9 125:17,20 126:9,11,23,25 carve-out 51:3 case 12:5 36:19 41:23 45:4,15 47:2,12,17 50:23 52:16 77:13 90:12 93:6 103:14 cases 32:23 45:23 65:18 86:3,16,17 107:11,14,15 110:25 catch 28:10 categories 68:10 68:25 69:1,6	category 33:20,24 34:1 69:14 112:21 113:8 cause 63:9 95:18 95:19 caution 39:21 102:22 cautious 39:23 caveat 76:2 cent 30:2,14 59:7 73:20 75:6 86:17 centre 29:10 49:12 84:5 113:3 124:22 CEO 57:6 116:19 117:19 CEOP 84:8 certain 37:12,13 56:22 64:13 81:22 88:16 certainly 75:13 100:14,23 106:24 114:6 118:4 119:7 certainty 77:13 93:11,11 certificate 37:19 chair 1:4,7 2:3,23 6:10 14:8 17:16 18:19,21 19:2,5,9 44:9,11 49:5 78:7 79:22,24 80:3 88:1 89:10 113:12,15 116:13 123:25 124:4,7 124:15,25 125:4 125:11,16,17,19 125:25 126:8,10 126:11 challenge 56:20 challenges 37:14 89:25 chance 52:25 74:2 change 26:24 40:5 66:24 changes 118:1 changing 40:5 charity 100:24 chat 4:18 16:10	110:2,8 check 7:22 28:3 36:10 43:15,18 47:8 53:1 59:18 66:1 78:5 85:23 106:16 113:11 checking 8:16 9:19 checks 43:7 53:17 65:14 chief 95:12 97:15 Chiefs' 95:11 child 16:12,13 17:1 20:14,15 21:4 26:10 29:12 29:23 31:2 33:3 33:6 38:16 39:11 39:18,18 45:4 46:20 47:17 48:9 49:7,11,21,24 50:3,17,19 51:6 57:15,16,21,24 58:3 59:8,21 60:2,15 61:9,14 62:18 63:3,9 64:2,17,22 65:1,3 65:21,22,22,25 66:4,4 68:13,13 68:15 69:8,14,17 69:24 70:3,8,17 70:23,25 71:23 72:1,6 74:15,16 77:5,12,25 78:3 80:7,21 82:23 83:7 84:1,7 85:3 85:9,11,16,22,24 86:14 88:15 90:16,22 92:9,19 93:9,22 95:8,16 96:8 99:18 100:20,25 102:5 102:18 104:4,15 104:16 109:9,16 112:7 113:6 115:10,13 123:1 124:16,16 child's 33:1 child-safety-spe... 103:11 child-sex-abuse-...	65:9 Childnet 91:5,5 children 2:1 3:14 6:1 7:15 10:9,11 10:15,20 12:11 12:16 13:5 15:6 15:19,22 16:3,19 16:22 17:19,22 18:2,4,8,9,11 35:6 39:21,24 40:2 46:8 49:7 49:10,13,15 50:10 69:9 83:10 84:14 85:18 87:1 87:22 88:17,20 89:23 90:2,13 113:21 121:12 122:2,6,13 123:7 123:9 children's 10:3 Chris 120:9 Christmas 3:17,18 CICA 15:5 circumstance 49:24 circumstances 37:17 claims 15:6,16,17 clarified 117:13 clarify 118:4,6,19 clarity 44:25 classifier 77:10,11 77:21,24 79:4 80:6 84:10,11,18 115:5,9,12,24 116:8 classifiers 75:7,8 97:12 98:12 clear 21:20 54:23 73:17 85:1,5 106:20 111:24 112:3 117:15 125:23 clear-cut 51:1 cleared 27:20 clearly 57:13 64:14 75:18 86:15 93:25 100:22 105:1
---	--	---	--	---

<p>climate 90:15 clings 14:18 closed 125:22,24 126:7,14 127:1 closely 72:5 co-organised 91:15 Coalition 91:18 code 112:8 collected 121:17 collecting 121:9 colloquially 52:2 combat 58:1 83:5 108:2 combating 109:9 combine 59:13 combined 56:17 come 2:19 5:6 7:23 8:1 10:14 14:5 21:9 23:18,21 26:24 29:10 30:3 30:6 34:4 38:6 42:6 44:7 45:6 52:24 58:4 62:14 66:6 71:3 78:6 78:15 88:10 90:18 105:20 116:9 121:1 125:1 comes 48:9 52:5 64:2 65:12 77:18 92:1 124:16,19 comfort 101:14 coming 5:14 9:12 22:3 39:25 72:24 73:1 91:12 comment 87:9 102:7,16 120:13 123:16,21 comments 108:5 125:8 committed 31:20 108:8 common 80:13 102:9 104:17 communicate 47:13 54:24 62:7 62:10 99:6 communication</p>	<p>86:13 87:21 communities 99:10 community 21:8 41:16 44:25 47:19 48:16,18 48:21,23,25 49:6 51:23 53:9,12,19 53:22 54:6 55:1 56:23 57:20 58:6 67:25 68:7 74:23 108:14,20 116:24 companies 80:10 91:21 112:18 company 19:23 41:8,17 54:25 55:18,21 57:3 61:16 67:8 90:24 98:4 104:21 108:7 110:22 116:21 124:4,12 compare 76:4 117:2 compared 72:8 83:18 103:10 compares 72:13 comparing 72:2 116:24 117:1 comparison 43:23 72:10 compensate 123:13 compensated 123:10 compensation 15:5,7,9,11,19,21 16:18 17:10 competition 120:12 complete 24:23 completed 81:9 118:13 completely 92:14 completing 25:14 complex 27:25 113:5 complexity 37:10 108:18 compliance 49:14</p>	<p>complicated 61:3 comply 107:10 component 35:4 computer 3:25 8:18,21 9:3,19 11:5 17:24 computers 3:24 concentrating 33:17 concept 91:17,24 concern 95:10 101:18 concerned 84:7 89:17 concerning 59:15 85:11 concerns 66:4,5 87:1 99:24 100:19,23 101:2 101:4 106:17 112:20 125:13 conclude 76:7 79:14 125:18 concluded 46:11 concludes 19:1 conclusion 79:19 119:1 conclusive 33:13 conduct 86:1 conduit 100:9 confidence 88:2 confident 76:18 confirm 24:23 36:15,20 46:5 117:10 118:2 121:12 confirmation 33:14 confirmed 62:1 92:15 95:23 100:6 conflated 92:12 conflation 110:19 connect 22:3 23:18 23:21 connected 39:11 89:5 connecting 39:15 96:18</p>	<p>consensual 64:6 86:3 consequence 79:16 consequences 48:10 51:10 consider 47:21 61:13 121:15 123:5 consideration 99:1 considerations 107:23 considering 32:20 57:18 79:15 Constable 95:12 constant 22:21 87:14 constantly 96:22 constraints 121:6 121:17 constructed 89:8 consultation 111:10,14 consulted 47:24 contact 29:9,23,25 30:22 36:12,19 39:2 44:4 48:5 84:6,22 87:10 110:25 122:25 contacted 65:17 contacting 30:23 contain 77:11,25 78:3 containing 19:17 contains 70:8 71:23 81:20 content 9:17 21:3 35:13 41:4,11,15 44:22,23 47:22 47:25 48:19,23 49:9 50:9 51:2,5 51:12,16 52:6,7 53:1,8,25 54:19 55:4,8,23 59:6 60:10,11,14,16 60:19,20,22 61:7 61:10,18 62:8,8 62:16,18 63:16 64:7,10 65:2 66:19 69:4,16,21</p>	<p>69:24 70:8,15,19 71:16,17,20,23 71:25 72:7,14 73:4,7,16 74:1,14 74:16,22 77:17 77:20,23 78:17 78:19,24 79:19 93:6 94:13,19 96:18 97:3,22 98:15 101:16 102:4 103:7 107:15 112:21 113:2 114:4,11 114:23 116:10 context 22:24 31:21 47:18 50:16 52:8 63:24 114:25 116:19 continue 88:5 100:4 117:23 continuing 56:7 108:21 continuously 24:21 contract 119:25 contractual 119:19 contrary 100:22 contributed 111:13 controls 89:13,18 convenient 44:9 conversation 94:7 99:3 100:5 119:9 124:21,22 conversations 82:3 82:8,14 84:1 94:4 102:19 122:10 convey 39:22 convicted 23:10 24:15 43:5 cookie 27:21 COPPA 30:25 copy 24:5 core 21:10 23:17 44:2 correct 9:15,18 21:12 22:8 23:2</p>
--	---	---	--	---

27:23 34:10 46:6 47:12 105:13 110:11 124:2 correctly 45:8 cost 56:23 106:12 costs 57:1 Council 95:12 count 22:2,12 counter-balance 99:14 counter-terrorism 66:18 countries 33:19 37:13 country 66:15 99:16 105:25 106:3 124:7 country-specific 124:11 couple 6:9 8:21 13:22 29:20 78:9 113:18 course 2:19 12:9 31:16 35:12 84:25 88:14 102:13 121:2 124:6,14 court 126:14 127:1 cover 73:9 106:4 covering 14:9 covers 111:23 CP' 95:17 create 18:9 23:3,7 23:9,22 24:12 25:18,20 27:11 27:22 90:14 created 16:9,11,17 17:13 24:20 25:10 63:4 89:21 107:21 113:1 creates 121:17 creating 26:13,23 29:4 98:20 creation 91:16 120:18 credit 121:9 Crime 79:1 105:3 105:9 107:25 Criminal 15:4	critical 90:6 criticise 99:16 crowd 14:23 Crude 86:17 cruelty 100:25 crushes 120:11 CSAM 78:8 curl 11:11 current 19:24 20:19 83:19 currently 20:4 59:1 70:6 78:10 81:7 100:6 109:22 cyber 64:23 88:9 CyberTipLine 64:15	13:13 daughter's 8:5 9:3 11:4 12:21 day 1:4 87:21 days 98:3 110:24 de 19:12,15,16 34:11 44:16 73:2 80:4 95:2 100:13 111:7 113:10,17 126:24 de-encrypt 94:7 deactivating 46:14 46:14 deal 6:12 20:21 23:5 34:2 35:18 46:22 48:15 60:5 61:8,10 63:15 dealing 2:15 12:2 26:8 50:7 53:14 57:18 59:2 61:7 86:9 106:10 dealt 15:3 42:7 December 20:20 105:16 decide 6:20 10:21 99:19 decided 47:15 decides 46:25 decision 22:17 45:24 46:4,6 48:8 52:8 55:13 118:18 declares 43:6 dedicated 44:3 54:6 55:7,22 58:2 89:21 105:23 106:5 deduce 111:1 deem 48:20 deemed 68:24 78:2 97:20 106:21 deep 114:9 default 38:10,13 39:24 40:1 define 23:6 definite 78:15 definitely 88:11 120:7 124:23 degree 93:11	delaying 107:22 delete 32:9,23 33:2 51:2 77:17 deleted 8:21 30:11 32:15 45:10,13 48:1 50:24 76:20 85:4,5 deleting 31:20 46:13,18 51:12 76:22 deletion 25:5 31:8 31:18 32:19 45:17 47:16 52:19 demonstrated 87:6 dependent 26:15 34:5 43:2 114:21 depending 27:7 41:6 59:2 124:9 depends 25:2 44:19 45:17,19 50:2 depicts 50:9 deploy 78:18 deployed 104:21 deploying 55:24 depressed 2:25 depth 60:22 describe 22:5 124:25 described 20:2 37:4 design 108:4 designated 105:24 Designed 63:11 desktop 25:12 26:12 27:19 despite 94:10 123:8 destroy 63:8 destroys 120:11 detail 11:13 84:10 109:11 details 29:23 38:2 39:8 62:24 detect 25:21 59:6 59:15 75:8 80:7 91:10 97:13	103:24 104:8 109:24 115:13,25 detected 73:21 100:21 detecting 97:21 detection 58:1 59:4 73:24 74:10 74:25 75:3 82:11 83:17 84:15 85:21 87:3 93:19 96:1,20 114:12 121:21 126:2 detects 115:14 deter 87:16 determine 77:11 93:20 determining 28:4 34:9 develop 72:20 79:8 102:24 109:12 116:5 developed 60:11 60:12 79:9 82:18 90:25 91:22 108:7 109:15 115:9 121:25 122:8 developing 77:19 97:24 108:10,18 115:19 device 27:7 90:4 devices 110:6 devised 49:1 Diana 91:2 dictate 56:8 difference 36:21 different 20:3,5 21:23,24 27:6 33:20 36:23 40:13 43:14 52:8 55:8 57:22,22 58:14 59:3 61:4 65:19 66:15 69:21 78:4 92:14 97:7 107:8 113:7 124:9 differentiate 28:14 difficult 13:21 28:14 30:23 31:5
---	---	--	--	---

