

1 Wednesday, 24 January 2018  
2 (10.30 am)  
3 THE CHAIR: Good morning, Ms Carey.  
4 MS CAREY: Good morning, chair. Chair, can we turn today,  
5 please, to file 2.  
6 MR KEITH ANDREW NIVEN (continued)  
7 Examination by MS CAREY (continued)  
8 MS CAREY: Mr Niven, you are still under oath from yesterday  
9 and I would like to consider with you this morning,  
10 please, how the NCA-CEOP actually go about pursuing  
11 those who are intent on using the internet to facilitate  
12 child sexual abuse.  
13 I don't, so that you know, Mr Niven, propose to take  
14 you through all the statistics in relation to the scale  
15 of the problem, but may I summarise it in this way,  
16 quoting from your second statement. I think the  
17 position is this, by way of example:  
18 "The average level of monthly referrals from  
19 industry has increased by 700 per cent ..."  
20 **A. That's correct.**  
21 Q. "... since the beginning of the NCA in 2006."  
22 **A. Yes.**  
23 Q. Understanding the scale and the types of demand on the  
24 NCA, something that you have assisted the inquiry about  
25 at paragraph 44 of your first statement, which ends

Page 1

1 reference 163. Perhaps if we could turn up your first  
2 statement.  
3 **A. Yes.**  
4 Q. I would like your help, Deputy Director, with what the  
5 NCA considers to be the types of evolving threat that  
6 the NCA now faces?  
7 **A. Yes. The evolving threats that we have found are**  
8 **certainly, in terms of, now, we have individuals that**  
9 **share images, obviously, that we have spoken about, but**  
10 **we are also looking at live streaming now, and we are**  
11 **finding that is much more prevalent; grooming as well.**  
12 **They are two of the areas we are certainly focusing on.**  
13 **When we assess this -- and certainly at paragraph 44**  
14 **there, we assess that a majority of CSEA is committed by**  
15 **lone offenders or is intrafamilial in nature. However,**  
16 **there is some evidence of gang-related-type behaviour.**  
17 Q. I think there is also an increase in referrals to  
18 NCA-CEOP concerning abuse images and criminal behaviour  
19 online?  
20 **A. Yes, that's true. The referrals have significantly**  
21 **increased, and I think the total for 2017 was about**  
22 **80,000 referrals that we received into the agency.**  
23 Q. Just so that we are clear, that is not just from NCMEC,  
24 the United States referral service, but other industry  
25 and, indeed, referrals from the public?

Page 2

1 **A. In the majority of cases, they are from NCMEC that**  
2 **report into us, but we also receive reports from the**  
3 **public as well, through our reporting portal, and other**  
4 **industry referrals as well that come to us.**  
5 Q. Against that background, can we consider for a moment  
6 your paragraph 51 and the issue of what is commonly  
7 referred to as the darknet.  
8 **A. Yes.**  
9 Q. In brief, Mr Niven, can you just explain, in layman's  
10 terms, what is the darknet and how it relates in  
11 relation to online-facilitated child sexual abuse?  
12 **A. So the internet is broken into the open web, which is**  
13 **the search facilities that we would all use -- Google.**  
14 **There is then the deep web, which is where there's**  
15 **a different level, which means you may need to use**  
16 **a password or there are some other processes to go**  
17 **through. Then there is the darknet. The darknet,**  
18 **amongst other services, but to access the darknet, then**  
19 **the majority of people would use the TOR services that**  
20 **are provided, and these allow for anonymity of**  
21 **the individuals using those services. Again, it is**  
22 **something you can then use to browse, and it will**  
23 **provide access to what are referred to as hidden**  
24 **services, and those hidden services can require**  
25 **a variety of criteria in order to access them. They are**

Page 3

1 **not easily accessible, but the point behind it is that**  
2 **there is anonymity and people can't be traced using it.**  
3 Q. You can't trace, indeed, the person going onto the  
4 website or necessarily the website that they access; is  
5 that right?  
6 **A. Yes. The websites that they access are available to**  
7 **see, but actually getting into those websites can be**  
8 **incredibly difficult unless you are part of that group.**  
9 Q. Is this the position, though, that the majority of sites  
10 that have on them indecent imagery are in fact on the  
11 open web?  
12 **A. Yes, they are. They can be accessed by TOR users. This**  
13 **is The Onion Router that is referred to. That enables**  
14 **them to access on the open web, but they can remain**  
15 **anonymous.**  
16 Q. Clearly, dealing with the extent and scale of offending  
17 on the dark web is a matter of concern to everyone. Can  
18 I ask you, please, Mr Niven, to have a look at what the  
19 NCA is doing in this regard at your third statement,  
20 ending NCA000264. It is behind tab 3, chair. In  
21 particular, paragraph 18.  
22 **A. Yes.**  
23 Q. There will be understandable concern by members of  
24 the public about the ability of law enforcement to  
25 detect those that use the dark web. Can you give us an

Page 4

1 overview, please, of what the NCA are doing to combat  
 2 that threat?  
 3 **A. Yes. We have a dedicated project to this, and we are**  
 4 **looking at these sites, we are finding much more about**  
 5 **them, we are understanding more around what that threat**  
 6 **represents and the content of those sites.**  
 7 Q. To put this in context, I was wondering, Deputy  
 8 Director, if you could help with an example of someone  
 9 who has crossed over and used the dark web. I think you  
 10 refer to a gentleman by the name of Mr Coban, who was  
 11 a suspect and became a defendant in relation to  
 12 offending on the dark web?  
 13 **A. Yes, Mr Coban was charged by Dutch Police with offences,**  
 14 **including indecent assault, production and dissemination**  
 15 **of child abuse material, fraud and computer intrusion.**  
 16 **He used encryption services. He had an encrypted USB**  
 17 **drive containing incriminating evidence and a variety of**  
 18 **other material was found. He targeted more than**  
 19 **20 victims that were identified in the UK. He used**  
 20 **hidden services to communicate with individuals,**  
 21 **including one individual who, sadly, took her own life.**  
 22 Q. I think in due course he was found guilty by a Dutch  
 23 court; is that right?  
 24 **A. That is correct.**  
 25 Q. In relation to the woman who took her own life as

Page 5

1 a result of the abuse suffered by him, the Canadian  
 2 authorities are seeking to extradite him in relation to  
 3 that offence?  
 4 **A. Yes, they were. He was using social networking sites**  
 5 **and he was again using anonymity to ensure that he**  
 6 **wasn't detected. But eventually, he was detected**  
 7 **through the determination of law enforcement.**  
 8 Q. In that third statement, are you able to give us an  
 9 indication of how many live sites there are on the dark  
 10 web which are criminally orientated? Not just specific  
 11 to online CSA. I think you deal with this at  
 12 paragraph 20 in your statement.  
 13 **A. Yes. We assess there are approximately 30,000 live**  
 14 **sites at any one time. These sites come up and then**  
 15 **they go down on a regular basis. 55 per cent of those**  
 16 **are assessed on the dark web as falling into legal**  
 17 **categories and then the remainder, around 45 per cent,**  
 18 **which are considered as illicit.**  
 19 Q. That spans a whole range of criminality, not just in  
 20 relation to online child sexual abuse; is that right?  
 21 **A. Yes, that's true. That can be firearms and a variety of**  
 22 **other, you know, weapons extremism; a whole range of**  
 23 **criminal activity going on, but CSEA, child sexual**  
 24 **abuse, is within some of those sites.**  
 25 Q. Clearly, therefore, there is concern about the use of

Page 6

1 the dark web, but given what you have said in relation  
 2 to the majority of offending being available on the open  
 3 web, can we turn to consider, please, the NCA's response  
 4 in relation to what is available on the open web. Is  
 5 this the position, Deputy Director, that in April 2015,  
 6 the NPCC and the NCA agreed a framework in relation to  
 7 the pillars of threat?  
 8 **A. Yes, that is correct.**  
 9 Q. Can we have a look, please, at NCA000164 on screen.  
 10 Chair, you will find what is known as the 18-box grid  
 11 behind your tab 4.  
 12 To remind everyone, as a result of a concern by the  
 13 then NCA director, I think it was --  
 14 **A. Yes, deputy director.**  
 15 Q. Deputy director, he wrote a letter to the then chair of  
 16 the NPCC suggesting that there needed to be more  
 17 improvement in relation to a nationally coordinated  
 18 response in relation to online CSEA?  
 19 **A. Yes, that was to Sir Jon Murphy, and that was to secure**  
 20 **an efficient and effective response.**  
 21 Q. As a result of that letter, the agreement was put in  
 22 place between the NCA and the NPCC of how to combat, at  
 23 various levels of policing, the respective threats to  
 24 child abuse or child abuse in this area. Is this what  
 25 is known as the 18-box grid?

Page 7

1 **A. It is, yes.**  
 2 Q. If we have a look, please, running across the top of  
 3 the grid, is the respective threats as they were seen to  
 4 be then the sharing of imagery; volume referrals; victim  
 5 identification; and so on?  
 6 **A. Yes, they were the threats that were assessed at the**  
 7 **time that required the effective and efficient response**  
 8 **at national, regional and local level.**  
 9 Q. Clearly, the NCA would have responsibility for the  
 10 national level?  
 11 **A. Yes.**  
 12 Q. When I'm taking you through your evidence this morning,  
 13 we will make reference to those respective threats.  
 14 **A. Yes.**  
 15 Q. Can we start, then, please, with pillar 1 and the  
 16 sharing of indecent imagery. In a summary form, what do  
 17 you say in relation to that level of threat and what the  
 18 NCA do about responding to it?  
 19 **A. Yes. This was a threat that was identified where**  
 20 **individuals share indecent images of children. The**  
 21 **intelligence enabled us to identify that as a prolific**  
 22 **threat that was increasing, and we took a very robust**  
 23 **law enforcement response, not only from the National**  
 24 **Crime Agency, but as the 18-box grid suggests there,**  
 25 **this is a national response. This is local policing,**

Page 8

1 **this is regional officers as well, and also it's the**  
 2 **National Crime Agency.**  
 3 Q. In relation to those who share indecent imagery, is this  
 4 the position, that the police, both the NCA and indeed  
 5 the forces, use a prioritisation tool to assist and  
 6 guide them in how quickly they need to respond to  
 7 someone who is sharing indecent imagery?  
 8 **A. Yes. I mean, the volumes are very high, so we**  
 9 **prioritise.**  
 10 Q. Can I ask you, please, about that tool, and it starts at  
 11 your paragraph 88 in your first witness statement. The  
 12 tool is what is known as KIRAT. What does KIRAT stand  
 13 for?  
 14 **A. This is the Kent internet risk assessment tool and, as**  
 15 **has been stated, it is a prioritisation tool used by law**  
 16 **enforcement in the investigation of an individual**  
 17 **suspected of possessing, making, taking or distributing**  
 18 **indecent images of children.**  
 19 Q. Now, the aim of the tool is to try to differentiate  
 20 between those offenders who are more likely than others  
 21 to commit contact abuse?  
 22 **A. Yes. So contact abuse is the most serious of offending,**  
 23 **and this tool enables us to prioritise those who are**  
 24 **most likely, or more likely, to be contact abusers.**  
 25 Q. I think the scores that are applied once the risk

Page 9

1 assessment has been completed are low, medium, high and  
 2 very high?  
 3 **A. Yes.**  
 4 Q. The KIRAT prioritisation tool has been under assessment  
 5 and is now in its second version?  
 6 **A. Yes.**  
 7 Q. I think you are able to provide the inquiry with some  
 8 figures as to its correct prediction rate which are at  
 9 your paragraph 90, Deputy Director. Is this the  
 10 position, that when KIRAT version 2 was analysed and  
 11 assessed, it was found to be successful at identifying  
 12 the most dangerous offenders?  
 13 **A. Yes, that's correct.**  
 14 Q. With 97 per cent of contact offenders being properly  
 15 assessed as very high or high risk?  
 16 **A. Yes, that was the assessment.**  
 17 Q. 73 per cent of noncontact offenders were classified as  
 18 medium or low risk?  
 19 **A. Yes.**  
 20 Q. Mr Niven, you observe there that the overall correct  
 21 prediction rate was 83.7 per cent?  
 22 **A. Yes.**  
 23 Q. It inevitably begs the question, what of the  
 24 16.3 per cent where the prediction tool doesn't work and  
 25 isn't accurate?

Page 10

1 **A. Yes, this is a tool for use by officers in making those**  
 2 **judgments, but what we make very clear is that the**  
 3 **officers' own judgment as well has to be taken into**  
 4 **account for this. So we are not saying, "That's the**  
 5 **tool. Use it religiously". We are saying, "Use it as**  
 6 **a guide and then use your own judgment as well and any**  
 7 **further enquiries that may be required". So it is**  
 8 **a tool. It's got a significantly high success rate.**  
 9 **But it is not the only part of the investigation.**  
 10 Q. Insofar as you are able, are you able to give the chair  
 11 and panel an idea of what other assessments and other  
 12 kinds of judgments the police bring to bear, aside from  
 13 the prioritisation tool?  
 14 **A. Well, they will have -- because they know the details of**  
 15 **the individual who they are investigating, then those**  
 16 **investigations can -- the breadth of those**  
 17 **investigations can be significant. So those**  
 18 **investigations may provide an indication that an**  
 19 **individual needs to be arrested straightaway because**  
 20 **there is an immediate risk, and these are the sorts of**  
 21 **processes that we would -- our officers would undertake.**  
 22 **So the tool is there. But there are wider**  
 23 **investigations that can take place as well using**  
 24 **a variety of agencies and sources for information and**  
 25 **make those judgments, and then, subsequently, those**

Page 11

1 **individuals will be arrested. But it is an order of**  
 2 **priority, not an elimination tool.**  
 3 Q. Has any thought been given to the ways in which the tool  
 4 could be enhanced to try to eradicate the inability to  
 5 correctly predict a level of risk?  
 6 **A. Yes, it's under constant review. That's why version 2**  
 7 **has been brought into play. But this isn't something**  
 8 **that we look at and develop and then say, "Right, that's**  
 9 **the only product". These things move on, and the threat**  
 10 **moves and changes. This is a very dynamic environment.**  
 11 **We are consistently reviewing this and looking at it and**  
 12 **looking to improve and absolutely to get that to**  
 13 **100 per cent.**  
 14 Q. Being realistic about it, though, Mr Niven, is it ever  
 15 likely that a tool such as this could result in  
 16 a 100 per cent success rate?  
 17 **A. I think that has to be the ambition and we have to try.**  
 18 **The reality may be something different. But at**  
 19 **97 per cent, it's quite significant.**  
 20 Q. The tool itself was put into use in an operation that  
 21 was conducted by the NCA in conjunction with a number of  
 22 the forces across England and Wales that became known as  
 23 Operation Notarise?  
 24 **A. Yes, that's correct.**  
 25 Q. I was wondering, please, if you could just summarise, in

Page 12

1 essence, what Operation Notarise was and what the  
 2 results were from that operation?  
 3 **A. Yes. In 2014, the first coordinated national response**  
 4 **to the threat from sharing indecent images of children**  
 5 **was authorised, as we have said, by the NPCC, Chief**  
 6 **Constables' Council. This is -- was a coordinated**  
 7 **investigation across the UK using forces and directed by**  
 8 **the National Crime Agency. This was the first time that**  
 9 **we had combined forces together with the NCA to have**  
 10 **such a concerted effort against people who were sharing**  
 11 **indecent images of children.**  
 12 **That had two main objectives: to rescue children**  
 13 **from abuse and to identify previously unknown child sex**  
 14 **offenders.**  
 15 **That operation, known as Operation Notarise, ran**  
 16 **from April to December 2014, and the results of that**  
 17 **operation were that there were 787 arrests made, there**  
 18 **were 9,685 devices seized, 518 children were safeguarded**  
 19 **or protected, and 107 suspects who are registered sex**  
 20 **offenders or who had a conviction or allegation for**  
 21 **a contact sex offence against a child were identified.**  
 22 **139 of those individuals were identified in a position**  
 23 **of trust.**  
 24 Q. When looking at those figures, clearly there is a demand  
 25 placed on policing to be able to cope with that number

Page 13

1 of arrests, that number of investigations, the digital  
 2 forensic work that needs to be carried out on the  
 3 devices?  
 4 **A. Yes.**  
 5 Q. In that regard, can I ask you about some of  
 6 the observations made in an HMIC inspection of  
 7 the National Crime Agency. Can we have a look, please,  
 8 at exhibit NCA000197. Chair and panel, you will find  
 9 this behind tab 8 in our bundle. Could we go to page 8,  
 10 please.  
 11 I should say at the outset, this was an inspection  
 12 of the NCA in its entirety, not solely focused on CEOP,  
 13 but, clearly, as part of the investigation, CEOP was  
 14 assessed and inspected by HMIC?  
 15 **A. Yes.**  
 16 Q. At paragraphs 34 and 35 of that report, HMIC -- and the  
 17 report came out in March 2015, so just after  
 18 Operation Notarise had been conducted and the arrests,  
 19 et cetera, were running through the criminal justice  
 20 system -- said this:  
 21 "We are concerned about the NCA's capacity to  
 22 collect communications data during periods of  
 23 extraordinary demand. We understand that this has  
 24 occurred mainly during a large-scale investigation into  
 25 a substantial number of individuals suspected of sharing

Page 14

1 indecent images of children across computer networks  
 2 (Operation Notarise ...). Communications data were  
 3 obtained concerning the suspects' computers, in order to  
 4 identify them and where they lived. This was  
 5 a necessary step before the NCA could allocate the cases  
 6 to the suspects' local police forces for their officers  
 7 to make arrests."  
 8 HMIC went on to say:  
 9 "When periods of extraordinary demand arise, there  
 10 should be scope for the burden to be shared across the  
 11 NCA, police and other organisations that collect  
 12 communications data."  
 13 There was a concern, to use the terms of that  
 14 report, about the ability of the NCA to cope with  
 15 demands when running an operation such as  
 16 Operation Notarise?  
 17 **A. Yes.**  
 18 Q. How, Deputy Director, have those concerns been met and  
 19 how will they continue to be met if operations like this  
 20 are done in the future?  
 21 **A. Well, in response to that, there were ten new dedicated**  
 22 **posts that were provided to our communications data**  
 23 **unit. That was provided out of "We Protect" funding by**  
 24 **CEOP. That increase in posts, as I understand, has**  
 25 **remained, and this is where the National Crime Agency,**

Page 15

1 **working as one agency, supports the work of priority**  
 2 **threats. So we rely on that unit which has dedicated**  
 3 **individuals that provide communications data, and they**  
 4 **support CEOP on an hourly, daily, basis, but that is an**  
 5 **NCA resource that is used to support CEOP work.**  
 6 Q. If in future NCA-CEOP, and in conjunction with the  
 7 forces, if need be, wanted to run another operation like  
 8 this, is that something that could be met by a request  
 9 for additional funding?  
 10 **A. I think it would be met by the unit that's in place now,**  
 11 **because we are consolidating as an agency, we are**  
 12 **growing various parts of our business, and now there is**  
 13 **a unit that supports all of NCA business. So we would**  
 14 **provide that unit with notification of what we were**  
 15 **going to do and what we were going to require, and they**  
 16 **would flex the resource into that. So it wouldn't be**  
 17 **a CEOP resource that's used, this is a National Crime**  
 18 **Agency resource. There's been an increase to that**  
 19 **resource, that's monitored regularly and it is**  
 20 **a priority and it is work that's provided for us on**  
 21 **a daily basis. So they would absorb whatever demand we**  
 22 **placed on them.**  
 23 Q. There was a further operation in 2015/16 called  
 24 Operation Ziganka, if I have pronounced that correctly.  
 25 Director, you have covered this in fact in your second

Page 16

1 statement, behind tab 2, NCA000230?

2 **A. Could you remind me of the paragraph number?**

3 Q. Paragraph 48.

4 **A. Yes, this was another operation dedicated to arresting**

5 **individuals.**

6 Q. In summary form, was this an NCA operation where you

7 worked with colleagues from the FBI?

8 **A. Yes, that's true.**

9 Q. If you could just tell the panel, please, a little bit

10 more about Operation Ziganka and its aim, and then we

11 will deal with the results of it as well?

12 **A. Yes, this was to focus, with the FBI, upon individuals**

13 **with a sexual interest in children who used a particular**

14 **site called the Playpen site located on the dark web.**

15 **This is where individuals would commit abuse and share**

16 **material on that site. This was a coordinated operation**

17 **internationally and the NCA coordinated that. Also,**

18 **that activity was nationally as well, so, again, this**

19 **was another operation that involved collaboration and**

20 **cooperation with forces, and securing their support for**

21 **this, and the activity resulted in the arrest by UK law**

22 **enforcement of over 280 individuals and more than 120 of**

23 **those were by the National Crime Agency, and the**

24 **safeguarding of more than 140 children in operational**

25 **activity linked to this site.**

Page 17

1 **I think, again, it just goes to show that the**

2 **influence of the National Crime Agency and the influence**

3 **of CEOP, the ability to work with other forces and not**

4 **only in the UK but internationally as well, is bringing**

5 **successes in operations which are resource intensive.**

6 Q. You mentioned there successes as far as the NCA is

7 concerned. But is this right: in fact, there were no

8 nationally-coordinated operations by the NCA in

9 2016/2017?

10 **A. Yes, that's correct.**

11 Q. Are you able to explain to the panel why, given their

12 apparent success, there wasn't such an operation in 2016

13 to '17?

14 **A. Well, certainly as a consequence of Operation Notarise,**

15 **forces then became trained, they then started to look to**

16 **engage and work against the threat, and certainly in**

17 **relation to indecent images of children, all forces are**

18 **now dedicated to tackling that level of threat, and that**

19 **is -- again, that comes through our Pursue Board, which**

20 **is chaired by Chief Constable Simon Bailey, where the**

21 **results of those can be seen. So forces started to work**

22 **independently, in a way, to tackle the threat in their**

23 **particular area which had geolocated to them. That**

24 **means that the offenders are in their particular**

25 **geographical area. That operation has continued and the**

Page 18

1 **successes are significant.**

2 Q. I'd like to consider that answer in relation to the

3 arrest data that the NCA hold. It is not in our bundle,

4 but can I call up, please, NCA000210. Because you have

5 provided the inquiry with arrest data. If we are able

6 to expand it so that we can read it, I want to consider

7 with you, Deputy Director, the arrest data from the

8 periods 2014/15 onwards. Are you able to see it

9 sufficiently clearly?

10 **A. Yes.**

11 Q. Perhaps if we can expand there. To orientate ourselves,

12 the arrest data is in the column down that starts "Full

13 year data not available". There are three of those in

14 the middle of the page. It is the column with the

15 figure 917451170. Is that right? That's the arrest

16 data column? Do you need to see back to the wider

17 exhibit?

18 **A. Yes, please. Yes, "CSEA Arrests NCA led and coordinated**

19 **activity".**

20 Q. If we follow that line and highlight it again, I want to

21 ask you about those figures. In 2014/15, there were 917

22 arrests. That was the year in which Operation Notarise

23 was carried out?

24 **A. Yes, that's correct. I think it is worth pointing out**

25 **that this involved a significant level of investigation**

Page 19

1 **by the National Crime Agency to identify the**

2 **individuals, and this culminated in very detailed**

3 **intelligence packages. So all the communications data**

4 **and the investigation. So there was a significant level**

5 **of investigation conducted by the NCA. Then those**

6 **packages were disseminated to forces for them to take**

7 **action upon.**

8 Q. In 2015/16, the number of arrests is 451.

9 **A. Yes.**

10 Q. Then, when one looks at the figures for 2016 into 2017,

11 the arrests are 170?

12 **A. Yes.**

13 Q. That is quite a significant, on any view, decline from

14 Operation Notarise at its highest in 2014/15, down to

15 170 in 2016/17?

16 **A. Yes, it is. The reason for those figures, in the way**

17 **that they have been presented there, is that, as I have**

18 **said, the initial Operation Notarise was coordinated and**

19 **led and actually the investigative work -- the initial**

20 **investigative work was conducted by the National Crime**

21 **Agency-CEOP. So those figures are included, the**

22 **Notarise figures are included because we had**

23 **a substantial contribution to that investigation at the**

24 **initial stages. Equally, that was a similar situation**

25 **for Operation Ziganka. So it is not that the arrests**

Page 20

1 **have significantly gone down from CEOP and the NCA. It**  
 2 **is just that we haven't had nationally-coordinated**  
 3 **operations and those nationally-coordinated operations**  
 4 **are included in the figures for the National Crime**  
 5 **Agency for those years.**  
 6 Q. So rather than it being a decrease, as it were, in  
 7 relation to 2016/17, 2014/15 and 2015/16 were inflated  
 8 because it takes into account the arrests that were  
 9 conducted by everyone in those two operations?  
 10 **A. It is reflecting the activity, but the arrests and the**  
 11 **effort and the resource that's gone into this level of**  
 12 **offending has continued and increased over the years.**  
 13 Q. One, looking at those figures, might still take the  
 14 view, if you take 2016/17 as an example, that across the  
 15 NCA, 170 arrests, whilst not, of course, to be derided,  
 16 is not a significant figure in relation to the budget  
 17 and size of the NCA-CEOP team.  
 18 Do you have any observations to make about perhaps  
 19 a contrary argument than I have just put to you?  
 20 **A. We are operating at the high end of high harm. These**  
 21 **are complex investigations, involving incredibly**  
 22 **dangerous individuals. So it is not about volume, it is**  
 23 **about threat risk and harm. Operating at a national**  
 24 **level, it is right and proper that we target those**  
 25 **individuals who do pose the highest harm to children.**

Page 21

1 **But, equally, those are the individuals that engage**  
 2 **anonymisation techniques, they do not want to be**  
 3 **detected by law enforcement and do their utmost to**  
 4 **ensure that they are not. That provides a challenge for**  
 5 **us, and we rise to that challenge. We work**  
 6 **collaboratively as an agency, we target these**  
 7 **individuals, and certainly that is evidenced in the**  
 8 **recent case of Matthew Falder. I can't go into the**  
 9 **detail too much around that, because that case is coming**  
 10 **up for sentencing, but Matthew Falder was an individual**  
 11 **who used most of the techniques to protect his identity**  
 12 **and the complexity of his operation. And it is through**  
 13 **the concerted effort of CEOP and the NCA working**  
 14 **together over a number of years that individual has now**  
 15 **been detected, caught, prosecuted and pleaded guilty.**  
 16 Q. Can I move on to look at the pillar 2 threat and the  
 17 threat in relation to volume referrals. We are turning  
 18 back to paragraph 96 onwards in your first witness  
 19 statement, Mr Niven.  
 20 Can I just ask you, please, firstly, to explain to  
 21 us the number of sources of referrals from the various  
 22 organisations that contribute to what are called volume  
 23 referrals?  
 24 **A. As we can see there, the first reference is to NCMEC,**  
 25 **and that's the National Center for Missing and Exploited**

Page 22

1 **Children in the United States. US companies are**  
 2 **legislated to report to NCMEC when they find material or**  
 3 **material is reported to them on their sites and**  
 4 **platforms. Those referrals are then assessed and they**  
 5 **are located to the countries to which those offences**  
 6 **have taken place, so the majority of our volume**  
 7 **referrals comes from NCMEC.**  
 8 **We also have an online public reporting portal,**  
 9 **Click CEOP. This is for children, young people,**  
 10 **parents, carers, where they can report online to us when**  
 11 **they have concerns or offences that they want to inform**  
 12 **us about.**  
 13 **Then we have as well law enforcement overseas, and**  
 14 **they also will make referrals to us when they have found**  
 15 **offending on the internet that relates potentially to UK**  
 16 **offenders, and that would be -- all of those would be**  
 17 **regarded as volume referrals.**  
 18 Q. Without going into all of the statistics that are  
 19 available over the time that CEOP has been established  
 20 up to today's date, I think you say this, that the level  
 21 of referrals has increased substantially  
 22 since April 2015, even if one starts from there, and  
 23 that in the three months ending August 2016, has risen  
 24 to over 3,500 referrals a month.  
 25 Now, that figure includes what you refer to as

Page 23

1 "informationals"?  
 2 **A. Yes.**  
 3 Q. Can you help the panel, please, with what an  
 4 informational is?  
 5 **A. Yes. An informational can be a viral image, and what we**  
 6 **have found is that there are a number of individuals who**  
 7 **rightfully will be outraged when something may pop up on**  
 8 **their computer or they find some imagery or they find**  
 9 **some material that they find abusive. A number of those**  
 10 **individuals may then distribute those amongst their own**  
 11 **networks to inform people of what those images may be**  
 12 **and to express their outrage as well. Well, every time**  
 13 **those images are transmitted, an offence is committed**  
 14 **and an automatic referral will be to NCMEC. So we find**  
 15 **a lot of those images come to us for investigation**  
 16 **because there is a process, an automated process, where**  
 17 **that comes to us.**  
 18 **Also, there are cartoons that we find, referred to**  
 19 **as memes. We find some of those. We find imagery**  
 20 **that's not necessarily indecent, doesn't meet the**  
 21 **threshold, but could be regarded as borderline, and**  
 22 **there may be some caution around this, where we receive**  
 23 **these referrals as well.**  
 24 **We did a test and a review of this in -- I think it**  
 25 **was the last three months of 2016, where we found that**

Page 24

1 **only 38 of those referrals out of thousands actually**  
2 **contained indecent imagery. So the volumes are really**  
3 **significant, and we look at all of these, and we**  
4 **certainly utilise a lot of resource.**  
5 **Now, at the moment, we are looking at ways to reduce**  
6 **that demand and working with NCMEC, looking at whether**  
7 **or not there's a more streamlined way to deal with**  
8 **informationals, because at the moment, there's such**  
9 **a significant number.**  
10 Q. Does it come to this, Deputy Director, that, actually,  
11 a lot of time is spent weeding out, for want of a better  
12 phrase --  
13 **A. Yes.**  
14 Q. -- the informationals to distinguish between those who  
15 genuinely have an interest in indecent imagery of  
16 children?  
17 **A. Yes, absolutely. I mean, we are committed to looking --**  
18 **you know, we found 38 image offences there, so we are**  
19 **committed to doing this. But there is definitely more**  
20 **work here that industry needs to do to provide that**  
21 **sifting for us on our behalf, because we are spending**  
22 **resource doing it at the moment.**  
23 Q. Those referrals that come in are then reviewed and the  
24 NCA-CEOP, is this right, has its own categorisation, so  
25 much like there was the KIRAT categorisation of risk,