66:13,20 70:14 101:6 111:20 114:13 123:1,4 124:20 125:6 difficulties 3:6 42:20 97:21 difficulty 77:15 digital 76:4 directed 96:7 direction 90:19 98:16 directly 39:2 dis 118:23 disabled 24:16 46:10,12,22 47:9 50:23 69:24 93:9 disabling 46:13,16 disaggregate 74:12 disappear 11:11 disciplines 100:3 disclose 65:5 discover 114:19 discoverability 38:25 discovering 39:14 discuss 112:16 discussed 24:11 113:20 discussing 31:22 80:17 81:12 82:1 discussion 52:17 112:11 118:12,19 118:21 discussions 90:13 118:10,15 disgusting 9:9 15:22 disposal 41:2 disseminated 105:2 distances 14:17 distant 13:25 distinct 65:17 distinction 37:6 46:13 48:17 54:25 112:3 114:16 distribution 91:20	dive 114:9 divider 23:25 doable 98:11 documents 37:12 doing 4:8 14:13 18:11 34:18 38:22 43:9 53:17 87:1 89:16 95:20 97:2 101:1 114:9 118:17 dollars 109:6 117:3,5,6 123:13 domestic 99:5 door 79:18 doors 18:9 double 53:1 double-check 30:6 47:11 doubt 95:21 99:24 downs 71:13 downstairs 5:6 drafted 120:1 drafting 81:7 draw 119:1 121:22 drawn 52:23 99:20 dropped 120:7 Dublin 20:7 21:9 58:9 100:8 105:20 due 2:19 12:9 72:19 96:17 116:11 <hr/> E <hr/> E 126:20 earlier 67:18 83:9 93:4 95:3 112:15 early 6:16 13:14 34:24 57:7 81:9 98:3 earmarked 57:25 easier 19:20 20:21 100:20 101:21 easiest 71:9 easily 43:12 easy 121:7 educate 16:5 89:11 89:16 90:22 93:5 educated 5:1 educating 18:2	93:7 education 5:22,23 6:5 17:19 85:18 educational 3:9 40:3,6 44:23 51:17,22 85:15 85:24 90:21 effect 10:15 effective 114:20 effectively 29:17 29:21 43:2 94:3 effectiveness 28:18 effort 68:16 115:23 122:12 efforts 71:19 123:8 124:23 either 18:19 36:2 36:17 43:2 84:18 90:21 96:16 100:7 106:14 element 113:7 elements 48:22 93:2 99:13 else's 16:2 email 29:23 emanates 33:17 embark 126:6 emerging 52:11 94:15 98:10 employ 28:4 employed 55:18 employee 22:12 employees 22:9,13 22:15 82:7 employs 59:1 enable 126:2 enables 71:22 enabling 99:15 encompass 69:17 encounter 72:6 encouraging 73:24 encrypted 94:2 97:25 98:2 99:3 101:12 encrypting 101:8 101:19 encryption 94:11 97:14,18,25 99:9 99:15,19 101:9	101:21 end-to-end 94:2 94:11 97:14,18 97:25 98:1 99:9 99:14,19 101:9 101:21 endangers 49:10 ended 10:2 enforce 34:18 41:3 89:18 enforcement 34:8 42:7,12,23 43:2 44:2 45:5 48:4 59:25 63:12 64:20,24 65:5,17 67:25 68:7 79:17 81:3 84:8 85:13 87:5 89:4 97:21 99:23 100:5,9 104:23,24 105:5 105:23,25 106:5 106:13,18,19 107:1,4 110:9 111:3 enforcing 23:8 engage 88:19 engaged 88:22 engagement 104:24 121:10 engaging 21:1 50:11 86:1 90:12 99:23 100:2 engineer 76:3 engineering 21:2 87:15 108:13 engineers 55:2 57:20 engines 82:19 120:2 England 86:12 105:19 enlarge 24:1,4 ensure 34:18 40:23 41:11 43:7 123:7 ensures 41:22 ensuring 41:19 102:23 entails 20:18 40:8	enter 25:13 entered 26:21 enterprise 119:16 entire 94:24 110:18 entirety 101:19 entitled 49:6 entry 32:6 equally 30:8 45:12 71:17 89:14 100:15 equating 110:21 erect 115:15 escalating 60:16 especially 18:23 essence 67:19 essential 71:13 117:22 essentially 6:4 26:14 34:4 48:25 68:1 73:6 establishing 112:14 estimate 70:4,7 estimated 70:11 estimates 77:21 euros 117:5 evade 26:11 96:20 96:20 114:11 126:2 evading 25:19 evaluate 80:12 81:25 123:17 evaluated 106:2 event 37:1 43:6 45:25 46:7,20 47:15 61:25 83:11 84:6,18 117:15 everybody 12:21 14:17 16:14 60:13 124:24 everyday 24:11 26:9 evidence 1:11 15:15,18,18 16:4 18:23 19:1,4 20:23 33:25 44:8 63:8 95:15
--	--	---	--	--

106:24 119:9 125:23 126:1 evolves 83:21 exact 32:22 39:7 45:20 61:2 109:4 exactly 48:14 72:12 73:14 95:1 107:18 Examination 1:12 19:13 126:23,25 example 25:21 26:25 30:9 31:12 33:7 35:15 36:8 37:15,19 38:13 39:1,16 40:9 41:8,10 43:9 49:20,21 57:1 59:4 64:4,5 65:2 65:10 81:21 83:6 85:2 89:2 92:18 110:3,10 112:14 112:22 121:1 125:11 examples 36:9 50:13 96:11 102:25 exception 52:4 exceptions 52:4 exciting 98:13 executive 97:15 executives 55:17 exhibit 37:5 exhibits 19:18,18 19:21 exist 83:22 89:8 existed 102:21 114:4 existing 77:19 exists 114:22 expect 23:18,21 73:1 97:23 experience 20:10 28:19 108:6 expert 57:19 60:10 61:17 107:18 expertise 56:22 experts 21:1 50:7 56:12 57:21 68:18 71:3,4	90:14 98:8 121:10 explain 37:17 70:15,18 85:25 86:2 88:1 92:6 126:5 explained 88:4 explaining 44:23 70:18 115:5 explanation 113:23 explicitly 107:21 exploitation 45:4 48:10 49:7,12 50:10 58:4 59:8 60:15 62:19 64:3 64:22 65:25 68:13 69:9,14,25 70:3,9,17,23,25 71:24 72:7 74:15 77:12 80:21 82:23 92:10,20 93:10,22 102:5 104:4 112:7 113:7 exploitative 69:4 69:23 77:21 Exploited 49:13 exploits 49:10 exposed 67:13 70:20 exposure 20:12 express 70:24 71:5 expressed 74:24 95:10 100:23 106:17 expressing 103:25 extended 39:25 extensive 90:25 extent 11:18 83:1 97:17 external 58:12 extort 52:17 extract 109:18 extreme 50:18,19 50:21 extremely 50:25 103:17 108:9 111:20	eyes 115:22 <hr/> F <hr/> face-to-face 15:12 Facebook 19:22 20:5,6,9 21:1,10 21:15,17,21 22:3 22:5,6,9 23:1,14 24:2,4,10,14,19 25:7,16 26:7,18 27:8,17 28:4,23 29:22 30:25 31:9 31:25 32:8,10,11 32:21 33:20 34:6 34:17,19 35:20 36:10 37:1,3,11 38:10 39:12,25 40:12,16,25 41:9 41:25 42:13,17 42:19 43:7,17 44:18 46:8,15,16 47:15 49:1 50:21 51:21 52:21 53:3 53:8,18 54:10 55:17 57:1 58:25 59:23 62:11 64:19 65:11 66:5 66:8 67:2,12,20 69:15 70:4,9 71:22,24 73:21 75:1,14,18 76:1,9 77:6 79:6 80:6 80:11,19,25 81:10,16,19,21 82:24 83:5,6 85:4 86:16,21,25 87:14,21,24 88:2 88:15,25 89:1,12 89:15,16,17 90:20 91:8 92:1 92:7,10 93:3,9,15 93:17 96:16 97:18 98:1,2,16 98:23 99:23 101:1,8,19,25 102:2,9 103:23 105:4,6,8,14,18 106:25 107:21 108:4 109:20 110:1,7 111:2,12	113:21 117:18 118:16 119:15 120:1,10,23 121:3 122:7,13 122:14 124:1,21 Facebook's 83:1 97:16 100:19 104:23,25 108:5 110:12 111:15 112:9 Facebook-owned 95:14 faced 37:14 facing 96:19 fact 8:20 9:14 11:1 23:17 29:2 35:8 42:21 43:20 61:3 62:1 63:11 67:11 73:20 94:10 97:17 109:17 110:20 112:6 119:12 fail 17:5 failed 16:20 failing 95:7 fake 25:22,24 26:2 27:14 28:8,9 36:3 59:5 109:23 fall 33:25 50:17 107:16 false 25:15 familiar 60:7 family 13:8 22:4,6 23:19 29:9 35:10 far 15:10 28:1 89:17 91:23 109:20 110:15 fast 76:25 120:5 faster 76:17 fault 16:21,21 73:11 favourably 72:13 FBK000002 49:5 FBK000005_003 23:25 FBK000008_001 36:25 FBK000018_001 29:16	FBK000039_005 67:23 fear 98:22 feasible 44:1 98:8 feature 102:15 110:14,16 February 53:20 54:8 55:11 57:7 116:20 feed 101:11 115:23 feedback 97:23 98:7,19 99:9 100:9,15,23 feeding 104:12 feeds 119:11 feel 16:9 113:3 117:21 fell 118:23 felt 47:22 77:8 82:12 83:8,10 112:24 field 30:13 88:15 fight 3:8,11 figure 33:5,10 56:25 66:1 67:5 72:12 74:20 117:4,15,18 118:5 figures 54:23 74:13 75:1 86:15 file 6:24 7:1 filled 29:25 filter 45:5 final 15:24 47:13 111:7 finally 39:21 82:22 100:11 119:1 120:16 financed 107:25 financial 57:2 107:23 109:2 financing 56:23 106:13 find 6:12,23 39:12 45:9 60:19 69:23 85:22 91:19 finding 113:20 125:6 finds 76:19
---	---	--	---	--

<p>fine 1:22 80:16 fingerprint 76:4 fingertips 123:3 finished 46:10 finishing 12:2 first 19:9 26:20 39:14 46:22 51:21 54:2 60:4 60:23 66:16 68:7 68:12,14,24 70:1 74:6 86:9 89:7 90:9 92:13 96:12 114:2 123:22 125:21 126:6 firstly 1:7 12:17 23:4 70:10 101:24 110:11 120:22 five 21:7 82:4 114:3 125:2 fix 17:13 flag 29:10 30:20 36:3 62:18 77:23 84:9 85:13 87:16 88:21 94:19 96:1 115:3 116:3,10 flagged 47:4 71:21 76:23 114:7 flagging 77:15 84:15 flaw 110:1 flows 55:9 focus 23:20 47:9 56:11,13 59:21 88:16 113:6,9 125:10 focusing 69:13 125:10 follow 57:24 58:15 76:8 80:14 94:2 followed 61:22 follows 104:2 122:11 football 40:17 forces 44:4 105:10 105:19 foremost 90:9 forensic 59:25 forget 14:16</p>	<p>form 29:9 30:22 33:3 43:12 69:21 104:2 forms 33:6 forth 82:9 forthcoming 74:8 forward 51:3 forwarded 60:10 85:8 fought 86:22 found 1:25 6:24 10:6 12:5 13:12 46:21 50:21 58:13 Foundation 80:23 founded 21:16 founders 120:9 four 6:19 frame 32:22 framework 111:16 Frank 116:13,14 117:1,9,11,24 118:4,21 119:6,8 119:14 120:9,15 121:24 122:11 123:5,20,24 friend 38:21 friends 22:4 23:19 38:18 40:1,9 frightened 83:12 front 1:15 3:25 4:11 19:16,20 full 11:18 19:14 full-time 22:13,15 fully 96:23 99:13 function 75:5 funding 107:2 further 2:13 32:4 59:18 63:9 65:1 67:9 80:13 83:13 85:9 91:5,25 97:5 111:18,20 114:9 115:16 future 16:1 80:24</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">G</p> <hr/> <p>gain 101:12 gained 101:10 gaps 103:4 gather 37:21</p>	<p>Gay 95:17 GDPR 121:16 gender 37:16 general 66:3 generally 49:16 59:14 66:8 79:12 generated 33:6 65:2 generation 90:5 geographical 41:6 geography 67:1 getting 13:13 64:10 girl 2:21 give 1:20 15:19 20:23 26:25 32:21 36:9 38:12 48:4 60:23 65:7 81:10 91:11 106:12 109:3 115:1 121:25 124:15 given 1:11 41:1 97:20 100:14 105:25,25 106:22 108:15 109:3 116:15 giving 27:23 33:25 125:23 global 19:25 20:2 20:25 37:11 65:14 66:19 98:25 116:6 globally 67:3 globe 58:7 99:2 go 4:7,18 6:20 7:22 13:25 28:2 32:9 35:18 48:15 52:19 54:16 61:16 62:23 67:24 73:2 74:9 90:6 105:21 106:9 goal 68:25 78:19 89:6 goals 44:2 124:12 goes 17:10 52:2,3 86:20 96:4 106:5 109:25</p>	<p>going 1:7,13,17 2:19 9:19,21 10:5,14 11:25 13:16 14:2 17:25 19:18,19 21:8,13 38:16 40:1 45:6 47:8 51:20 92:13 95:22 99:8,19 101:12,20 113:5 115:22 118:10 125:21 gonna 5:15,24 good 1:4,13 10:9 30:2 35:13 49:15 56:19 59:10 64:4 81:15 88:21 101:14 115:21,21 Google 96:5,6 govern 16:19 65:8 governed 48:21 government 98:22 111:19,24 112:10 121:1,9 government's 111:8 112:4 granted 67:6 126:6 grateful 18:22 117:14 gratification 65:4 great 81:24 84:4 90:18 99:2 Green 111:13 grey 50:16,22 groom 83:7 100:21 101:18 122:25 groomed 83:12 87:2,23 122:15 123:7 groomers 109:24 grooming 65:25 83:3 84:3 86:6 86:22 87:24 88:3 91:7,10 96:12 101:20 108:2 grossly 51:15 group 37:4,4,6,6 40:17,20,22 41:2 41:4,20,24 71:2</p>	<p>94:19,19,21,24 95:22,25 97:7 100:14 109:22 113:22 grouped 37:3 grouping 91:18 groups 23:12 95:15,20 96:7 101:11 grow 55:19 growing 108:17 grown 37:9 53:25 108:7 growth 22:20 guarantee 122:13 122:16 123:6 guaranteeing 122:24 guard 25:17 guardian 33:1 guess 22:20 28:7 37:10 43:13 72:4 77:15 82:11 117:20 guidelines 35:5 47:20 50:6</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">H</p> <hr/> <p>H1 2:23 6:23 10:14 12:1,19 14:4,10 15:24 18:17,25 Hackathon 91:8 91:14 hacking 98:22 half 82:15 118:13 hand 74:13,15 78:22,22 111:3 handing 109:24 handle 12:25,25 handled 61:24 happen 15:20 44:25 81:15 82:16 98:4 99:12 99:12 123:9 happened 1:25 2:8 2:10,13 4:20 5:10 11:9,13,16 11:17,18,25 12:6 13:11,13,20 14:16 15:7 62:24</p>
--	--	---	---	--