Page 25

1 the NCA has a similar, but not identical --  
2 **A. Yes.**  
3 Q. -- categorisation?  
4 **A. Yes.**  
5 Q. In the NCA-CEOP, the referrals are graded?  
6 **A. They are, yes, that's correct.**  
7 Q. Can you explain to the panel, please, the grading system  
8 that NCA-CEOP operates?  
9 **A. Yes, the officers in the referrals bureau would grade**  
10 **the most serious, where there would be an immediate**  
11 **threat to the life of a child, as a grade 1, and they**  
12 **are prioritised and actioned as soon as possible.**  
13 **Grade 2 are exceptionally urgent operational**  
14 **requirement for the prevention or detection of a serious**  
15 **crime against a child, and they are prioritised and**  
16 **actioned as soon as possible, but in any case within two**  
17 **days.**  
18 **And then grade 3 material is actionable and it is**  
19 **allocated to officers on the basis of the oldest case**  
20 **first.**  
21 **So they have all gone through a review process.**  
22 **It's prioritised those cases where the information that**  
23 **we have suggests that there are differing levels of risk**  
24 **and then we take action accordingly.**  
25 Q. If the referral is able to be located to a particular

Page 26

1 area, is that the stage at which then the referral is  
2 disseminated to a local force?  
3 **A. Yes. Geolocation, as it is referred. So once we have**  
4 **reviewed these particular referrals and identified where**  
5 **those cases may locate to, then they will be**  
6 **disseminated to forces for forces to take the action as**  
7 **they see fit.**  
8 Q. Once the referral is made to the force, is there any  
9 steps taken by the NCA to ensure that the force acts on  
10 the referral?  
11 **A. That's a matter for the force themselves. It is not**  
12 **a case of the NCA looking for returns from those**  
13 **disseminations. They are disseminated to a specific**  
14 **point of contact in the force itself, and they are**  
15 **managed by their own units that deal with vulnerability.**  
16 **But it is not something that we would look to**  
17 **coordinate returns from or become involved in the**  
18 **administration of that.**  
19 Q. I ask you about it for this reason: the panel heard some  
20 evidence yesterday afternoon of an example of a case  
21 which is believed to have come in to CEOP  
22 in January 2017 and was disseminated, clearly, to  
23 a force and ended up with a Child Abuse Investigation  
24 Team being tasked with looking at the case  
25 in August 2017. Now, there may be caveats to the way in

Page 27

1 which that information was presented and the accuracy of  
2 it, but, as a general example, if there were a case  
3 which came into CEOP and was then disseminated, on any  
4 view, an eight- or nine-month delay before the force  
5 acting on it by many would not be seen to be an adequate  
6 policing response. That's why I ask whether NCA follow  
7 up a referral to ensure that a case isn't overlooked or  
8 left in abeyance for a long period of time?  
9 **A. The sheer numbers of cases that are disseminated to**  
10 **forces, once they are disseminated to forces, it is then**  
11 **for the force to decide what's the appropriate action.**  
12 **We have a certain amount of information that we judge**  
13 **our assessments on, and then the forces then would, you**  
14 **know, react to those and respond to them as they saw**  
15 **fit. But we certainly don't go back to those forces and**  
16 **look for what the outcomes are or how they're**  
17 **progressing those cases.**  
18 Q. It may sound as though the NCA are, in short, washing  
19 their hands of it once they send the matter out to the  
20 referral. I don't mean to be glib by that, but there  
21 may be a concern that, once you move it out to force  
22 level, it is a matter for the forces to deal with and  
23 there is no oversight by the National Crime Agency of  
24 whether that is in fact acted upon. Now, clearly, on  
25 any view, that might not have at its heart child

Page 28

1 protection and the protection of any child that that  
 2 offender had access to.  
 3 Do you have concerns, Deputy Director, about what  
 4 goes on at regional or local level in cases where you  
 5 disseminate the information to the forces?  
 6 **A. Well, I would have concern, as anyone would, if there**  
 7 **was a case that hadn't been progressed and a child was**  
 8 **abused or there were any other outcomes similar to that,**  
 9 **and those cases would need to be looked at very closely**  
 10 **to find out where the system had potentially not**  
 11 **provided the service that would be expected.**  
 12 **In those particular cases, I can't comment on that**  
 13 **particular case, but I would imagine that there would be**  
 14 **that process that takes place to look at what the**  
 15 **reasoning behind that and, if there's any learning from**  
 16 **that particular review, then action would need to be**  
 17 **taken and new processes potentially could be examined**  
 18 **and introduced.**  
 19 **But when those cases are disseminated to forces, it**  
 20 **is not a case of washing our hands of the case; it is**  
 21 **that we are confident that, when we have disseminated**  
 22 **those forces, they are disseminated to professional**  
 23 **officers who are trained in child protection that have**  
 24 **dedicated units to deal with this, and then the**  
 25 **appropriate action, we would expect, would take place.**

Page 29

1 **In the vast majority of cases, that's exactly what**  
 2 **happens, but there is an example there that I would hope**  
 3 **has been looked at or, if it hasn't, it should be looked**  
 4 **at now, to see if there is any learning from that**  
 5 **particular example.**  
 6 Q. Just finally dealing with referrals and, indeed,  
 7 prioritisation tools based on an assessment of risk, you  
 8 have explained why, as far as the NCA-CEOP is concerned,  
 9 you are prioritising the most serious offenders  
 10 operating in online-facilitated child sexual abuse. But  
 11 do you consider, Deputy Director, that there is in fact  
 12 perhaps too little focus on the low-risk offender and  
 13 that, whilst everyone understands the need to prioritise  
 14 the high risk, nonetheless the medium and low-risk  
 15 offenders are somehow being left behind?  
 16 **A. Well, obviously there has to be a prioritisation tool**  
 17 **that we use or a process to ensure that the highest**  
 18 **risks are dealt with. If there is an immediate risk to**  
 19 **a child, then that's our absolute responsibility.**  
 20 **But -- and I have said this -- these tools and processes**  
 21 **that we use, they are not to eliminate, they are to**  
 22 **prioritise. So the expectation would be that those**  
 23 **individuals, if somebody has committed a crime against**  
 24 **a child, those individuals, a robust, law enforcement**  
 25 **response will take place. But it is a point of**

Page 30

1 **prioritising which cases to deal with first, but not**  
 2 **whether or not to deal with any of the other cases.**  
 3 **Those cases can equally be important cases that need**  
 4 **investigating. But the prioritisation of the immediate**  
 5 **action may be indicated by the prioritisation tools that**  
 6 **are in place.**  
 7 Q. Can we turn to look at the other pillars of threat,  
 8 please, and pick up in your statement at paragraph 107  
 9 of your first witness statement, Deputy Director.  
 10 I just want to briefly consider, so that we have looked  
 11 at all the pillars of threat, victim identification,  
 12 live streaming, online grooming and then the more  
 13 complex international investigations.  
 14 **A. Yes.**  
 15 Q. Now, the panel are aware of the child abuse image  
 16 database and indeed victim identification. But if you  
 17 could just summarise it in a nutshell. How does the  
 18 child abuse image database work and how does it assist  
 19 in relation to law enforcement's response?  
 20 **A. Yes. Well, the child abuse image database was developed**  
 21 **by the Home Office in collaboration with the UK**  
 22 **policing, industry partners and a number of others, and**  
 23 **it is a secure database of illegal images of children.**  
 24 **It is designed to hold records of all child abuse images**  
 25 **known to UK law enforcement. The database contains tens**

Page 31

1 **of millions of images and hash values.**  
 2 **Now, the reason that it is so important to UK**  
 3 **policing is that, when images are recovered during the**  
 4 **numerous investigations that take place, those images**  
 5 **that we recover from individual devices, we can check**  
 6 **those images against the database of known images that**  
 7 **have already been in possession of law enforcement. The**  
 8 **benefit to that is, a lot of those images are already**  
 9 **graded on the system. The grading is from A to C. The**  
 10 **grading has taken place by a police officer having to**  
 11 **look at those images and provide their judgment of what**  
 12 **those grades are. Now, we can't underestimate the**  
 13 **impact of that over a long period of time and the**  
 14 **welfare of police officers is paramount in this type of**  
 15 **work.**  
 16 **But the database will enable us to potentially**  
 17 **identify one of those images and it will negate the need**  
 18 **for an officer to look through thousands of images to**  
 19 **grade them, because, if they are already known, then**  
 20 **that grading is accepted, it is accepted in law, and**  
 21 **there is a process for ensuring how those grades are**  
 22 **endorsed.**  
 23 **So it is a huge, hugely beneficial tool to police**  
 24 **officers. When we refer to hash numbers as well, the**  
 25 **hash numbers are unique numbers to that particular**

Page 32



1 **image. We can then use those hash numbers to search**  
 2 **across other databases to identify those images across**  
 3 **the internet.**  
 4 Q. I think this is right, that all forces, and indeed the  
 5 National Crime Agency, are connected to the child abuse  
 6 image database?  
 7 **A. Yes, that's correct. It went live in 2014.**  
 8 Q. Insofar as you are able, is that database going to be  
 9 something that's going to be able to assist in the years  
 10 to come --  
 11 **A. Yes.**  
 12 Q. -- with dealing with the problem of online CSA?  
 13 **A. Very much so. It is definitely a work in progress. We**  
 14 **develop that as we find more challenges that come to us.**  
 15 **I think recently that's now including videos that are in**  
 16 **there. So it evolves over time as we understand more**  
 17 **detail around the threat, but it is a very useful tool**  
 18 **and it certainly will be maintained, continued and**  
 19 **developed as time goes forward.**  
 20 Q. How is that tool funded?  
 21 **A. I think that's Home Office funding and law enforcement**  
 22 **as well, but I would have to check the exact funding**  
 23 **behind that. But I know that it is certainly**  
 24 **Home Office sponsored, but I will check the detail.**  
 25 Q. Thank you very much. Another pressing concern to many

Page 33

1 will be live streaming of abuse --  
 2 **A. Yes.**  
 3 Q. -- which, in essence, involves networking between  
 4 offenders via online conferencing platforms or, indeed,  
 5 commercial live streaming of abuse for payment?  
 6 **A. Yes.**  
 7 Q. Can you just give us an idea about how much of a problem  
 8 live streaming is becoming as far as the NCA are  
 9 concerned?  
 10 **A. Yes, this is one of the emerging threats that we have**  
 11 **identified and we refer to. The very concerning part of**  
 12 **this is that this is where individuals in the UK can**  
 13 **watch live child abuse anywhere across the world, and in**  
 14 **some of these sites and some of these facilities it**  
 15 **enables them to direct individuals who are abusing**  
 16 **children to abuse them in a way to which they gain some**  
 17 **form of satisfaction. They can do this from the comfort**  
 18 **and apparent safety of their own home, they can do it**  
 19 **across the internet and, on occasions, there can be**  
 20 **people that are gaining money out of this, because there**  
 21 **can be a money aspect, or it could be between**  
 22 **individuals, like-minded individuals, who are doing this**  
 23 **to support each other.**  
 24 Q. If, as you have just said, it can be done from the  
 25 privacy of one's own home, do the NCA have any idea

Page 34

1 about the scale of this threat or the numbers of people  
 2 who may be interested in live streaming?  
 3 **A. It is very difficult to establish the numbers in this**  
 4 **particular case. This is work that's ongoing. We are**  
 5 **finding this. We are targeting individuals who are**  
 6 **using these facilities. But an actual number, as is in**  
 7 **many of these areas of child abuse, is very difficult to**  
 8 **place, given the difficulties and the use of**  
 9 **the internet for this. But the NCA are targeting these**  
 10 **individuals as a priority. We are arresting individuals**  
 11 **that we find that are using these techniques and we are**  
 12 **arresting those on a regular basis.**  
 13 Q. Is there scope in relation to the threat of live  
 14 streaming for collaboration with the platforms that  
 15 allow the streaming to take place? Is there any work  
 16 being done with industry to combat this particular  
 17 threat?  
 18 **A. So the issue that we have here is that the products and**  
 19 **services on the internet are enabling this form of abuse**  
 20 **to take place. My view is that it is now time for**  
 21 **industry to take a look at how these products and**  
 22 **services have enabled this to take place and put in**  
 23 **place prevention measures to stop that happening, not**  
 24 **only on the sites and the services that are currently**  
 25 **being used, but in the design of any new products and**

Page 35

1 **services as well. Because we have to prevent this, we**  
 2 **have to prevent it at source, because it is an enabler**  
 3 **and it is being used and it is being abused. I know**  
 4 **that these services and products were not designed for**  
 5 **this, they were designed for legitimate purpose. That**  
 6 **is unquestionable. But they are being used to enable**  
 7 **this form of crime.**  
 8 **So the National Crime Agency, we do work with**  
 9 **industry, it is a very positive relationship that we**  
 10 **have, and industry have worked and improved, in my view,**  
 11 **but there is a long way to go. We are having**  
 12 **a round-table workshop in May of this year, where we are**  
 13 **inviting industry to come along and to help them and for**  
 14 **them to help us to solve this problem, and the problem**  
 15 **won't be solved until the products and services are not**  
 16 **being used to facilitate this form of criminality.**  
 17 Q. If a new product or a new website is made available, is  
 18 there any obligation on the provider of that website to  
 19 come to the NCA, for example, and say, "What advice  
 20 would you give us? How can we combat this?" They may  
 21 do it voluntarily, but are they under any obligation at  
 22 all to take advice and seek guidance in this area?  
 23 **A. No, there is no obligation. I use this analogy, that if**  
 24 **we were to build a housing estate next to this building,**  
 25 **in order to get planning permission, we would have to**

Page 36

1 **build that housing estate designing out potential for**  
2 **crime within that housing estate. When a new product or**  
3 **service is provided, the same legislation, the same**  
4 **regulation, isn't in place, as far as I know.**  
5 Q. So whilst there may be many providers who do seek your  
6 assistance and voluntarily come to you with concerns  
7 about that, they are under no obligation to do so?  
8 **A. No, not that I'm aware of.**  
9 Q. Clearly, in relation to some of the larger platforms,  
10 there are good lines of communication between the NCA --  
11 **A. Yes.**  
12 Q. -- and more well-known companies, but what about in  
13 relation to perhaps some of the smaller operators of  
14 websites or smaller companies that operate in this  
15 field?  
16 **A. So the smaller companies, I do think they need to be**  
17 **supported by the larger companies in industry, because**  
18 **there has to be in place protective measures, there has**  
19 **to be reporting facilities, there has to be the ability**  
20 **to be private on those networks, and a whole host of**  
21 **protection that's in place at the moment. Some of these**  
22 **companies I think expand and progress very quickly, and**  
23 **then, once that's happened, then it is a case of trying**  
24 **then to sometimes introduce some safety measures.**  
25 **So I think the initial stages have got to be --**

Page 37

1 **prevention of this type of offending has to be paramount**  
2 **and at the heart of all design.**  
3 Q. Online grooming and blackmail via online grooming is  
4 clearly a threat that was set out in the 18-box grid.  
5 **A. Yes.**  
6 Q. In relation to that, what is it that the NCA are  
7 actively doing to try to deal with the problem of online  
8 grooming?  
9 **A. Well, online grooming is yet another area that is**  
10 **emerging and evolving. What we are finding is that**  
11 **children are being deceived into communicating and**  
12 **relating to individuals who seek to abuse them. On many**  
13 **occasions, we find that those individuals have deceived**  
14 **their victims into providing quite explicit images and**  
15 **potentially video, and then they will use those to**  
16 **blackmail these children into doing more explicit and**  
17 **more depraved activities.**  
18 **We are very much focused upon this, not just the NCA**  
19 **but nationally as well, and Mr Bailey may well go on and**  
20 **talk about what that national response is and how**  
21 **policing and the NCA are dealing with that. But we are**  
22 **very focused on this. We are looking to tackle this**  
23 **issue and we are looking to use sensitive methods to do**  
24 **that.**  
25 Q. Finally, Deputy Director, in relation to those more

Page 38

1 complex and international investigations, insofar as you  
2 are able, can you inform the panel, please, of the work  
3 being done by NCA-CEOP in this regard?  
4 **A. Yes, certainly. And this is, I think I mentioned, the**  
5 **extensive international liaison and network that the NCA**  
6 **has. It is another resource that's provided to CEOP.**  
7 **That resource enables us to look at UK offenders who**  
8 **leave the UK with the intention of offending abroad.**  
9 **What we find is that those individuals will target**  
10 **areas where they think they are least likely to be**  
11 **detected.**  
12 **As a consequence of that, we have prosecuted**  
13 **a number of cases under section 72 of the Sexual**  
14 **Offences Act which enables us to prosecute UK nationals**  
15 **here in the UK for offending that is committed abroad.**  
16 **I will name just one of those cases, which was**  
17 **Richard Huckle, who was a young man, 29/30 years of age**  
18 **who went to Malaysia, went to a very impoverished**  
19 **community in Malaysia, and he -- the level of abuse that**  
20 **he inflicted on young children, from babies up to young**  
21 **teenagers, was absolutely horrific. As a consequence of**  
22 **that, through a great deal of hard work and dedication**  
23 **and resource from the National Crime Agency and CEOP,**  
24 **and working with our international liaison network, we**  
25 **managed to detect this individual, we managed to secure**

Page 39

1 **the evidence, because he was operating on the dark web.**  
2 **His depraved activities, he was recording and he was**  
3 **uploading and he was exchanging those with individuals**  
4 **who were like-minded, and he was seeking to gain**  
5 **financial reward for that.**  
6 **He gave himself points for the level of depravity**  
7 **that he used against children.**  
8 **As a consequence of that, we arrested him, we**  
9 **prosecuted him and he received 22 life sentences through**  
10 **the work of the NCA and CEOP and our international**  
11 **partners.**  
12 Q. That gives the panel, I hope, a scale of the potential  
13 magnitude of an offender who is intent on travelling  
14 abroad, as you say.  
15 I want to turn, perhaps, to a different aspect of  
16 work by the NCA, because we have spent some time this  
17 morning considering the Pursue response.  
18 **A. Yes.**  
19 Q. I think it important that the panel also considers the  
20 Protect and Prepare element to the NCA's work. Perhaps  
21 if we could do that now before the mid-morning break,  
22 that would be a convenient moment.  
23 Can we turn, please, to your paragraph 153 in your  
24 first statement, Deputy Director. I would like to ask  
25 you, please, about the Thinkuknow website, which

Page 40

<p>1 I believe is an NCA website, and how it operates and how                  2 it is going to continue to operate to help try to                  3 educate, in essence, children, parents, et cetera, of                  4 some of the dangers of online child sexual abuse?                  5 <b>A. We were very proud of this as an organisation, because                  6 this has been ongoing for some time now, and it moves                  7 from strength to strength. The design of the Thinkuknow                  8 website is to provide educational resources for teachers                  9 and resources for parents and children and young people                  10 so that they can stay safe on the internet.</b>                  11 <b>What it does, it provides -- it breaks the age                  12 groups down from 5 to 7, 8 to 10s, 11 to 13, 14-plus, so                  13 that it is relevant to individuals. It provides                  14 guidance to children and young people to enable them to                  15 become safe on the internet. Certainly we have now                  16 somewhere in the region of around 7,000 ambassadors, we                  17 call them. These are people we have trained, we train                  18 professionals on a monthly basis. They are normally                  19 teachers and they then go to their schools and train the                  20 trainer, that's the process, and our reach I think in                  21 '16/'17 to children was about 5.9 million children in                  22 the UK. That's part of what we do.</b>                  23 <b>Certainly we are looking to refresh our resource on                  24 a regular basis. I recall yesterday, with respect to                  25 Mr Gamble, he mentioned that there was no mention of</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 41</p>	<p>1 <b>It needs to be consistent, it needs to be constant,                  2 because the internet changes, and it needs to be                  3 monitored to ensure that the learning objectives, like                  4 any other subject, are monitored and there are standards                  5 in relation to this level of teaching.</b>                  6 Q. Without wishing to detract from the good work that you                  7 have just told us about being conducted by Thinkuknow,                  8 I think you are aware, Deputy Director, that in research                  9 commissioned on behalf of the inquiry, Thinkuknow was                  10 certainly considered, in the report, looking at the                  11 behaviour and characteristics of perpetrators. I just                  12 want to ask you about that.                  13 <b>A. Yes.</b>                  14 Q. Chair, can we turn in our bundles, please, to tab 13.                  15 So that you are aware, the Internet Investigation has                  16 commissioned a number of pieces of research to try to                  17 assist you with looking at the behaviour and                  18 characteristics of victims, behaviour and                  19 characteristics of perpetrators, and, indeed, what is                  20 known about the scale of the problem from an academic                  21 perspective.                  22 Within the research prepared, there is reference to                  23 the Thinkuknow website. I would like just to have                  24 a look at it with the deputy director. It is at                  25 page 49. It might assist if we call up on screen</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 43</p>
<p>1 <b>Snapchat on our website. Well, he was in fact                  2 incorrect, because Snapchat is mentioned on our website                  3 with advice for a new product that they brought out                  4 in July 2017.</b>                  5 <b>But the value of this is to ensure that children are                  6 given the right level of advice. They can go on this                  7 site and they can gain advice. They see videos. They                  8 are made for young people. We test these products on                  9 young people as well to ensure they are relevant. So                  10 the Thinkuknow are 8 to 10s. We have a new product,                  11 Play Like Share. It is on our website if you want to                  12 see it. But this was about teaching 8- to 10-year-olds                  13 about relationships on the internet and the dangers they                  14 could face and the challenges that they face. There                  15 were three teaching resources for this. It comes in                  16 phases and it is taught over an incremental period of                  17 time, to ensure that children understand the message.</b>                  18 <b>But there is a wider point here, and the wider point                  19 is that, although there are 7,000 ambassadors, and this                  20 has been promoted in schools, this is not in all                  21 schools, and the point that I make is that education --                  22 we need to look at a consistent and compulsory education                  23 of internet safety to ensure that all our age groups                  24 receive the right level of training and support and                  25 education to ensure that they are safe on the internet.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 42</p>	<p>1 reference INQ000993 page 49, please. Sorry, it is                  2 internal page 49, INQ000993_051. If we could highlight,                  3 please, the paragraph starting "In the UK, CEOP's online                  4 safety education programme ..."                  5 Deputy Director, this piece of research certainly                  6 drew on an evaluation done in 2009. I accept at the                  7 outset that is many years ago now.                  8 <b>A. Yes.</b>                  9 Q. But nonetheless, as the research into the Thinkuknow                  10 programme found, the evaluation found that a high                  11 proportion of young people were unable to remember                  12 whether or not they had received Thinkuknow training.                  13 They couldn't recall the safety messages that had seemed                  14 to fade over time and evidence did not suggest there was                  15 a relationship between having received Thinkuknow                  16 training and risk-taking behaviour?                  17 <b>A. Yes.</b>                  18 Q. I alight upon this section not to criticise Thinkuknow,                  19 perhaps, but to draw everyone's attention to the                  20 problems with there being a training programme but                  21 nonetheless it not sticking in the minds of the very                  22 people we are trying to protect. The research goes on:                  23 "However, the evaluation found that young people who                  24 had received Thinkuknow training were more likely to                  25 report that they had experienced suspect behaviour</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 44</p>

1 either through ChildLine or Thinkuknow. The authors  
 2 suggested that the website be made more  
 3 young-person-friendly, interactive and less text-based."  
 4 In relation to Thinkuknow, and perhaps some of  
 5 the -- not criticisms, but concerns raised by the  
 6 authors of this piece of research, are efforts being  
 7 taken by NCA-CEOP to try to drive the message home in  
 8 a way that remains in the minds of the children we are  
 9 trying to protect?  
 10 **A. Absolutely. You make the point this was 2009, before**  
 11 **the NCA was created, and a lot of work has gone in.**  
 12 **Certainly, we have -- well, I mentioned 7,000**  
 13 **ambassadors. There weren't 7,000 ambassadors**  
 14 **championing this in 2009. That is not to sit on our**  
 15 **laurels in any way, shape or form. The point I make**  
 16 **about, "This has to be compulsory in education as part**  
 17 **of a programme", is one that I will keep reinforcing,**  
 18 **because that is the way to ensure that the message is**  
 19 **delivered to all children consistently and up to date.**  
 20 **In terms of our interaction with children, well,**  
 21 **I mentioned with the 8 to 10s, we actually took that to**  
 22 **a school. In fact, it was actually made in a school.**  
 23 **It is an animated version, but it is almost like some of**  
 24 **the cartoons you see which are against the backdrop of**  
 25 **reality, and this backdrop of reality was a school**

Page 45

1 **itself. Before that product was actually launched, we**  
 2 **consulted with the children to see what their reaction**  
 3 **was. Was this relevant? Did we get it right? The**  
 4 **reaction was really positive. It was certainly positive**  
 5 **by the children; it was positive by the teachers as**  
 6 **well, because the downloads were in the thousands when**  
 7 **we first launched that.**  
 8 **So it is about making sure that it is relevant.**  
 9 **In terms of user-ability -- so part of what we are**  
 10 **trying to help children with is, if they do have any**  
 11 **concerns -- so what happens is, as a result of this,**  
 12 **that they identify some issues they are concerned about.**  
 13 **Where do they go? Will they go to Click CEOP? And**  
 14 **Click CEOP is a central part of this.**  
 15 Q. I want to come on to that in just a moment.  
 16 **A. Okay.**  
 17 Q. So that you know and the panel have a balanced picture,  
 18 in the HMIC inspection of the NCA carried out  
 19 in March 2015, in fact by 2015, as far as that report  
 20 was concerned, certainly the Thinkuknow programme and  
 21 the online learning process was certainly viewed  
 22 favourably by HMIC come 2015. I only say that because  
 23 I acknowledge that that research is old and I don't want  
 24 to be certainly accused of picking out the criticisms  
 25 without drawing the compliments where they are due

Page 46

1 either.  
 2 **A. What's reassuring to me is that here as well it says:**  
 3 **"However, the evaluation found that young people who**  
 4 **had received Thinkuknow training were more likely to**  
 5 **report."**  
 6 **That's actually what we want them to do if they have**  
 7 **been victims of crime.**  
 8 Q. In essence, though, perhaps it does come back to the  
 9 consistent and compulsory message, as you termed it, in  
 10 relation to education of our children?  
 11 **A. Absolutely.**  
 12 Q. Picking up then on the Click CEOP button before we have  
 13 the break, can I ask, please, that we have a look at  
 14 exhibit NCA000235. It is behind tab 12, but it may  
 15 assist you, chair and panel, actually to look at it live  
 16 on the screen. I think if we turn to page 3 of that  
 17 document, one can actually see how the Click CEOP button  
 18 works?  
 19 **A. Yes.**  
 20 Q. I was wondering, Deputy Director, if you wouldn't mind  
 21 just talking us through how the Click CEOP button works  
 22 and how a report can actually be made to the NCA?  
 23 **A. Just in terms of a user-friendly approach, Click CEOP**  
 24 **was significantly -- well, was significantly more pages**  
 25 **prior to our review of this, which took place I think**

Page 47

1 **now towards the end of 2016 when we launched this new**  
 2 **version. We took a lot of advice around this, about**  
 3 **particular colours, the particular layout, the amount of**  
 4 **pages, taking into consideration the views of children**  
 5 **as well in how to present this.**  
 6 **So this is a very recent product by comparison, but**  
 7 **this takes the individual, hopefully in the most**  
 8 **friendly way that we can possibly do this, through how**  
 9 **to make the report. You can see there, "Should I make**  
 10 **a report? What happens when I make a report? How can**  
 11 **CEOP help me?" Then it starts to ask you a variety of**  
 12 **questions.**  
 13 **Now, at any stage, if somebody isn't comfortable in**  
 14 **continuing through those pages, there will be a pop-up**  
 15 **there to the NSPCC, because the NSPCC is an opportunity**  
 16 **to report anonymously, whereas we are looking for some**  
 17 **detail because we are looking to take executive action**  
 18 **potentially against an offender.**  
 19 **Sometimes people aren't ready to report at that**  
 20 **time, and that's fine. If they want to then take advice**  
 21 **from the NSPCC, we work collaboratively with them. In**  
 22 **fact, we have seven members of the NSPCC who work in our**  
 23 **department that's dedicated to this. But I think it is**  
 24 **worthy of making that point as well. Because we have in**  
 25 **excess of 20 trained social workers that work alongside**

Page 48

1 our investigators in CEOP. It is unique. It doesn't  
 2 occur anywhere else in policing. It is an incredible  
 3 resource that we have that we will definitely maintain.  
 4 When these reports come in online, it is those very  
 5 social workers that take those reports, look at them,  
 6 communicate with the children and then look to see  
 7 whether they can take them through a process to provide  
 8 levels of support that they may require.  
 9 Equally, you will see on there there's an  
 10 opportunity "Quick exit". People may well want to exit  
 11 these pages for a variety of reasons very quickly, and  
 12 then no-one would know that they are making this report.  
 13 But it is not just for children, it is for parents, it  
 14 is for guardians, it is for carers as well. But it is  
 15 an opportunity -- it is the only online reporting  
 16 opportunity. The reason it is important is because  
 17 children don't walk into police stations to report  
 18 child abuse. They work online, they operate online, so  
 19 it is right that we provide a service for them to do  
 20 that. We work very closely with the NSPCC in relation  
 21 to this, and it is a really positive and close  
 22 collaboration.  
 23 Q. You mentioned there a reference to the ability to  
 24 report -- in fact, if we just go on one page in the  
 25 presentation, one can see that on, I hope, the next