113:24 119:18 happening 6:13 16:2,6 59:16 72:8 76:25 87:11 100:1 103:2,8,13 104:11 116:1 happens 84:20 90:3,16 happy 80:14 harassment 69:8 hard 24:5 43:21 83:16 harm 63:9 99:17 101:19 104:2 111:19 112:18 harmful 47:21 112:22 harms 57:13 65:19 72:10 111:9 112:2,4,5 hash 81:2 hashed 77:16 78:10,13 82:24 hashes 47:11 76:5 79:20 80:22,25 81:1 94:20 hate 66:18 hates 13:18 hazard 42:22 headline 95:6 hear 1:7 2:19 125:25 heard 2:23 7:21 11:24 34:12 64:15 89:10 90:1 99:3,4 123:14,17 123:22 hearing 1:5,24 10:20 33:12 126:16 held 101:25 110:22 hell 7:23 help 6:5 16:7 17:12,22 20:17 21:16 29:9,21 37:21 49:2,17 56:2 58:11 68:19 71:5 75:21 90:22	104:4 116:14 119:3 121:22 helped 21:10 helpful 73:19 115:4 117:11 helping 89:22 112:12 helps 1:20 75:15 hide 18:10 high 59:15 71:16 71:17 74:5 77:12 83:10 93:10,11 124:20 high-quality 48:12 higher 74:11 115:24,25 116:1 highlight 30:13 48:19 101:7 highlighting 40:14 73:25 highly 12:4 15:3 115:16 hiring 100:7 history 4:22,24 hold 110:23 118:5 holders 66:9 holding 25:4 118:5 holiday 66:24 home 5:14 16:22 18:4 22:5 67:13 89:19 homework 4:9,17 6:5 hope 1:15 19:16 81:8,15 92:3 118:5 119:13,21 hopefully 72:20 81:17 89:22 118:2 hoping 33:8 horrific 13:9 hour 4:10 hours 30:16 32:18 77:4 house 3:24 4:6 11:1 12:23 16:23 household 89:1 huge 35:4 47:9 88:5 90:18	114:25 Hughes 120:9 Hughes' 120:13 human 25:24 58:25 84:2 88:6 114:21 humans 108:11 hundreds 87:13 96:8 hurdle 77:20 hurdles 25:11,19 29:4 30:24 39:13 39:15 hurt 18:6 <hr/> I <hr/> ICA 16:19 ID 36:10,11 37:3 53:17 121:1 idea 13:8 17:6 31:6 42:17 65:7 74:3 77:13 97:20 102:12 124:15 ideas 121:24 123:18 identification 28:22 37:2 53:15 identified 75:10,20 101:20 identify 37:20 51:6 75:21 80:20 83:7 83:14,25 115:10 identity 35:19,20 37:12 120:17 IDs 37:8,21 121:9 illegal 46:3 47:4,16 47:21 51:10 61:7 62:2 63:19 69:20 73:17 74:14 96:8 97:22 112:5,6,21 113:8 image 46:25 47:3 47:16 49:24 50:2 50:17,19,22 52:16 60:4 61:14 61:25 62:2,25 64:5 69:18 75:8 75:19,21,24,25 76:8,22 77:6,7,11 77:24 78:1,8,8,12	79:5,7 80:6 114:22 115:5,9 115:13,17 121:19 image-based 77:10 imagery 53:3 63:20 73:18 79:2 80:8 81:20 82:23 83:2 85:3 92:10 93:16,19 94:3 95:22 96:15 97:13 100:1 108:2 113:21 images 46:8 49:15 49:16,19 50:5 60:9 74:20 75:9 78:10,13,14 80:17,24 95:8 114:18 116:11 imagine 30:3 75:5 115:12,15 immediate 25:6 64:17 65:1,8 76:23 77:3 106:21 immediately 46:12 46:18 52:19 60:6 imminent 64:18 106:25 imminently 72:24 impact 12:16 13:8 13:14,23 14:12 31:19 61:23 impacted 12:20 impacting 117:20 impacts 17:6 implement 39:8 81:18 121:8 implementable 58:16 implementation 121:15 implemented 59:9 82:10 98:12 important 48:6 70:12 77:22 82:13 94:5 98:24 99:5 112:17 122:6 125:5 imposed 32:12	44:18 impossible 28:16 122:16 impressed 9:6 improve 24:21 28:17 97:2 103:10 improved 18:24 improving 83:16 116:8 IN-A1 1:18 IN-A2 1:18 IN-H1 1:8,10,13 2:4 126:22 inaccurate 45:15 inappropriate 63:25 83:25 84:19,21 85:1 88:23 inappropriately 85:17 inauthentic 25:24 inbox 62:11 incest 10:9 incident 15:11 incidents 86:13 87:20 96:25 114:17 include 23:10 41:19 55:2 73:17 74:21 76:22 107:12 included 68:8,15 including 21:4 50:11 62:16 69:7 incorporate 101:1 increase 22:16,17 55:10,13 56:3,7 78:21 increased 102:19 105:17 incredibly 55:22 70:12 72:15 73:22 99:9 114:23 115:2 120:5 indecent 46:8,25 47:1 50:19 52:16 53:3 60:4 61:1
---	---	--	---	---

63:19 75:19,20 75:24,25 76:8 77:7,25 78:12,13 83:2 94:3,4 95:22 113:20 indicate 28:8 72:3 84:12 87:23 101:6 103:3 115:11 117:18 indicated 98:20 indicates 26:21 108:20 indicating 40:12 51:17 62:22 indication 37:23 60:24 63:7 87:11 106:12 115:14 indicative 64:22 indicators 85:12 individual 94:23 individuals 96:19 industry 19:10 51:14 79:2 80:10 81:3 88:10 91:18 97:10 information 22:19 23:16,23 24:12 26:22 27:23 30:4 30:24 31:13 32:5 32:20,23 33:1,13 34:5 35:23 38:15 38:17,20 43:11 45:16,18,19,21 48:3 51:9 57:2 62:13,15 65:5 66:25 67:6,10,16 68:20 71:13 76:6 79:16 82:4 91:25 92:12 93:24 97:11 101:10 107:13 115:1 121:14 ingest 80:22 ingestible 43:12 inhospitable 87:7 initial 28:3,16 114:12 115:20 initiated 82:8 118:12	initiatives 118:9 120:4 injured 123:14,15 Injuries 15:5 innocent 49:20 69:17 innocently 50:6 innocuous 113:2 input 68:18 99:1 111:20 114:1 INQ004186_001 86:8 INQ004189_001 100:12 INQ004190 95:5 INQ004287 69:11 inquiry 19:14 31:22 49:4 106:24 109:18 111:10 113:9 inquiry's 125:22 insight 101:13 insights 79:10 99:22 104:12 insofar 91:11 111:12 Instagram 22:7 86:16,21 instance 46:22 49:23 60:4,23 113:24 instances 32:19 86:18 88:12 intelligence 35:1 83:20,20,24 109:7,9 121:20 intent 96:17 99:18 intention 53:2 65:3 intentionally 63:5 63:9 intentions 49:16 51:7 interact 58:24 85:19 interacting 85:16 interaction 84:19 104:24 interactions 39:5	39:19 41:15 63:24 85:7 88:19 89:7 interesting 74:7 104:14 Interestingly 68:12 interference 98:22 internal 21:2 internally 31:22 47:9 53:24 International 91:5 internet 4:20 16:20,20,24 17:4 18:10 80:23 84:5 91:6 interventions 114:18 interviews 125:8 invent 102:20 invest 59:12 88:5 invested 88:4 116:16 investigation 62:3 63:2,8 investigations 60:1 investing 57:4 116:23 investment 22:21 47:10 55:21,25 56:21 108:9,23 109:1,6 116:21 116:22 117:22 124:22 involve 104:4 involved 8:15 10:22 12:4,8 63:12 106:10 118:14,25 inwards 14:25 15:1 IP 66:22 89:2 105:2 107:5 IPO'd 57:9 irrespective 31:13 53:2 72:12 ISPs 82:18 120:2 issue 61:4 issues 59:17 113:5	item 108:15 IWF 81:8,13,14 82:1,3 119:7,21 <hr/> J <hr/> January 27:1,3 95:6 100:17 job 87:15 journalist 114:7 Julie 19:12,15 126:24 July 73:11,12 June 20:6 <hr/> K <hr/> keen 104:19 keep 17:22 30:17 30:23 38:19,23 42:9 52:22 66:8 67:2 75:1,3 124:23 keeping 41:15 55:1,25 108:9 112:18 116:22,24 kept 57:14 66:12 key 84:15 101:5 107:25 kicks 79:4 kid 13:5 kids 5:15 17:4,11 17:23 18:7 95:17 122:8 kind 4:15 6:5 11:5 13:23 16:6 33:18 38:19 40:6 52:22 58:15 60:7 62:15 63:4 67:14 68:9 69:16 74:22 75:3 82:6 89:19 93:16 96:15 97:22 99:25 105:24 116:20 125:4 kinds 114:9 knew 8:10 11:17 knocking 79:17 know 1:17 2:23 3:1 4:19,20 5:11 5:25 7:16,24 9:13,21 10:1 11:12,16,17 12:9	14:19 16:12,16 17:2 18:3,7,7,8,8 18:9,10,16 21:16 23:23 24:21 25:2 26:2 27:8 29:1,3 30:10 31:5,11 32:14,16,18,19 32:22 33:18 34:1 35:8 36:3 37:23 39:12 43:4,10,21 43:21,25,25 44:4 49:14 50:3 51:8 52:8 56:1,10 58:3 60:13 61:20 64:1,1,12 66:23 67:15 72:17 73:24 74:6,8,12 75:4,18 77:2,13 77:17 78:20,25 79:9,11,15 80:13 85:19 87:9 88:8 88:8,13 89:5,18 91:23 92:2 97:1 98:21,25 101:6 104:17 105:22,22 106:2,11 107:4,7 107:11,22 108:3 108:11,12,21 110:15 111:18,18 112:11 114:5,11 116:10 117:3 119:22 121:25 122:2,4,7,25 123:17,20 124:13 125:13 knowing 32:1 72:11 75:5 78:16 knowledge 27:10 27:19 76:2 84:24 101:25 114:3 known 23:19,22 39:6 41:8 49:13 75:25 77:5 78:8 78:13 80:21 knows 14:19 <hr/> L <hr/> lagging 56:19 languages 58:21 laptop 6:20,23 8:3
---	--	--	---	---

8:4,5 9:4 laptops 3:15,18 4:1,4,6,7,8,10,12 4:16 5:4 6:4 large 27:18 28:12 43:22 59:7 67:12 68:17 late 104:6 latest 22:12 launched 75:8 law 34:8 42:7,12 42:23 43:2 44:2 45:5 48:4 49:14 59:24 63:12 64:19,24 65:5,17 79:17 81:3 84:8 85:13 87:4 89:4 97:21 99:23 100:5,9 104:23 104:24 105:5,23 105:25 106:5,13 106:17,19 107:1 107:3 110:9 111:3 laws 24:17 lawyer 107:7 119:21 lawyers 81:14 layman's 115:6 layperson 56:9 lead 99:25 leadership 124:19 125:8 leaflets 5:14 learn 5:15 learning 3:6 34:25 56:16 58:23 59:4 77:19 104:8,11 104:18 121:21 leave 7:22 12:23 78:24 121:11 leaving 78:19 left 71:20 legal 32:11,13,25 81:14 82:20 105:8,9,15,18 107:8,9,17 108:13 118:25 legality 85:25	legitimate 84:21 length 78:20 106:18 lesson 5:18 let's 47:3 64:6 66:10,23 70:20 115:12 level 41:22 64:1 66:15 86:24 90:22 leviathan 120:11 liaising 105:24 liberal 99:16 life 24:11 106:21 121:2 lightweight 44:21 like-minded 96:18 limit 39:5 41:5 limited 50:11 62:21 limits 104:18 110:15 line 41:15 52:23 108:15 111:25 lines 112:14 link 14:5 81:20 links 53:10 81:22 92:7 97:7 114:3 list 65:24 81:8,11 81:12,17,23,24 82:6,10,13,18 119:7,20,23,25 listen 17:16 little 2:1,16 3:1,13 6:9 12:15 13:22 14:11 15:4 21:13 24:1 27:25 44:5 44:7 93:4 112:15 live 5:25 14:5 46:9 101:23 102:1,8 102:10,14,19,20 102:20 103:1,5,8 103:14,16,16,17 103:19,24 104:9 104:16 108:2 local 105:10,19,21 location 41:7 58:17 66:21 67:1 locations 58:7 61:5	logged 7:3 110:8 London 22:11 long 4:7 56:20 59:5 62:20 76:13 76:21 77:3 78:11 78:25 107:1 114:5 118:6 119:16 120:8 122:23 longer 118:17 look 5:25 7:13 10:14,25 17:3,8 19:18,20 21:9,13 23:12,24 25:25 28:6 29:15 36:4 36:24 44:7 49:3 51:14 56:14 60:5 60:15,25 65:24 75:12 83:2 86:7 95:3 97:1 99:8 100:12 101:7 102:3,5 108:16 109:9 115:17 121:8,19 126:4 looked 4:23,24 6:23 7:9 11:4,5 35:23 42:4,14 68:12 96:12 97:24 107:14 looking 6:10 7:7 7:17 8:10,11 9:2 15:25 23:4 28:13 28:17 30:12 31:24 33:12 38:11 40:15 44:16 53:7 59:16 60:7 68:10 70:14 71:8,20,25 72:4 75:16 84:11,16 86:24 88:8 91:19 94:15 95:25 98:3 101:8 102:5,8 117:25 121:4,9 125:7 looks 8:25 39:17 60:14 83:1 86:11 90:4 lose 52:1 losing 90:3	lost 13:6,6,6 lot 14:18 18:12 35:7 36:6 37:10 99:11 lots 7:11 9:11 18:12 57:22,22 61:3 101:14 loved 99:6 low 70:9 71:24 74:5 lucky 13:3 lunch 75:12 79:23 80:5,18 <hr/> M <hr/> machine 34:25 56:16 58:23 59:4 83:19,20 104:7 104:10 Mail 100:17 main 118:6 maintaining 16:14 90:5 majority 30:15 60:9 74:1 making 16:14 22:21 26:5 39:22 55:22 82:16 87:7 88:11,21 100:18 100:20 117:23 man 9:14 managed 70:24 manager 19:24 20:2 21:1 manages 26:10 managing 21:7 mandatory 30:6 30:13 manipulate 18:8 manipulative 10:10 manner 103:2 manpower 123:2 March 68:9 86:10 97:15 100:16 Mark 54:17 57:6 116:20 marked 6:24 match 76:6,13,19 76:24	matched 74:21 94:20 matches 75:19 80:20 matching 79:20 material 46:3,21 50:25 52:23 57:25 59:22 60:2 60:8,15 61:1 77:16 85:10,23 86:4 116:10 maths 86:17 matter 34:15 79:12 80:4 matters 91:6 119:1 126:1 mean 13:3 14:20 28:6 46:17 51:15 84:3 85:21 means 25:21 29:7 30:21 40:4,6,14 60:13 meant 37:7 52:15 120:25 124:12 measure 70:12 74:9 measurement 68:18 71:4 mechanism 27:7 28:18 73:25 74:10 82:12 83:17 85:22 87:4 96:1,21 121:21 mechanisms 29:13 media 109:20 medical 15:18 medium-sized 91:21 meet 65:3 member 42:6 110:21 members 23:9 29:9 35:10 75:11 mental 20:13 mention 97:9 mentioned 34:23 54:22 57:7 60:20 67:18 71:3 74:19 93:2 94:12 95:24
--	--	--	--	--

100:13 104:6,16 112:22 120:24 121:19 mentioning 63:5 107:15 message 7:23 9:20 9:21 39:13,23 40:12 44:23 51:17,22,22 62:25 63:5 88:25 94:1 98:15 110:3 110:5,7 122:7 messaged 9:23 10:17 messages 9:3,10 9:12,16,17 10:21 11:5 39:15 40:3 63:10 85:15,15 85:24 94:13 101:16,17 105:6 107:6,16 110:1 110:17,23 messaging 10:1 62:19 92:4 95:14 98:17 messed 18:13,14 Messenger 22:7 81:21 83:6 85:19 98:2 method 26:18 metric 70:5,6 112:17 Microsoft 79:9 91:15,24 mid-morning 41:24 million 21:19,20 43:24 73:6,15,20 74:20 mind 40:5 112:4 112:23 123:6 124:24 mine 118:6 minimal 72:8,11 minimise 121:16 minimum 112:19 minors 50:12 minute 27:2 79:3 minutes 44:11	76:16 78:9 misappropriating 49:19 Missing 49:13 misunderstanding 63:18 misunderstandi... 66:3 MLAT 107:16,20 Mm 21:22 29:14 68:4 Mm-hm 58:22 mobile 25:12 26:12 27:25 38:16 model 56:18 58:16 91:20 103:16 moderating 54:9 moderator 60:5 84:18 moderators 53:20 53:21 55:14 56:4 56:10 58:25 59:19 62:1 74:23 84:2 moment 13:10 14:4,6 15:2 32:8 44:9 54:22 58:23 113:11 125:15,21 moments 38:4 month 21:17 27:16 92:19 94:13 months 8:22 65:13 74:8 81:13 82:2 86:14 118:12 119:11 morning 1:4,8,13 6:16,19 11:2 18:18 19:1 44:16 89:10 mother 17:3 89:24 move 19:3 56:4 79:12 101:23 104:23 moved 120:5 moving 67:22 98:16 multibillion 109:6 multiple 51:24	53:10 Mum 7:25,25 mums 89:14 music 4:9,18 8:9 Mutual 107:17 <hr/> N <hr/> N 126:20 name 1:20 14:9 19:14 23:18,22 24:10 25:24 36:7 36:10,17,20,22 37:18,19 names 28:6 narrow 51:3 93:6 nasty 10:10 17:24 national 49:12 79:1,1 95:11 105:3,9 107:25 nature 47:4 82:19 96:3,17 116:11 119:24 navigate 89:22 NCA's 108:5 NCMEC 45:5 46:23 48:13 49:13 51:2,13 53:4 60:3,19 61:15 64:14,18 64:21 66:9 67:3 67:9 69:25 71:10 76:20 77:2 79:17 80:23 81:4,5 85:5,14 87:12 105:1,4 near 28:15 nearly 73:15 necessarily 22:19 36:18 47:20 66:22 71:11 89:5 90:1 98:14 112:25 116:3 117:21 necessary 125:24 need 15:19 17:12 18:2 32:4,8 35:24 48:5 56:1 59:12 60:18 61:21,23 76:5 79:13,18 81:25	82:13,20 89:11 96:22,24 99:17 106:16 107:9 117:22 122:5,9 needed 4:22 57:14 77:8 83:13 needs 3:9 18:1,2 18:12 60:21 116:6 119:22 network 84:4 122:16 networking 98:17 never 78:24 90:12 96:23 new 56:21,21,21 59:8 60:20 65:2 69:1 75:8 76:4 77:10,15,19,20 80:6 83:22 97:8 108:10 112:1,20 116:10 117:12 newer 75:7 91:22 91:23 94:14 newly-generated 82:23 news 86:10 101:11 NGO 30:22 NGOs 21:2 nice 10:8 night 5:4,7 Nodded 3:3 11:7 45:14 49:22 non-coerced 86:3 non-encrypted 92:16 non-illegal 73:17 non-immediate 106:23 normal 31:16 notes 123:19 notified 62:3 notifying 64:19 noting 94:16 November 54:17 68:3 72:25 91:8 nowadays 124:20 NSPCC 84:5 86:11 100:18 NSPCC's 101:2	nuanced 57:18 59:11 113:5 nude 49:15,21 50:17 nudity 49:7 64:5 66:18 69:8,14,17 70:3,9,15,21,22 71:24 72:1 74:17 77:25 78:3 number 19:17 21:3,7,17,18,18 22:22 28:12 29:1 29:3,6 31:7,10,14 32:17,22 38:16 38:22 40:6 41:2 41:9 42:15 43:22 50:13 54:2,10,11 54:18,21 55:4,6 55:14,16 56:4,13 57:3,6,13,13,19 58:12,21,25 61:4 65:14,15,19 66:13,17,19 67:8 67:12 69:12 70:8 70:13 71:10,12 71:16,17,23 72:16 73:19,23 74:7,9 75:4 81:13 82:2 83:22 85:20 88:8 90:10 91:1,3 94:12 98:13 100:3 102:19 105:11 106:11,14,15 107:9,24 108:22 109:2,4,11 110:24 111:11,23 116:23 117:6,25 118:9,14,25 122:19 123:17 numbers 32:3,7 33:8,15 54:1,5,24 55:15 56:6 59:7 61:2 65:13 68:17 68:19 69:1,3 71:19 72:2,18,22 87:9 94:24 106:8 106:9 108:18,25 116:15 117:10,20
---	--	---	---	---

<p>O</p> <p>O'Connor 2:20 9:14 12:9</p> <p>objective 77:10 78:17,23 98:4</p> <p>objectives 124:10</p> <p>observer 96:14</p> <p>obtain 70:14</p> <p>obtained 106:15 109:18</p> <p>obvious 5:23 50:21 65:10 112:25</p> <p>obviously 8:24 13:11 22:6 33:16 42:3 48:10 50:19 51:7 55:16 62:23 70:17 90:24 92:14 101:4 102:20 103:9 104:25 111:22 112:5 114:8 115:2</p> <p>occasionally 6:1 35:19</p> <p>occurrence 51:18</p> <p>October 68:8</p> <p>October/Novem... 69:2</p> <p>offence 43:5</p> <p>offences 86:24</p> <p>offender 24:15 42:5,8,13 43:1,8 43:17 45:13 46:2</p> <p>offenders 23:11 42:1,10,18 126:2</p> <p>offer 41:5 104:14</p> <p>office 20:7 22:11</p> <p>officer 97:15</p> <p>officers 11:1,4 12:4</p> <p>offices 58:13</p> <p>official 19:23,24 37:21</p> <p>offline 113:3</p> <p>offset 99:17</p> <p>Oh 10:23</p> <p>okay 3:12 4:24 6:14 8:4 12:14 14:24 52:14 66:7</p>	<p>92:25 115:8</p> <p>old 88:24</p> <p>older 26:6</p> <p>once 12:5 27:9 52:21 61:13 76:12 109:12</p> <p>one's 23:20</p> <p>ones 16:18 88:9</p> <p>ongoing 15:16,17 28:12 108:23 111:11,11</p> <p>online 5:12,19,22 10:3,7 20:10,12 43:13 59:25 88:3 88:20 89:22 90:3 90:5,14,23 97:24 100:17 111:9,19 112:6 113:4 124:21</p> <p>only' 95:17</p> <p>onwards 6:11 10:25 75:16 83:4</p> <p>open 1:3 42:22,25 43:9 113:22 122:2 125:24 126:21</p> <p>opened 7:1</p> <p>openly 88:18</p> <p>operate 78:16 93:25</p> <p>operates 75:18 77:5</p> <p>operations 19:25 21:8 53:9,12,19 53:22 54:6 56:24 57:21 58:6 74:23 108:14,20</p> <p>opportunities 83:22 103:10 104:7,14</p> <p>options 109:21</p> <p>order 14:9 24:22 32:6 76:3 87:17 118:17 126:5</p> <p>orders 126:3</p> <p>ordinarily 35:22 37:25 40:18</p> <p>organisation 20:5 124:4 125:1</p>	<p>organisations 22:23 91:1</p> <p>ought 87:25</p> <p>outcome 35:17 62:3</p> <p>outlets 109:20</p> <p>outline 112:9</p> <p>outlined 97:16</p> <p>outrage 51:5,14 52:17 93:6</p> <p>outreach 44:2 100:5</p> <p>outset 33:16 49:8 69:15 79:3,7 106:20 125:23</p> <p>outside 96:14</p> <p>overdosed 13:1</p> <p>overdosing 12:22</p> <p>overspeaking 7:6</p> <p>overstep 51:15</p> <hr/> <p>P</p> <p>paedophile 10:17 10:18</p> <p>paedophiles 95:7 95:15 96:7,8</p> <p>page 24:2,19 25:7 29:18 40:18,23 41:1,6,10,14,18 41:22 68:5,5,6 69:5 70:1 73:2,3 86:9,12 92:6 95:9,10 103:22</p> <p>pages 41:5 69:12 101:10</p> <p>PANE 127:1</p> <p>panel 2:23 17:16 18:20 34:12 64:15 78:7 88:2 89:10 113:13,16 125:25</p> <p>Paper 111:9,13,22 112:3</p> <p>par 55:25</p> <p>paragraph 2:3 6:11 10:25 15:25 17:18 23:4 24:3 38:11 42:2 53:7 54:8,16 63:15,18 63:21 80:18 83:4</p>	<p>92:5,12 93:3 95:11 101:24 103:22</p> <p>paragraphs 75:16</p> <p>parent 16:21 17:5 30:9 32:25 49:21 49:23 90:15</p> <p>parental 89:13,18</p> <p>parents 17:20 18:1 18:11 29:8 35:10 84:8 88:19 89:11 89:21,22 90:1,9 122:1,5,24 123:9</p> <p>part 21:9 22:20 24:20 41:3 74:20 91:7 94:1,7 98:2 109:15</p> <p>participant 94:21</p> <p>participants 94:25</p> <p>participate 91:14</p> <p>participated 91:8</p> <p>participation 50:9</p> <p>particular 26:10 39:11 55:20 56:20 76:7 81:23 82:18 91:2 109:15 113:24 119:25</p> <p>particularly 48:9 74:5,5</p> <p>parties 82:21</p> <p>partner 3:17 4:25 5:1 8:15,20 9:2,4 9:23 10:2,6,6,16 10:21</p> <p>partner's 14:9</p> <p>partners 35:8 58:12 84:4</p> <p>partnership 87:4 91:4,6</p> <p>partnerships 90:25</p> <p>parts 50:4 64:13 92:16 97:25 101:9 102:17</p> <p>party 64:6,6 112:25</p> <p>pass 107:6</p> <p>passed 79:17</p>	<p>password 24:14</p> <p>pattern 28:7 84:16 103:23</p> <p>patterns 84:12 94:15</p> <p>pause 13:10 14:3,7 17:15 19:2 92:21</p> <p>pay 17:9</p> <p>paying 16:18</p> <p>pending 63:2</p> <p>penis 115:15</p> <p>people 7:11,16 9:16 13:3,16 14:18,22 16:5,9 18:6 21:17 22:1 22:25 23:18,21 24:3 25:13,22 28:19 29:4,7,10 35:18 36:12 37:14 38:17 40:7 41:5,25 43:22,24 45:24 48:6 49:15 49:18 51:4,15 52:6,13,15 54:3,9 54:18,20,25 55:4 55:6,23 56:1,13 56:17 57:14 60:13,22,24 63:16 66:23 67:9 67:13 74:22 78:22 83:6 84:3 84:22 85:19 87:13 88:21 89:5 93:5 96:17,19 97:23 98:20 99:1 99:10 100:14 101:1 106:3 108:10,22 113:1 114:13,23 116:3 116:22 121:13 122:21,25 124:18 124:23</p> <p>people's 37:12 57:4 101:11</p> <p>percentage 74:11 74:24</p> <p>perception 102:9 109:22</p> <p>perfect 17:2</p>
--	---	---	---	---