Page 49

1 page -- yes, there we are, a pop-up in relation to  
 2 someone, whether it is the child or the parent or anyone  
 3 else, that they can call ChildLine?  
 4 A. Absolutely. Our experience is, you know, people  
 5 shouldn't be forced or rushed into this. This is  
 6 something that the individual victim needs to do at  
 7 their own pace, and this enables them to do that. If  
 8 ChildLine then can deal with whatever the issue is --  
 9 sometimes it is not a criminal offence, this sometimes  
 10 relates to bullying, we find there is a lot of that  
 11 there, and the NSPCC are very well equipped to deal with  
 12 that. But if it is a matter that people do report to  
 13 us, we will act immediately on whatever that information  
 14 is.  
 15 Q. Finally this before we break: the panel heard yesterday  
 16 about some previous efforts and attempts to have the  
 17 Click CEOP button incorporated into social media  
 18 websites, and that wasn't taken up by the social media  
 19 websites at the time. I think we are talking about 2009  
 20 or there or thereabouts.  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. Is there any attempt by the NCA to renew that and have  
 23 the Click CEOP button available on the home page of any  
 24 given website or social media site?  
 25 A. I mean, these are areas for us to discuss with industry

Page 50

1 when we have our round table in May, and it is certainly  
 2 worthy of consideration and take a look at that. At the  
 3 moment, it doesn't happen. The sites themselves have  
 4 their own reporting processes.  
 5 Q. That would be a report going to the owner -- not the  
 6 owner, but the operator of the website rather than  
 7 coming into law enforcement?  
 8 A. Yes. So the reporting process is on their own website.  
 9 Of course, these are websites that serve the whole of  
 10 the world. So there would be some work to ensure that  
 11 that was UK-based only. But that is certainly something  
 12 that we can take a look at and explore when we meet.  
 13 Q. Not wishing to detract from the value of the website  
 14 itself having its own reporting mechanism, clearly that  
 15 only goes to the operator of the website?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. They would then be responsible for referring it on to  
 18 the NCA, which adds a layer, for want of a better  
 19 phrase, of bureaucracy and time delay potentially.  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. That's why I queried whether actually the time has come  
 22 to renew efforts to have the Click CEOP button  
 23 incorporated into the social media websites?  
 24 A. We can certainly take a look at that and see the merits  
 25 of that within our workshops that are going to take

Page 51

1 place in May.  
 2 Q. Clearly, though, if there were that reporting mechanism,  
 3 that in itself may place demands on your capacity to  
 4 deal with those reports?  
 5 A. Absolutely. And that would be one of  
 6 the considerations, because we would need to resource  
 7 that and we would potentially look for funding from  
 8 elsewhere for that and maybe those industry partners  
 9 might be able to assist there.  
 10 Q. When we come back after the break, I would like to spend  
 11 a little time with you, Deputy Director, just looking at  
 12 the Prevent arm of the response, and indeed the role,  
 13 perhaps, a little bit more of industry and NGOs and the  
 14 challenges faced by the NCA.  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 MS CAREY: Chair, would that be a sensible moment for  
 17 a mid-morning break?  
 18 THE CHAIR: Thank you, Ms Carey. We will return just after  
 19 12 noon.  
 20 (11.48 am)  
 21 (A short break)  
 22 (12.06 pm)  
 23 MS CAREY: Mr Niven, turning, then, please, to the Prevent  
 24 strand of the work being done by the NCA, I would like  
 25 to ask you a little bit, please, about the work being

Page 52

1 done by NCA-CEOP with non-governmental organisations.  
 2 You referred earlier this morning in your evidence to  
 3 the work that you do with the NSPCC and the staff that  
 4 are embedded from that organisation in NCA-CEOP.  
 5 **A. Yes.**  
 6 Q. Is that something that's done, again, on a voluntary  
 7 basis?  
 8 **A. That's with a memorandum of understanding with the**  
 9 **NSPCC. They work alongside our social work -- they are**  
 10 **qualified social workers, they work alongside. We have**  
 11 **I think it is seven qualified social workers that work**  
 12 **in our team of around 20, 20-plus, and they work on our**  
 13 **safety centre, which is where those reports that we**  
 14 **spoke about earlier are brought into the agency. They**  
 15 **also work alongside our operations teams as well. So**  
 16 **before any of our operations take place, there is**  
 17 **a child-centred assessment of what the impact of law**  
 18 **enforcement's activity would be on the family, on the**  
 19 **child, and in a lot of occasions, the social workers**  
 20 **will go along with the investigators on those operations**  
 21 **not only in the UK, but also internationally as well,**  
 22 **when we have worked internationally.**  
 23 **There is an additional member of staff that they**  
 24 **provide to the Child Trafficking Advice Centre, which is**  
 25 **based within the NSPCC, and that is an individual**

Page 53

1 **working on behalf of CEOP-NCA, but that is again funded**  
 2 **by the NSPCC and that funding continues.**  
 3 Q. I think another significant partner of the NCA is the  
 4 Internet Watch Foundation?  
 5 **A. Yes.**  
 6 Q. Can you just explain a little about the work that  
 7 NCA-CEOP does with IWF, as it is known?  
 8 **A. We work very closely with the IWF. They come to our**  
 9 **Pursue Board, so they are very much involved in our**  
 10 **strategic approach to child sexual exploitation and**  
 11 **abuse. They, of course, have the responsibility in the**  
 12 **UK for identifying material that's on the internet and**  
 13 **they can take those websites down. So they take down**  
 14 **what are URLs, which are the reference numbers to web**  
 15 **pages, and I think their most recent figures were**  
 16 **somewhere in the region of 60,000 or 70,000 that they**  
 17 **had actually taken down. So a significant contribution**  
 18 **from the IWF.**  
 19 **And when we spoke in relation to working together,**  
 20 **they work with industry to ensure that these images are**  
 21 **taken down. They work very closely with us and we**  
 22 **exchange information and then they work with industry to**  
 23 **ensure that those images that they have provided to**  
 24 **industry, or the references to those images, are taken**  
 25 **down.**

Page 54

1 Q. I'm aware that you have provided evidence to the inquiry  
 2 in relation to the work being done between the NCA and  
 3 the Lucy Faithfull Foundation?  
 4 **A. Yes.**  
 5 Q. But I am going to deal with that aspect of the work  
 6 through Mr Bailey.  
 7 **A. Right.**  
 8 Q. So I don't need to trouble you with that this morning.  
 9 Can we turn, please, to the role of industry and the  
 10 work being done, and potentially not being done, by  
 11 industry and look, please, starting, really, at  
 12 paragraph 173 in your first statement, although in  
 13 subsequent statements you have gone on to provide some  
 14 further evidence in this regard?  
 15 **A. Yes.**  
 16 Q. As a general proposition, is this right, Mr Niven, that  
 17 you consider NCA-CEOP does have positive relationships  
 18 with many of the information communications technology  
 19 companies and indeed global and wider ICT industry?  
 20 **A. Yes, we do, and we seek to continue that.**  
 21 Q. Now, you have informed the inquiry that you practise  
 22 this work with discretion.  
 23 **A. Yes.**  
 24 Q. I don't wish to impinge on it, but I do think it  
 25 important that you can explain, insofar as you are able

Page 55

1 to, why there is a need for discretion or a desire for  
 2 discretion in relation to collaboration between the  
 3 police and industry?  
 4 **A. I mean, it is not in all cases, but there are instances**  
 5 **where we have worked with industry and industry have**  
 6 **requested that we don't publicise the nature of that**  
 7 **work.**  
 8 **The rationale behind that is a matter for them, and**  
 9 **there will be a variety of reasons, but they have**  
 10 **certainly made those requests to us in the past, and we**  
 11 **wouldn't breach that trust in that relationship.**  
 12 Q. I think, looking at your paragraph 174, certainly, there  
 13 are a number of requests that you promote -- I say  
 14 "you", NCA-CEOP promote -- to all platforms through what  
 15 is termed bilateral engagement?  
 16 **A. Yes.**  
 17 Q. I just want to try to put that into layman's terms so  
 18 that anyone listening or following this inquiry can  
 19 understand the work that is being done. Can we have  
 20 a look, please, at the work being done in relation to  
 21 blocking and removing child sexual abuse content from  
 22 those websites.  
 23 **A. Yes, certainly. When we say "bilateral engagement",**  
 24 **these are meetings that take place with NCA-CEOP, with**  
 25 **UKCCIS, which was mentioned yesterday, Virtual Global**

Page 56

1 Taskforce, which has been mentioned, and We Protect.  
 2 That is so that there is a relationship built with  
 3 industry and there is an understanding between industry  
 4 and law enforcement and, when we talk about blocking and  
 5 removing CSEA content, that's where we then look to the  
 6 IWF, that is the catalyst, if you like, to ensure that  
 7 any material that is brought to their attention, they  
 8 will then bring that to the attention of the platforms  
 9 and services with a view to that material being taken  
 10 down.

11 Q. Can I ask you, please, about your paragraph 180, which  
 12 picks up on the evidence in relation to what happens  
 13 when a platform or service detects indecent imagery or  
 14 child sexual abuse on their site. You say this:  
 15 "It is important, obviously, to remove or block the  
 16 content to clean up that platform ... however, this  
 17 should not be prioritised above victim and offender  
 18 identification. NCA-CEOP regularly reinforces this  
 19 message to its industry partners."  
 20 I just want to understand, in practice, though,  
 21 there appears to be, on what you are saying, a tension,  
 22 perhaps, between the desire to take the image down and  
 23 a desire by law enforcement to potentially protect  
 24 a child from harm?

25 A. Yes.

Page 57

1 Q. Can you just develop that for the panel, please, so that  
 2 we understand perhaps those competing priorities?

3 A. **Once this material has actually been uploaded or**  
 4 **produced or retained on a particular platform or site**  
 5 **and that information is brought, for example, to the**  
 6 **attention of the IWF and they contact that company, what**  
 7 **we seek is the details of potentially the offender, but**  
 8 **definitely our opportunity to identify who the victim**  
 9 **is. If that is first generation imagery, then that is**  
 10 **something that we would focus on. We focus on all of**  
 11 **it, but the primary focus is on first-generation imagery**  
 12 **because that indicates that potentially the person**  
 13 **uploading that material is the person that's abused the**  
 14 **child. So it is important to us that we gain that**  
 15 **information and it is important that then it is taken**  
 16 **down so that it is not then repeated across platforms.**  
 17 **On speaking to victims, and I think this is really**  
 18 **important, every time the image of a child is shown or**  
 19 **viewed, that child is revictimised. They are the**  
 20 **feelings of the victims that we have spoken to. So it**  
 21 **is essential that this material -- and I go back to my**  
 22 **point, this material shouldn't be on there in the first**  
 23 **place, and that is where industry needs to start**  
 24 **looking, at how it can be prevented from being uploaded,**  
 25 **regardless of anything else that's done. Because it is**

Page 58

1 **about the victim being revictimised every time it is**  
 2 **portrayed or distributed on those platforms.**  
 3 **But if it has, then it is essential for us to try to**  
 4 **find that victim and safeguard them and identify the**  
 5 **perpetrator and take action accordingly.**

6 Q. One can understand the priority of victim identification  
 7 where there is a first-generation image, ie, taken  
 8 perhaps by a father in a home abusing a child or  
 9 stepchild. There are thousands, if not millions, of  
 10 indecent images available to anyone who wants to search,  
 11 many of which are years and years old. In relation to  
 12 those much older, and obviously so, imagery, is there  
 13 the same delay in taking down those imageries where it  
 14 is obviously not first generation and victim  
 15 identification is not going to be possible?

16 A. **No, I think the obligation of the company is, once it's**  
 17 **been reported to them, then they will take that material**  
 18 **down. All we're saying is, we need the details before**  
 19 **that's done so that then we can take action. Even if it**  
 20 **is an image taken a significant time ago, it can still**  
 21 **be a window to other offending for law enforcement.**

22 Q. At paragraph 174, you also alight on something I think  
 23 we've touched on earlier in evidence in relation to the  
 24 platform itself having a robust reporting mechanism. We  
 25 discussed earlier Click CEOP and the attempts that were

Page 59

1 previously made to have a Click CEOP button on various  
 2 social media websites. You say the platform should have  
 3 in place a robust reporting mechanism. In the first  
 4 instance, who do you envisage that reporting mechanism  
 5 being to?

6 A. **So this would be for individuals using those sites so**  
 7 **they could report any detail that they found on a site**  
 8 **that they want the company to take action on. The**  
 9 **majority of platforms, once they have received that**  
 10 **report, they are legislated to report that to NCMEC in**  
 11 **the United States and then that subsequently is reported**  
 12 **to law enforcement in whichever country it relates to.**

13 Q. Just dealing with NCMEC, I think it necessary, if not  
 14 important, to make this point -- forgive me, I will just  
 15 find the paragraph in the statement. NCMEC deals with  
 16 referrals coming in from the United States.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. I think at paragraph 55 of your first statement, you  
 19 explain, do you not, Deputy Director, that in fact, in  
 20 the USA, companies who provide electronic communications  
 21 services or remote computing services to the public and  
 22 who obtain actual knowledge of the facts or  
 23 circumstances of child sexual abuse are required, as  
 24 soon as it is reasonably practicable, to report that to  
 25 NCMEC?

Page 60

1 **A. Yes, that's true. So there's a legal obligation upon**  
2 **them to do so when that material has been reported to**  
3 **them.**  
4 Q. Is there any like obligation on companies within the UK  
5 to report where they have actual knowledge of a CSA  
6 image or of CSA offending?  
7 **A. I'm not aware of legislation that is of a similar nature**  
8 **to that in the US.**  
9 Q. Clearly, that US legislation puts the obligation on the  
10 company to report?  
11 **A. Yes.**  
12 Q. Hence the vast volume of referrals --  
13 **A. Yes.**  
14 Q. Sorry, of reports that go to NCMEC and hence the  
15 referrals that come to the UK?  
16 **A. Yes.**  
17 Q. In your opinion, Deputy Director, would that kind of  
18 legislation assist law enforcement with adequately  
19 responding to concerns and child protection,  
20 essentially, in the UK?  
21 **A. I think when you read the IWF report, I think they talk**  
22 **in terms of the UK hosting this sort of material, it is**  
23 **about 0.1 per cent, it is very, very low, which is to be**  
24 **championed as a success, because that means that a lot**  
25 **of this material is not being hosted in the UK. But**

Page 61

1 **whether or not legislation would assist that, I think**  
2 **that's to be considered, but given the low numbers of**  
3 **sites that are hosting this material, and that are**  
4 **actually based in the US, which is why that legislation**  
5 **is so important, but I think it is possibly something**  
6 **that needs to be looked at and evaluated and assessed to**  
7 **see, but I'm only reflecting what -- the conversations**  
8 **that I have had with the IWF regarding the volume that's**  
9 **hosted in the UK and I think it's one of the lowest in**  
10 **the world. I think it's 0.1 per cent. But that said,**  
11 **if there is anything that can improve that position,**  
12 **then we should look at it and be open to it.**  
13 Q. I think it is worth the panel being aware of this:  
14 although they are legally obliged in the States to  
15 report it to NCMEC where they are aware of actual  
16 knowledge --  
17 **A. Yes.**  
18 Q. -- there is no obligation on the company to proactively  
19 search for indecent imagery or child abuse material; is  
20 that right?  
21 **A. That's absolutely right. That's one of the areas as**  
22 **well which we are concerned about, is that proactivity.**  
23 **So, yes, there is legislation that ensures that if**  
24 **something has been reported to those companies, then**  
25 **they report it to NCMEC and it will then be disseminated**

Page 62

1 **to whichever part of the world it relates to, but,**  
2 **actually, the proactivity of -- we are not just talking**  
3 **about images, we are talking about images, videos, we**  
4 **are talking about chat that takes place where**  
5 **grooming -- this is the sort of proactivity that is**  
6 **required from industry to identify where this material**  
7 **is and where this activity is taking place.**  
8 Q. It may be difficult to answer, but, again, in relation  
9 to the UK, clearly there is no obligation to report  
10 actual knowledge. Do you have any views or observations  
11 as to whether there should be a regulatory or  
12 legislative requirement to proactively search for  
13 indecent imagery and then not leave it to the best will  
14 and goodwill of those --  
15 **A. Individuals.**  
16 Q. -- service providers?  
17 **A. There should be an obligation on anybody who provides**  
18 **a service or a platform or a product, if their product**  
19 **is being used for this sort of material and they find**  
20 **child abuse material in any shape or form, then they**  
21 **should be reporting that to law enforcement.**  
22 Q. Can we turn to look, then, at some of the challenges in  
23 the future, as far as the NCA consider them to be.  
24 I would just like to ask you -- there is no need to call  
25 it up on screen, but in short, you have provided, the

Page 63

1 NCA has provided, the inquiry with a national strategic  
2 assessment of serious and organised crime for 2017.  
3 I just want to ask you about some of the challenges that  
4 lie ahead.  
5 In that assessment, there is an overview of  
6 the threat of child sexual abuse and exploitation. The  
7 assessment observes that changes in the use of  
8 technology, such as the use of cloud storage, have  
9 transformed, to use their words, the nature of CSEA and  
10 enabled global contact.  
11 Can you help the panel, please, about those  
12 challenges in relation to the use of technology, not  
13 just cloud, but encryption is another area where there  
14 is certainly a concern?  
15 **A. Yes. So we have touched upon The Onion Router, which is**  
16 **a way of anonymising. We have touched upon webmail**  
17 **addresses that people can get without having to provide**  
18 **any details at all to secure their anonymity. We**  
19 **haven't talked about encryption services, which are**  
20 **increasingly being used.**  
21 **So, historically, offenders have made great efforts**  
22 **to ensure that they're using these services. Actually,**  
23 **they are now being produced on a regular basis as part**  
24 **of the product. Those encryption services do not allow**  
25 **law enforcement to see what has been sent from one point**

Page 64



1 to another point via that particular channel. So that  
 2 is an emerging concern for us. So is the anonymisation  
 3 that people use, either by using the TOR services or by  
 4 using webmail as well.

5 So certainly the view is that, in exceptional cases,  
 6 law enforcement should be able to see what's in those  
 7 encrypted services, if that is evidence of child abuse,  
 8 and that evidence is required in order to prosecute  
 9 individuals for those offences.

10 Q. In general terms, how does the NCA envisage being able  
 11 to deal with the problem of encryption? What steps are  
 12 being put into place to try to tackle that growing  
 13 threat?

14 A. Well, these are matters that have been raised outside of  
 15 the NCA, and I know that there are communications in  
 16 relation to that, not at my level, but above my level,  
 17 and I know that certainly publicly those have been areas  
 18 which have been questioned.

19 Q. The threat assessment also observes that there is in  
 20 fact a decreasing amount of imagery, indecent imagery of  
 21 children, on file-sharing platforms and the threat  
 22 assessment makes this observation, that it is unclear to  
 23 what extent there has been displacement from one  
 24 file-sharing platform to another or whether it is as  
 25 a result of the efforts by law enforcement to tackle

Page 65

1 file sharing?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. If there is a decreasing amount of indecent imagery on  
 4 file-sharing platforms, to what extent are the NCA-CEOP  
 5 able to adapt their techniques to try to either find out  
 6 where the file sharing is taking place or to see what  
 7 has replaced potentially that problem?

8 A. It is that, in a nutshell, that we are looking to see  
 9 whether or not that activity has gone somewhere else.  
 10 It would be a very positive thought that it had stopped.  
 11 I don't have evidence to support that it's stopped. So  
 12 we need to continue looking to see and reassure  
 13 ourselves and keep looking at the platforms and  
 14 facilities and services that we know about and look for  
 15 new ones to see where this goes. If crime is being  
 16 deterred somewhere else, then we need to be somewhere  
 17 else and be looking for that regularly, which we are.

18 Q. In considering your evidence yesterday, and indeed this  
 19 morning, to the panel, a number of themes have emerged,  
 20 not just the efforts being made by the police to pursue  
 21 offenders but the steps being taken to try to prevent  
 22 offending in the first place and educating, for example,  
 23 the children in that regard. I just want to ask you,  
 24 finally, please, about this topic, and the suggestion  
 25 may be that, in reality, the police simply cannot arrest

Page 66

1 their way out of this problem, and if that be a fair  
 2 observation in relation to the scale of online  
 3 offending, what do you, Deputy Director, consider to be  
 4 a way of dealing with this?

5 A. So if we look at the progression and the activity of law  
 6 enforcement, that is all of the forces and the NCA, and  
 7 if we take that back to 2006 and 2007, today, by  
 8 comparison, we are arresting, against those pillars of  
 9 threat, about 426 people every month. I know it was  
 10 spoken about yesterday about numbers and numbers being  
 11 a deterrent, but we are arresting 426 individuals right  
 12 now. We are safeguarding somewhere in the region of  
 13 about 550 children. But nobody can say that this  
 14 problem has been solved. It is ongoing. So what if we  
 15 arrest another 200? Will that stop it? I actually  
 16 don't think it will.

17 This needs to be a multi-agency approach to this.  
 18 We need to prevent offenders from uploading material and  
 19 it being hosted on the services and products that are  
 20 currently provided and are being activated on the  
 21 internet. That is a primary part, to prevent this  
 22 taking place. Law enforcement of course have a serious  
 23 and significant role to play, and we will do that and we  
 24 will keep arresting people and we will keep prosecuting  
 25 them. But industry needs to prevent this material being

Page 67

1 available to be uploaded and be promoted on these sites.  
 2 So there needs to be crime prevention within all of  
 3 the products that are currently there and designed into  
 4 the new products. And then we need to look at  
 5 education. Education has a key role to play here. The  
 6 NCA-CEOP and my team of people in education have done  
 7 a fantastic job. They have reached out to millions of  
 8 children. But they are not reaching every child, and  
 9 that's where education has to play a significant role,  
 10 it has to be consistent, it has to be monitored, it has  
 11 to be delivered, we have to ensure that the learning  
 12 objectives are understood by children so they are safe  
 13 on the internet.

14 What that will do, that will reduce the by-product  
 15 of this. Not only is it that a victim will be saved  
 16 from being a victim, but those that aren't saved from  
 17 being victims, it will enable law enforcement to  
 18 concentrate its resources on the highest end of highest  
 19 harm, which is exactly where we should be focusing:  
 20 those people who are sophisticated offenders, who are  
 21 looking to do their best to ensure they are not  
 22 detected, who are committing the most depraved offences  
 23 against children and operating in places where those  
 24 children will not be able to report and people may not  
 25 be able to report and safeguard them. That is a global

Page 68

1 **view of how we deal with this problem. It is not just**  
2 **about arresting more people.**  
3 Q. You mentioned in the answer that you just gave the  
4 concept or the issue in relation to deterrence. Do you  
5 consider, Mr Niven, that the current level of activity  
6 of arresting and operations, et cetera, is sufficient to  
7 deter those people who are interested in imagery of this  
8 nature and child sexual abuse from actually stopping and  
9 thinking: well, the NCA are increasing their operations,  
10 they're doing more, they have publicly gone on record  
11 about this. Do you think there is sufficient activity  
12 to potentially provide a realistic deterrent to those  
13 people?  
14 **A. I think the activity will deter some, and they are**  
15 **potentially the lower-level offenders. But I'm not**  
16 **convinced that it will deter those that are absolutely**  
17 **determined to go out and commit sexual offences against**  
18 **children and take every step they can take to ensure**  
19 **they are not caught.**  
20 Q. If the priority for the NCA is, as you say, those at the  
21 highest end of highest harm, does that realistically  
22 deter the low-level and low-risk offender if they know  
23 you are targeting the high risk -- I say "you", I mean  
24 the NCA generally. One can understand, at a national  
25 level, why the NCA are targeting high risk, but does

Page 69

1 that not send out a message to the lower level that,  
2 actually, the efforts are being concentrated elsewhere?  
3 **A. Not at all. That is what the 18-box grid is all about.**  
4 **It is that national level for the higher end of higher**  
5 **harm individuals who are operating at regional level and**  
6 **the local level and a lot of those results that we see,**  
7 **the 426 arrests each month, a lot of those are at local**  
8 **level and at regional level. So those messages I think**  
9 **are very clear, and we are making them very clear now,**  
10 **that that is, you know, the performance that is taking**  
11 **place, it is monitored on a quarterly basis. We are**  
12 **putting an awful lot of effort and resource into this.**  
13 **So I would expect that to be the deterrent factor. But**  
14 **the reality is, we need to make it much more difficult**  
15 **for these individuals to commit these crimes in the**  
16 **first place and focus on those that are determined to do**  
17 **it at the highest level.**  
18 MS CAREY: Mr Niven, thank you. Those are all the questions  
19 I wanted to ask.  
20 Chair, is there anything that you or the panel would  
21 like to ask? I think Ms Sharpling has a question.  
22 Questions by THE PANEL  
23 MS SHARPLING: Thank you, Mr Niven. Am I right in thinking  
24 that the NCA has no governance arrangement with local  
25 forces, albeit you have described an operational

Page 70

1 relationship?  
2 **A. Yes. We have an operational relationship, but we also**  
3 **have the tasking powers under the Crime and Courts Act,**  
4 **which we have referred to previously around voluntary**  
5 **tasking, which enabled the work to take place in terms**  
6 **of --**  
7 MS SHARPLING: But essentially an operational matter?  
8 **A. It is an operational -- yes, it is an operational**  
9 **relationship, but we don't have the daily power to, you**  
10 **know, direct a force. We can disseminate to a force and**  
11 **then those forces will make those decisions themselves**  
12 **about where their priorities would lie, but if the**  
13 **director-general were to want to direct activity, then**  
14 **she has the power to do that.**  
15 MS SHARPLING: I see. Am I right in thinking, Mr Niven,  
16 that Police and Crime Commissioners are responsible for  
17 holding their local forces to account?  
18 **A. Yes, that's also correct.**  
19 MS SHARPLING: Does the NCA-CEOP have a relationship with  
20 Police and Crime Commissioners or is it an operational  
21 relationship with forces or both?  
22 **A. No, there is a relationship, as I understand, at**  
23 **a senior level, with Police and Crime Commissioners, so**  
24 **that would be director-general and deputy**  
25 **director-general level. That's my understanding, that**

Page 71

1 **they do have a relationship with Police and Crime**  
2 **Commissioners. And with chief constables as well. So**  
3 **they go to Chief Constables' Council.**  
4 MS SHARPLING: Thank you.  
5 MR FRANK: I just want to be clear about one thing. You  
6 will appreciate that the stated position of the inquiry  
7 has been that the safeguarding of our children in our  
8 country cannot be a matter of competing priorities. It  
9 has to be a matter of national imperative.  
10 **A. Yes.**  
11 MR FRANK: Can I just ask you to be clear about this: the  
12 fact that the CEOP is located within the NCA, I think --  
13 are you saying that in no way causes a problem in terms  
14 of the assignment of priorities?  
15 **A. In terms of being part of the NCA, the way I view this**  
16 **is that the NCA has got a significant level of resource.**  
17 **So, for example, there is 1,000 investigators, there is**  
18 **a tech command, there is work going on in the dark web**  
19 **for a whole variety of other areas. It is very much one**  
20 **agency. Whereas -- it may be an opportunity for me to**  
21 **speak about the proportionality of the budget in those**  
22 **terms, and we looked at the budget yesterday, and that**  
23 **is the budget for the people that are actually within**  
24 **the unit. But alongside those individuals is a whole**  
25 **agency that provides support. So that support is very**

Page 72

1 **much in technology, it is very much in our international**  
 2 **network, it is very much about the support. So when we**  
 3 **require resource, we go to the wider agency and that**  
 4 **resource is made available for us because this is**  
 5 **a priority. So it may have not truly reflected in the**  
 6 **budget the reality of the fact that we work as part of**  
 7 **one agency, and there are various parts of our business**  
 8 **that is being dealt with in other parts of the agency,**  
 9 **and we draw upon that. As a consequence of that, we**  
 10 **have resilience and we can expand those resources when**  
 11 **we are required to do so.**  
 12 MR FRANK: Thank you. That's very helpful. One final  
 13 matter, and it is a detail in a way, but you made  
 14 reference in your statement to what I think is referred  
 15 to as "Project Convergence".  
 16 **A. Yes.**  
 17 MR FRANK: This is in relation to updating the technology.  
 18 **A. Yes.**  
 19 MR FRANK: A problem, I think, that many institutions have.  
 20 Can you just give us an idea about that and to the  
 21 extent to which you think you are able to provide the  
 22 inquiry with the information that has been requested of  
 23 you, bearing that in mind?  
 24 **A. So Project Convergence was around -- because the**  
 25 **National Crime Agency in 2013 was a conglomeration of**

Page 73

1 **a variety of other units and disciplines beforehand, it**  
 2 **all came together and with that came a variety of**  
 3 **systems and independent systems as well. So there was**  
 4 **a project to look at consolidating all of those systems**  
 5 **together. That's been an ongoing project. But I have**  
 6 **a technical command that we posed that issue to them and**  
 7 **they have been working on this as well, and they**  
 8 **reassure me as best they can that they have managed to**  
 9 **retain the material, because it was all -- some of it**  
 10 **was set to be decommissioned, so they have maintained**  
 11 **some of that so that this inquiry -- we can service this**  
 12 **inquiry when you make a request for material that can be**  
 13 **many years old.**  
 14 MR FRANK: Bearing in mind this is part 1 of an ongoing  
 15 inquiry into the Internet Investigation, if any further  
 16 information emerges as a result of that work, no doubt  
 17 you will make that available to the inquiry as well?  
 18 **A. We absolutely will. We are retaining the material that**  
 19 **we have with this very focus of this operation.**  
 20 MR FRANK: Thank you very much, indeed.  
 21 MS CAREY: Chair, any other questions?  
 22 THE CHAIR: No.  
 23 MS CAREY: Thank you. That concludes, then, Mr Niven's  
 24 evidence. Thank you very much, Deputy Director.  
 25 (The witness withdrew)

Page 74

1 MS CAREY: The next witness is going to be Chief Constable  
 2 Simon Bailey. Can I invite you to put down file 2 and  
 3 I hope you have with you file 3.  
 4 MR SIMON ROBERT BAILEY (sworn)  
 5 Examination by MS CAREY  
 6 MS CAREY: Chief Constable, your full name, please, for the  
 7 inquiry?  
 8 **A. Simon Robert Bailey.**  
 9 Q. I hope you have with you a folder setting out your  
 10 various statements and exhibits to which you will be  
 11 referred during the course of the evidence?  
 12 **A. I do, yes.**  
 13 Q. A little bit of background, please, for those who are  
 14 not aware. I think you are currently the national  
 15 police lead for child protection and abuse  
 16 investigations?  
 17 **A. That's correct.**  
 18 Q. Can you help anyone watching who isn't familiar with the  
 19 various people responsible for work in this area what  
 20 the NPCC lead does and what your responsibilities are?  
 21 **A. The NPCC is divided up into a number of coordinating**  
 22 **committees. So within the Crime Coordinating Committee,**  
 23 **there is a portfolio which looks at violence and public**  
 24 **protection. I am the violence and public protection**  
 25 **portfolio lead, so within that portfolio lead, I am**