<p>period 73:15 76:9 86:19 87:20</p> <p>permanent 25:5 46:18</p> <p>permanently 31:1 35:7 51:19</p> <p>perpetrate 67:14</p> <p>persisting 64:9</p> <p>person 2:12 10:4 10:13 13:5 17:24 22:3 26:19,21 27:20 29:24 30:1 30:4 35:24 36:7 36:13,16 38:6,18 39:15 40:14 42:13 43:6,19 44:24 45:8,12 46:3,5 47:6,8,11 62:2 63:7 64:9 76:7 79:14 94:18 110:3,4,4,5,18 112:24 117:17 123:16,20</p> <p>personal 24:13 38:20</p> <p>personally 120:14</p> <p>perspective 17:20 28:1 34:24 82:21 107:10 116:14 121:7</p> <p>pertained 119:4</p> <p>pertinent 49:4</p> <p>phone 84:7</p> <p>phoned 10:23</p> <p>photo 64:13 75:25 76:7,13,20 79:14 94:20 102:7 115:11,15</p> <p>PhotoDNA 21:10 21:13 47:5,11 60:21 61:23 73:22 74:21 75:6 75:12,15,17,21 76:12,19,24 77:5 79:4,8 92:15 93:19,25 94:20 95:24 97:12</p> <p>photograph 86:12</p> <p>photographs 7:12</p>	<p>photos 76:4</p> <p>phrase 89:20</p> <p>pick 44:5</p> <p>picked 119:10</p> <p>pictured 115:10</p> <p>pictures 7:12,14</p> <p>piece 53:8</p> <p>pieces 70:19 73:6 73:16</p> <p>pipeline 118:10</p> <p>place 15:12 18:13 27:9 35:5 39:14 48:2 62:11 85:2 89:7 90:11 93:20 96:1,21 103:5 116:9 122:20</p> <p>placed 42:23 79:10</p> <p>places 11:23</p> <p>planned 56:6</p> <p>planning 57:8</p> <p>plans 22:16 56:3 74:12,18 100:19</p> <p>platform 25:6 31:3 35:3 37:11 40:7 41:12 45:3 48:7 48:20 64:8 70:22 71:15,18 72:9 79:11 84:14 87:2 87:7 89:7 97:24 98:6,18,25 102:4 102:10,24 103:2 103:13 112:19 114:5,6,13 116:6 121:23</p> <p>platforms 92:9 124:21</p> <p>plausible 36:18</p> <p>Play 96:5</p> <p>players 97:10</p> <p>please 1:9,14 2:2 12:18 16:4 19:10 19:14,22 20:17 21:15 23:14,24 24:1,7 29:15 31:7 32:10 35:21 36:24 42:2 49:3 49:4 67:22,23 69:11 70:1 83:3 86:7,25 90:17</p>	<p>92:5 95:4 100:11 101:23,24 109:5 111:7 115:7</p> <p>pm 44:15 79:25 80:2 126:12,15</p> <p>point 11:12 25:12 26:20 28:25 36:2 38:3 88:24 116:6 117:19 120:18,20 120:22,24</p> <p>pointed 65:13</p> <p>pointing 120:6 121:4</p> <p>points 32:6 85:23</p> <p>police 10:22,23 11:8,12,20,21 12:2,4,7,7 15:3 30:22 44:3 86:12 87:10 95:8,11 105:10,19 109:24 110:25</p> <p>policies 23:6,17 87:3 103:7,18 113:1</p> <p>policy 20:2,25 21:3 21:3,7,25 24:7 32:11 44:4 49:9 51:3 94:18</p> <p>pop 7:18 9:20</p> <p>popped 7:19,20</p> <p>popular 102:14,14 102:16,16</p> <p>pornography 96:9</p> <p>pornography' 95:16</p> <p>portal 89:21 105:23</p> <p>portion 75:9 108:1</p> <p>portions 121:12</p> <p>posed 70:2</p> <p>posited 27:13</p> <p>position 32:21 62:23 83:3 93:15 118:16</p> <p>positive 99:10 100:15,22</p> <p>positives 99:14</p> <p>possibility 49:18 122:14 123:15</p>	<p>possible 23:8 25:18 26:12 30:8 41:23 62:15 78:18 87:8,18 98:14 123:4</p> <p>post 40:2 50:9 52:7 54:17 63:16,19 116:19</p> <p>posted 44:24 47:22 53:1 62:25 64:4</p> <p>posting 40:4,8,9 40:11 52:6 64:9</p> <p>posts 39:22 40:1 103:15,24 125:7</p> <p>potential 30:20 38:5 42:18 49:17 60:20 77:15 79:5 91:9 99:17 121:22</p> <p>potentially 27:23 31:1 48:18 50:16 51:23 60:2 65:3 67:13 70:20 74:19 85:1 87:22 96:13</p> <p>pounds 117:5</p> <p>practical 38:12</p> <p>practically 26:8 58:16 75:23 84:20</p> <p>practice 39:6,7,10 75:17 112:9</p> <p>practices 97:11</p> <p>preceded 111:14</p> <p>precise 11:13</p> <p>predatorial 84:13</p> <p>predominantly 100:24 101:17</p> <p>preliminary 111:15</p> <p>premises 91:15</p> <p>preparation 31:21</p> <p>prepared 20:22</p> <p>preparing 33:11 42:14</p> <p>presence 41:9 90:5</p> <p>present 34:6</p> <p>presently 31:25 122:12</p>	<p>presents 3:18</p> <p>Presumably 59:19</p> <p>presume 97:10</p> <p>pretty 51:1 52:24 62:20 76:22</p> <p>prevalence 70:12 70:14,18,24 71:6 71:9,12,18 72:16 102:3 112:16,16</p> <p>prevalent 70:3,16 70:22 72:3 102:1</p> <p>prevent 16:2 25:13 26:4,23 39:18 75:25 79:2,6 80:24 89:6 92:9 93:16 95:20 96:15</p> <p>preventing 29:4 81:19</p> <p>prevention 20:13 21:5 58:1</p> <p>prevents 25:15</p> <p>previous 20:10</p> <p>previously 8:21 24:15 77:7,16 80:7</p> <p>primarily 20:12 21:1</p> <p>primary 90:21</p> <p>prime 100:8</p> <p>prior 20:9 21:6</p> <p>priorities 124:1,5 124:17</p> <p>prioritisation 103:16</p> <p>prioritised 103:15</p> <p>priority 32:23 106:22</p> <p>privacy 38:10,13 38:25 120:11 125:12</p> <p>privacy-focused 98:5,17</p> <p>private 38:20 90:24</p> <p>privy 56:6</p> <p>proactive 40:6 74:25 95:25 114:12</p>
---	---	--	--	--

<p>proactively 28:11 28:13 65:5,17 75:10 87:10 89:4 93:15 115:3</p> <p>probability 59:15 83:10 115:25</p> <p>probably 26:9 30:13 38:1 44:5 59:9 60:13 82:14 113:10 117:10 125:9,12</p> <p>problem 14:3 17:13 32:2 83:2 83:6 88:3 96:12 96:13 102:12 108:2</p> <p>procedures 31:18</p> <p>process 24:22 27:5 28:21 32:19 34:13 37:16 46:9 46:11 47:5 48:1 51:1 100:7 107:17,20 121:15</p> <p>processes 35:16 51:11 60:12 61:22 85:2 103:18 122:17,19</p> <p>produce 68:16</p> <p>produced 85:10</p> <p>product 21:3 102:14</p> <p>products 24:17</p> <p>profile 66:21 101:11</p> <p>programmes 91:4</p> <p>progress 59:10 80:14 104:10</p> <p>progresses 112:18</p> <p>prohibit 26:8</p> <p>prohibited 24:16 41:25</p> <p>prohibition 42:3</p> <p>projects 58:5 82:10</p> <p>proliferation 99:25</p> <p>promise 123:1,2</p> <p>proof 91:17,24</p> <p>properly 73:12</p>	<p>proportion 117:17</p> <p>proposal 111:16 112:10</p> <p>proposals 118:22 119:5</p> <p>protected 14:19</p> <p>protection 4:21 18:12,13 100:25 124:16</p> <p>prototype 91:10 91:12,16</p> <p>prove 38:7</p> <p>provide 24:11 28:19,22 32:6 37:9 45:23 56:25 57:2 62:13,15,20 63:23 67:5 68:11 68:22 69:1 70:6 72:21 79:10 84:10 99:21 104:18 106:8 121:1</p> <p>provided 35:24 36:11 45:18 55:3 66:19 67:21 70:11 76:15 88:9 101:14 102:25 104:8 107:2,13 107:14</p> <p>provider 110:22</p> <p>provides 23:15 45:15 83:21 97:4</p> <p>providing 90:20</p> <p>provision 26:14</p> <p>provoke 52:17</p> <p>pseudonyms 109:23</p> <p>public 1:5 23:9 39:22 40:8,11 42:6,9,22 43:3 47:25 54:2 55:16 75:2,11 108:25 110:21 122:1</p> <p>publicised 111:8</p> <p>publicly 40:2,4 47:24</p> <p>published 53:8 117:12 126:2</p> <p>pull 92:13 96:1</p>	<p>pulled 69:12</p> <p>pure 85:14</p> <p>purely 28:13 86:3</p> <p>purposes 24:13</p> <p>put 4:11 7:25,25 18:12 19:19 25:8 27:9,14,17 52:2 69:11 91:13 96:21 116:14 122:12 123:2</p> <p>puts 26:17,25 113:3</p> <p>putting 25:15 28:23 34:5,14 43:23 72:17 116:23 124:22</p> <p>puzzling 52:12</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">Q</p> <hr/> <p>Q3 73:14</p> <p>quality 47:10 115:24</p> <p>quarter 73:8,10,13 74:3</p> <p>question 30:2 34:17 45:21 62:6 70:2 97:6 104:2 113:15 114:15 123:25 124:3,11 125:6</p> <p>questions 1:14 18:18,20,21 29:20 56:9 92:4 107:24 113:11,13 113:16,18 125:17 127:1</p> <p>quick 32:17,20 47:5,6 65:24</p> <p>quickly 31:20 32:14,24 60:16 78:18 79:12 103:6,17,21 107:13 119:23</p> <p>quiet 14:15</p> <p>quite 28:12 31:2,5 34:21 36:18 40:10 44:21 47:19 53:25 59:7 60:16 63:10 68:17 79:15</p>	<p>83:18 84:16 111:17 119:23 121:5,14</p> <p>quote 97:16 120:19</p> <p>quoted 96:10 120:10</p> <p>quoting 117:4,11</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">R</p> <hr/> <p>R&D 108:3,24</p> <p>radar 120:7</p> <p>raise 51:5</p> <p>range 66:15 71:3 100:2 112:2</p> <p>rationale 49:9 98:18</p> <p>reach 40:6</p> <p>react 10:7 13:23</p> <p>read 2:24 9:5 24:24 63:21 95:13</p> <p>readily 37:13 39:13 43:11</p> <p>reading 9:3,6 73:11 75:4</p> <p>reads 95:6</p> <p>real 23:23 35:19 36:5,7 100:19,23 108:11</p> <p>reality 122:15</p> <p>really 14:23 31:20 32:24 40:7 42:21 48:8,23 51:15 52:10 55:24 56:13 59:5,16 60:22 61:17 62:17 63:6 79:12 84:11,14,16 86:25 88:1 90:6 90:8 92:6 98:5 104:14 113:6 114:20 122:19,24</p> <p>realtime 62:14</p> <p>rearrange 19:3</p> <p>reason 67:11,15 78:20 84:22</p> <p>reasonable 27:9 36:14 37:23 79:19</p>	<p>reasons 2:25 35:14 39:10 56:18 66:13</p> <p>reassure 90:8</p> <p>receive 30:18 64:24 105:4,8,22</p> <p>received 12:9 31:12,15 105:14 105:18 114:3</p> <p>receives 107:8</p> <p>receiving 24:17 32:14</p> <p>recognition 84:17 103:23</p> <p>recommend 21:25</p> <p>reconvene 125:21</p> <p>recorded 86:13,24</p> <p>redacted 14:1,1</p> <p>refer 1:17 51:1 53:24 60:6 75:7 75:10</p> <p>reference 67:18 73:3 95:10 100:18</p> <p>referrals 67:2</p> <p>referred 58:23 67:9</p> <p>referring 55:15 118:19</p> <p>refers 75:6</p> <p>refused 15:9,11</p> <p>regain 37:22</p> <p>regard 39:23 109:21</p> <p>regardless 83:14</p> <p>regards 41:4 52:9 103:1,11 121:3</p> <p>region 106:1</p> <p>regional 124:10</p> <p>register 43:1,17,20</p> <p>registered 23:10 42:1,5,10,13,18 43:8 45:12 46:1</p> <p>registration 24:22 24:23 25:12,14 38:3 120:18</p> <p>registry 42:22 43:23</p> <p>regular 35:13</p>
---	--	--	---	---

regularly 65:6,8	removed 35:7	65:11 67:19	retrieved 110:9	risk 85:25 104:9
regulation 113:4	45:23,25 47:25	68:23 71:10,12	return 44:11 79:24	106:23
regulator 112:1	48:6 49:25 51:19	74:25 75:10 94:5	126:10	role 19:22 20:3,18
regulators 98:19	53:1 62:9 71:16	104:19 115:1	returning 81:23	20:19,19,25
111:21	72:1 73:7,16	representative	reusing 49:18	111:24
regulatory 111:16	74:14,16 76:14	74:4	reveal 39:7	roll-out 119:4
reinitiated 82:14	78:9,18 85:4	request 33:1,3,5,6	revenue 57:9,10	rolled 110:15
118:21,24	110:2,5,7,16,17	106:6,13,19	116:25 117:2,7	116:7 119:13
related 20:10	110:23	107:2,4 120:3	117:17,21 123:12	room 3:25 4:11
30:20 31:1 32:16	removing 61:20	requests 35:20	review 25:25	15:20 16:10 19:3
35:4 42:16,21	64:11 76:24	105:5,8,9,15,18	32:16 35:13	rooms 4:19 16:23
62:18 65:22,25	repeatedly 52:20	105:20,22 106:3	54:19 55:23	roughly 65:16
66:17 69:3 70:24	rephrase 56:11	106:9,10 107:8	60:11 78:25 85:9	87:20
89:25 93:3,8	report 25:23 29:7	107:12	87:14 110:19	routinely 64:21
114:3 119:20,24	29:18 30:8 32:15	require 37:1,8	reviewed 46:5	rude 7:12,14 9:9
relates 33:17	35:11 42:5,6	required 28:22	59:17 77:14 78:2	rudimentary
105:1	48:11,13 49:12	30:25 68:16	103:15,17	83:18
relating 126:1	61:14 62:22	110:9 120:19	reviewers 25:25	rules 4:6,15 6:1
relation 42:10	64:14,18,21	requirement 23:15	35:13 53:25 54:6	49:1
64:19 67:20	67:25 68:1,8	32:11,13 120:17	55:4	run 43:18 94:24
74:14,16 90:20	69:10,13,25 70:2	120:23,25	reviewing 55:8	running 40:17
96:12 104:1,3	72:20,24 74:2	research 4:9 43:9	60:1 64:10 84:25	92:15 95:24
107:23 111:8	75:2 76:20,21	86:11 108:4	103:6	
118:22 119:7	83:15 84:3,25	resolved 82:5	right 1:22 2:4,13	S
120:16	85:14 87:12,17	119:2	2:17 3:4,16,19	sadly 2:4
relationship 86:5	88:12 96:9 105:1	resource 88:6	4:5,12 5:2,6 6:8	safe 4:21 16:15,23
Relativity 73:3	113:2 114:13	respond 56:20	6:13 7:17,20 8:2	16:25 17:22 18:5
relay 123:19	115:4	106:19 107:1,3	8:18 9:12,23,24	38:24 55:1 57:14
reliably 70:7,11	reported 35:14	responded 12:5	10:3,24 11:19,24	116:22,24 122:14
relies 36:6	42:12 46:1 53:9	response 47:13	11:24 12:11	124:23
rely 94:3 98:15	60:5 62:2,7,8	56:15,15 58:15	13:21 14:10 15:1	safeguard 51:6
101:15 115:2	66:4,5,9 85:5	83:1 87:24 91:7	15:9,16,23 17:3	safeguarding
116:3	110:17,18 114:6	110:12 116:2	17:15 18:15	116:18 119:5
remain 46:9	114:19 116:17	responsibility	22:22 23:24	124:16
remainder 74:4	reporting 29:12,17	16:10 17:8,9,11	26:25 39:17	safeguards 38:24
remaining 71:17	29:24 30:1,9	40:22 41:17	45:13 47:10 48:9	89:8 98:6
remember 83:9	34:8 43:3 45:4	88:11 90:10	48:15,24 49:1	Safer 84:5
remit 53:13	46:23 51:12	122:23	53:6 54:7 55:5	safety 5:12,19,22
removal 25:6	53:10 58:1 60:2	responsible 16:13	55:23 56:18 58:7	17:23 20:2,11,12
44:22 45:3 46:19	60:19 64:14	40:19 41:14	61:15 67:17	20:14,25 21:4,4,6
47:5,12 64:9	74:22 77:2 83:11	53:14,17 100:24	69:20,22 71:7	35:8 54:18 55:1
66:19 79:13	94:3 103:5 105:1	restricting 41:12	76:8 80:16 81:13	55:6 57:4,15,16
removals 89:9	105:3 114:17,23	restriction 14:8	88:12,13 89:20	57:21 59:25
remove 28:11 31:3	reports 25:25	126:3	90:19 91:7,17	65:21,22 66:4
31:4 38:6 46:16	30:16,17,19	result 47:16 90:3	93:17 105:4	84:4 85:9 88:15
47:23 49:16 59:6	31:12,15 32:6,17	results 81:23	111:6 116:17,18	88:20 98:6 99:2
71:20 75:22	33:19 34:7 42:9	retain 48:3 111:2	122:7 123:16,20	99:13 101:5
78:12 94:11 97:8	53:4,14 61:25	retained 31:13	ring 95:19	102:18 104:15
97:9 110:4	62:12 64:23 65:8	retaining 31:17	ring-fenced 108:1	108:9 109:16,21
				125:9

<p>sanction 24:25 25:1 44:18</p> <p>sat 9:5</p> <p>satisfied 76:12</p> <p>satisfy 82:21</p> <p>saved 11:6</p> <p>saw 9:7 74:6 108:24</p> <p>saying 5:14 7:23 43:3 51:23 120:10 122:11,18</p> <p>says 39:4 49:8 50:8 69:15 70:4 88:3 95:12 96:9 109:19</p> <p>scale 31:6,10 32:1 47:3 102:12</p> <p>scanned 80:20</p> <p>scars 13:1</p> <p>scenario 26:9 27:13</p> <p>scenes 38:23 51:11 108:22</p> <p>school 2:16 4:8 5:12 38:16 90:21</p> <p>schools 90:25</p> <p>scientists 55:2</p> <p>scope 42:24 108:17 111:23</p> <p>scout 40:17</p> <p>screen 19:19,21 23:25 30:12 50:4 68:6 69:5,11 95:4</p> <p>screens 85:20</p> <p>screenshot 29:17</p> <p>screenshots 94:8</p> <p>scroll 69:5 70:19</p> <p>search 39:12 82:18 120:2</p> <p>second 52:25 95:11 118:8</p> <p>secondary 90:22</p> <p>secondly 90:12 110:12</p> <p>seconds 34:15 76:17 79:13</p> <p>section 73:4</p> <p>sections 31:7</p>	<p>secure 99:7</p> <p>security 18:1,2,3 54:19 55:1,7 57:5</p> <p>see 7:7,10 8:1,7 17:25 18:19 25:3 29:19 33:12 35:1 44:20 47:2 59:13 69:5,8 72:8 73:24 74:7,10,13 84:24 100:16 107:5 111:2 114:24 116:12 117:9 121:20</p> <p>seeing 10:21 43:19 50:16</p> <p>seek 30:4 45:20 67:6 114:1</p> <p>seeking 39:17,19 41:17 42:19 68:18</p> <p>seeks 115:9</p> <p>seen 43:3 50:3,4 51:3 52:11 55:17 55:18 56:21 62:19 76:16 98:10 102:18 103:1,12,20 107:12 108:6 109:12</p> <p>self-generated 85:23</p> <p>self-harming 12:22 13:2</p> <p>semi-official 37:21</p> <p>send 51:22</p> <p>sender 110:2,17,24</p> <p>sending 81:20 85:22 86:4</p> <p>sends 110:3</p> <p>senior 19:24 124:19 125:8</p> <p>sense 55:4 124:16</p> <p>sensible 43:18 97:20</p> <p>sensitive 38:15 126:1</p> <p>sensitivity 39:10</p> <p>sent 64:10 85:15</p>	<p>85:24 88:25</p> <p>sentence 12:10</p> <p>separate 21:20 33:24 34:1,2 37:4 46:23 53:23 55:3 61:11,12 109:2</p> <p>September 73:12 86:14</p> <p>sequence 77:1</p> <p>series 40:3</p> <p>serious 87:6</p> <p>seriously 90:10 116:21 122:24 123:14</p> <p>servers 32:21</p> <p>service 24:3,9,19 24:25 34:16 40:25 42:4 44:17 48:17,19,22 64:13 82:19 87:18 92:4,14 98:1 101:9 102:17 109:16 122:8</p> <p>services 43:13,25 90:14 91:23 99:11 102:22 112:13 120:1</p> <p>session 1:3 45:7 125:24 126:14,21 127:1</p> <p>sessions 125:22,25 126:7</p> <p>set 4:15 6:1 21:10 24:18,19 26:17 27:4,18 29:1 34:13 37:2 38:9 41:21 45:9 47:18 49:1 50:7 68:9 68:14,24 69:23 73:4 75:1 86:15 95:15 101:24 109:23,23 124:5</p> <p>sets 24:3 68:6 88:24 107:20</p> <p>setting 28:21 35:22 38:2 40:15 41:21 43:8,19</p>	<p>50:13 67:19 111:25 123:12</p> <p>settings 38:10,14</p> <p>severe 45:2 50:25 51:10 79:15 93:22</p> <p>severity 44:19</p> <p>sex 20:15 23:10 24:15 42:1,5,10 42:13,18 43:1,5,8 43:17 45:12 46:2 46:20 47:17 60:2 61:9 66:4 77:5 80:7 95:17</p> <p>sexual 9:10,17 45:4 48:9 49:7 50:10,11 57:25 58:3 59:8,21 60:15 61:14 62:18 64:2 65:4 65:23,25 68:13 68:13,15 69:8,14 70:3,9,17,23,25 71:24 72:6 74:15 77:12 80:21 82:23 86:13 87:20 92:10,20 93:9,22 99:18 102:5 104:4 109:9 112:7 113:7 115:12</p> <p>sexually 2:5 49:10</p> <p>shamed 10:9</p> <p>share 24:13 33:8 35:8 41:4 49:15 49:23 51:4 52:14 61:2 80:9 81:2,4 89:2,3 91:25 93:5 95:22 97:11 98:21</p> <p>shared 49:2 50:6 50:14 53:3 54:4 54:17 55:16 57:6 65:13 67:8,11 68:20 92:8,10,18 93:6,16 94:23 104:7 108:19,25</p> <p>shares 52:16</p> <p>sharing 49:21 51:9</p>	<p>51:14,16 52:22 54:1 66:16 67:15 92:19 93:9 94:18 95:7 96:8,18 119:5 122:7</p> <p>SHARPLING 113:17 114:15 115:7 116:4,12</p> <p>she'd 8:10</p> <p>shift 96:22</p> <p>shock 8:14</p> <p>short 19:2,7 27:13 44:14 62:5 63:10 80:1 126:13</p> <p>should've 7:13</p> <p>show 38:17 51:17</p> <p>showcase 98:13 116:20</p> <p>showed 17:24</p> <p>shows 31:14</p> <p>side 35:8 87:14,15 104:15 108:13,14 108:14,20,23</p> <p>sides 110:2</p> <p>signals 26:2 115:11</p> <p>significant 28:10 103:3</p> <p>significantly 54:1</p> <p>signify 37:7</p> <p>signs 25:7</p> <p>Simon 95:12</p> <p>simplistically 71:8</p> <p>simply 34:12</p> <p>single 40:15 96:24 96:25</p> <p>singled 95:14</p> <p>site 7:2,3,13 8:9 53:11 95:16</p> <p>sites 58:14</p> <p>sitting 78:19,24 81:14</p> <p>situation 43:14 51:6,21</p> <p>situations 37:15</p> <p>six 68:24 86:14</p> <p>six-month 86:18 87:20</p> <p>size 55:5,18 78:21</p>
--	--	---	---	---