Page 75

1 **responsible for coordinating and overseeing the**  
 2 **service's response to matters as broad as rape, as acid**  
 3 **attacks, county lines and other issues of vulnerability,**  
 4 **and, within that particular portfolio, I then lead the**  
 5 **Child Protection and Abuse Investigations Working Group.**  
 6 **So within that specific working group, I provide the**  
 7 **operational oversight and leadership. I am responsible**  
 8 **for the development in consultation and engagement with**  
 9 **the College of Policing for the development of policies**  
 10 **and responses to emerging issues. I am responsible for**  
 11 **being the spokesperson for the NPCC and generally take**  
 12 **that coordinating role in response to all matters of**  
 13 **child protection. So I am the go-to chief officer when**  
 14 **matters around child protection come to the fore, so**  
 15 **I will represent, at Chief Constables' Council, papers**  
 16 **in respect of my particular working group, but also then**  
 17 **will represent, and present with other colleagues,**  
 18 **papers which are representative of the broader**  
 19 **vulnerability agenda.**  
 20 Q. Notwithstanding the wide remit and responsibilities you  
 21 have, you are able, are you not, to assist the inquiry  
 22 with specifics in relation to internet-facilitated child  
 23 sexual abuse, which is what we are here to consider  
 24 during the course of this week?  
 25 **A. Yes, very much so.**

Page 76

1 Q. Now, the chair and panel will be aware that in recent  
2 times there have been a number of changes to policing's  
3 approach to online-facilitated child sexual abuse.  
4 Without wishing to go to all of them, for it may not be  
5 necessary, can I summarise it in this way, that in 2015,  
6 did child sexual abuse become a strategic policing  
7 requirement?  
8 **A. It did, and I believe it was in March 2015, and that was**  
9 **very much in response to what had taken place in 2014.**  
10 **So the chair's report into Rotherham had obviously**  
11 **attracted national and international headlines.**  
12 **Operation Hydrant had been established, which was**  
13 **coordinating the response to non-recent sexual abuse by**  
14 **persons in positions of public prominence and within**  
15 **institutions. Operation Notarise had taken place. The**  
16 **Home Secretary at the time, who is, of course, now the**  
17 **Prime Minister, saw throughout 2014 this emergence of**  
18 **a number of threats to children and obviously reports of**  
19 **non-recent abuse of children, and then -- it was then**  
20 **adopted in the SPR in 2015.**  
21 Q. We are going to have a look at the actual document,  
22 please. Can we call up exhibit OHY002224, please. It  
23 is behind tab 4 in our bundle. Whilst we wait for the  
24 document to come up on the screen, this is a Home Office  
25 publication dated March 2015. To put into context the

Page 77

1 reference to child sexual abuse becoming a strategic  
2 policing requirement, I just want to set out the  
3 introduction on -- it'll be your page 4, Chief  
4 Constable, to this document. It says this:  
5 "The strategic policing requirement was issued in  
6 2012 in execution of the Home Secretary's statutory duty  
7 to set out what are, in her view, the national threats  
8 at the time of writing and the appropriate national  
9 policing capabilities required to counter those  
10 threats."  
11 It goes on to say:  
12 "Whilst many threats can be tackled by individual  
13 police forces within their own force areas, national  
14 threats, such as terrorism, civil emergencies, serious  
15 and organised crime, public order and a national cyber  
16 security incident require a coordinated or aggregated  
17 response."  
18 Clearly in that introduction, one can see the areas  
19 that historically had been of concern to the  
20 Home Secretary and indeed the kind of threats that the  
21 SPRs, the strategic policing requirement, was focused on  
22 combating. If we are able to, can we call up page 7 of  
23 that document? If not, I will take you to it and read  
24 it out so that anyone following can understand what is  
25 being asked. The document goes on to consider national

Page 78

1 threats and if, Chief Constable, you have page 7, one  
2 can see there, at the outset, that the threats are  
3 outlined as follows: terrorism; serious and organised  
4 crime; a national cyber security incident; threats to  
5 public order; civil emergencies; and then we can see  
6 a reference to child sexual abuse?  
7 **A. Yes.**  
8 Q. It is not suggested that they are threats that are put  
9 in order of priority, may I make that clear, but just to  
10 give everyone an idea of what the threats were deemed to  
11 be at the time of this policing requirement.  
12 In relation to child sexual abuse, this was said:  
13 "Whilst this is not a threat to national security as  
14 identified in the NSS ..."  
15 Forgive me, I'm afraid I can't remember, is that the  
16 national security strategy?  
17 **A. Yes, I believe so.**  
18 Q. "... it is a threat of national importance. Its  
19 potential magnitude and impact necessitate a cohesive,  
20 consistent, national effort to ensure police and  
21 partners can safeguard children ..."  
22 It then goes on to outline what child sexual abuse  
23 covers, and it says this:  
24 "Child sexual exploitation offences that are  
25 attributed to serious and organised crime, including

Page 79

1 those which take place online, will continue to be  
2 captured under the existing serious and organised crime  
3 threat in the strategic policing requirement."  
4 It may not be clear to a layman or member of  
5 the public watching this, but what is the impact of CSA  
6 becoming, or the effect of CSA becoming, a strategic  
7 policing requirement?  
8 **A. Well, it makes it very clear that chief constables and**  
9 **Police and Crime Commissioners need to pay absolute**  
10 **respect to the fact it is now within the strategic**  
11 **policing requirement to make sure it features within**  
12 **their policing requirement plans and make sure the**  
13 **appropriate level of resource and response is put in**  
14 **place. I, as the National Police Chiefs' Council lead,**  
15 **have taken the responsibility for ensuring that that**  
16 **response is coordinated at a -- in conjunction with the**  
17 **National Crime Agency with our Regional Organised Crime**  
18 **Units and across policing, and that's being done in**  
19 **a number of ways to make sure that I can demonstrate**  
20 **that, to meet the threat that's been highlighted, the**  
21 **appropriate responses are in place. So that has**  
22 **included the development of the child abuse image**  
23 **database, it's included the deployment of child sexual**  
24 **exploitation, coordinated analysts and, more recently,**  
25 **Prevent officers. It's included additional investment**

Page 80

<p>1 <b>into our regional and organised crime capability. It's</b>                  2 <b>seen our work develop through Operation Hera and the</b>                  3 <b>consistent targeting of those individuals who are</b>                  4 <b>viewing indecent imagery online. It has seen the</b>                  5 <b>development of the national Pursue Board and the</b>                  6 <b>Prevent Board.</b>                  7 Q. That's exactly what I wanted to stop you on, because                  8 I want to come on to that Pursue Board, and in                  9 particular your role in developing the Pursue response,                  10 as it has been termed, in the area of online-facilitated                  11 child sexual abuse. Although the panel have seen it                  12 before, since it refers to you, can I ask, please, that                  13 we have a look at the letter NCA000237, and it is behind                  14 your tab 18, Chief Constable. This is at around the                  15 same time, as one can see from the date of the letter,                  16 26 February 2015, just a few days before that strategic                  17 policing requirement.                  18 <b>A. Yes.</b>                  19 Q. This is a letter that was written by Mr Keith Bristow,                  20 the then director-general of the National Crime Agency,                  21 and he wrote it to Sir Jon Murphy, the Chief Constable                  22 of Merseyside Police, who I believe was the then NPCC                  23 lead in this area?                  24 <b>A. He was the Crime Coordinating Committee lead.</b>                  25 Q. Thank you. It was my fault. If one looks at the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 81</p>	<p>1 that UK policing and wider law enforcement are currently                  2 facing."                  3 In a nutshell, Chief Constable, are you able to help                  4 the panel with what was then summarised as being a stark                  5 analysis of the challenges being faced?                  6 <b>A. Yes. We were, to the best of our ability, able to</b>                  7 <b>present a picture which really put the spotlight on the</b>                  8 <b>scale of the threat that we were confronted with. We</b>                  9 <b>were able to look at the academic research and evidence</b>                  10 <b>that was there. Johnny and I had commissioned research</b>                  11 <b>over and above that. We were able to identify new and</b>                  12 <b>emerging threats and presented a picture which showed --</b>                  13 <b>the word "stark" is used -- a stark analysis of</b>                  14 <b>the threats that we faced across a number of areas of</b>                  15 <b>threat.</b>                  16 <b>It really highlighted the fact that we should, and</b>                  17 <b>could, be doing more, and that was really the heart of</b>                  18 <b>the presentation, as I recall it.</b>                  19 Q. If we look over onto page 2 of that letter, we can see                  20 at the top of that page a recommendation by you and                  21 Johnny Gwynne to that coordination group of what was                  22 termed a "pressing need for improved, coordinated                  23 national Pursue response", and that in the absence of an                  24 improved response, the risk to the public would be                  25 significant, if not critical.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 83</p>
<p>1 detail -- you may be able to help us, Mr Bailey, with                  2 how this letter came into being and what the effect of                  3 the letter was, but the letter reads:                  4 "Thank you for your attendance and supportive                  5 engagement at yesterday's National Strategic Tasking and                  6 Coordination Group. The purpose of this letter is to                  7 follow up in writing, and confirm your agreement to my                  8 request that you develop a national PURSUE response to                  9 mitigate the threat posed ..."                  10 You can see there that the director-general of                  11 the NCA then made reference to his powers under the                  12 Crime and Courts Act to combat online child sexual                  13 exploitation. As was discussed at that coordination                  14 group:                  15 "... on the assessed threat posed from online child                  16 sexual exploitation was, I know you will agree, both                  17 constructive and most concerning. The assessment within                  18 the national strategic assessment 2015, reinforced by                  19 the presentation ..."                  20 Given by you and indeed the director of CEOP                  21 command, who was then Johnny Gwynne.                  22 <b>A. That's correct.</b>                  23 Q. The letter says:                  24 "... provided us a stark analysis of the scale of                  25 the national, regional and local operational challenges</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 82</p>	<p>1 It is fairly strong language, on any view, that                  2 letter?                  3 <b>A. It is.</b>                  4 Q. One might infer from that that potentially there were                  5 problems with there not being a sufficient or adequate                  6 response from law enforcement to this particular threat.                  7 Clearly, there were concerns, hence the wording of                  8 the letter. Do you have any observations to make as to                  9 the state of the national Pursue response prior to this                  10 letter, the strategic policing requirement and what we                  11 will come to look at as the 18-box grid?                  12 <b>A. Ms Sharpling's HMI work in 2012 going into 2013</b>                  13 <b>highlighted some really committed people trying to do</b>                  14 <b>their best, but some failings --</b>                  15 Q. Pausing there, you are referring to the HMIC report                  16 "Online and on the edge"?                  17 <b>A. Yes.</b>                  18 Q. We will come to look at that later this afternoon.                  19 <b>A. It highlighted some failings and some real issues and</b>                  20 <b>some reputational issues for the police service. Deputy</b>                  21 <b>director-general Phil Gormley at that time, then</b>                  22 <b>directed very clearly that the service had to respond</b>                  23 <b>and the NCA quite rightly had to play a role in that.</b>                  24 <b>He was pretty much putting in place what I believed was</b>                  25 <b>the director-general's role, a responsibility under the</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 84</p>

1 **Crime and Courts Act to ensure an efficient and**  
 2 **effective response to serious and organised crime. It**  
 3 **became very clear that there wasn't an efficient and**  
 4 **effective response based upon Ms Sharpling's work.**  
 5 **In response to that, Operation Notarise, as we have**  
 6 **heard, was commissioned and I think we demonstrated**  
 7 **through Operation Notarise what was possible, but it**  
 8 **became abundantly clear that we had to do so much more**  
 9 **if we were truly going to tackle the threat, and that is**  
 10 **very much, as I recall, what Johnny Gwynne and I set out**  
 11 **in that presentation, and we made it very clear that if**  
 12 **there was going to be a robust response to the threat,**  
 13 **we were going to have to deliver it in a joined-up**  
 14 **response which saw a national, regional and local coming**  
 15 **together and coordination of activity which has led to**  
 16 **where we are today.**  
 17 Q. Annexed to this letter, if we look at page 3, was in  
 18 fact what the director-general set out, how this  
 19 response should be performed. I alight upon it for this  
 20 reason: one can see there at the top of the page that  
 21 the national Pursue response should be developed that  
 22 describes the UK law enforcement response to the  
 23 following, and there are a number of bullet points  
 24 there.  
 25 **A. Yes.**

Page 85

1 Q. Did they essentially get taken up and put into the  
 2 framework that's become known as the 18-box grid?  
 3 **A. They did. I think it is fair to say that Johnny and**  
 4 **I had done the work around this beforehand. We were**  
 5 **able to go to the director-general and say, "This is the**  
 6 **area that we need to focus upon".**  
 7 Q. This afternoon, if I may, Chief Constable, we will  
 8 perhaps look again at some of those pillars of threat  
 9 along with some of the other issues that relate to the  
 10 forces' level and the work that they need to be doing.  
 11 **A. Yes.**  
 12 MS CAREY: Chair, I wonder, although it is a few minutes  
 13 early, whether, before embarking on a different section  
 14 of evidence, that might be an appropriate time for  
 15 lunch?  
 16 THE CHAIR: Yes, thank you, Ms Carey. We will return at  
 17 2.00 pm.  
 18 (12.56 pm)  
 19 (The short adjournment)  
 20 (2.00 pm)  
 21 MS CAREY: Chief Constable, can we turn to consider briefly  
 22 the issue of resourcing. Can I say at the outset that  
 23 I am aware that you have informed the inquiry that, as  
 24 national police lead for child protection, you are not  
 25 responsible for resources available to forces for the

Page 86

1 detection, prevention and response to online child  
 2 sexual abuse. I hope that is clear. But, nonetheless,  
 3 you do play a role in applying for funding, do you not,  
 4 for various projects and pilots that you wish to  
 5 undertake?  
 6 **A. Yes, and I was going to say, in terms of, I have no**  
 7 **jurisdiction over -- there are 42 chief constables and**  
 8 **commissioner colleagues, but I have been able to bring**  
 9 **my focus to applying for police transformation fund**  
 10 **bids, for money from the Home Office, to support the**  
 11 **police service and law enforcement's response to**  
 12 **tackling the threat of CSE and, in particular, the**  
 13 **online threat, and those funding bids continue.**  
 14 **So to date, I have secured in the region of**  
 15 **£15 million to tackle the threat. There is a further**  
 16 **bid of circa £30 million for the next two years. So the**  
 17 **financial year '18/'19 and '19/'20 to increase our**  
 18 **capacity and capability to try, again, to meet the scale**  
 19 **of the threat and, what is becoming increasingly clear,**  
 20 **the complexity and the sophistication of the threat.**  
 21 Q. Can we look a little bit at some of the funding that you  
 22 have currently secured. I think in 2015 -- is this  
 23 right? -- you secured a Home Office grant of  
 24 £1.5 million to fund some network of coordinators and  
 25 analysts in relation to child sexual abuse?

Page 87

1 **A. That's correct.**  
 2 Q. Can you just help, in practical terms, what was it  
 3 envisaged that those coordinators and analysts would do  
 4 and how that would positively impact on law enforcement  
 5 and detection?  
 6 **A. On the back of, chair, your report into Rotherham, the**  
 7 **threat of child sexual exploitation around the country**  
 8 **became increasingly clear, and I think we very quickly**  
 9 **recognised that it was taking place -- and I have used**  
 10 **this language before, and I think, chair, it was you or**  
 11 **the HMI's language -- in towns, cities and hamlets up**  
 12 **and down the country.**  
 13 **So the response was to put into each of the Regional**  
 14 **Organised Crime Units, of which there are nine, and then**  
 15 **into the Metropolitan Police Service as well a detective**  
 16 **inspector to coordinate the region's response with an**  
 17 **analyst and then, more recently, a Prevent officer, and**  
 18 **the rationale behind that was to improve our knowledge**  
 19 **and understanding of what was taking place within the**  
 20 **child sexual exploitation arena, to complete the**  
 21 **national child sexual exploitation action plan, to**  
 22 **create regional problem profiles to identify hot spots,**  
 23 **to identify best practice, and create a national**  
 24 **strategic assessment which identifies the totality of**  
 25 **the threat across the country. So it generally was,**

Page 88

<p>1 <b>right, this is what is going on at a national level,</b> 2 <b>a regional level and a local level.</b> 3 <b>Those coordinators and analysts have now been in</b> 4 <b>post for a number of years but that funding stream now</b> 5 <b>comes to an end in March of this year.</b> 6 Q. You mentioned there the regional capacity to look at 7 these problems in the various areas around the country. 8 Why is regional capacity so important? 9 <b>A. Because, as chief constables, we are paying into</b> 10 <b>Regional Organised Crime Units and, as part of my work</b> 11 <b>as my lead for the National Police Chiefs' Council, my</b> 12 <b>focus has been very much upon ensuring that the NCA,</b> 13 <b>working with forces at a regional level and then at</b> 14 <b>a local level, are really all contributing to the</b> 15 <b>totality of meeting the threat. So it generally has</b> 16 <b>been a really coordinated response which has been driven</b> 17 <b>by the director-general and, in particular, the last two</b> 18 <b>years, the director-general of the NCA, Lynne Owens, has</b> 19 <b>really started to bring about a cultural change within</b> 20 <b>the National Crime Agency, has developed a different --</b> 21 <b>a response and a different approach to tackling the</b> 22 <b>threat, has particularly focused upon the vulnerability</b> 23 <b>pillar and, as part of that approach, we have seen what</b> 24 <b>I think is a significantly improved response to the</b> 25 <b>totality of the threat. So it generally is, and we</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 89</p>	<p>1 About halfway down that page, Mr Bailey, you in that 2 statement deal with some of the funding, and in 3 particular funding for the coordinators and analysts 4 that you have just been speaking about. 5 <b>A. Yes.</b> 6 Q. You have, I think, been inquiring of the regional units 7 about how they perceive the end of that funding and the 8 impact it will have and their plans for the future, as 9 it were? 10 <b>A. That's correct.</b> 11 Q. I think out of the ten regional units, you have received 12 responses from six, with only two confirming further 13 independent funding for the coordinator role. I wanted 14 to ask you about what you consider to be the impacts of 15 losing the funding for a network of coordinators and 16 analysts? 17 <b>A. Of course. Can I just say that, as part of this</b> 18 <b>£30 million bid which is going to be submitted next</b> 19 <b>week, there is an element of that which would see the</b> 20 <b>continuation of the coordinators, the analysts and the</b> 21 <b>Prevent officers. But if I lose them, and I will answer</b> 22 <b>the question, if they are lost, there will obviously be</b> 23 <b>an impact, but if I could just take a moment just to</b> 24 <b>explain what is currently within the regional organised</b> 25 <b>crime unit structure and what my strategic direction of</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 91</p>
<p>1 <b>demonstrated it through the development of the 18-box</b> 2 <b>grid, a response which is based both at a national</b> 3 <b>level, a regional level and local level.</b> 4 <b>Every officer, understanding their role and their</b> 5 <b>part in it, understands that the NCA are really going to</b> 6 <b>deal with the really complex, sophisticated threat. The</b> 7 <b>regional people then take on the serious and organised</b> 8 <b>crime that is going cross-border, with the understanding</b> 9 <b>that the forces will then deal with what's local to</b> 10 <b>them, but in particular, the safeguarding issues which</b> 11 <b>the National Crime Agency identify and the ROCUs</b> 12 <b>identify during the course of their operations, because</b> 13 <b>that's where the safeguarding expertise really lies.</b> 14 Q. We are going to come on this afternoon to look at the 15 local or force level of a number of these issues, but 16 just sticking with the funding, so that people are 17 clear, there is currently in place a number of funds 18 which are due to expire in March of this year, as you 19 just mentioned? 20 <b>A. They are.</b> 21 Q. I just wanted to ask you, Chief Constable, about the 22 impact of the end of some of that funding which you deal 23 with in, in fact, I think your third statement behind 24 tab 3, the one ending reference 3408. Pages 2 and 3 of 25 that statement.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 90</p>	<p>1 <b>travel and ambition is, the Regional Organised Crime</b> 2 <b>Units currently have a detective inspector coordinator</b> 3 <b>and analyst and a Prevent officer that is working out</b> 4 <b>within the field. That model is very much replicated</b> 5 <b>through funding that was allocated to tackle the</b> 6 <b>modern-day slavery and human trafficking threat.</b> 7 <b>My ambition would ultimately be that, within each of</b> 8 <b>the Regional Organised Crime Units, we would have</b> 9 <b>a detective inspector with other assets that would form</b> 10 <b>the basis and the backbone of an organised exploitation</b> 11 <b>threat desk, so within each ROCU there is the capacity</b> 12 <b>and capability to tackle the threat because</b> 13 <b>increasingly, as we have done our analysis -- and it</b> 14 <b>won't come as any surprise to the panel at all -- we are</b> 15 <b>seeing significant linkage between the CSE threat, the</b> 16 <b>modern-day slavery threat and the emergence of county</b> 17 <b>lines, and we are seeing children, in particular, being</b> 18 <b>exploited within those three spheres of exploitation and</b> 19 <b>the ambition is that we get to the point whereby we are</b> 20 <b>able to tackle the totality of that threat rather than</b> 21 <b>dealing with it in silos.</b> 22 Q. I only want to interrupt you to this extent: those not 23 familiar with the criminal justice system may not be 24 au fait with the phrase "county lines"? 25 <b>A. Sorry.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 92</p>

1 Q. Not at all, but can you explain in simple terms what you  
2 mean by that and the problem it causes?  
3 **A. County lines is very much based upon the big  
4 metropolitan cities exporting drugs and exploiting young  
5 people, in particular, to carry those drugs, to carry  
6 money out into the market towns, into cities like  
7 Norwich, where they will then supply and create supply  
8 routes. They then use mobile phones to facilitate their  
9 drug trafficking and their drug dealing. They will then  
10 exploit the vulnerable within the town which they are  
11 targeting. They will -- cuckoo houses, so they will  
12 exploit the vulnerable, they will then move into that  
13 house and set it up as a place to deal and they bring  
14 with them exceptional levels of violence, they bring  
15 with them exceptional levels of exploitation and abuse,  
16 and we are seeing that model, that crime model, that  
17 serious organised crime model, spread its tentacles  
18 right across the country. We are seeing, in my view,  
19 certainly from my own perspective with my own force,  
20 unprecedented levels of violence. So knives being used  
21 consistently, young people carrying knives and having no  
22 qualms about using them. We are seeing some of the most  
23 vulnerable in our societies being exploited. But what  
24 we are seeing is, with that, there is then a sexual  
25 element.**

Page 93

1 **So child sexual exploitation is then part of that  
2 and of course some of these people are, in effect, in  
3 slavery. So it is a complex mix, and my strategic  
4 direction of travel, working very closely with  
5 colleagues across the NPCC, is to create capacity and  
6 the capability within the Regional Organised Crime Units  
7 to be able to tackle the threat, but not do it in such  
8 a way where we have a silo for slavery, we have a silo  
9 for child sexual exploitation and a silo for county  
10 lines.**

11 Q. Can I ask you about that? You mentioned in your answer  
12 a number of times it is your ambition, to use your word,  
13 to have this more cohesive response from the potentially  
14 various different areas of crime.

15 In the responses to you provided by the ROCUs, there  
16 was a varying degree, was there not, of takeup of  
17 the positions of analysts and coordinators? I just want  
18 you to have a look, please, at the exhibit you provided  
19 us with, which is OHY003112. You should find it behind  
20 tab 11 in your bundle.

21 If we look at the columns going across the top, the  
22 two in particular I wanted to ask you about, Chief  
23 Constable, was the question that you posed:  
24 "Are you planning to maintain the role of the CSA/E  
25 coordinator ..."

Page 94

1 And equally, in the next column:  
2 "Are you planning to maintain the role of CSA/E  
3 analysts ..."  
4 You have spoken of your ambition. It is not in an  
5 attempt to in any way denigrate that ambition, but it  
6 perhaps may not be shared by some of the ROCUs in terms  
7 of the responses they gave you. If we just look  
8 through, firstly, there, there is the response of  
9 South Wales. In that particular example, the strategic  
10 lead has an express "interest", is how it is termed, to  
11 keep the role of coordinator going when the funding ends  
12 in March. Equally, though, in relation to the analyst,  
13 the ROCU will align an analyst to perform the role of  
14 the current analytical resilience. So there, there is  
15 an interest and the analyst role being taken up.

16 Perhaps when we go through the responses, for  
17 example, the south-east ROCU, which is on page 5 of that  
18 document, in relation to the role of coordinator, the  
19 south-east said:  
20 "The ROCU has not felt a direct benefit from this  
21 post."  
22 And in respect of, "Are you planning to maintain the  
23 role of analyst", the south-east said, "Not in its  
24 current format". So there may be a divergence of  
25 opinion or, indeed, from the studies that have been done

Page 95

1 between your ambition for these two roles and actually,  
2 practically, how the ROCUs see those roles being  
3 performed. Do you have any observations to make about  
4 what you say, on one hand, you see as a key ambition and  
5 perhaps the responses that you have received from the  
6 respective ROCUs?  
7 **A. I could sit here and simply say I would have loved the  
8 ROCUs to have all signed up unilaterally to keep that  
9 funding going, and that's the easy answer, but actually  
10 it's more complex than that.**

11 **Up until very recently, we have all been looking to  
12 how we can ensure we carry on delivering the best  
13 service we can against reduced budgets. The ROCUs are  
14 no different. The ROCUs already have within their  
15 structures a number of detective inspectors and  
16 detective chief inspectors. I think what comes through  
17 very clear from all the ROCUs is, yes, there is an  
18 absolute recognition and a commitment that tackling CSEA  
19 is a priority for them. It is very much from my  
20 perspective now down to each of the regional ACCs and  
21 the detective chief superintendents running each ROCU to  
22 decide how they deliver their services to manage the  
23 threat, and ultimately, whilst I can make the case to  
24 turn around and say, "This is what I think you should be  
25 doing", ultimately, that's their decision. But what**

Page 96



1 I would say is that, to the best of my knowledge, all  
 2 the ROCUs are going to keep the analytical capability,  
 3 not dedicated just to CSE but still having that capacity  
 4 to be able to do it, they will be the CSEA expert, they  
 5 do a lot of the work in terms of collating the  
 6 management information for our online activity.  
 7 So there is -- the nucleus is still there. There  
 8 will still be a detective inspector who will have  
 9 responsibility for the modern slavery agenda.  
 10 I have learned during the last four years of leading  
 11 the response to this that it takes time to turn the  
 12 tanker around. It just doesn't turn around on  
 13 a sixpence. We have come a long, long way changing the  
 14 narrative in particular from that traditional  
 15 environment, of which I was a part of in the late '90s  
 16 in terms of national crime units. I was on the  
 17 National Crime Squad, where our focus was very much upon  
 18 the trafficking of drugs, and that was our main  
 19 occupation.  
 20 We are now starting to see a change and an  
 21 appreciation of the exploitation and the serious  
 22 criminality that's involved in slavery, county lines and  
 23 CSEA. It is going to take some time. We are on that --  
 24 we are taking some positive steps. Have we reached the  
 25 point where everybody really gets this? We haven't.