sleep 6:16	90:7 99:5	23:3 75:13	stricter 38:9,13	36:14 38:15,23
slightly 20:3,5	speaking 66:8	started 8:16 12:21	striving 124:13	40:7 41:3 44:3
24:5 27:6 43:14	71:11 75:23 90:2	54:1 66:16 73:10	strong 23:20 91:4	45:7 48:8,11
118:2	92:2 110:14	82:8 121:18	108:9	52:24 53:21 55:3
small 32:1	specialist 61:6,13	starting 2:2 20:9	strongly 16:9	55:22 61:21,24
smaller 91:20	specially 59:24	starving 12:22	21:25 77:8	62:20 63:17
117:17	60:25	state 27:12 53:7	structured 57:17	68:20 74:18
smart 55:24	specific 57:15,24	54:8,16 94:17	stuff 5:24 6:24,25	77:23 78:4,17,23
Snapchat 86:22	58:5 61:8,9 87:9	stated 66:21	16:24 17:23 18:9	79:18 80:12
social 98:17	109:11 125:14	statement 1:14 2:3	subscriber 107:12	81:12 88:11,21
109:20	specifically 20:14	2:24 3:9 6:11	subsequent 60:18	89:6 92:12 98:5
solely 65:20,22	20:15 25:3 55:20	12:3 19:17,20	subsequently	99:21 104:6
69:13	102:7	20:1,20,22 22:14	110:4	105:22 106:1,16
soliciting 85:3	spectrum 102:6	22:25 29:19	substantial 106:2	110:19 114:1
solid 122:19,20	speculate 99:21	30:15 32:25	121:14	116:8 119:23
solution 34:22	speech 66:18	35:18 38:9 39:4	subverted 34:13	123:22 124:3
121:8,18	speed 56:14 58:15	40:18 42:3 58:19	succeed 26:13	125:14
solutions 121:7	76:18 116:2	63:15 75:16	success 70:13 74:9	surely 99:16
solve 34:23	speedier 85:13	80:19 81:6 82:2	successfully 25:20	surface 27:7
somebody 93:21	speedily 81:18	92:6 103:22	83:12	surprise 8:13
100:7 114:17	spend 57:4,8	105:11,15 109:18	suddenly 40:10	surprised 56:7
118:23	spending 57:7	109:25 110:11	suffer 123:10	survivors 99:4
son 1:17,21 3:4,4	spent 21:7	statements 76:15	suffers 3:6 14:23	Susan 9:13,20 10:1
3:17 5:11 8:4,11	spoke 12:3 32:8	states 73:4	sufficient 76:6	10:2,6,7,15,16,17
10:18 11:14,20	89:11	statistics 33:18	sufficiently 87:25	10:20 11:14
11:21 13:22,25	spoken 50:15	87:19	suggest 96:14	suspect 8:13
14:11	118:9 123:12	stay 14:4 96:24	suggestion 79:22	119:11,24
son's 6:20 8:18	staff 22:22 105:24	step 32:10 51:21	suggestions 112:8	suspected 46:7
soon 76:23 77:17	stag 64:6	77:22 83:13	123:18	59:21 60:1 61:25
81:25	stage 28:21 29:6	84:20 90:18	suicidal 103:25	63:2 92:19
sooner 32:18	30:7,14 33:25	96:24	suicide 20:13 21:5	suspicion 46:20
sophisticated	34:24 48:15 59:3	steps 28:17 36:14	65:10,12	swift 32:17 114:8
59:11 84:16	64:11 101:5	60:18 61:22	suitable 64:8	swiftly 31:2
104:13	stages 67:24	67:20 76:22 79:6	79:22	107:15
sophistication	115:21	90:20	summary 20:17	switched 40:13
59:3	stakeholders	stood 74:4	Sunday 113:19	switching 40:11
sorry 14:2 26:5	100:2 101:5	stop 16:6 95:7	support 17:12	sworn 1:8 19:11
52:21 69:7 73:11	stand 55:11 68:21	store 96:5 116:10	56:1 62:10 72:21	system 34:8 47:4
100:17 109:6	72:18	stored 32:20	supported 91:16	60:12
121:19 124:3	standard 48:18	stories 96:25	supporting 55:8	systems 28:9 36:3
sort 38:12 105:20	49:6	straight 10:23	108:10	45:23 59:14 75:5
sound 61:19	standardise	strategic 124:1,5	suppose 123:5	96:20 114:20
sounds 31:25	112:12	streaming 101:23	supposed 4:17	
source 43:9 97:1	standards 41:16	102:1,10,14,20	sure 16:14 17:15	<hr/> T <hr/>
space 78:16 89:22	44:25 47:19	102:21 103:1,6	20:24 21:18	tab 23:24 29:15
98:20 111:21,25	48:16,21,23,25	103:12 104:3,16	22:21 23:6,13	30:23 36:24 49:5
spam 59:5	51:24 67:25 68:7	108:3	27:9 28:1,18	67:22,22 69:10
span 27:14,18	stark 117:18	streams 103:9	30:2,5,14 33:11	86:7 95:4 100:12
speak 56:12 71:19	start 9:2 19:22	strict 47:20 94:17	34:21 35:9 36:12	109:17
				tackling 88:3

tactic 27:17	81:14 85:9 92:17	36:6 43:3 114:21	101:15 113:20	113:4,19 114:23
take 14:4 15:12	93:13,24 94:5,6,9	temper 10:8,8	114:24 115:25	116:1,19 117:19
16:10 19:2 29:21	94:16 95:23 97:6	ten 70:20	118:2 119:17	118:12,14,21
35:16 36:14	100:6 103:20	tend 56:11,13,14	120:3 123:5,9	119:4,10,18,19
37:25 41:4,24	104:12 106:6,9	102:3	124:13 125:4,9	120:5,6,24 121:4
43:7 46:15 47:2	106:13 107:7	term 40:25 48:17	think 1:17 2:8,12	121:18 122:4,5
48:2 59:11 61:18	112:12 114:9	termination 52:9	3:8,16,21 8:15,20	122:11,18,19,21
61:19 62:16	124:19 125:8	terms 21:25 22:9	9:12,23 10:16,25	123:16,17,22
64:12,19 70:18	teams 21:2,2,8	23:6 24:2,9,19,24	11:20 15:21,21	124:9,18 125:7
71:13 73:5 75:22	22:22 31:24	24:25 34:16 36:1	16:1,5 20:1 21:6	125:12
76:13,16,21 77:3	37:20 53:23 54:3	42:4 44:17,17	22:5,11,15,24	thinking 4:5 34:21
77:9 82:13 83:13	55:2,25 56:21	48:19,21 51:11	24:20 26:10	49:20 112:23
90:9,20 94:9	57:17,19,22 58:3	51:16 63:6 72:2	29:12,19 30:6,19	thinks 77:24 84:19
97:5 98:25 109:8	58:4,6,14,18	76:17 81:19	31:4,16 32:3,4,18	third 86:16 93:8
115:16,18 119:23	59:14,24 60:11	82:17 85:7 88:5	34:20,23 35:4	112:25
122:23 125:20	60:17,25 61:4,6	93:21 115:6	36:12 37:8 39:20	thought 15:3
taken 24:2 30:10	61:11,12,17 72:5	117:7 121:24	39:21 40:17 41:1	17:18 85:16
60:18 62:14,22	78:21 83:19	terrible 14:12	41:14,21 42:4,20	110:24 120:10
67:20 94:21	92:15 97:2 103:6	terrified 12:21	43:10,23 44:1,7	thoughts 18:23
99:13 106:19	106:16 107:24	terrorist 61:10	45:19 46:12	32:4 44:1 98:21
120:8	108:11,12,16	112:6	47:18 48:19,22	103:25 120:13
takes 32:10 67:1	114:1 115:23	terrorists 99:18	50:2 51:13 52:3	thread 110:18
78:11 107:1,3	116:7 118:14,25	testament 94:14	52:3 53:19 54:2	three 6:19 69:12
118:17	123:19 124:9	thank 1:7,23 18:17	55:15,19,21	107:25 108:19
talk 9:22 10:9,20	Tech 91:18	18:22,24,25,25	56:11,14,17	113:23 125:9
11:8,10,20 12:24	technical 25:19	19:4 24:8 44:12	57:11,16 58:6,18	three-month 73:15
50:25 90:18	26:1 28:1 29:4	53:2 69:7 79:21	59:2,7,10,23 61:2	threshold 85:6
talked 93:4 112:15	34:24 77:20	79:24 80:3,16	63:23 64:7,15	thresholds 78:5
talking 6:18 29:12	114:18	113:17 116:12	65:12,16,24 68:1	tick 107:9
48:13 52:10	technically 77:18	119:14 120:15	69:12 70:12 71:1	time 2:8 3:21 4:3
63:19 64:2 69:20	technological	123:24,25 125:16	71:11,12,19	4:23 6:18 7:21
88:18 122:6	101:13 103:3	125:16 126:8,9	72:15,25 73:6,19	20:1 22:14 26:20
tampered 18:3	technologies 77:19	126:11	74:6,7,9,24 75:14	27:14,18 28:25
targeted 112:24	108:10 115:20	thankfully 70:23	76:3,15 77:22	32:22 34:21
task 60:21	technology 28:17	83:19 104:17	78:4 79:8,13,18	40:10 41:1 43:15
tasked 60:1	34:25 56:21	thanking 62:21	80:12,18 81:22	46:10 48:4 59:6
taught 5:11,19	59:13 75:15	theirs 16:22	82:7,17,22 83:8	62:20 66:17 67:6
teachers 29:8	78:22 79:9 80:9	they'd 5:18 12:5	85:6 87:3,5 88:4	72:6 74:6 76:9
35:10	82:5 83:17,21	41:10 53:1	89:5 91:22 92:22	76:15 78:1,20
team 19:25 21:10	88:6 94:14 98:10	thing 6:6 16:6,17	93:19 94:6 96:17	79:23 81:7 82:9
31:19 32:16 36:4	103:8,24 104:1,3	17:2,17 31:8	96:19 97:4,19,23	106:18 107:1,3
36:14 38:4 40:17	104:20 109:12	84:8 89:25 94:16	98:11,11,19	111:17 115:20
44:3 45:20 46:5	115:3 123:3	118:7,8 120:15	100:4,8,16 101:5	118:11 119:16
47:8 53:9,12,13	teenager 37:25	things 4:15 8:25	102:11 104:6,13	120:20,22,25
53:19,22,25 55:5	teens 38:23 86:4	11:22 13:11	104:19 105:16	121:5 122:23
55:19 56:24	Telegraph 95:5	18:24 21:23,24	107:9,16 108:6,8	123:22
59:18 60:14 61:9	tell 5:18 12:19	36:23 38:22 44:5	108:15,16 109:1	timeline 24:13
61:13,19,20 72:6	63:1 122:21	47:20 85:12	110:14 111:11,13	times 13:1 42:12
74:23 77:14	telling 10:2 14:11	90:11 98:11	111:17 112:16	113:19 114:4

<p>117:12 tiny 69:7 tips 64:23 88:10 title 19:23,24 95:21 titles 95:16,18,25 today 30:7 32:7 42:14 55:12 94:17 112:23 123:18 today's 33:11 told 4:18,19 5:3 7:25 8:20 11:21 15:2 17:21 34:15 42:1 75:14 80:5 97:6 116:16 tolerate 69:16 tolerated 88:18 tomorrow 5:15 tool 61:23 91:22 tools 41:2 73:22 90:21 top 124:24 125:2,9 topic 15:24 34:2 46:23 82:22 88:20 100:11 111:7,19 topics 21:4 52:13 56:22 108:23 111:23 121:10 124:10,18 touch 11:22 38:15 38:24,25 48:23 touched 104:25 touching 31:18 57:21 102:19 108:12 trace 62:12 track 34:6 tracked 33:14 trained 59:24 60:25 61:6 transitioning 37:16 transparency 67:19 68:1,23 69:13 70:2 71:2 72:20,23 transparent 62:17</p>	<p>108:21 travel 66:24 treated 15:22 Treaty 107:17 tremendous 101:12 tremendously 81:16 trend 52:14 tried 25:8 27:16 46:2 47:3 70:15 70:17 tries 24:18 75:19 77:6 triggered 55:20 true 2:14,18 20:8 32:3 trust 10:13 13:2,3 13:16 14:18 90:15 trusts 13:4 truthful 26:15 try 16:1 17:22 25:21 26:18 34:18 35:16 36:19 50:15 51:6 52:20 62:13,14 74:12 80:6 83:25 84:20 89:16 90:22 115:2 trying 6:4 7:11,16 15:25 26:4,8 27:22 37:11 43:18 57:25 61:7 68:10 71:9,14 78:7 83:5 84:13 90:8 92:9 96:19 96:20 102:12 108:2 109:23 114:20 117:19 118:25 Tuesday 1:1 turn 1:24 23:12 64:23 68:5 73:2 93:10 113:12 121:19 turned 4:11 10:10 11:21 13:5 turning 19:9 22:24</p>	<p>turns 45:12 95:9 tweaks 82:20 twenties 13:14 twice 52:22 two 2:1 3:14 10:15 15:22 21:23,24 26:6 27:18 33:14 36:22 37:4 53:22 56:17 62:6 69:6 79:4 84:22 87:20 87:22 92:8 96:11 108:19 125:11 two-week 1:5 type 25:2 37:8,20 44:19 50:2,3 51:5,9,14 52:6,25 57:18 59:2,11,12 60:21,25 63:24 64:7 77:23 83:14 84:15 87:8,17 94:18 102:23 types 37:3 61:7 72:7,13 83:11 102:4 104:22 107:8 typical 47:2 Typically 45:20</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">U</p> <hr/> <p>UK 21:17,19 22:10 22:20 29:2 30:18 33:6,18,20,23,25 42:12,21 43:1,24 44:3,3 65:15,17 84:5 87:5 91:1 100:8,18,24 105:2,5 106:9,10 106:17 111:8 112:10 118:23 UK-based 66:9 82:7 ultimately 46:25 99:20 umbrella 92:1 unable 42:15 123:6 unacceptable 86:23 88:7,17 uncomfortable 90:17</p>	<p>underage 29:12,18 30:15,17,20 31:10,12,15 32:2 32:15 33:21 34:7 34:7,9 53:14 underneath 50:8 understand 6:15 15:10 24:22 26:4 27:21 31:9,10 32:5,13,25 35:11 39:9 40:4,8 42:23 44:4 45:7 49:2,25 50:14,15 52:20 53:13 54:21 60:22 61:8 63:14 64:11,25 66:13,14 71:5,14 72:10,23 75:17 75:23 78:7 85:10 87:15 91:17 98:8 99:11 103:8 104:19 107:19 113:25 114:2,10 114:16 115:17 118:24 121:11,22 124:3 understanding 26:1 35:2 82:12 112:17 116:1 understands 60:14 104:11 undertaking 104:17 undoubtedly 113:8 uneducated 89:17 unencrypted 94:1 unfavourably 72:13 unfortunately 123:8 unidentified 77:7 80:7 unique 36:18 37:15 57:16 80:10 universities 71:4 unknown 78:13 80:7</p>	<p>unreported 75:9 up-to-date 54:21 update 20:22 68:2 81:10 91:12 updated 54:5 55:5 68:22 69:3 updates 62:14 68:22 72:19 updating 72:18 uphold 122:9 upload 46:2 47:3 75:19,24 76:17 77:7 80:24 uploaded 63:1 76:1,7 78:9 79:3 79:7,14,19 80:19 uploading 46:8 64:13 urgent 106:25 URL 29:21 81:8 81:12 119:7,25 use 4:3,16,17 5:7 6:4 21:25 23:6 24:4,5,10,10,10 24:13,14 27:7 42:19 58:11,23 81:24 82:3,6,17 86:16 93:21 95:22 99:10 104:20 useful 30:5 31:23 62:15 72:15 73:23 81:16 114:24 115:2 user 23:15 25:8,15 26:15 27:22 28:3 28:22 29:18 34:5 34:9 38:21 40:15 45:21 46:14,24 47:13 49:2 51:24 52:16 53:15 62:7 62:8,21 63:11 74:25 75:10 76:18 83:14 84:1 84:1 93:13,14 94:23 111:1 user's 53:2 users 21:19,23 22:2 29:2,8</p>
--	---	---	---	--

30:21 31:10 32:2 33:21 35:2 36:6 37:9,22 39:25 52:5 54:10 63:25 89:4 92:22 94:3 94:5 98:19 102:15 uses 26:18 80:6 81:24 usually 45:3 51:9 52:6 72:25 86:4 109:13 115:21	violent 12:23 visibility 41:6 visible 41:11 50:1 110:20 vision 97:16 volumes 72:2 voluntarily 83:11 volunteering 26:22 vulnerable 2:21 14:14,15	warrant 15:21 64:8 85:13 warranted 48:11 wasn't 2:21 9:6 Watch 80:23 watching 102:22 way 17:24 28:4 31:25 34:8 39:22 43:16,18 56:11 56:14 57:17 59:7 60:11 63:17,25 70:16,25 71:7 72:16 79:11 82:17 84:13,14 88:23 93:17 99:7 116:9 123:12,14 ways 18:7 31:11 71:9 91:19 we'll 14:4 44:11 46:22 51:17 79:24 115:24 116:2 123:17,19 126:10 we're 1:7,17 2:19 10:14 18:22 19:9 19:18 21:8,13,20 27:20,21 28:13 45:6 52:10 54:5 57:18,21 59:2,3 62:23 64:1 69:20 72:17 77:18 80:12 84:11,14 84:15 90:8 96:19 98:3 101:7 102:5 104:19 108:8,12 113:4 116:23 120:5,6 124:13 125:21 we've 24:11 28:10 35:7,22 40:15 42:14 52:21,22 54:2 58:13 59:4 59:10 68:17 70:15,17 81:12 82:8 90:1 91:1 91:15 96:11 99:3 99:4 101:20 111:23 115:19 121:4 122:22	123:14,17 website 7:9,18 8:8 29:22 126:4 websites 16:10 Wednesday 126:17 week 2:9 5:15 96:6 117:13 weekly 80:22 weeks 72:19 111:12 welcome 1:4 88:16 111:18,21,24,25 112:14 114:24 welfare 65:14 wellbeing 20:13 went 3:1 14:25 17:1 126:14 127:1 weren't 5:3 16:25 56:7 West 90:11 WhatsApp 22:7 92:1,3,7,11,14,16 92:17,22 93:12 93:13,14,17,23 93:23 94:4,5,6,9 94:10,16,22 95:2 95:7,20,23 96:7 96:13,16 97:6,6 100:5 whilst 2:9 5:7 86:22 113:12 White 111:9,22 112:3 wholesome 51:7 wholly 69:20 widely 119:5 wider 22:24 wild 90:11,11 willing 80:12 wipe 31:1 wish 20:23 wished 46:24 wishes 124:5 witness 1:10,14 2:3 18:22 19:10 34:12 81:6 89:10 92:2,6 96:6	105:11 113:14 126:22 witnesses 19:10 125:23 woke 6:16 women's 21:4 won 96:23 wonder 24:4 116:14 123:11 wondering 119:3 word 84:15 words 10:8 12:19 120:20 work 20:9,10 28:10 35:7 39:6 54:25 58:3 59:8 66:23 68:16 72:16 75:21 77:9 78:11 81:8 87:4 99:11 102:18 108:17 111:18 119:22 120:4 122:5,22 124:18 worked 37:20 72:5 114:2 119:22 124:2 workforce 22:16 22:18 working 20:6 21:6 50:7 52:13 54:3 54:18 55:6 57:19 59:5 61:4,6 71:1 73:25 76:18 78:22 79:11 81:7 82:15 83:9,16 87:14 88:14 91:2 98:7 106:3 108:22 115:19 116:7 122:17,22 124:9 works 87:19 93:19 110:16 115:5 world 5:25 13:18 17:3 23:1 58:10 58:13 84:6 88:21 100:3 124:2 worldwide 33:22 54:10,14,15 92:23 116:4
V	W			
vague 63:5,10 validate 68:19 value 72:11 various 30:21 96:4 107:24 vast 60:9 74:1 117:16 119:16 vendors 58:12 verification 120:17 121:3,8 verified 35:20 37:2 verify 26:18 28:23 35:24 37:11 38:1 verifying 31:11 53:15 versus 36:22 72:7 76:5 118:1 victims 99:4 100:21 video 102:7 103:14 103:19,20 videolink 1:11 videos 80:19,21 103:16,24 view 47:25 55:10 87:22 95:18 112:9 113:22 viewed 30:16 78:1 viewing 7:17 views 70:8 71:23 98:21 101:2 111:15,15 violating 72:7 violation 93:22 violations 70:4 violence 99:5	wait 18:19 waited 122:21 Wales 86:13 105:19 walk 40:2 want 1:21,25 6:12 11:8,10 12:24 17:17 18:6 29:21 30:10 32:9 36:21 37:5 39:7 42:25 45:7 46:12,15 48:11 50:15 51:8 52:17,20 53:12 53:21 54:21,22 56:9 59:21 61:18 62:17 63:6,17,21 66:2 67:12,24 73:16 75:17,23 83:2 84:9,10 86:6,25 88:1 101:7 102:17 107:4 110:25 115:16 116:5 125:10 wanted 4:3 9:21 10:1 11:11 17:2 17:20 18:18 31:9 39:3 40:2 41:9 49:23 55:3 63:23 68:19 94:16 113:6 117:15 118:8 120:15,21 wants 14:15 29:18 75:24 126:4 warned 52:21,22 warning 51:22 52:5 85:15			

124:8 worry 14:10 worse 101:22 worth 94:16 would've 57:10 109:3 wouldn't 12:22 13:25,25 32:21 39:7 71:8 106:11 111:2 write 9:5 wrong 5:24 17:10 wrote 22:14	<hr/> Z <hr/> Zuckerberg 54:17 57:6 97:16 116:20 <hr/> 0 <hr/> 002 86:8 003 86:8 <hr/> 1 <hr/> 1 23:25 27:1,3 37:4 37:6 86:10 92:22 126:21,22,23 1,800 22:15 1,944 86:13 1.00 79:25 10 100:12 10,000 70:19 10.30 1:2 126:17 10.55 19:6 100 30:2,14 105:15 11-year-old 26:5 11.10 19:8 11.52 44:13 113 127:1 12 27:1,12 34:13 122:3 12- 26:5 12-year-old 28:15 12.05 44:15 126 127:1,1 13 3:21 23:7 24:15 25:4,9,13,16 26:5 26:23 27:3,11,15 29:2,6 31:2 34:15,17 35:6,15 38:5,8 40:24,24 45:8,10 122:3,9 13- 88:24 13-year-olds 34:19 14 1:1 12:10 27:12 109:17 14-year-old 28:15 15 118:12 126:17 15,000 54:5,22 55:7,11 56:10 16 92:6 17 68:8 103:22 18 38:11,14 39:4	54:8 65:13 68:9 73:12,12 119:11 18-year 88:24 18s 41:12 19 126:24,25 <hr/> 2 <hr/> 2 1:4 6:11 22:25 36:24 37:4,6 73:3 95:10 2,300 22:12,17 2,700 105:18 2,898 105:9 2.00 79:24 80:2 20 2:3 20/30 13:1 2004 21:16 2010 3:17 20:6 2011 21:11 57:10 59:9 75:15 116:25 117:1 2012 6:10,15 83:8 83:18 2014 82:3 119:10 2017 54:4 73:8 103:23 104:7 105:8,17 2018 20:20 53:20 54:11,17 55:10 68:8 73:8,14 86:14 91:9 105:14 117:8 2019 1:1 56:4 57:3 81:9 116:17 119:12 126:17 2020 56:5 21 95:6 23 86:17 24 15:25 30:16 32:18 77:4 24/7 58:18 25 126:10 250,000 92:19,21 94:12 <hr/> 3 <hr/> 3 24:3 29:15 3,500 54:3 65:13 3.1 23:4 3.10 126:12	3.2 38:11 3.7 42:2 57:4,11 116:16 117:4,16 30,000 54:19 55:6 35 65:17 <hr/> 4 <hr/> 4 49:5 4.05 126:15 40 21:19,20 43:24 46 105:8 <hr/> 5 <hr/> 5 2:5 44:11 67:22 103:22 105:16 5.2 53:7 5.6 63:15 500 86:18 540 117:3 55 117:7 123:11 <hr/> 6 <hr/> 6 67:22 68:5,6 69:10 6.1 54:8 <hr/> 7 <hr/> 7 10:25 13:12 86:7 7,500 53:20 54:5,9 54:11 55:11 <hr/> 8 <hr/> 8 75:16 8(k) 92:12 93:3 8.1(b) 80:18 8.1(h) 83:4 8.1(k) 92:5 8.1(l) 101:24 8.7 73:6,20 74:20 <hr/> 9 <hr/> 9 6:15 73:15 95:4 99 59:7 99.2 73:20 75:6
---	--	--	--