Page 97

1 **But it will take time. But the direction of travel,**  
 2 **from my perspective, overall is a positive one.**  
 3 Q. You mentioned in evidence that there is going to be  
 4 a bid for £30 million funding. I gather from what you  
 5 have said that that is not solely focused on CSEA but  
 6 encompasses the other vulnerabilities of which you have  
 7 spoken. Is there going to be an element of that which  
 8 will tackle the problem of online-facilitated CSA?  
 9 **A. Sorry, if I have misled you, I'm sorry.**  
 10 Q. It might be my fault. I might be getting the wrong idea  
 11 from you.  
 12 **A. The 30 million is absolutely dedicated to the CSEA**  
 13 **threat and overwhelmingly the online element of that**  
 14 **threat.**  
 15 Q. Are you able to tell us, if successful in that bid, how  
 16 long the funding would be in place for?  
 17 **A. Two years, but, counsel, could I say that, as part of**  
 18 **that whole narrative is the -- one of the challenges**  
 19 **that I faced when I took on the portfolio was not a true**  
 20 **understanding of the scale of the threat, not a true**  
 21 **understanding of the costs of the policing operation and**  
 22 **not a true understanding of the impact of the abuse.**  
 23 **Four years on, I can say with real confidence that we**  
 24 **understand the cost to policing. I think we have a far**  
 25 **better understanding and appreciation of the scale of**

Page 98

1 **the threat. But what we have also seen during the**  
 2 **course of that time is the threat has shifted and has**  
 3 **started to change, and it's become very complex, it's**  
 4 **become very sophisticated.**  
 5 **What we need to be able to do is to genuinely be**  
 6 **able to present to the Home Office and the Treasury**  
 7 **a really very, very clear picture of the scale of this.**  
 8 **Now, we talk about numbers and various academics**  
 9 **will talk about whether that view of an image is**  
 10 **a contact abuse or not. There is so much conflict in**  
 11 **terms of academia of whether they are or they are not.**  
 12 **But, ultimately, what I would want and I would expect**  
 13 **that two years of funding to be able to do, would be to**  
 14 **be able to bring about a different conversation around**  
 15 **the future of investment in the serious organised crime**  
 16 **strategy. Because, ultimately, that's what we have got**  
 17 **to do. We have got to be able to present that picture**  
 18 **that turns around and says, "This is the totality of**  
 19 **abuse within the darknet, the dark web, within these**  
 20 **hidden services. This is the impact on society. We**  
 21 **have got to understand this better". The threat is**  
 22 **changing and morphing all the time. Once we have**  
 23 **achieved that, I think we can then go with a very, very**  
 24 **different ask of Home Office colleagues, and within the**  
 25 **Treasury, to make the case to turn around and say, "We**

Page 99

1 **need to invest more in this, because the response from**  
 2 **Treasury colleagues will always be, "Where is the**  
 3 **evidence? Where are the metrics?" We need to be able**  
 4 **to do that over and above the position we already find**  
 5 **ourselves in.**  
 6 Q. It may be, Chief Constable, that in due course the  
 7 inquiry comes back to you for some further detail in  
 8 relation to that bid. Is it a police transformation  
 9 fund bid?  
 10 **A. It is a police transformation fund bid, and, again, just**  
 11 **to demonstrate what we are trying to do, it's being done**  
 12 **absolutely in conjunction with the NCA, a joint bid**  
 13 **going into the PTF to turn around and say this is the --**  
 14 **we are now getting an increasing understanding of what**  
 15 **is taking place, the hidden services, the complexity of**  
 16 **it, what we now need to be able to do to analyse it to**  
 17 **be able to understand the costs, so we can present**  
 18 **a compelling case that says, "We need to do more here".**  
 19 Q. In relation to that bid, and running throughout,  
 20 I suspect, much of your evidence, is references to the  
 21 scale of the problem. I think you are aware,  
 22 Chief Constable, there's already been much evidence  
 23 given to the panel about the scale, which I don't intend  
 24 to go over. But you have, yourself, made a number of  
 25 comments about the scale of the problem, and I would

Page 100

<p>1 like to ask you about some of those, please.                  2 I wonder if we could have a look at, please,                  3 a letter written to you by the Home Affairs Committee,                  4 and in due course your response to it --                  5 <b>A. Yes.</b>                  6 Q. -- which will be reference OHY002228. It is behind,                  7 chair, tab 5 and the response is behind tab 6.                  8 I expect, Chief Constable, you are fully familiar with                  9 the letter and indeed your response to it?                  10 <b>A. Yes.</b>                  11 Q. Indeed, it is right to note there has been a degree of                  12 publicity about it at the time you made these comments                  13 and indeed interviews you have given with the press.                  14 But nonetheless, they are of such importance that it                  15 seems appropriate for you, before this inquiry, to                  16 assist us with the questions posed of you and the                  17 answers?                  18 <b>A. I do understand, yes.</b>                  19 Q. Taking the letter firstly, one can see there, after the                  20 introductory comments, that the letter which was written                  21 by Yvette Cooper, a Member of Parliament, says this:                  22 "Your comments that the police have reached                  23 'saturation point' and 'are not coping' with the scale                  24 of paedophile offences were clearly of great concern to                  25 us. As you may know, the Committee has launched an</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 101</p>	<p>1 <b>I see Crown Courts and their contested time</b>                  2 <b>50 per cent plus, probably, now, being given over to sex</b>                  3 <b>abuse trials. And I see 74 per cent of indecent imagery</b>                  4 <b>offenders at that time receiving nothing more than</b>                  5 <b>community service offence findings, conditional</b>                  6 <b>discharges or suspended sentences.</b>                  7 <b>Then, when I have gone into a sex offenders prison,</b>                  8 <b>what I see is a rehabilitation unit that is dealing</b>                  9 <b>with, quite rightly, those offenders who pose the</b>                  10 <b>greatest threat, and certainly within my experience,</b>                  11 <b>very few, if any, viewers of indecent imagery,</b>                  12 <b>offenders, seeing any form of rehabilitation if they are</b>                  13 <b>sent to prison.</b>                  14 <b>So in that interview, what I was trying to set out</b>                  15 <b>was the fact that the system isn't able to cope at this</b>                  16 <b>moment in time with the volume and, if you look at rape</b>                  17 <b>and serious sexual offence trend lines, they continue to</b>                  18 <b>go up and up and up. Victims, who I care passionately</b>                  19 <b>about, just being let down consistently and, when I am</b>                  20 <b>seeing offenders go into court, very little actually</b>                  21 <b>happening to them.</b>                  22 <b>What I suggested was that under those circumstances</b>                  23 <b>and on the back of that evidence -- I will just</b>                  24 <b>reiterate again, 74 per cent not getting a custodial</b>                  25 <b>sentence -- that actually we should have a debate</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 103</p>
<p>1 inquiry into Policing for the Future, which is examining                  2 the challenges facing the police ..."                  3 We are now almost a year on from that letter and,                  4 indeed, no doubt the comments that you made that were                  5 quoted directly in it. Do you still consider that                  6 police have reached saturation point?                  7 <b>A. Yes. There is always a risk when you do an interview</b>                  8 <b>with a journalist that headlines will be grabbed and you</b>                  9 <b>then bear the consequences. The interview was very much</b>                  10 <b>based upon a discussion that I wanted to create based</b>                  11 <b>upon an evidence-based assessment of what I was seeing</b>                  12 <b>and having to deal with.</b>                  13 <b>What I was seeing, and continue to see, is the</b>                  14 <b>police service struggling to contend with the volume of</b>                  15 <b>reports of abuse, and that's right across both adult and</b>                  16 <b>child abuse.</b>                  17 <b>My frustration that victims are being let down, so</b>                  18 <b>victims of rape and serious sexual offences waiting</b>                  19 <b>a year and a half, two, two and a half years before</b>                  20 <b>their trial is heard. I see victims, quite</b>                  21 <b>understandably, wanting to get on with their lives.</b>                  22 <b>I see a court system, a Crown Prosecution system, within</b>                  23 <b>their Rape and Serious Sexual Offences Team who, in my</b>                  24 <b>professional opinion, are struggling to cope with the</b>                  25 <b>volume of work that they are having to deal with.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 102</p>	<p>1 <b>whereby we might explore alternative outcomes.</b>                  2 <b>Now, the word "caution", on reflection, I now</b>                  3 <b>recognise instantly creates a real sense of anger, that</b>                  4 <b>there is the National Police Chiefs' Council lead for</b>                  5 <b>this going soft on paedophiles. Nothing could be</b>                  6 <b>further from the truth. I hope by demonstrating just</b>                  7 <b>how many paedophiles are being arrested and charged,</b>                  8 <b>I have demonstrated nothing could be closer to the</b>                  9 <b>truth -- or nothing could be further from the truth.</b>                  10 <b>But, actually, if there is some form of formal criminal</b>                  11 <b>justice finding that means that they have to confront</b>                  12 <b>their offending, they have to acknowledge their abuse</b>                  13 <b>and receive some form of treatment, then I genuinely</b>                  14 <b>believe that has to be better than a conditional</b>                  15 <b>discharge or some kind of community service.</b>                  16 <b>Now, I was vilified for that article in the Times,</b>                  17 <b>but I still believe that's the case. When you look at</b>                  18 <b>the numbers that we are dealing with, you look at the</b>                  19 <b>challenges the Crown Prosecution Service are facing, the</b>                  20 <b>courts are facing, the sex offenders prisons are facing,</b>                  21 <b>in the context of what at this moment in time is not, in</b>                  22 <b>my view, a really coherent disruption strategy to stop</b>                  23 <b>the material in the first place, then I think the debate</b>                  24 <b>is worth having.</b>                  25 Q. There are a number of things that you have said there,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 104</p>

1 Chief Constable. Firstly this, and it ties into  
 2 something you said in the letter. Clearly, you had  
 3 informed the Home Affairs Committee that the police were  
 4 making over 400 arrests a month for offences relating to  
 5 the viewing of indecent images. But you went on to say,  
 6 or certainly as the letter records, this was placing too  
 7 great a burden on the police, Crown Prosecution Service,  
 8 and the courts, almost in some respects saying, well, we  
 9 are doing quite well, but it has a clearly knock-on  
 10 effect on other areas of the criminal justice system.

11 **A. Yes.**

12 Q. Do you still consider that in making the number of  
 13 arrests that are currently being made in relation to the  
 14 viewing of indecent images it still places too great  
 15 a burden on those other areas of criminal justice?

16 **A. It is not just our activity in this particular line of**  
 17 **investigation. It is all the other reports of**  
 18 **child abuse that we are having to deal with. It is all**  
 19 **the reports of rape and serious sexual offences we are**  
 20 **having to deal with. It is all the reports of**  
 21 **non-recent abuse that we are having to deal with. And**  
 22 **as we have lifted the stone, you just find more and**  
 23 **more.**

24 I hate the fact that victims are just saying,  
 25 "I want to get on with my life, and I'm not prepared to

Page 105

1 wait any longer for this case to come to trial". What  
 2 I was saying was, I think that our focus and our  
 3 attention in law enforcement should be on those people  
 4 who pose the greatest harm, the greatest risk, and there  
 5 are some lower-risk offenders. Now -- and again,  
 6 Mr Niven said this morning that every time one of those  
 7 images that we are talking about here is viewed, that  
 8 victim is being re-abused, and I understand that and  
 9 I get that and I have spoken to victims of those crimes,  
 10 and it is awful.

11 However, in my experience, there are some offenders,  
 12 and I have been on these warrants and I have been there  
 13 when these people have been arrested, who I personally  
 14 and professionally don't believe pose a contact abuse  
 15 threat.

16 Q. I will ask you about that, absolutely, because a theme  
 17 that has been running through some of the evidence we  
 18 have heard this week is whether there is a distinction  
 19 to be drawn between those who offend only online and  
 20 those who are perhaps either dual offenders or contact  
 21 only. I won't go over all of the evidence, but there  
 22 are varying views about whether that is an appropriate  
 23 distinction to be drawn.

24 I want to ask you about it, because at page 43 and  
 25 page 44 of your first statement to the inquiry, you were

Page 106

1 asked in terms -- it is behind tab 1 -- your views about  
 2 the alternative approach that should be taken to  
 3 low-risk offenders. Assuming for a moment that the risk  
 4 assessment tools are correct in their identification of  
 5 a low risk offender, I think you have certain views  
 6 about how they may potentially be dealt with within the  
 7 system. I want to make this much clear, in fairness to  
 8 you and everyone: in this section of the statement, you  
 9 make it abundantly clear that this is your alternative  
 10 proposal, not an agreed NPCC policy or position as to  
 11 how low-risk offenders should be viewed?

12 **A. That's absolutely right.**

13 Q. I'm sure everyone will understand, then, why I am going  
 14 to ask you about your view, Chief Constable --

15 **A. Yes.**

16 Q. -- and what you seek to potentially provoke debate about  
 17 when dealing with those lower risk offenders.

18 In short, I think you propose a more streamlined  
 19 enforcement investigation. Put it, please, into simple  
 20 terms so we can understand what it is that you want  
 21 everyone to consider as a possible approach?

22 **A. Within the current criminal justice system, and I don't**  
 23 **like the word, as I have said, but a conditional caution**  
 24 **could be applied. It is a formal finding whereby, as**  
 25 **one of the conditions of that caution, the offender**

Page 107

1 would have to undertake a form of rehabilitation and  
 2 some treatment programme. Other conditions could be  
 3 applied. They would still go on the registered sex  
 4 offenders register. They would still, throughout the  
 5 rest of their entire life, through a DBS -- Disclosure  
 6 and Barring Service -- check, that would come up, that  
 7 they have viewed indecent imagery. So all the  
 8 safeguards would be there, as if they had been before  
 9 a judge and there had been a formal finding in a Crown  
 10 Court, the difference being that that formal sanction  
 11 would have been delivered outside of what is perceived  
 12 by I think the majority of people that formal court  
 13 environment. So an inspector would deliver that  
 14 finding, would apply specific cautions. If they failed  
 15 to adhere to those cautions, you could then go back to  
 16 the original offence.

17 But what it would allow us to do, it would allow us  
 18 to ensure that the Crown Prosecution Service was able to  
 19 deal with the rapes and the serious sexual assaults that  
 20 they are dealing with more efficiently, I believe. It  
 21 would take out some of the stress from Crown Courts,  
 22 which means trials could be listed more quickly. And  
 23 victims of those contact abuse offences would see their  
 24 offender, if they are found guilty, brought to justice,  
 25 or certainly a hearing would be held that much more

Page 108

<p>1 quickly.</p> <p>2 <b>When you look at the volumes that we are dealing</b></p> <p>3 <b>with every month -- and we have talked about the 420</b></p> <p>4 <b>arrests every month, the numbers just keep growing and</b></p> <p>5 <b>growing and growing. I think we owe it to victims of</b></p> <p>6 <b>contact abuse to ensure that they get the best possible</b></p> <p>7 <b>service and, where we deem an offender is low risk, then</b></p> <p>8 <b>is a formal finding and having to go through some form</b></p> <p>9 <b>of rehabilitation, still becoming a registered sex</b></p> <p>10 <b>offender, is that any less of a finding than</b></p> <p>11 <b>a conditional discharge or community service in the</b></p> <p>12 <b>Crown Court?</b></p> <p>13 Q. Can I pose this of you, though: there may well be many</p> <p>14 who take the view that there is a salutary effect in</p> <p>15 going to court itself, even if the disposal is perhaps</p> <p>16 not at the more serious end of the sentencing spectrum,</p> <p>17 but nonetheless being hauled before the court, if I can</p> <p>18 put it colloquially, lets everyone know loud and clear</p> <p>19 that the view of society is one that it takes it</p> <p>20 seriously. Is there not a risk that by the imposition</p> <p>21 of a caution at a police station, the perception at</p> <p>22 least will be that we are viewing indecent imagery</p> <p>23 viewing as a less serious form of offending and</p> <p>24 therefore less of a priority, less of a deterrent</p> <p>25 message going out? There must be that danger, mustn't</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 109</p>	<p>1 Aren't we creating a sort of a different problem?</p> <p>2 <b>A. Well, would it cause a problem initially? I dare say it</b></p> <p>3 <b>would. But I would much rather have the offender having</b></p> <p>4 <b>to confront their offending behaviour, and maybe they</b></p> <p>5 <b>would stop viewing indecent images as a result.</b></p> <p>6 Q. Would you still advocate for the low-risk offender who</p> <p>7 is given the caution and given the treatment programme</p> <p>8 to be made subject to a behavioural order such as</p> <p>9 a sexual harm prevention order?</p> <p>10 <b>A. Yes, if it is appropriate, yes.</b></p> <p>11 Q. I wanted to ask you about that, because certainly in,</p> <p>12 I think, your third statement provided to the inquiry,</p> <p>13 there is reference to the unit that has to manage,</p> <p>14 I accept, the sexual and violent offenders, which is</p> <p>15 perhaps at a different end of the spectrum, but</p> <p>16 nonetheless, there are police and units that have to</p> <p>17 enforce those behavioural orders. If they are</p> <p>18 struggling with the more serious offender and monitoring</p> <p>19 them, how are they going to monitor the low-risk</p> <p>20 offender?</p> <p>21 <b>A. But those numbers, regardless of how we treat them, are</b></p> <p>22 <b>coming through anyway. They might not have</b></p> <p>23 <b>a behavioural order attached, but those numbers are</b></p> <p>24 <b>still coming through the criminal justice system. That</b></p> <p>25 <b>offender gets charged, goes to court, put on the</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 111</p>
<p>1 there, in the suggestion that you pose?</p> <p>2 <b>A. Yes, there is a risk, but I would argue that -- you</b></p> <p>3 <b>know, and there has been a lot of media coverage about</b></p> <p>4 <b>the number of people that we are arresting. I haven't</b></p> <p>5 <b>seen any evidence that that's working as a particular</b></p> <p>6 <b>deterrent. I absolutely get the point, but I will</b></p> <p>7 <b>always base my responses and my thoughts as far as</b></p> <p>8 <b>possible on the evidence that I am presented with.</b></p> <p>9 <b>I can only present it on the basis of what I am seeing</b></p> <p>10 <b>and the analysis of what's taking place within the Crown</b></p> <p>11 <b>courts in terms of formal findings, the awful amount of</b></p> <p>12 <b>time it's taking for victims to be able to go and give</b></p> <p>13 <b>their evidence. I just think the system is failing</b></p> <p>14 <b>victims of some of the most appalling forms of abuse,</b></p> <p>15 <b>and it just does not sit comfortably with me. Through</b></p> <p>16 <b>all our activity, we are putting all this additional</b></p> <p>17 <b>work into the system and the system is not coping.</b></p> <p>18 Q. As part of this debate, clearly, you raise the spectre</p> <p>19 of cautions, but running alongside a rehabilitative</p> <p>20 element such as requirements to attend a treatment</p> <p>21 programme?</p> <p>22 <b>A. Yes.</b></p> <p>23 Q. That in itself, does it not, just shifts the burden onto</p> <p>24 a different arm of those trying to work within this</p> <p>25 field and running those courses, monitoring the courses.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 110</p>	<p>1 <b>register. They still then have to be managed. What</b></p> <p>2 <b>I am advocating is that, at least, if low risk, then at</b></p> <p>3 <b>least they are having to confront their offending</b></p> <p>4 <b>behaviour, which is what they are not having to do at</b></p> <p>5 <b>this moment in time. Even if there is a custodial</b></p> <p>6 <b>sentence, I don't believe that the capacity exists</b></p> <p>7 <b>within our sex offender units, and I have been in the</b></p> <p>8 <b>Bure Prison, to give that indecent imagery offender the</b></p> <p>9 <b>opportunity to confront their offending behaviour.</b></p> <p>10 <b>So I'm trying to encourage a conversation or</b></p> <p>11 <b>a debate, and I know and I understand just how toxic</b></p> <p>12 <b>this is, so I don't do this lightly and I didn't do the</b></p> <p>13 <b>interview with The Times lightly, because I know just</b></p> <p>14 <b>how toxic it is. But what I am seeing across the whole</b></p> <p>15 <b>of my portfolio in my own county, victims of rape who</b></p> <p>16 <b>are saying, "I have now been waiting a year. I can't go</b></p> <p>17 <b>on with this anymore". Violent sex offenders are</b></p> <p>18 <b>getting away with it. I don't like it.</b></p> <p>19 Q. In answering the questions and in providing the evidence</p> <p>20 to the panel, in fact you have covered most of that</p> <p>21 which you outlined in your response to that Home Affairs</p> <p>22 Select Committee. So I am going to suggest that, rather</p> <p>23 than we go through it again, the letter which is the</p> <p>24 letter I read out and OHY002229 go up onto the website</p> <p>25 so people can see in context the comments from the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 112</p>

1 letter and your response to it in addition to that which  
 2 you have outlined for the inquiry.  
 3 Underpinning your suggestion as to an alternative  
 4 way of dealing with those low-risk offenders is in fact  
 5 the veracity and accuracy of the risk assessment tool,  
 6 is it not?  
 7 **A. That is an element of it, yes, but there is also the**  
 8 **academic research that's taken place, and I know there**  
 9 **are different views and different points made on this.**  
 10 **But when I took on the portfolio, I commissioned through**  
 11 **the University of Merseyside -- of Liverpool, sorry,**  
 12 **a systematic review of all the literature that was there**  
 13 **around those offenders that view indecent imagery who**  
 14 **then become contact offenders, and the breadth of that**  
 15 **systematic review was anywhere, I believe, between about**  
 16 **9 per cent and about 52 or 53 per cent. So best case is**  
 17 **only 1 in 10; worst case is every other.**  
 18 **Now, we have a risk assessment tool in the KIRAT**  
 19 **tool --**  
 20 Q. Yes, I want to ask you about that.  
 21 **A. -- which we have heard about this morning. But we go**  
 22 **beyond just the tool. We look at the whole picture, as**  
 23 **far as we can, before making any decisions, in terms of,**  
 24 **"Right, is a formal sanction outside of the normal**  
 25 **process, the Crown Court process, an appropriate one?"**

Page 113

1 **And ultimately, we are making those risk-based decisions**  
 2 **on a daily basis.**  
 3 Q. I understand that. But if one of the potential  
 4 suggestions for how we can reform or invigorate debate  
 5 in this regard is dependent upon the risk assessment, at  
 6 its heart, the risk assessment needs to be accurate. In  
 7 that regard, Chief Constable, can I ask you about some  
 8 of the statistics at page 29 in your first statement and  
 9 in particular in relation to an assessment done of  
 10 the KIRAT assessment tool.  
 11 The panel are aware of how KIRAT now works, but in  
 12 that academic review, KIRAT was -- version 2, I should  
 13 say, was found to be successful at identifying the most  
 14 dangerous offenders, with 97 per cent of contact  
 15 offenders being classified as very high or high risk.  
 16 We understand that.  
 17 In relation to those noncontact offenders being  
 18 classified as medium or low risk, it was 73 per cent  
 19 accurate.  
 20 **A. Yes.**  
 21 Q. Does that not tie in with a concern that if you are  
 22 advocating for a different approach to a low-risk  
 23 offender, the assessment of that person as being low  
 24 risk needs to be made on a reliable and accurate  
 25 assessment tool?

Page 114

1 **A. The KIRAT risk assessment is done before you've then**  
 2 **executed your warrant. Once you have then executed your**  
 3 **warrant, you then have what I would describe as a new**  
 4 **picture, new sets of information, new sets of data. You**  
 5 **start to understand other things that you didn't**  
 6 **previously know, which then allows you, I believe, to**  
 7 **then use KIRAT as a guide, but then also all the**  
 8 **additional information that you have then acquired as**  
 9 **a result of executing that warrant to then be able to**  
 10 **make a determined decision.**  
 11 **So, if I may, one of the warrants I went out on,**  
 12 **I was confronted by a man in his mid 60s, living alone**  
 13 **in a -- not a particularly nice house with his computer**  
 14 **there and a box of tissues and no access to children**  
 15 **whatsoever. Didn't go out of the house, was living that**  
 16 **life.**  
 17 **Now, when you looked at KIRAT and you then looked at**  
 18 **all the other information that then became available to**  
 19 **you, I think, with as great a degree of confidence as**  
 20 **you can, I would say that person hits the low-risk**  
 21 **threshold. It is that type of case that I'm referring**  
 22 **to, when you have got the complete picture. Because**  
 23 **KIRAT is only a tool that informs your prioritisation**  
 24 **prior to a warrant being executed. Once the warrant is**  
 25 **executed, you then have so much more information at your**

Page 115

1 **disposal to be able to make that decision.**  
 2 Q. I think we appreciate it is one of a number of steps,  
 3 but there is no denying it is an important step in the  
 4 initial assessment of risk?  
 5 **A. It is, but it is just part of it rather than the**  
 6 **complete assessment. Once you then have all of**  
 7 **the information, I think you can make a more informed**  
 8 **decision.**  
 9 Q. I want to pose to you the same question I posed to  
 10 Mr Niven, because clearly the KIRAT's tool overall  
 11 correct prediction rate was 83.7 per cent, which is not  
 12 to be denigrated in any way, but it is not 100 per cent.  
 13 Even if it were to be substantially increased, there are  
 14 nonetheless going to be those suspects and offenders  
 15 where the tool doesn't accurately predict their level of  
 16 risk. Is there not a danger, though, that we are  
 17 placing too much emphasis on the tool to the detriment  
 18 of safeguarding the child, which is what this is  
 19 fundamentally aimed to do?  
 20 **A. At this moment in time, the KIRAT tool is the best that**  
 21 **we have. But I go back to that point that KIRAT is that**  
 22 **initial assessment. You are then provided with a wealth**  
 23 **of additional information once you then come into**  
 24 **contact with that offender.**  
 25 **I think that then bolsters or gives you greater**

Page 116

1 concern as to that person being a greater threat,  
 2 because there are occasions, as the analysis will show,  
 3 that you will go through and instantly you think, this  
 4 person is not a low-risk offender, they are a high-risk  
 5 offender. You then re-evaluate your assessment.  
 6 So I don't think you can look at it through the lens  
 7 of, KIRAT would then be the tool upon which you would  
 8 then make a decision for maybe an alternative disposal;  
 9 it would be an assessment of everything you have at your  
 10 disposal.

11 Q. Just finally when looking at KIRAT and those risk  
 12 assessment tools, I think, is this right, there are no  
 13 national directives compelling respective forces to  
 14 respond to the risk assessment within certain  
 15 timescales; is that correct?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. I want to deal with that as a separate topic.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. By way of example, in this investigation, Cumbria Police  
 20 provided the inquiry with their aims by which they would  
 21 respond. I will just remind everyone of it. In a very  
 22 high-risk case, Cumbria responds, or aims to respond,  
 23 within 24 hours; in a high-risk case, within seven days;  
 24 a medium-risk case, within 14 days; and in a low-risk  
 25 case, within 30 days.

Page 117

1 Do you think that there is a need for there to be  
 2 a national directive or policy in this regard to ensure  
 3 a consistency of approach across the forces in England  
 4 and Wales?

5 A. I don't, because I could see some real problems with  
 6 doing that, because, when you are looking at risk and  
 7 you are looking at the totality of risk across your  
 8 force boundaries, there could be occasions when that  
 9 team who is just about to go and execute a high-risk  
 10 warrant, somebody might -- they'd come into the office  
 11 at that moment in time and say at that moment, "We have  
 12 just taken a report of contact abuse and grooming and we  
 13 now need to go and act upon that now for all the  
 14 following reasons".

15 Now, ultimately, the risk around all these cases is  
 16 being managed on a day-to-day basis by very skilled,  
 17 very committed individuals who will be making decisions  
 18 literally every 24 hours in lots of forces, to turn  
 19 around and say, "This is how we are going to allocate  
 20 our resources", because they would recognise that that  
 21 is where the greatest threat is posed to a child. They  
 22 are accountable for that decision.

23 I wouldn't want to impose upon those officers,  
 24 "Right, it is very high, you have to do it", because  
 25 what happens if you then have two or three very highs?

Page 118

1 You have to be able to trust those officers to go and do  
 2 their job and to be held to account for it, and  
 3 I believe that they are being held accountable for it.  
 4 Within my own force, I know that a very high or  
 5 a high will be dealt with within 24, within a maximum of  
 6 48 hours, because you have detective inspectors  
 7 invariably leading these teams, knowing full well that's  
 8 their job, to go and ensure that they are mitigating the  
 9 risk posed to children as soon as is reasonably  
 10 practicable. But there will be occasions when they will  
 11 be going out the door to do a warrant and the force  
 12 control room will turn around and say, "A paedophile  
 13 hunter group has now called us. They are now in the  
 14 process of running a live sting. It is now being  
 15 streamed. There are children at the address where the  
 16 sting is taking place. You now have got to go and deal  
 17 with that". To be able to say, "You have got to do  
 18 it" -- I just don't think we are being fair to those  
 19 officers and I genuinely don't think it would be  
 20 practicable.

21 Q. There are clearly, from what you have said there,  
 22 competing demands, potentially, in the examples you  
 23 gave, of what would undoubtedly probably be deemed to be  
 24 very high-risk cases, both of them?

25 A. Yes.

Page 119

1 Q. And to some extent I suppose the officers are caught  
 2 between a rock and a hard place?

3 A. They are.

4 Q. But notwithstanding that understanding of the pressures  
 5 on the police, is there still not a case for saying that  
 6 in a very high risk case where KIRAT has assessed it,  
 7 and indeed all the other checks that are performed by  
 8 the police, is there not an argument to say that in  
 9 a very high risk case, that should be dealt with in  
 10 24 hours or 48 hours?

11 A. I would like to think that very high-risk cases would be  
 12 dealt with within 24 or 48 hours, but ultimately, those  
 13 managers responsible for running those units are having  
 14 to manage the risk across a broad spectrum, and on  
 15 occasions there might be competing demands where they  
 16 actually make the decision, "Do you know what, the risk  
 17 on this job is actually greater on this one, this is  
 18 where we are now going to have to put our resources".  
 19 That's what the police service is doing on a daily basis  
 20 around the clock.

21 Q. Just finally on that topic, you said you would like to  
 22 think they would be accountable, and I am sure everyone  
 23 shares that wish. But is there any sanction, if there  
 24 is a competing demand one day and then the next day and  
 25 the next day and there is still nonetheless a very high

Page 120

<p>1 risk which is not dealt with for a number of days? What 2 of the child who needs the protection? 3 <b>A. I would expect, in those circumstances, the detective 4 inspector to be speaking to their line manager, to turn 5 around and say, "I am now -- I haven't been able to get 6 to this job. Another high risk has come in. I need 7 some additional support". Policing has become very 8 adept, I believe, at flexing its resources to go and 9 meet the threat wherever it is posed.</b> 10 <b>I would hate to think that there is an impression 11 that officers will be sitting on high or very high-risk 12 cases. There is a real focus upon this, and I believe 13 that we have demonstrated, through the arrests and 14 through that targeting of what we have done, that we 15 have sought to target those who present the highest risk 16 and are doing that consistently.</b> 17 MS CAREY: Mr Bailey, I suspect that may be a convenient 18 moment for a mid-afternoon break. I want to look this 19 afternoon after the break at some individual matters 20 relating to the forces and how all the things that you 21 speak of are actually put into effect on the ground, so 22 to speak. Perhaps we may do that after the break. 23 THE CHAIR: Yes. We will return at 3.10 pm. 24 (2.55 pm) 25 (A short break)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 121</p>	<p>1 Q. In part, that initial finding, if I call it that, by 2 HMIC, led to Operation Notarise? 3 <b>A. That's correct.</b> 4 Q. Because there was going to be an operation put into 5 effect, I think HMIC didn't want to jeopardise the 6 efficacy of that operation and so suspended some of 7 their fieldwork for a time to allow the operation to 8 run? 9 <b>A. That's correct.</b> 10 Q. In due course, they carried out additional inspections 11 after Operation Notarise. That's why, in fact, the 12 report did not come out until July 2015? 13 <b>A. That's correct.</b> 14 Q. Can I ask you, please, about some of the findings of 15 that report. At the top of our page, there is clearly 16 reference to the fact that the Inspectorate found there 17 were senior police leaders committed to protecting 18 children, but a gap between the stated force priority 19 and the reality of practice on the ground. 20 All the forces that were inspected experienced 21 varying delays in investigations. High-tech crime units 22 undertaking forensic work in forces experienced backlogs 23 in the analysis of media devices such as mobile phones 24 and computers. Certainly as at the drafting of 25 the report, it was not uncommon to see delays of up to</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 123</p>
<p>1 (3.14 pm) 2 MS CAREY: Chief Constable, I want to turn, perhaps, to look 3 at some of the issues relating to the forces and the 4 problems that the scale of online-facilitated child 5 sexual abuse causes them at that level. In particular, 6 as I think you're aware, some of the forces are going to 7 be either -- there is going to be read evidence from 8 them later this week or, indeed, some live evidence from 9 a selection from some of the forces. 10 I think before we descend to the detail, it might be 11 sensible to start by looking at the conclusions of 12 the HMIC report, "Online and on the edge". I know we 13 briefly alluded to it this morning. Can we call up 14 INQ001321. You will find that behind tab 21. 15 If we could go to page 6 of that report, I want to 16 look at some of the conclusions of the HMIC inspection. 17 Just so that everyone understands, in fact, the 18 fieldwork started to be carried out by Her Majesty's 19 Inspectorate in 2012? 20 <b>A. That's right.</b> 21 Q. I think, as a result of some of that fieldwork, there 22 was a recommendation that there needed to be 23 a coordinated law enforcement response to apprehend 24 offenders who were viewing indecent imagery? 25 <b>A. That's correct.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 122</p>	<p>1 12 months. That had a knock-on effect, clearly, of 2 offenders being released on bail for a long time and 3 potentially a risk to children whilst there was a period 4 of bail before a decision made as to whether to charge. 5 A little bit further down the page, HMIC remarked 6 that they found examples where the police had 7 administered cautions to offenders for online child 8 sexual exploitation, which they found to be concerning. 9 I will deal with all of the recommendations, we will 10 break them down afterwards. 11 <b>A. Yes.</b> 12 Q. The report goes on that the forces that they inspected 13 had made a considerable effort to provide advice and 14 guidance on internet safety, and we will pick up on that 15 theme a little later on, if we may. 16 They found some examples of good practice where 17 officers responded promptly, secured evidence in 18 a manner which was sensitive to the needs of the child 19 and safeguarded that child. 20 Just finally, over the page, onto page 7, the report 21 said that when dealing with child sexual exploitation in 22 a virtual world, there needed to be a different style of 23 policing from the conventional methods of the past. 24 Forces need to understand the nature and potential scale 25 of online exploitation of children to ensure that more</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 124</p>

<p>1 is done to protect them from harm and bring perpetrators 2 to justice. 3 Clearly within those findings which I have 4 summarised there, there are positive aspects and perhaps 5 some aspects that were certainly of cause for concern 6 for HMIC. I wanted to ask you about what is potentially 7 there the gap between the priority of you and those in 8 your position and the reality of what goes on on the 9 ground. 10 Since this report came out, do you have any 11 observations to make, Chief Constable, about whether 12 there is such a gap still today and, if there is, what 13 is being done to address that gap? 14 <b>A. Since the commission of the report, so if we go back to 15 2013, 2015 publication, I genuinely believe there has 16 been a really significant change. So if I use my own 17 force as an example, it is only now, in the last three 18 years, that we have had a safeguarding online team 19 dedicated to be able to meet this threat. I think that 20 for a lot of forces the creation of POLITs, OLITs, 21 SCOLTs, CAITs, whatever they might be described as -- 22 forgive all the acronyms, but they are all officers 23 being challenged by the online world. Every force has 24 now got that capability. There are now officers working 25 within that environment. We are bringing a level of</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 125</p>	<p>1 <b>nine to 12-month bracket and there are none in the 2 12-month and over bracket. So there have been some 3 improvements.</b> 4 <b>We have had to bring about a cultural change because 5 so many officers have been brought up on a staple diet 6 of dealing with theft of -- from cars, of cars, 7 burglaries, violent crime. They are now having to get 8 used to every victim, every offender they deal with, 9 having a smart device which is not just a simple phone, 10 it is a very powerful computer. They are having to come 11 to terms with the scale and the volume of material that 12 people now have within these smart devices. They have 13 had to come to terms with a generation of children who 14 think not that much -- who are very comfortable around 15 sending indecent images to a partner, exploring their 16 sexuality through technology, having to come to terms 17 with a generation of children that in lots of cases are 18 far more equipped in terms of technology than their 19 parents are.</b> 20 <b>So we have had to deal with a huge sea change in 21 profile offending behaviour, a new offender coming to 22 the fore, very different to the traditional offenders 23 that I have grown up with. Has that transformation 24 completely taken place yet? No, it hasn't. It will 25 take some time. Cultural change takes years. But the</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 127</p>
<p>1 <b>sophistication to the response. So if I use my own 2 force as an example, I have a triage van that goes out, 3 so I have a high-tech crime specialist who accompanies 4 the officers to the scene. We try and do as much triage 5 of high-tech equipment as we can to get an early 6 identification of equipment, but also to minimise the 7 impact invariably on a family in terms of taking their 8 devices away, and I know Tink Palmer will have spoken 9 very passionately about the impact our activity can have 10 on the family of offenders.</b> 11 <b>Have we got to the point yet where there are no 12 longer any delays within high-tech crime submissions? 13 I can't say that. The most recent stats that I have is 14 that over 50 per cent of forces are getting all the 15 examinations done within three months. Within my own 16 force, the examinations are being done in two or three 17 weeks. That is not unusual. But there are, for some 18 forces, some really significant challenges around 19 information technology infrastructure, the capacity to 20 deal with the incredibly large volumes of material that 21 we are now having to seize and analyse. So are there 22 still backlogs? Yes, unfortunately, there are, but 23 I don't believe they are as bad as they were and for the 24 38 forces that I have got the most recent stats on up 25 for December of '17, there are no forces that are in the</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 126</p>	<p>1 <b>CSE coordinators have overseen the delivery of 2 the plans. Officers now, I believe, are becoming more 3 comfortable with the implications of the technology. We 4 are getting better at it. Is it perfect? No. But it 5 is so much better than when the HMI went out and 6 undertook the fieldwork in 2012/13.</b> 7 <b>Q. You spoke there of recent data that you have obtained in 8 relation to the delays in the high-tech crime units in 9 their analysis of the respective devices. Is that 10 something that is actively monitored by you or something 11 you have done so that you could inform the panel of 12 the results of that this afternoon?</b> 13 <b>A. I wanted to be in a position to be able to inform the 14 panel. It is something I will now take away and reflect 15 on in terms of my Pursue Board accountability and the 16 management information. It is certainly a question that 17 we would be able to ask on a quarterly basis in terms of 18 the delays that forces are experiencing. But forces are 19 exploring all sorts of different options and 20 opportunities around doing this. The CAID, child abuse 21 image database, has made a really big difference in 22 terms of the amount of hours that officers and members 23 of staff have to view these most awful images. We are 24 seeing a database that that has over 9.1, I think it is, 25 unique images, 135 million versions of those unique</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 128</p>



1 **images, so slight technical changes. So that gives you**  
 2 **some idea of the scale and those numbers just keep**  
 3 **growing. The development of the child abuse image**  
 4 **database will really bring to the fore victim**  
 5 **identification which is getting better, offender**  
 6 **identification, identification of locations. So there**  
 7 **are some really positive things that have taken place**  
 8 **since Ms Sharpling's inspection. But there is always**  
 9 **going to be more to do.**

10 Q. I wanted to ask you about oversight in your role of  
 11 the forces and in particular by the Pursue Board.  
 12 Because I think you will recall the evidence this  
 13 morning of potentially an example where there was  
 14 a seemingly long delay between a referral from the NCA  
 15 and the Child Abuse Investigation Team actually  
 16 actioning it.

17 Now, the precise detail of that may be something  
 18 that we will find out more about in due course, but just  
 19 taking it as a very general example, clearly I asked the  
 20 deputy director about, well, once the NCA refers it to  
 21 the force, does the NCA have any oversight of it, and in  
 22 short, no, it became an issue for the force to consider.

23 Is there any oversight of the force then to ensure  
 24 that there aren't delays of that magnitude or, heaven  
 25 forbid, more, and what is your role in relation to that

Page 129

1 oversight?

2 **A. We have management information within the Pursue Board**  
 3 **dashboard that allows me to look on a quarterly basis at**  
 4 **the volume of volume referrals -- sorry, the referrals**  
 5 **that are coming from CEOP, I'm able to track the number**  
 6 **of referrals and I'm able to then ensure that forces are**  
 7 **then acting upon those referrals.**

8 **Now, of course, that's done at a fairly strategic**  
 9 **level, but I am able to ensure and see that the forces**  
 10 **are actually taking action against them and are not**  
 11 **doing something with them. It is not down to individual**  
 12 **case level. I wouldn't have the capacity to be able to**  
 13 **get to that point. But I am reassured that forces are**  
 14 **dealing with their volume referrals and the trend line**  
 15 **and the strategic direction of travel is a positive one.**

16 Q. Are you able to help the panel -- everyone would  
 17 understand that you can't micro-manage this in terms of  
 18 case by case, but within the respective forces or the  
 19 teams that deal with online-facilitated child sexual  
 20 abuse, is there, or should there be, someone who does  
 21 oversee the progression of a case to ensure there isn't  
 22 any delay as far as is possible?

23 **A. Yes. Ultimately, each of these teams will have probably**  
 24 **a detective inspector or a detective chief inspector**  
 25 **that will be being held to account by their ACC, their**

Page 130

1 **DCC or even their chief constable, if they are being**  
 2 **really intrusive around this, and they will have to**  
 3 **justify their decision making around the prioritisation**  
 4 **of their deployments, how they're using their staff, and**  
 5 **such is the depth of the management information that we**  
 6 **now have at our disposal, any senior officer from the**  
 7 **NPCC, so an ACC could go in and ask those questions, and**  
 8 **such is the -- I think the profile of all this work, and**  
 9 **quite rightly the expectation from the public around**  
 10 **this, I think the results to a degree should be speaking**  
 11 **for themselves in terms of the volumes of activity.**

12 **The activity is consistent and the Pursue Board has**  
 13 **overseen a really significant uplift in terms of**  
 14 **the number of arrests, a really significant uplift in**  
 15 **the number of victims that have been identified, the**  
 16 **volume referrals going through and action being taken**  
 17 **against them.**

18 Q. One other matter I wanted to pick up on, just looking at  
 19 that, you made reference to the myriad of teams and the  
 20 names that exist for -- and the respective departments  
 21 within a force who may be responsible for investigating  
 22 a case of online-facilitated crime. There's the  
 23 Child Abuse Investigation Team; SCOLT, the Safeguarding  
 24 Children Online Team; there is a POLIT team and a number  
 25 of others. The panel heard evidence earlier this week

Page 131

1 from Ms Palmer who raised a concern about the  
 2 proliferation of teams that might deal with an  
 3 online-facilitated investigation and essentially in  
 4 short suggested there wasn't enough joined-up thinking,  
 5 to use that phrase, and that there essentially should be  
 6 one team because online now potentially permeates  
 7 a number of aspects of child abuse.

8 Do you have any observations to make about the  
 9 number of teams and whether that is a sensible and  
 10 adequate way of approaching online-facilitated crime?

11 **A. I look at this through the lens of ensuring the best**  
 12 **possible response for the victims, the welfare of my**  
 13 **officers and my staff, and I know Tink really well,**  
 14 **I work closely with Tink and I really respect her**  
 15 **observations. But if I was to invite you to come and**  
 16 **look at where my online work is done, it is behind very,**  
 17 **very secure doors with warning signs up, with dedicated**  
 18 **breakout areas, viewing areas, because I want as few**  
 19 **people, officers and staff, viewing these vile images as**  
 20 **possible. It is really important that they are**  
 21 **operating, I think, within almost an hermetically-sealed**  
 22 **environment. Simply because nobody, unless they are**  
 23 **trained and prepared for it, should have to view this.**  
 24 **The links between my child abuse team and my online team**  
 25 **are absolutely -- they are there, they are made, they**

Page 132

1 **work hand in glove together. I understand Tink's**  
 2 **concerns, but I do think, when you are dealing with the**  
 3 **challenges we are dealing with in this online space,**  
 4 **that actually you have to create almost like an inner**  
 5 **sanctum. You can still have -- so the command, I still**  
 6 **have a detective superintendent overseeing all my child**  
 7 **abuse investigations, but there is a clear blue dividing**  
 8 **line between the two for really, really good operational**  
 9 **reasons.**

10 Q. Looking ahead at some of the challenges at force level,  
 11 I know you have dealt with this in part in your  
 12 statement at page 40, Chief Constable, of your first  
 13 statement. I'd like to get from you a summary of what  
 14 you see are the key challenges faced by the forces  
 15 themselves. We may come back to looking at challenges  
 16 faced by you at a national level. Can we start with the  
 17 forces? It is behind tab 1 at page 40.

18 I think in responding to a request on behalf of  
 19 the inquiry for your assessment of the challenges, you  
 20 grouped the challenges under a number of themes. I was  
 21 wondering if you could take the panel, as succinctly as  
 22 you can, through those themes and what you are doing and  
 23 the forces are doing to deal with those issues?

24 **A. First and foremost, there is the subject matter we have**  
 25 **been talking about so much in the last two days just in**

Page 133

1 **terms of the sheer volume of referrals, and we have**  
 2 **talked about that 700 per cent increase since 2012/13**  
 3 **and the fact that, whilst we are doing more and more and**  
 4 **more, the volumes keep growing. Again, that is a source**  
 5 **of real concern for me. One of the responses to that**  
 6 **has been trying to put in place a streamlined forensic**  
 7 **reporting approach whereby you draw a line at the number**  
 8 **of images that are being viewed, you complete a file**  
 9 **that goes straight to the Crown Court, and we have**  
 10 **trained hundreds of Crown Court judges that are then**  
 11 **able to deal with these cases without having to view the**  
 12 **images. So we have gone to great lengths to do that.**  
 13 **We are trying to streamline the forensic process with**  
 14 **triage on site, but there is no doubt that managing the**  
 15 **demand is really significant.**

16 A concern for me, both at force and national level,  
 17 is the fact that there is a huge reliance upon the  
 18 Pursue element of our approach. That isn't good enough.  
 19 We have got to do more than try to arrest our way out of  
 20 this. So this is around how we put all the preventative  
 21 activity in place and how we build resilience in young  
 22 people so they understand the risks of taking and  
 23 sharing images. How we educate, how we identify to them  
 24 the risk of going online, strangers approaching them,  
 25 the risk of live-streaming apps. Trying to create an

Page 134

1 **environment where children are able to protect**  
 2 **themselves.**

3 Q. Can I ask you about that? We obviously heard evidence  
 4 about the Thinkuknow programme being run by the NCA and,  
 5 indeed, the Click CEOP button. In relation to the  
 6 respective forces, is there a like-minded either  
 7 education programme or a reporting system on each  
 8 force's home page, for example?

9 **A. I genuinely don't know the answer to that question, I'm**  
 10 **sorry.**

11 Q. Do you think there should be?

12 **A. It is something I can certainly go away and absolutely**  
 13 **have a look at and would welcome that. I will take that**  
 14 **back and update the panel in due course.**

15 Q. It may be in due course we would welcome that --

16 **A. I can do that.**

17 Q. -- because not everyone will think of this as a national  
 18 problem. A person's first port of call might very well  
 19 be their local police force. So I suspect, Chief  
 20 Constable, if I may, the inquiry will come back to you  
 21 to ask for some answers to that.

22 **A. I can certainly deal with that.**

23 **In terms of the challenge to new technologies, so it**  
 24 **wasn't that long ago that most homes, most people, had**  
 25 **a PC on their desk in the study, wherever it might be,**

Page 135

1 **with a screen and a big hard drive. Technology has now**  
 2 **moved on, where it's laptops, it's mobile phones, where**  
 3 **levels of encryption security have moved on. That**  
 4 **presents a real challenge.**

5 **In terms of suicides, we have had a really**  
 6 **significant increase in the number of suicides, which**  
 7 **is -- I believe there is a direct correlation to the**  
 8 **number of arrests that we are making. One suicide is**  
 9 **too many. We have developed some interim suicide**  
 10 **prevention guidance and policy. More work is taking**  
 11 **place within that field with academics who are experts**  
 12 **in that field, with medical practitioners who, again,**  
 13 **are experts in that field, being led by the NPCC lead**  
 14 **for suicide prevention, and, again, I monitor that**  
 15 **through the Pursue Board because it was only a matter of**  
 16 **time before somebody asked me the question: just how**  
 17 **many people have killed themselves or tried to kill**  
 18 **themselves following one of these warrants? So again,**  
 19 **we monitor that and we are trying to do our best to**  
 20 **minimise it.**

21 **I am presented, and this has received a significant**  
 22 **amount of coverage in the media within the last few**  
 23 **weeks and months, the activity of paedophile hunter**  
 24 **groups.**

25 Q. Yes, I want to ask you about that.

Page 136

1 **A. The real challenge and the concern that they bring from**  
2 **my perspective, in terms of a real disregard for the**  
3 **broader safeguarding risks, and just by way of example,**  
4 **we had a sting within my own force area. It was**  
5 **streamed live on Facebook and I believe within the**  
6 **first, let's say, 24 hours there had been half a million**  
7 **hits. The offender, the alleged offender, had children.**  
8 **All of a sudden the children's identity is all over**  
9 **Facebook, the family is exposed. There are no**  
10 **safeguards in place. All we ever hear about is the**  
11 **operations that these groups would turn around and say**  
12 **are a success. I know that there are operations that**  
13 **have gone badly wrong. But of course, we don't get to**  
14 **hear about that.**  
15 **Unfortunately, I don't think I have won the argument**  
16 **with vigilantes that, actually, you are doing far more**  
17 **harm than you are good, and the numbers continue to**  
18 **grow, and the challenge that they present continues to**  
19 **grow, which is why my focus, and very much a public**  
20 **focus, has been we could actually stop this happening in**  
21 **the first place and, if we were to police, and the tech**  
22 **companies were to police the chat rooms where the**  
23 **grooming takes place, then actually vigilantes would go**  
24 **out of business.**  
25 Q. Allied to that topic, yesterday the panel heard

Page 137

1 a suggestion of a potential way of having additional  
2 resource available to deal with those who groom online,  
3 and I suspect you will recall the evidence of Mr Gamble  
4 and his suggestion that there be potentially a group of  
5 volunteers -- he posited the number of 1,500 by way of  
6 example -- who would go through a process of training  
7 and some kind of supervision, and essentially masquerade  
8 online as a child to draw in and detect those who want  
9 to masquerade and perpetrate online grooming.  
10 That suggestion is going to be something that the  
11 panel will consider, but from a policing perspective,  
12 Chief Constable, what do you say to a suggestion like  
13 that?  
14 **A. Can I say I absolutely share Jim Gamble's passion for**  
15 **child protection and safeguarding. He and I will agree**  
16 **on a number of things, but I don't agree with him on**  
17 **this. I am really concerned around the selection, the**  
18 **welfare and the logistics of such a proposal.**  
19 Q. You alluded a moment ago to the number of suicides of  
20 those who are investigated for online-related offending.  
21 I want to just spend a moment with you considering  
22 perhaps some of the work of the Lucy Faithfull  
23 Foundation, which has not been an aspect we have brought  
24 out in the inquiry thus far. Can I ask you, please, to  
25 turn to pages 34 and 35 in your statement, Chief

Page 138

1 Constable. It may well not be widely known or  
2 appreciated that there are perpetrators of this kind of  
3 offending who actually want to seek help for their own  
4 harmful behaviours.  
5 **A. Yes.**  
6 Q. There are agencies and organisations who do their best  
7 to try to assist those who want self-help, to put it  
8 colloquially. I think one of those foundations is the  
9 Lucy Faithfull Foundation.  
10 **A. Yes.**  
11 Q. It is a charity dedicated to preventing child sexual  
12 abuse. They work with abusers and they run a helpline  
13 for those who are worried about their own behaviour?  
14 **A. That's right.**  
15 Q. I think, is this right, that you informed the panel that  
16 there is in fact a "Stop it now" helpline run by the  
17 Lucy Faithfull Foundation?  
18 **A. That's correct.**  
19 Q. If scale impacts on the ability of policing to operate  
20 in this field, inevitably it impacts on those who try to  
21 prevent the offending and those who try to seek help.  
22 Can I ask you, please, about the top of your page 35 and  
23 the challenges that you are aware of identified by the  
24 Lucy Faithfull Foundation?  
25 **A. Yes. We have worked closely with the Lucy Faithfull**

Page 139

1 **Foundation to try to put into our approach to tackling**  
2 **the threat an alternative, and, as you have described,**  
3 **counsel, the ability for those offenders who have not**  
4 **yet been caught or who have ultimately been caught to go**  
5 **and get some form of help, and Lucy Faithfull have seen**  
6 **a really significant uplift in the number of calls that**  
7 **they have been getting.**  
8 **However, the problem with that is that only**  
9 **21 per cent of callers are managing to get through on**  
10 **their first call, and in the entire year that we looked**  
11 **at, there were nearly 44,000 calls missed by the**  
12 **Lucy Faithfull Foundation.**  
13 Q. I put that data on the record for those who are  
14 listening and watching in. The data provided by the  
15 Lucy Faithfull Foundation for the period  
16 between April 2016 and March 2017 identified that the  
17 "Stop it now" helpline engaged with 4,553 individual  
18 callers but missed calls from an additional 2,655  
19 individuals. So lest anyone thinks there is one or two  
20 people trying to do their best to resolve their harmful  
21 behaviour, there is in fact evidence before the panel,  
22 is there not, of thousands of callers trying to learn  
23 more about the work of the Lucy Faithfull Foundation and  
24 potentially inhibit their own offending?  
25 **A. Yes.**

Page 140

1 Q. Given that 21 per cent of callers managed to get  
 2 through, is there anything that can be done from  
 3 a policing perspective to try to remedy that, short of  
 4 donating money to the foundation to enable them to have  
 5 more operators at the end of the line?

6 **A. All I can do is have conversations with colleagues in  
 7 the Home Office, put the evidence in front of them and  
 8 encourage them to support Lucy Faithfull Foundation.  
 9 That's the only other funding stream I have. I don't  
 10 believe I can approach chief constables to say, "You  
 11 need to start allocating some of your budget to this".  
 12 I think the one weakness in -- I say "one". Sorry. One  
 13 of the weaknesses in our response to this threat is the  
 14 fact that we don't have a coherent disruption strategy.**

15 **So I'm prepared to stand full square behind our  
 16 Pursue response and to say that we are doing okay, but  
 17 there is so much more that needs to be done in the  
 18 Prevent, Prepare and Protect element of this. At this  
 19 moment in time, there isn't a coherent disruption  
 20 strategy in place, and my biggest concern is that,  
 21 without that coherent disruption strategy being in  
 22 place, the police service, my police service colleagues,  
 23 NCA and ROCU colleagues are being overwhelmed by the  
 24 volume, and we are not then having the opportunity to go  
 25 and target those people that pose the biggest threat to**

Page 141

1 **children.**

2 **We have got to get to the point whereby there is  
 3 a really joined-up and coherent response across building  
 4 resilience, across education, across helping offenders  
 5 that want to seek assistance and then industry doing its  
 6 bit as well.**

7 **We cannot, as a country, base our response purely  
 8 upon some half-reasonable figures that demonstrate that  
 9 we are locking -- well, we're arresting lots of people,  
 10 sorry, because we are not locking lots of people up, but  
 11 we are certainly arresting lots of people. That is not  
 12 the answer.**

13 Q. You mentioned there industry, and I would like to spend  
 14 a few minutes of what's left this afternoon looking at  
 15 what more, in your view, could industry do. Could I ask  
 16 you, please, to have a look at page 25 onwards in your  
 17 first statement. You observe there, Chief Constable,  
 18 there is a significant challenge to monitor, regulate  
 19 and respond to concerns raised by users in a timely  
 20 manner and more needs to be done by the providers of  
 21 social media applications, websites, for example, to  
 22 manage this demand.

23 **Requiring more of industry has been a theme running  
 24 through the evidence and may continue to be so for some  
 25 time, but practically speaking, what is it that you**

Page 142

1 envisage industry could, and should, be doing?

2 **A. I think industry should be doing its level best to  
 3 eradicate the proliferation of indecent imagery of  
 4 children, and I think industry should be doing its best  
 5 to police the activity that's taking place within chat  
 6 rooms, and in that environment where children should be  
 7 able to go and engage with their peers safely.**

8 **Those two things, from my perspective, would have  
 9 the greatest impact upon the challenges that we face  
 10 currently.**

11 Q. I think you went on to say that society considers that  
 12 policing has its own portal mechanism to remove content  
 13 and that is not right, is it?

14 **A. No, it is not.**

15 Q. You said that more needs to be done by providers to  
 16 promote self-reporting by users, the providers having  
 17 the capability and capacity to deal with this demand.  
 18 One can well understand why you make that observation.  
 19 But the child has to know, don't they, that they are  
 20 being groomed or that the person that they are dealing  
 21 with is not the 18-year-old friend but a 35-year-old  
 22 male?

23 **A. Absolutely.**

24 Q. One well understands the intention behind it, but being  
 25 realistic about it, it isn't going to help the child who

Page 143

1 doesn't realise what is happening to them and therefore  
 2 knows, "I should report this" or "I should seek more  
 3 advice about this"?

4 **A. That goes, I think, to the heart of what I have  
 5 described as building resilience in young people. We  
 6 need, through parenting, through education in school, to  
 7 build resilience in young people so they understand that  
 8 if they go online and somebody who they don't know  
 9 approaches them or they get inappropriate comments --  
 10 and when you look at this activity, and I have watched  
 11 it take place, groomers are being sexually explicit  
 12 almost from the very first conversation, and we need our  
 13 children to turn around and say, "I have now had this  
 14 sexual approach" and to report it. If we can build that  
 15 resilience within children, it will help. It is not the  
 16 complete solution, but it will certainly help. It is  
 17 not just around online grooming, it is around CSE,  
 18 because we know CSE amongst peers is there, and it is  
 19 prolific. We need to give children the confidence to be  
 20 able to report abuse, to understand they are being  
 21 groomed or exploited, and to then go and report it.**

22 Q. Do you think there is any force behind the suggestion  
 23 made that there ought to be some legislation preventing  
 24 an adult going online and masquerading as an  
 25 under-18-year-old unless they have reasonable authority

Page 144

1 or good excuse, to use the phrase? Do you think that  
 2 might assist certainly in preventing the adult  
 3 masquerading as a child, even if the child doesn't know  
 4 that the person they are dealing with is in fact an  
 5 adult?  
 6 **A. I get why Jim has said that. I listened to his**  
 7 **evidence. I just need to generally think about the**  
 8 **practicalities of this. So you go and arrest that**  
 9 **person. What is the outcome going to be in terms of**  
 10 **what are we going to find, what are we then going to**  
 11 **present before the court? What's the court's response**  
 12 **going to be? I just need to think that through.**  
 13 **Because we are already overwhelmed, and I'm just not**  
 14 **sure of the practicalities of it and ultimately the**  
 15 **outcome, and ultimately, this for me is one of those**  
 16 **areas where, if companies did what I believe they should**  
 17 **be doing, and I believe the technology exists through**  
 18 **artificial intelligence, if they invest in the people to**  
 19 **go and monitor, being led by artificial intelligence,**  
 20 **then I think we have the potential to really do**  
 21 **something significant about this.**  
 22 Q. One of the other concerns in this area is clearly  
 23 surrounding training and perhaps the number of providers  
 24 responsible for training. Because if we are going to  
 25 target the children and teach them how to respond

Page 145

1 appropriately online or teach the teachers how to teach  
 2 them or the caregivers, does there not need to be  
 3 a minimum standard by which the message can go out to  
 4 everyone, not just dependent on whether you pick a large  
 5 service provider, you have a local charity providing the  
 6 training, whether it is done in school or at your Scout  
 7 group. What do you think about the suggestion that  
 8 there should be a minimum standard to training?  
 9 **A. I want children to become aware. I want children to get**  
 10 **the very, very best education they possibly can around**  
 11 **this. Quite how you'd go and regulate what that minimum**  
 12 **standard is and how you would award some form of**  
 13 **accreditation, I just don't know at this moment in time,**  
 14 **and I'm not sure if it is for the police to do, if I'm**  
 15 **being honest.**  
 16 I think, again, I listened with great interest to  
 17 Jim's evidence yesterday. It is something that I need  
 18 to think about it. But what I absolutely do know is  
 19 that when children are being educated about the risks of  
 20 this type of activity and around sex education, it has  
 21 got to be delivered by people with credibility. It  
 22 cannot be the geography teacher that next lesson is now  
 23 going to be talking to you about glaciers. It has got  
 24 to be more sophisticated than that. I believe that most  
 25 schools, and certainly I have presented to a number of

Page 146

1 **school organisations, they get this, and they understand**  
 2 **the importance of the quality of the input and they**  
 3 **understand that, if they build the resilience of**  
 4 **children, then actually they are well placed to look**  
 5 **after themselves.**  
 6 Q. One of the matters you do alight upon when looking at  
 7 what legislation there is about to be in this area is  
 8 the new powers contained within the Digital Economy Act  
 9 of 2017. Sections 14 to 20 of that Act require that  
 10 people who make pornographic material available on  
 11 a commercial basis -- legally, I hasten to add -- must  
 12 prevent access to under-18-year-olds. If they don't  
 13 prevent that access, then there is power built in within  
 14 the Act for the regulator to impose a fine or  
 15 enforcement notice on them requiring them to ensure  
 16 there is no such access.  
 17 Do you see that Act as having any real impact,  
 18 though, on the scale of online child sexual abuse?  
 19 Because although it might prevent a child going onto an  
 20 adult website and looking at an image of an older woman  
 21 that is no doubt arousing to them, is that really going  
 22 to cut, Chief Constable, to the heart of the problem as  
 23 we have been discussing this afternoon?  
 24 **A. I think it will really assist.**  
 25 Q. How and why do you say that?

Page 147

1 **A. Can I first and foremost say, I have always been really**  
 2 **concerned and have never, ever been able to understand**  
 3 **that if you are 14, 15 or 16, you couldn't put a bet on**  
 4 **Arsenal v Chelsea tonight because of age verification,**  
 5 **but all you have to do is put "porn hub" into Google and**  
 6 **within two or three clicks you are looking at some**  
 7 **fairly hardcore pornography as an 11-, 12-, 13-,**  
 8 **14-year-old. All the academic research is there that**  
 9 **children are being exposed to it.**  
 10 In my view, it is driving a certain behaviour, it is  
 11 leading boys in particular to think that's what a normal  
 12 relationship looks like, and what I have also seen, in  
 13 terms of the ready availability of pornography, is --  
 14 and the Lucy Faithfull Foundation will talk about  
 15 this -- such is its availability now that it is then  
 16 creating a group of men who will look at pornography and  
 17 the pornography gets harder and harder and harder, to  
 18 the point where they are simply getting no sexual  
 19 stimulation from it at all, so the next click is  
 20 child abuse imagery. This is a real problem.  
 21 It really worries me that children who should not be  
 22 being able to access that material can. They are being  
 23 led to believe this is what a normal relationship looks  
 24 like and this is normal activity. I am not a prude, and  
 25 I don't believe that's the case, and it is driving a set

Page 148

1 of conduct and behaviour where you are seeing, "Well,  
 2 this is what you do", and I think it is really  
 3 unhelpful.  
 4 So I think that the age verification is really  
 5 significant and I think it can contribute in part to  
 6 this agenda.  
 7 Q. That brings me on to the final topic I would like your  
 8 assistance with, please, Mr Bailey, and it is this: you  
 9 alluded to there a section of society, young men, young  
 10 teenage boys, potentially seeing some quite graphic,  
 11 hardcore pornographic material and that impacting on  
 12 their attitude as to what is normal, what is right. It  
 13 may well feed into the phenomenon in part -- I stress  
 14 "in part" -- of what is known as "sexting"?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. The panel are aware of what that is and the scale of  
 17 the problem. I would like to ask you a little bit about  
 18 what is known as outcome 21.  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. In short, outcome 21 is to try to deal with the exchange  
 21 of indecent imagery between teenagers, which is  
 22 nonetheless a criminal offence, where they may be in  
 23 a consensual relationship, for example, but have  
 24 committed, under the law, an offence.  
 25 A. Yes.

Page 149

1 Q. As I understand it, outcome 21 enables the police force  
 2 to record that a crime has been committed?  
 3 A. Yes.  
 4 Q. But the young boy or girl concerned who shared the image  
 5 is not prosecuted as it is not deemed to be in the  
 6 public interest?  
 7 A. That is correct.  
 8 Q. That is an outcome that is put into place where there  
 9 are no aggravating factors -- for example, the image  
 10 hasn't been exchanged and there's been blackmail related  
 11 to it or extortion?  
 12 A. That's correct.  
 13 Q. I just put that so everyone understands what outcome 21  
 14 is. Now, there was some criticism potentially of that  
 15 approach given in evidence yesterday, whereas actually  
 16 we are criminalising 15-/16-year-olds in an otherwise  
 17 perfectly normal, consensual and happy relationship who  
 18 now, as part of it, exchange sexual imagery. There is  
 19 nothing wrong with that. They are both happy with it.  
 20 Yet they have on their record a crime has been recorded.  
 21 So essentially the concern is, well, it is not focused  
 22 on the child, we are looking at crime statistics.  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. What do you say to the criticisms of the outcome 21  
 25 procedure?

Page 150

1 A. I operate within the law, as it is constructed at this  
 2 moment in time. It is an offence. We have become  
 3 acutely aware in the last three or four years that  
 4 children were becoming criminalised and, as a result,  
 5 their life chances were then going to be significantly  
 6 undermined, because the Disclosure and Barring Service  
 7 would then disclose if they wanted to become a police  
 8 officer or a nurse or a social worker.  
 9 We have worked with colleagues in education, across  
 10 the Home Office, and outcome 21 has been specifically  
 11 designed to ensure that we are allowed and are able to  
 12 remain compliant with our crime data integrity  
 13 requirements that the HMI has set, but ensure that,  
 14 whilst somebody might be recorded on a crime report as  
 15 a suspect, outcome 21 declares that it is simply not in  
 16 the public interest to pursue this any further and there  
 17 is then -- that will then not be disclosed in later  
 18 years by the Disclosure and Barring Service.  
 19 The statistics which we have gathered, which  
 20 demonstrate that this is working, it was 1 per cent of  
 21 the total number of crime reports that had been  
 22 generated resulted in a charge sheet. Now, not all of  
 23 those were outcome 21. Forces were using different  
 24 outcomes. But the sentiments and the -- if you like,  
 25 the ethos of that particular approach is coming to the

Page 151

1 fore. I have some more work to do around that, but  
 2 whilst the law exists -- and we have to be really  
 3 careful if we are going to change the law, because we  
 4 have to accept that there are people out there that will  
 5 acquire an image and then use that in a coercive  
 6 relationship or to exploit somebody for their own  
 7 gratification, for their own sexual purposes or for the  
 8 sexual purposes of a friend, so we have to make sure  
 9 that we don't take our eye off the really criminal  
 10 element of this, but we have now created a structure  
 11 that allows us not to criminalise a whole generation of  
 12 young people.  
 13 MS CAREY: Chief Constable, those are all the questions  
 14 I wanted to ask. Chair, are there questions from you or  
 15 the panel? Ms Sharpling?  
 16 Questions by THE PANEL  
 17 MS SHARPLING: Thank you, Mr Bailey. I just want to clarify  
 18 your view about conditional cautioning to make sure  
 19 I have understood it properly. It was put to you by  
 20 counsel to the inquiry that a conditional caution would  
 21 be an alternative to pursuing a more formal criminal  
 22 justice process through the courts. Is it also your  
 23 contention that a conditional caution could be used on  
 24 those cases in which, in current circumstances, no  
 25 action would be taken at all? So would it be a means of

Page 152

1 bringing more offenders through some form of formal  
 2 process or only as an alternative, what might in  
 3 old-fashioned language be called a diversion?  
 4 **A. If the offender admits the offence, then yes,**  
 5 **absolutely, it could be. Because the principle of**  
 6 **a caution is that obviously the person has to admit the**  
 7 **offence. So that's the first step. There is then an**  
 8 **admission of guilt, which I think then gives us**  
 9 **potentially the scope to then turn around and say,**  
 10 **"Right, you have now, as one of the conditions of**  
 11 **your caution, got to confront your offending behaviour".**  
 12 **There would have to be an admission of some description.**  
 13 MS SHARPLING: I think the point is, in part, whether the  
 14 police service as a whole would be able to undertake  
 15 more action in relation to low-risk offenders because  
 16 they have an opportunity to use a conditional caution  
 17 rather than the formal court process? Or are we talking  
 18 about the same numbers?  
 19 **A. I think it would create the additional capacity that**  
 20 **would allow us to undertake more activity. But I need**  
 21 **to caveat that with, such is the scale of the volume**  
 22 **that my concern is that we are being distracted by the**  
 23 **scale of that volume, and it has to be a disruption**  
 24 **strategy that is put in place that allows the**  
 25 **Lucy Faithfulls, or the foundations of this world that**

Page 153

1 **offer that alternative self-help, to flourish that we**  
 2 **get PSHE training in schools embedded so children become**  
 3 **resilient and are able to protect themselves and the**  
 4 **tech companies do their best to take the material away.**  
 5 **So at this moment in time, yes, I think it has the**  
 6 **potential to create the additional capacity, but that is**  
 7 **not the answer or the -- I don't believe it is the**  
 8 **solution.**  
 9 MS SHARPLING: I understand that point. Thank you.  
 10 Just an entirely separate point: we heard evidence  
 11 during the course of this inquiry of Ms LaFave and the  
 12 murder of her son Breck and the difficulties that she  
 13 had experienced on making the police service she was  
 14 contacting understand the gravity of the situation that  
 15 she faced.  
 16 It has been said that, many institutions, the  
 17 leaders can only be as good as the weakest link in  
 18 respect of the actions taken on the frontline.  
 19 I wondered, in those circumstances, what your view was  
 20 and what chief constables and senior leaders in police  
 21 services, and indeed other institutions for that matter,  
 22 need to do to ensure that more members of their staff  
 23 are fully apprised of some of these challenges and  
 24 difficulties so that the public receive a better  
 25 service?

Page 154

1 **A. I have heard Lorin talk on two occasions now, and it is**  
 2 **incredibly powerful and really, really impactful. Since**  
 3 **those failings, the police service, and I believe it is**  
 4 **now -- if it is not already in across every force, the**  
 5 **direction of travel is there, the THRIVE approach to**  
 6 **call handling has been implemented. So every time**  
 7 **a caller calls, the call will be based upon the**  
 8 **structure in terms of threat, harm, risk, investigative**  
 9 **opportunities, vulnerability and engagement.**  
 10 **I would dearly love to say that as a result of that**  
 11 **training that's now gone in, we would never, ever have**  
 12 **a Breck Bednar scenario again. You are only ever, you**  
 13 **are quite right, as good as your weakest link, but we**  
 14 **have done a lot to raise the levels of awareness and**  
 15 **understanding and the College of Policing within the**  
 16 **next 14 months will have rolled out to 10,000 members of**  
 17 **staff, I believe 10,000 officers, their vulnerability**  
 18 **training package. That has nine elements to it, one of**  
 19 **which is the story of Breck. The forces will choose two**  
 20 **of the nine options, and the remaining seven will be**  
 21 **delivered through a distance learning, continuous**  
 22 **development -- continuous professional development**  
 23 **package.**  
 24 **So we are doing our best to learn those lessons, but**  
 25 **it doesn't make it any easier. It really doesn't.**

Page 155

1 MS SHARPLING: Thank you. That's helpful.  
 2 MS CAREY: Any other questions? Thank you.  
 3 Thank you, Mr Bailey, that concludes your evidence.  
 4 (The witness withdrew)  
 5 MS CAREY: Chair, that is all the evidence for today.  
 6 THE CHAIR: Thanks. We will reconvene tomorrow at 10.30 am.  
 7 (4.06 pm)  
 8 (The hearing was adjourned to  
 9 Thursday, 25 January 2018 at 10.30 am)  
 10  
 11 I N D E X  
 12  
 13 MR KEITH ANDREW NIVEN (continued) .....1  
 14  
 15 Examination by MS CAREY (continued) .....1  
 16  
 17 Questions by THE PANEL .....70  
 18  
 19 MR SIMON ROBERT BAILEY (sworn) .....75  
 20  
 21 Examination by MS CAREY .....75  
 22  
 23 Questions by THE PANEL .....152  
 24  
 25

Page 156

A				
<b>abeyance</b> 28:8	<b>abuse</b> 1:12 2:18	115:14 147:12,13	<b>actively</b> 38:7	<b>admits</b> 153:4
<b>ability</b> 4:24 15:14	3:11 5:15 6:1,20	147:16 148:22	128:10	<b>adopted</b> 77:20
18:3 37:19 49:23	6:24 7:24,24 9:21	<b>accessed</b> 4:12	<b>activities</b> 38:17	<b>adult</b> 102:15
83:6 139:19 140:3	9:22 13:13 17:15	<b>accessible</b> 4:1	40:2	144:24 145:2,5
<b>able</b> 6:8 10:7 11:10	27:23 30:10 31:15	<b>accompanies</b> 126:3	<b>activity</b> 6:23 17:18	147:20
11:10 13:25 18:11	31:18,20,24 33:5	<b>account</b> 11:4 21:8	17:21,25 19:19	<b>advice</b> 36:19,22
19:5,8 26:25 33:8	34:1,5,13,16 35:7	71:17 119:2	21:10 53:18 63:7	42:3,6,7 48:2,20
33:9 39:2 52:9	35:19 38:12 39:19	130:25	66:9 67:5 69:5,11	53:24 124:13
55:25 65:6,10	41:4 49:18 54:11	<b>accountability</b>	69:14 71:13 85:15	144:3
66:5 68:24,25	56:21 57:14 60:23	128:15	97:6 105:16	<b>advocate</b> 111:6
73:21 76:21 78:22	62:19 63:20 64:6	<b>accountable</b> 118:22	110:16 126:9	<b>advocating</b> 112:2
82:1 83:3,6,9,11	65:7 69:8 75:15	119:3 120:22	131:11,12 134:21	114:22
86:5 87:8 92:20	76:5,23 77:3,6,13	<b>accreditation</b>	136:23 143:5	<b>Affairs</b> 101:3 105:3
94:7 97:4 98:15	77:19 78:1 79:6	146:13	144:10 146:20	112:21
99:5,6,13,14,17	79:12,22 80:22	<b>ACCs</b> 96:20	148:24 153:20	<b>afraid</b> 79:15
100:3,16,17	81:11 87:2,25	<b>accuracy</b> 28:1	<b>acts</b> 27:9	<b>afternoon</b> 27:20
103:15 108:18	93:15 98:22 99:10	113:5	<b>actual</b> 35:6 60:22	84:18 86:7 90:14
110:12 115:9	99:19 102:15,16	<b>accurate</b> 10:25	61:5 62:15 63:10	121:19 128:12
116:1 119:1,17	103:3 104:12	114:6,19,24	77:21	142:14 147:23
121:5 125:19	105:18,21 106:14	<b>accurately</b> 116:15	<b>acutely</b> 151:3	<b>age</b> 39:17 41:11
128:13,17 130:5,6	108:23 109:6	<b>accused</b> 46:24	<b>adapt</b> 66:5	42:23 148:4 149:4
130:9,12,16	110:14 118:12	<b>achieved</b> 99:23	<b>add</b> 147:11	<b>agencies</b> 11:24
134:11 135:1	122:5 128:20	<b>acid</b> 76:2	<b>addition</b> 113:1	139:6
143:7 144:20	129:3,15 130:20	<b>acknowledge</b> 46:23	<b>additional</b> 16:9	<b>agency</b> 2:22 8:24
148:2,22 151:11	131:23 132:7,24	104:12	53:23 80:25	9:2 13:8 14:7
153:14 154:3	133:7 139:12	<b>acquire</b> 152:5	110:16 115:8	15:25 16:1,11,18
<b>abroad</b> 39:8,15	144:20 147:18	<b>acquired</b> 115:8	116:23 121:7	17:23 18:2 20:1
40:14	148:20	<b>acronyms</b> 125:22	123:10 138:1	21:5 22:6 28:23
<b>absence</b> 83:23	<b>abused</b> 29:8 36:3	<b>act</b> 39:14 50:13	140:18 153:19	33:5 36:8 39:23
<b>absolute</b> 30:19 80:9	58:13	71:3 82:12 85:1	154:6	53:14 72:20,25
96:18	<b>abusers</b> 9:24	118:13 147:8,9,14	<b>address</b> 119:15	73:3,7,8,25 80:17
<b>absolutely</b> 12:12	139:12	147:17	125:13	81:20 89:20 90:11
25:17 39:21 45:10	<b>abusing</b> 34:15 59:8	<b>acted</b> 28:24	<b>addresses</b> 64:17	<b>Agency-CEOP</b>
47:11 50:4 52:5	<b>abusive</b> 24:9	<b>acting</b> 28:5 130:7	<b>adds</b> 51:18	20:21
62:21 69:16 74:18	<b>academia</b> 99:11	<b>action</b> 20:7 26:24	<b>adept</b> 121:8	<b>agenda</b> 76:19 97:9
98:12 100:12	<b>academic</b> 43:20	27:6 28:11 29:16	<b>adequate</b> 28:5 84:5	149:6
106:16 107:12	83:9 113:8 114:12	29:25 31:5 48:17	132:10	<b>aggravating</b> 150:9
110:6 132:25	148:8	59:5,19 60:8	<b>adequately</b> 61:18	<b>aggregated</b> 78:16
135:12 138:14	<b>academics</b> 99:8	88:21 130:10	<b>adhere</b> 108:15	<b>ago</b> 44:7 59:20
143:23 146:18	136:11	131:16 152:25	<b>adjourned</b> 156:8	135:24 138:19
153:5	<b>ACC</b> 130:25 131:7	153:15	<b>adjournment</b> 86:19	<b>agree</b> 82:16 138:15
<b>absorb</b> 16:21	<b>accept</b> 44:6 111:14	<b>actionable</b> 26:18	<b>administered</b> 124:7	138:16
<b>abundantly</b> 85:8	152:4	<b>actioned</b> 26:12,16	<b>administration</b>	<b>agreed</b> 7:6 107:10
107:9	<b>accepted</b> 32:20,20	<b>actioning</b> 129:16	27:18	<b>agreement</b> 7:21
	<b>access</b> 3:18,23,25	<b>actions</b> 154:18	<b>admission</b> 153:8,12	82:7
	4:4,6,14 29:2	<b>activated</b> 67:20	<b>admit</b> 153:6	<b>ahead</b> 64:4 133:10



<p><b>aim</b> 9:19 17:10  <b>aimed</b> 116:19  <b>aims</b> 117:20,22  <b>albeit</b> 70:25  <b>alight</b> 44:18 59:22  85:19 147:6  <b>align</b> 95:13  <b>allegation</b> 13:20  <b>alleged</b> 137:7  <b>Allied</b> 137:25  <b>allocate</b> 15:5  118:19  <b>allocated</b> 26:19  92:5  <b>allocating</b> 141:11  <b>allow</b> 3:20 35:15  64:24 108:17,17  123:7 153:20  <b>allowed</b> 151:11  <b>allows</b> 115:6 130:3  152:11 153:24  <b>alluded</b> 122:13  138:19 149:9  <b>alongside</b> 48:25  53:9,10,15 72:24  110:19  <b>alternative</b> 104:1  107:2,9 113:3  117:8 140:2  152:21 153:2  154:1  <b>ambassadors</b> 41:16  42:19 45:13,13  <b>ambition</b> 12:17  92:1,7,19 94:12  95:4,5 96:1,4  <b>amount</b> 28:12 48:3  65:20 66:3 110:11  128:22 136:22  <b>analogy</b> 36:23  <b>analyse</b> 100:16  126:21  <b>analysed</b> 10:10  <b>analysis</b> 82:24 83:5  83:13 92:13  110:10 117:2</p>	<p>123:23 128:9  <b>analyst</b> 88:17 92:3  95:12,13,15,23  <b>analysts</b> 80:24  87:25 88:3 89:3  91:3,16,20 94:17  95:3  <b>analytical</b> 95:14  97:2  <b>ANDREW</b> 1:6  156:13  <b>anger</b> 104:3  <b>animated</b> 45:23  <b>Annexed</b> 85:17  <b>anonymisation</b>  22:2 65:2  <b>anonymising</b> 64:16  <b>anonymity</b> 3:20 4:2  6:5 64:18  <b>anonymous</b> 4:15  <b>anonymously</b>  48:16  <b>answer</b> 19:2 63:8  69:3 91:21 94:11  96:9 135:9 142:12  154:7  <b>answering</b> 112:19  <b>answers</b> 101:17  135:21  <b>anybody</b> 63:17  <b>anymore</b> 112:17  <b>anyway</b> 111:22  <b>appalling</b> 110:14  <b>apparent</b> 18:12  34:18  <b>appears</b> 57:21  <b>applications</b>  142:21  <b>applied</b> 9:25  107:24 108:3  <b>apply</b> 108:14  <b>applying</b> 87:3,9  <b>appreciate</b> 72:6  116:2  <b>appreciated</b> 139:2  <b>appreciation</b> 97:21</p>	<p>98:25  <b>apprehend</b> 122:23  <b>apprised</b> 154:23  <b>approach</b> 47:23  54:10 67:17 77:3  89:21,23 107:2,21  114:22 118:3  134:7,18 140:1  141:10 144:14  150:15 151:25  155:5  <b>approaches</b> 144:9  <b>approaching</b>  132:10 134:24  <b>appropriate</b> 28:11  29:25 78:8 80:13  80:21 86:14  101:15 106:22  111:10 113:25  <b>appropriately</b>  146:1  <b>approximately</b>  6:13  <b>apps</b> 134:25  <b>April</b> 7:5 13:16  23:22 140:16  <b>area</b> 7:24 18:23,25  27:1 36:22 38:9  64:13 75:19 81:10  81:23 86:6 137:4  145:22 147:7  <b>areas</b> 2:12 35:7  39:10 50:25 62:21  65:17 72:19 78:13  78:18 83:14 89:7  94:14 105:10,15  132:18,18 145:16  <b>arena</b> 88:20  <b>argue</b> 110:2  <b>argument</b> 21:19  120:8 137:15  <b>arm</b> 52:12 110:24  <b>arousing</b> 147:21  <b>arrangement</b> 70:24  <b>arrest</b> 17:21 19:3,5  19:7,12,15 66:25</p>	<p>67:15 134:19  145:8  <b>arrested</b> 11:19 12:1  40:8 104:7 106:13  <b>arresting</b> 17:4  35:10,12 67:8,11  67:24 69:2,6  110:4 142:9,11  <b>arrests</b> 13:17 14:1  14:18 15:7 19:18  19:22 20:8,11,25  21:8,10,15 70:7  105:4,13 109:4  121:13 131:14  136:8  <b>Arsenal</b> 148:4  <b>article</b> 104:16  <b>artificial</b> 145:18,19  <b>aside</b> 11:12  <b>asked</b> 78:25 107:1  129:19 136:16  <b>aspect</b> 34:21 40:15  55:5 138:23  <b>aspects</b> 125:4,5  132:7  <b>assault</b> 5:14  <b>assaults</b> 108:19  <b>assess</b> 2:13,14 6:13  <b>assessed</b> 6:16 8:6  10:11,15 14:14  23:4 62:6 82:15  120:6  <b>assessment</b> 9:14  10:1,4,16 30:7  53:17 64:2,5,7  65:19,22 82:17,18  88:24 102:11  107:4 113:5,18  114:5,6,9,10,23  114:25 115:1  116:4,6,22 117:5  117:9,12,14  133:19  <b>assessments</b> 11:11  28:13  <b>assets</b> 92:9</p>	<p><b>assignment</b> 72:14  <b>assist</b> 9:5 31:18  33:9 43:17,25  47:15 52:9 61:18  62:1 76:21 101:16  139:7 145:2  147:24  <b>assistance</b> 37:6  142:5 149:8  <b>assisted</b> 1:24  <b>Assuming</b> 107:3  <b>attached</b> 111:23  <b>attacks</b> 76:3  <b>attempt</b> 50:22 95:5  <b>attempts</b> 50:16  59:25  <b>attend</b> 110:20  <b>attendance</b> 82:4  <b>attention</b> 44:19  57:7,8 58:6 106:3  <b>attitude</b> 149:12  <b>attracted</b> 77:11  <b>attributed</b> 79:25  <b>au</b> 92:24  <b>August</b> 23:23 27:25  <b>authorised</b> 13:5  <b>authorities</b> 6:2  <b>authority</b> 144:25  <b>authors</b> 45:1,6  <b>automated</b> 24:16  <b>automatic</b> 24:14  <b>availability</b> 148:13  148:15  <b>available</b> 4:6 7:2,4  19:13 23:19 36:17  50:23 59:10 68:1  73:4 74:17 86:25  115:18 138:2  147:10  <b>average</b> 1:18  <b>award</b> 146:12  <b>aware</b> 31:15 37:8  43:8,15 55:1 61:7  62:13,15 75:14  77:1 86:23 100:21  114:11 122:6</p>
---	--	--	---	--



45:24 <b>case</b> 22:8,9 26:16 26:19 27:12,20,24 28:2,7 29:7,13,20 29:20 35:4 37:23 96:23 99:25 100:18 104:17 106:1 113:16,17 115:21 117:22,23 117:24,25 120:5,6 120:9 130:12,18 130:18,21 131:22 148:25 <b>cases</b> 3:1 15:5 26:22 27:5 28:9 28:17 29:4,9,12 29:19 30:1 31:1,2 31:3,3 39:13,16 56:4 65:5 118:15 119:24 120:11 121:12 127:17 134:11 152:24 <b>catalyst</b> 57:6 <b>categories</b> 6:17 <b>categorisation</b> 25:24,25 26:3 <b>caught</b> 22:15 69:19 120:1 140:4,4 <b>cause</b> 111:2 125:5 <b>causes</b> 72:13 93:2 122:5 <b>caution</b> 24:22 104:2 107:23,25 109:21 111:7 152:20,23 153:6 153:11,16 <b>cautioning</b> 152:18 <b>cautions</b> 108:14,15 110:19 124:7 <b>caveat</b> 153:21 <b>caveats</b> 27:25 <b>cent</b> 1:19 6:15,17 10:14,17,21,24 12:13,16,19 61:23 62:10 103:2,3,24 113:16,16 114:14	114:18 116:11,12 126:14 134:2 140:9 141:1 151:20 <b>Center</b> 22:25 <b>central</b> 46:14 <b>centre</b> 53:13,24 <b>CEOP</b> 14:12,13 15:24 16:4,5,17 18:3 21:1 22:13 23:9,19 27:21 28:3 39:6,23 40:10 46:13,14 47:12,17,21,23 48:11 49:1 50:17 50:23 51:22 59:25 60:1 72:12 82:20 130:5 135:5 <b>CEOP's</b> 44:3 <b>CEOP-NCA</b> 54:1 <b>certain</b> 28:12 107:5 117:14 148:10 <b>certainly</b> 2:8,12,13 18:14,16 22:7 25:4 28:15 33:18 33:23 39:4 41:15 41:23 43:10 44:5 45:12 46:4,20,21 46:24 51:1,11,24 56:10,12,23 64:14 65:5,17 93:19 103:10 105:6 108:25 111:11 123:24 125:5 128:16 135:12,22 142:11 144:16 145:2 146:25 <b>cetera</b> 14:19 41:3 69:6 <b>chair</b> 1:3,4,4 4:20 7:10,15 11:10 14:8 43:14 47:15 52:16,18 70:20 74:21,22 77:1 86:12,16 88:6,10 101:7 121:23	152:14 156:5,6 <b>chair's</b> 77:10 <b>chaired</b> 18:20 <b>challenge</b> 22:4,5 135:23 136:4 137:1,18 142:18 <b>challenged</b> 125:23 <b>challenges</b> 33:14 42:14 52:14 63:22 64:3,12 82:25 83:5 98:18 102:2 104:19 126:18 133:3,10,14,15,19 133:20 139:23 143:9 154:23 <b>championed</b> 61:24 <b>championing</b> 45:14 <b>chances</b> 151:5 <b>change</b> 89:19 97:20 99:3 125:16 127:4 127:20,25 152:3 <b>changes</b> 12:10 43:2 64:7 77:2 129:1 <b>changing</b> 97:13 99:22 <b>channel</b> 65:1 <b>characteristics</b> 43:11,18,19 <b>charge</b> 124:4 151:22 <b>charged</b> 5:13 104:7 111:25 <b>charity</b> 139:11 146:5 <b>chat</b> 63:4 137:22 143:5 <b>check</b> 32:5 33:22 33:24 108:6 <b>checks</b> 120:7 <b>Chelsea</b> 148:4 <b>chief</b> 13:5 18:20 72:2,3 75:1,6 76:13,15 78:3 79:1 80:8 81:14 81:21 83:3 86:7 86:21 87:7 89:9	90:21 94:22 96:16 96:21 100:6,22 101:8 105:1 107:14 114:7 122:2 125:11 130:24 131:1 133:12 135:19 138:12,25 141:10 142:17 147:22 152:13 154:20 <b>Chiefs'</b> 80:14 89:11 104:4 <b>child</b> 1:12 3:11 5:15 6:20,23 7:24 7:24 13:13,21 26:11,15 27:23 28:25 29:1,7,23 30:10,19,24 31:15 31:18,20,24 33:5 34:13 35:7 41:4 49:18 50:2 53:19 53:24 54:10 56:21 57:14,24 58:14,18 58:19 59:8 60:23 61:19 62:19 63:20 64:6 65:7 68:8 69:8 75:15 76:5 76:13,14,22 77:3 77:6 78:1 79:6,12 79:22,24 80:22,23 81:11 82:12,15 86:24 87:1,25 88:7,20,21 94:1,9 102:16 105:18 116:18 118:21 121:2 122:4 124:7 124:18,19,21 128:20 129:3,15 130:19 131:23 132:7,24 133:6 138:8,15 139:11 143:19,25 145:3,3 147:18,19 148:20 150:22 <b>child-centred</b> 53:17	<b>ChildLine</b> 45:1 50:3,8 <b>children</b> 8:20 9:18 13:4,11,12,18 15:1 17:13,24 18:17 21:25 23:1 23:9 25:16 31:23 34:16 38:11,16 39:20 40:7 41:3,9 41:14,21,21 42:5 42:17 45:8,19,20 46:2,5,10 47:10 48:4 49:6,13,17 65:21 66:23 67:13 68:8,12,23,24 69:18 72:7 77:18 77:19 79:21 92:17 115:14 119:9,15 123:18 124:3,25 127:13,17 131:24 135:1 137:7 142:1 143:4,6 144:13,15 144:19 145:25 146:9,9,19 147:4 148:9,21 151:4 154:2 <b>children's</b> 137:8 <b>choose</b> 155:19 <b>circa</b> 87:16 <b>circumstances</b> 60:23 103:22 121:3 152:24 154:19 <b>cities</b> 88:11 93:4,6 <b>civil</b> 78:14 79:5 <b>clarify</b> 152:17 <b>classified</b> 10:17 114:15,18 <b>clean</b> 57:16 <b>clear</b> 2:23 11:2 70:9,9 72:5,11 79:9 80:4,8 85:3,8 85:11 87:2,19 88:8 90:17 96:17 99:7 107:7,9 109:18 133:7
--	--	---	---	--

<p><b>clearly</b> 4:16 6:25 8:9 13:24 14:13 19:9 27:22 28:24 37:9 38:4 51:14 52:2 61:9 63:9 78:18 84:7,22 101:24 105:2,9 110:18 116:10 119:21 123:15 124:1 125:3 129:19 145:22</p> <p><b>click</b> 23:9 46:13,14 47:12,17,21,23 50:17,23 51:22 59:25 60:1 135:5 148:19</p> <p><b>clicks</b> 148:6</p> <p><b>clock</b> 120:20</p> <p><b>close</b> 49:21</p> <p><b>closely</b> 29:9 49:20 54:8,21 94:4 132:14 139:25</p> <p><b>closer</b> 104:8</p> <p><b>cloud</b> 64:8,13</p> <p><b>Coban</b> 5:10,13</p> <p><b>coercive</b> 152:5</p> <p><b>coherent</b> 104:22 141:14,19,21 142:3</p> <p><b>cohesive</b> 79:19 94:13</p> <p><b>collaboration</b> 17:19 31:21 35:14 49:22 56:2</p> <p><b>collaboratively</b> 22:6 48:21</p> <p><b>collating</b> 97:5</p> <p><b>colleagues</b> 17:7 76:17 87:8 94:5 99:24 100:2 141:6 141:22,23 151:9</p> <p><b>collect</b> 14:22 15:11</p> <p><b>College</b> 76:9 155:15</p> <p><b>colloquially</b> 109:18 139:8</p>	<p><b>colours</b> 48:3</p> <p><b>column</b> 19:12,14 19:16 95:1</p> <p><b>columns</b> 94:21</p> <p><b>combat</b> 5:1 7:22 35:16 36:20 82:12</p> <p><b>combating</b> 78:22</p> <p><b>combined</b> 13:9</p> <p><b>come</b> 3:4 6:14 24:15 25:10,23 27:21 33:10,14 36:13,19 37:6 46:15,22 47:8 49:4 51:21 52:10 54:8 61:15 76:14 77:24 81:8 84:11 84:18 90:14 92:14 97:13 106:1 108:6 116:23 118:10 121:6 123:12 127:10,13,16 132:15 133:15 135:20</p> <p><b>comes</b> 18:19 23:7 24:17 42:15 89:5 96:16 100:7</p> <p><b>comfort</b> 34:17</p> <p><b>comfortable</b> 48:13 127:14 128:3</p> <p><b>comfortably</b> 110:15</p> <p><b>coming</b> 22:9 51:7 60:16 85:14 111:22,24 127:21 130:5 151:25</p> <p><b>command</b> 72:18 74:6 82:21 133:5</p> <p><b>comment</b> 29:12</p> <p><b>comments</b> 100:25 101:12,20,22 102:4 112:25 144:9</p> <p><b>commercial</b> 34:5 147:11</p> <p><b>commission</b> 125:14</p> <p><b>commissioned</b> 43:9</p>	<p>43:16 83:10 85:6 113:10</p> <p><b>commissioner</b> 87:8</p> <p><b>Commissioners</b> 71:16,20,23 72:2 80:9</p> <p><b>commit</b> 9:21 17:15 69:17 70:15</p> <p><b>commitment</b> 96:18</p> <p><b>committed</b> 2:14 24:13 25:17,19 30:23 39:15 84:13 118:17 123:17 149:24 150:2</p> <p><b>Committee</b> 75:22 81:24 101:3,25 105:3 112:22</p> <p><b>committees</b> 75:22</p> <p><b>committing</b> 68:22</p> <p><b>commonly</b> 3:6</p> <p><b>communicate</b> 5:20 49:6</p> <p><b>communicating</b> 38:11</p> <p><b>communication</b> 37:10</p> <p><b>communications</b> 14:22 15:2,12,22 16:3 20:3 55:18 60:20 65:15</p> <p><b>community</b> 39:19 103:5 104:15 109:11</p> <p><b>companies</b> 23:1 37:12,14,16,17,22 55:19 60:20 61:4 62:24 137:22 145:16 154:4</p> <p><b>company</b> 58:6 59:16 60:8 61:10 62:18</p> <p><b>comparison</b> 48:6 67:8</p> <p><b>compelling</b> 100:18 117:13</p> <p><b>competing</b> 58:2</p>	<p>72:8 119:22 120:15,24</p> <p><b>complete</b> 88:20 115:22 116:6 134:8 144:16</p> <p><b>completed</b> 10:1</p> <p><b>completely</b> 127:24</p> <p><b>complex</b> 21:21 31:13 39:1 90:6 94:3 96:10 99:3</p> <p><b>complexity</b> 22:12 87:20 100:15</p> <p><b>compliant</b> 151:12</p> <p><b>compliments</b> 46:25</p> <p><b>compulsory</b> 42:22 45:16 47:9</p> <p><b>computer</b> 5:15 15:1 24:8 115:13 127:10</p> <p><b>computers</b> 15:3 123:24</p> <p><b>computing</b> 60:21</p> <p><b>concentrate</b> 68:18</p> <p><b>concentrated</b> 70:2</p> <p><b>concept</b> 69:4</p> <p><b>concern</b> 4:17,23 6:25 7:12 15:13 28:21 29:6 33:25 64:14 65:2 78:19 101:24 114:21 117:1 125:5 132:1 134:5,16 137:1 141:20 150:21 153:22</p> <p><b>concerned</b> 14:21 18:7 30:8 34:9 46:12,20 62:22 138:17 148:2 150:4</p> <p><b>concerning</b> 2:18 15:3 34:11 82:17 124:8</p> <p><b>concerns</b> 15:18 23:11 29:3 37:6 45:5 46:11 61:19 84:7 133:2 142:19</p>	<p>145:22</p> <p><b>concerted</b> 13:10 22:13</p> <p><b>concludes</b> 74:23 156:3</p> <p><b>conclusions</b> 122:11 122:16</p> <p><b>conditional</b> 103:5 104:14 107:23 109:11 152:18,20 152:23 153:16</p> <p><b>conditions</b> 107:25 108:2 153:10</p> <p><b>conduct</b> 149:1</p> <p><b>conducted</b> 12:21 14:18 20:5,20 21:9 43:7</p> <p><b>conferencing</b> 34:4</p> <p><b>confidence</b> 98:23 115:19 144:19</p> <p><b>confident</b> 29:21</p> <p><b>confirm</b> 82:7</p> <p><b>confirming</b> 91:12</p> <p><b>conflict</b> 99:10</p> <p><b>confront</b> 104:11 111:4 112:3,9 153:11</p> <p><b>confronted</b> 83:8 115:12</p> <p><b>conglomeration</b> 73:25</p> <p><b>conjunction</b> 12:21 16:6 80:16 100:12</p> <p><b>connected</b> 33:5</p> <p><b>consensual</b> 149:23 150:17</p> <p><b>consequence</b> 18:14 39:12,21 40:8 73:9</p> <p><b>consequences</b> 102:9</p> <p><b>consider</b> 1:9 3:5 7:3 19:2,6 30:11 31:10 55:17 63:23 67:3 69:5 76:23 78:25 86:21 91:14</p>
---	--	--	--	--

102:5 105:12 107:21 129:22 138:11 <b>considerable</b> 124:13 <b>consideration</b> 48:4 51:2 <b>considerations</b> 52:6 <b>considered</b> 6:18 43:10 62:2 <b>considering</b> 40:17 66:18 138:21 <b>considers</b> 2:5 40:19 143:11 <b>consistency</b> 118:3 <b>consistent</b> 42:22 43:1 47:9 68:10 79:20 81:3 131:12 <b>consistently</b> 12:11 45:19 93:21 103:19 121:16 <b>consolidating</b> 16:11 74:4 <b>constable</b> 18:20 75:1,6 78:4 79:1 81:14,21 83:3 86:7,21 90:21 94:23 100:6,22 101:8 105:1 107:14 114:7 122:2 125:11 131:1 133:12 135:20 138:12 139:1 142:17 147:22 152:13 <b>constables</b> 72:2 80:8 87:7 89:9 141:10 154:20 <b>Constables'</b> 13:6 72:3 76:15 <b>constant</b> 12:6 43:1 <b>constructed</b> 151:1 <b>constructive</b> 82:17 <b>consultation</b> 76:8 <b>consulted</b> 46:2	<b>contact</b> 9:21,22,24 10:14 13:21 27:14 58:6 64:10 99:10 106:14,20 108:23 109:6 113:14 114:14 116:24 118:12 <b>contacting</b> 154:14 <b>contained</b> 25:2 147:8 <b>containing</b> 5:17 <b>contains</b> 31:25 <b>contend</b> 102:14 <b>content</b> 5:6 56:21 57:5,16 143:12 <b>contention</b> 152:23 <b>contested</b> 103:1 <b>context</b> 5:7 77:25 104:21 112:25 <b>continuation</b> 91:20 <b>continue</b> 15:19 41:2 55:20 66:12 80:1 87:13 102:13 103:17 137:17 142:24 <b>continued</b> 1:6,7 18:25 21:12 33:18 156:13,15 <b>continues</b> 54:2 137:18 <b>continuing</b> 48:14 <b>continuous</b> 155:21 155:22 <b>contrary</b> 21:19 <b>contribute</b> 22:22 149:5 <b>contributing</b> 89:14 <b>contribution</b> 20:23 54:17 <b>control</b> 119:12 <b>convenient</b> 40:22 121:17 <b>conventional</b> 124:23 <b>Convergence</b> 73:15 73:24	<b>conversation</b> 99:14 112:10 144:12 <b>conversations</b> 62:7 141:6 <b>conviction</b> 13:20 <b>convinced</b> 69:16 <b>Cooper</b> 101:21 <b>cooperation</b> 17:20 <b>coordinate</b> 27:17 88:16 <b>coordinated</b> 7:17 13:3,6 17:16,17 19:18 20:18 78:16 80:16,24 83:22 89:16 122:23 <b>coordinating</b> 75:21 75:22 76:1,12 77:13 81:24 <b>coordination</b> 82:6 82:13 83:21 85:15 <b>coordinator</b> 91:13 92:2 94:25 95:11 95:18 <b>coordinators</b> 87:24 88:3 89:3 91:3,15 91:20 94:17 128:1 <b>cope</b> 13:25 15:14 102:24 103:15 <b>coping</b> 110:17 <b>coping'</b> 101:23 <b>correct</b> 1:20 5:24 7:8 10:8,13,20 12:24 18:10 19:24 26:6 33:7 71:18 75:17 82:22 88:1 91:10 107:4 116:11 117:15,16 122:25 123:3,9,13 139:18 150:7,12 <b>correctly</b> 12:5 16:24 <b>correlation</b> 136:7 <b>cost</b> 98:24 <b>costs</b> 98:21 100:17 <b>Council</b> 13:6 72:3 76:15 80:14 89:11	104:4 <b>counsel</b> 98:17 140:3 152:20 <b>counter</b> 78:9 <b>countries</b> 23:5 <b>country</b> 60:12 72:8 88:7,12,25 89:7 93:18 142:7 <b>county</b> 76:3 92:16 92:24 93:3 94:9 97:22 112:15 <b>course</b> 5:22 21:15 51:9 54:11 67:22 75:11 76:24 77:16 90:12 91:17 94:2 99:2 100:6 101:4 123:10 129:18 130:8 135:14,15 137:13 154:11 <b>courses</b> 110:25,25 <b>court</b> 5:23 102:22 103:20 108:10,12 109:12,15,17 111:25 113:25 134:9,10 145:11 153:17 <b>court's</b> 145:11 <b>courts</b> 71:3 82:12 85:1 103:1 104:20 105:8 108:21 110:11 152:22 <b>coverage</b> 110:3 136:22 <b>covered</b> 16:25 112:20 <b>covers</b> 79:23 <b>create</b> 88:22,23 93:7 94:5 102:10 133:4 134:25 153:19 154:6 <b>created</b> 45:11 152:10 <b>creates</b> 104:3 <b>creating</b> 111:1 148:16 <b>creation</b> 125:20	<b>credibility</b> 146:21 <b>crime</b> 8:24 9:2 13:8 14:7 15:25 16:17 17:23 18:2 20:1 20:20 21:4 26:15 28:23 30:23 33:5 36:7,8 37:2 39:23 47:7 64:2 66:15 68:2 71:3,16,20 71:23 72:1 73:25 75:22 78:15 79:4 79:25 80:2,9,17 80:17 81:1,20,24 82:12 85:1,2 88:14 89:10,20 90:8,11 91:25 92:1,8 93:16,17 94:6,14 97:16,17 99:15 123:21 126:3,12 127:7 128:8 131:22 132:10 150:2,20 150:22 151:12,14 151:21 <b>crimes</b> 70:15 106:9 <b>criminal</b> 2:18 6:23 14:19 50:9 92:23 104:10 105:10,15 107:22 111:24 149:22 152:9,21 <b>criminalise</b> 152:11 <b>criminalised</b> 151:4 <b>criminalising</b> 150:16 <b>criminality</b> 6:19 36:16 97:22 <b>criminally</b> 6:10 <b>criteria</b> 3:25 <b>critical</b> 83:25 <b>criticise</b> 44:18 <b>criticism</b> 150:14 <b>criticisms</b> 45:5 46:24 150:24 <b>cross-border</b> 90:8 <b>crossed</b> 5:9 <b>Crown</b> 102:22
--	--	---	---	--

103:1 104:19	3:17,18 99:19	130:14 133:2,3	131:10	29:3 30:11 31:9
105:7 108:9,18,21	<b>dashboard</b> 130:3	143:20 145:4	<b>delay</b> 28:4 51:19	38:25 40:24 43:8
109:12 110:10	<b>data</b> 14:22 15:2,12	<b>deals</b> 60:15	59:13 129:14	43:24 44:5 47:20
113:25 134:9,10	15:22 16:3 19:3,5	<b>dealt</b> 30:18 73:8	130:22	52:11 60:19 61:17
<b>CSA</b> 6:11 33:12	19:7,12,13,16	107:6 119:5 120:9	<b>delays</b> 123:21,25	67:3 71:24 74:24
61:5,6 80:5,6 98:8	20:3 115:4 128:7	120:12 121:1	126:12 128:8,18	84:20 129:20
<b>CSA/E</b> 94:24 95:2	140:13,14 151:12	133:11	129:24	<b>derided</b> 21:15
<b>CSE</b> 87:12 92:15	<b>database</b> 31:16,18	<b>dearly</b> 155:10	<b>deliver</b> 85:13 96:22	<b>descend</b> 122:10
97:3 128:1 144:17	31:20,23,25 32:6	<b>debate</b> 103:25	108:13	<b>describe</b> 115:3
144:18	32:16 33:6,8	104:23 107:16	<b>delivered</b> 45:19	<b>described</b> 70:25
<b>CSEA</b> 2:14 6:23	80:23 128:21,24	110:18 112:11	68:11 108:11	125:21 140:2
7:18 19:18 57:5	129:4	114:4	146:21 155:21	144:5
64:9 96:18 97:4	<b>databases</b> 33:2	<b>deceived</b> 38:11,13	<b>delivering</b> 96:12	<b>describes</b> 85:22
97:23 98:5,12	<b>date</b> 23:20 45:19	<b>December</b> 13:16	<b>delivery</b> 128:1	<b>description</b> 153:12
<b>cuckoo</b> 93:11	81:15 87:14	126:25	<b>demand</b> 1:23 13:24	<b>design</b> 35:25 38:2
<b>culminated</b> 20:2	<b>dated</b> 77:25	<b>decide</b> 28:11 96:22	14:23 15:9 16:21	41:7
<b>cultural</b> 89:19	<b>day</b> 120:24,24,25	<b>decision</b> 96:25	25:6 120:24	<b>designed</b> 31:24
127:4,25	<b>day-to-day</b> 118:16	115:10 116:1,8	134:15 142:22	36:4,5 68:3
<b>Cumbria</b> 117:19,22	<b>days</b> 26:17 81:16	117:8 118:22	143:17	151:11
<b>current</b> 69:5 95:14	117:23,24,25	120:16 124:4	<b>demands</b> 15:15	<b>designing</b> 37:1
95:24 107:22	121:1 133:25	131:3	52:3 119:22	<b>desire</b> 56:1 57:22
152:24	<b>DBS</b> 108:5	<b>decisions</b> 71:11	120:15	57:23
<b>currently</b> 35:24	<b>DCC</b> 131:1	113:23 114:1	<b>demonstrate</b> 80:19	<b>desk</b> 92:11 135:25
67:20 68:3 75:14	<b>deal</b> 6:11 17:11	118:17	100:11 142:8	<b>detail</b> 22:9 33:17
83:1 87:22 90:17	25:7 27:15 28:22	<b>declares</b> 151:15	151:20	33:24 48:17 60:7
91:24 92:2 105:13	29:24 31:1,2 38:7	<b>decline</b> 20:13	<b>demonstrated</b> 85:6	73:13 82:1 100:7
143:10	39:22 50:8,11	<b>decommissioned</b>	90:1 104:8 121:13	122:10 129:17
<b>custodial</b> 103:24	52:4 55:5 65:11	74:10	<b>demonstrating</b>	<b>detailed</b> 20:2
112:5	69:1 90:6,9,22	<b>decrease</b> 21:6	104:6	<b>details</b> 11:14 58:7
<b>cut</b> 147:22	91:2 93:13 102:12	<b>decreasing</b> 65:20	<b>denigrate</b> 95:5	59:18 64:18
<b>cyber</b> 78:15 79:4	102:25 105:18,20	66:3	<b>denigrated</b> 116:12	<b>detect</b> 4:25 39:25
	105:21 108:19	<b>dedicated</b> 5:3 15:21	<b>denying</b> 116:3	138:8
	117:17 119:16	16:2 17:4 18:18	<b>department</b> 48:23	<b>detected</b> 6:6,6 22:3
<b>D</b>	124:9 126:20	29:24 48:23 97:3	<b>departments</b>	22:15 39:11 68:22
<b>D</b> 156:11	127:8,20 130:19	98:12 125:19	131:20	<b>detection</b> 26:14
<b>daily</b> 16:4,21 71:9	132:2 133:23	132:17 139:11	<b>dependent</b> 114:5	87:1 88:5
114:2 120:19	134:11 135:22	<b>dedication</b> 39:22	146:4	<b>detective</b> 88:15
<b>danger</b> 109:25	138:2 143:17	<b>deem</b> 109:7	<b>deployment</b> 80:23	92:2,9 96:15,16
116:16	149:20	<b>deemed</b> 79:10	<b>deployments</b> 131:4	96:21 97:8 119:6
<b>dangerous</b> 10:12	<b>dealing</b> 4:16 30:6	119:23 150:5	<b>depraved</b> 38:17	121:3 130:24,24
21:22 114:14	33:12 38:21 60:13	<b>deep</b> 3:14	40:2 68:22	133:6
<b>dangers</b> 41:4 42:13	67:4 92:21 93:9	<b>defendant</b> 5:11	<b>depravity</b> 40:6	<b>detects</b> 57:13
<b>dare</b> 111:2	103:8 104:18	<b>definitely</b> 25:19	<b>depth</b> 131:5	<b>deter</b> 69:7,14,16,22
<b>dark</b> 4:17,25 5:9,12	107:17 108:20	33:13 49:3 58:8	<b>deputy</b> 2:4 5:7 7:5	<b>determination</b> 6:7
6:9,16 7:1 17:14	109:2 113:4	<b>degree</b> 94:16	7:14,15 10:9	<b>determined</b> 69:17
40:1 72:18 99:19	124:21 127:6	101:11 115:19	15:18 19:7 25:10	70:16 115:10
<b>darknet</b> 3:7,10,17				

<b>deterred</b> 66:16	<b>directives</b> 117:13	<b>dissemination</b> 5:14	<b>drugs</b> 93:4,5 97:18	<b>eight-</b> 28:4
<b>deterrence</b> 69:4	<b>directly</b> 102:5	<b>disseminations</b>	<b>dual</b> 106:20	<b>either</b> 45:1 47:1
<b>deterrent</b> 67:11	<b>director</b> 2:4 5:8 7:5	27:13	<b>due</b> 5:22 46:25	65:3 66:5 106:20
69:12 70:13	7:13,14,15 10:9	<b>distance</b> 155:21	90:18 100:6 101:4	122:7 135:6
109:24 110:6	15:18 16:25 19:7	<b>distinction</b> 106:18	123:10 129:18	<b>electronic</b> 60:20
<b>deduct</b> 43:6 51:13	25:10 29:3 30:11	106:23	135:14,15	<b>element</b> 40:20
<b>detriment</b> 116:17	31:9 38:25 40:24	<b>distinguish</b> 25:14	<b>Dutch</b> 5:13,22	91:19 93:25 98:7
<b>develop</b> 12:8 33:14	43:8,24 44:5	<b>distracted</b> 153:22	<b>duty</b> 78:6	98:13 110:20
58:1 81:2 82:8	47:20 52:11 60:19	<b>distribute</b> 24:10	<b>dynamic</b> 12:10	113:7 134:18
<b>developed</b> 31:20	61:17 67:3 74:24	<b>distributed</b> 59:2		141:18 152:10
33:19 85:21 89:20	82:20 129:20	<b>distributing</b> 9:17	<b>E</b>	<b>elements</b> 155:18
136:9	<b>director-general</b>	<b>divergence</b> 95:24	<b>E</b> 156:11	<b>eliminate</b> 30:21
<b>developing</b> 81:9	71:13,24,25 81:20	<b>diversion</b> 153:3	<b>earlier</b> 53:2,14	<b>elimination</b> 12:2
<b>development</b> 76:8	82:10 84:21 85:18	<b>divided</b> 75:21	59:23,25 131:25	<b>embarking</b> 86:13
76:9 80:22 81:5	86:5 89:17,18	<b>dividing</b> 133:7	<b>early</b> 86:13 126:5	<b>embedded</b> 53:4
90:1 129:3 155:22	<b>director-general's</b>	<b>document</b> 47:17	<b>easier</b> 155:25	154:2
155:22	84:25	77:21,24 78:4,23	<b>easily</b> 4:1	<b>emerged</b> 66:19
<b>device</b> 127:9	<b>discharge</b> 104:15	78:25 95:18	<b>easy</b> 96:9	<b>emergence</b> 77:17
<b>devices</b> 13:18 14:3	109:11	<b>doing</b> 4:19 5:1	<b>Economy</b> 147:8	92:16
32:5 123:23 126:8	<b>discharges</b> 103:6	25:19,22 34:22	<b>edge</b> 84:16 122:12	<b>emergencies</b> 78:14
127:12 128:9	<b>disciplines</b> 74:1	38:7,16 69:10	<b>educate</b> 41:3	79:5
<b>diet</b> 127:5	<b>disclose</b> 151:7	83:17 86:10 96:25	134:23	<b>emerges</b> 74:16
<b>difference</b> 108:10	<b>disclosed</b> 151:17	105:9 118:6	<b>educated</b> 146:19	<b>emerging</b> 34:10
128:21	<b>Disclosure</b> 108:5	120:19 121:16	<b>educating</b> 66:22	38:10 65:2 76:10
<b>different</b> 3:15	151:6,18	128:20 130:11	<b>education</b> 42:21,22	83:12
12:18 40:15 86:13	<b>discretion</b> 55:22	133:22,23 134:3	42:25 44:4 45:16	<b>emphasis</b> 116:17
89:20,21 94:14	56:1,2	137:16 141:16	47:10 68:5,5,6,9	<b>enable</b> 32:16 36:6
96:14 99:14,24	<b>discuss</b> 50:25	142:5 143:1,2,4	135:7 142:4 144:6	41:14 68:17 141:4
110:24 111:1,15	<b>discussed</b> 59:25	145:17 155:24	146:10,20 151:9	<b>enabled</b> 8:21 35:22
113:9,9 114:22	82:13	<b>donating</b> 141:4	<b>educational</b> 41:8	64:10 71:5
124:22 127:22	<b>discussing</b> 147:23	<b>door</b> 119:11	<b>effect</b> 80:6 82:2	<b>enabler</b> 36:2
128:19 151:23	<b>discussion</b> 102:10	<b>doors</b> 132:17	94:2 105:10	<b>enables</b> 4:13 9:23
<b>differentiate</b> 9:19	<b>displacement</b> 65:23	<b>doubt</b> 74:16 102:4	109:14 121:21	34:15 39:7,14
<b>differing</b> 26:23	<b>disposal</b> 109:15	134:14 147:21	123:5 124:1	50:7 150:1
<b>difficult</b> 4:8 35:3,7	116:1 117:8,10	<b>downloads</b> 46:6	<b>effective</b> 7:20 8:7	<b>enabling</b> 35:19
63:8 70:14	131:6	<b>drafting</b> 123:24	85:2,4	<b>encompasses</b> 98:6
<b>difficulties</b> 35:8	<b>disregard</b> 137:2	<b>draw</b> 44:19 73:9	<b>efficacy</b> 123:6	<b>encourage</b> 112:10
154:12,24	<b>disruption</b> 104:22	134:7 138:8	<b>efficient</b> 7:20 8:7	141:8
<b>digital</b> 14:1 147:8	141:14,19,21	<b>drawing</b> 46:25	85:1,3	<b>encrypted</b> 5:16
<b>direct</b> 34:15 71:10	153:23	<b>drawn</b> 106:19,23	<b>efficiently</b> 108:20	65:7
71:13 95:20 136:7	<b>disseminate</b> 29:5	<b>drew</b> 44:6	<b>effort</b> 13:10 21:11	<b>encryption</b> 5:16
<b>directed</b> 13:7 84:22	71:10	<b>drive</b> 5:17 45:7	22:13 70:12 79:20	64:13,19,24 65:11
<b>direction</b> 91:25	<b>disseminated</b> 20:6	136:1	124:13	136:3
94:4 98:1 130:15	27:2,6,13,22 28:3	<b>driven</b> 89:16	<b>efforts</b> 45:6 50:16	<b>ended</b> 27:23
155:5	28:9,10 29:19,21	<b>driving</b> 148:10,25	51:22 64:21 65:25	<b>endorsed</b> 32:22
<b>directive</b> 118:2	29:22 62:25	<b>drug</b> 93:9,9	66:20 70:2	<b>ends</b> 1:25 95:11

<b>enforce</b> 111:17	125:25 132:22	154:10 156:3,5	<b>exist</b> 131:20	<b>exposed</b> 137:9
<b>enforcement</b> 4:24	135:1 143:6	<b>evidence-based</b>	<b>existing</b> 80:2	148:9
6:7 8:23 9:16	<b>envisage</b> 60:4 65:10	102:11	<b>exists</b> 112:6 145:17	<b>express</b> 24:12
17:22 22:3 23:13	143:1	<b>evidenced</b> 22:7	152:2	95:10
30:24 31:25 32:7	<b>envisaged</b> 88:3	<b>evolves</b> 33:16	<b>exit</b> 49:10,10	<b>extensive</b> 39:5
33:21 51:7 57:4	<b>equally</b> 20:24 22:1	<b>evolving</b> 2:5,7	<b>expand</b> 19:6,11	<b>extent</b> 4:16 65:23
57:23 59:21 60:12	31:3 49:9 95:1,12	38:10	37:22 73:10	66:4 73:21 92:22
61:18 63:21 64:25	<b>equipment</b> 126:5,6	<b>exact</b> 33:22	<b>expect</b> 29:25 70:13	120:1
65:6,25 67:6,22	<b>equipped</b> 50:11	<b>exactly</b> 30:1 68:19	99:12 101:8 121:3	<b>extortion</b> 150:11
68:17 83:1 84:6	127:18	81:7	<b>expectation</b> 30:22	<b>extradite</b> 6:2
85:22 88:4 106:3	<b>eradicate</b> 12:4	<b>Examination</b> 1:7	131:9	<b>extraordinary</b>
107:19 122:23	143:3	75:5 156:15,21	<b>expected</b> 29:11	14:23 15:9
147:15	<b>essence</b> 13:1 34:3	<b>examinations</b>	<b>experience</b> 50:4	<b>extremism</b> 6:22
<b>enforcement's</b>	41:3 47:8	126:15,16	103:10 106:11	<b>eye</b> 152:9
31:19 53:18 87:11	<b>essential</b> 58:21 59:3	<b>examined</b> 29:17	<b>experienced</b> 44:25	
<b>engage</b> 18:16 22:1	<b>essentially</b> 61:20	<b>examining</b> 102:1	123:20,22 154:13	<b>F</b>
143:7	71:7 86:1 132:3,5	<b>example</b> 1:17 5:8	<b>experiencing</b>	<b>face</b> 42:14,14 143:9
<b>engaged</b> 140:17	138:7 150:21	21:14 27:20 28:2	128:18	<b>Facebook</b> 137:5,9
<b>engagement</b> 56:15	<b>establish</b> 35:3	30:2,5 36:19 58:5	<b>expert</b> 97:4	<b>faced</b> 52:14 83:5,14
56:23 76:8 82:5	<b>established</b> 23:19	66:22 72:17 95:9	<b>expertise</b> 90:13	98:19 133:14,16
155:9	77:12	95:17 117:19	<b>experts</b> 136:11,13	154:15
<b>England</b> 12:22	<b>estate</b> 36:24 37:1,2	125:17 126:2	<b>expire</b> 90:18	<b>faces</b> 2:6
118:3	<b>et</b> 14:19 41:3 69:6	129:13,19 135:8	<b>explain</b> 3:9 18:11	<b>facilitate</b> 1:11
<b>enhanced</b> 12:4	<b>ethos</b> 151:25	137:3 138:6	22:20 26:7 54:6	36:16 93:8
<b>enquiries</b> 11:7	<b>evaluated</b> 62:6	142:21 149:23	55:25 60:19 91:24	<b>facilities</b> 3:13 34:14
<b>ensure</b> 6:5 22:4	<b>evaluation</b> 44:6,10	150:9	93:1	35:6 37:19 66:14
27:9 28:7 30:17	44:23 47:3	<b>examples</b> 119:22	<b>explained</b> 30:8	<b>facing</b> 83:2 102:2
42:5,9,17,23,25	<b>eventually</b> 6:6	124:6,16	<b>explicit</b> 38:14,16	104:19,20,20
43:3 45:18 51:10	<b>everybody</b> 97:25	<b>exceptional</b> 65:5	144:11	<b>fact</b> 4:10 16:25
54:20,23 57:6	<b>everyone's</b> 44:19	93:14,15	<b>exploit</b> 93:10,12	18:7 28:24 30:11
64:22 68:11,21	<b>evidence</b> 2:16 5:17	<b>exceptionally</b> 26:13	152:6	42:1 45:22 46:19
69:18 79:20 85:1	8:12 27:20 40:1	<b>excess</b> 48:25	<b>exploitation</b> 54:10	48:22 49:24 60:19
96:12 108:18	44:14 53:2 55:1	<b>exchange</b> 54:22	64:6 79:24 80:24	65:20 72:12 73:6
109:6 118:2 119:8	55:14 57:12 59:23	149:20 150:18	82:13,16 88:7,20	80:10 83:16 85:18
124:25 129:23	65:7,8 66:11,18	<b>exchanged</b> 150:10	88:21 92:10,18	90:23 103:15
130:6,9,21 147:15	74:24 75:11 83:9	<b>exchanging</b> 40:3	93:15 94:1,9	105:24 112:20
151:11,13 154:22	86:14 98:3 100:3	<b>excuse</b> 145:1	97:21 124:8,21,25	113:4 122:17
<b>ensures</b> 62:23	100:20,22 103:23	<b>execute</b> 118:9	<b>exploited</b> 22:25	123:11,16 134:3
<b>ensuring</b> 32:21	106:17,21 110:5,8	<b>executed</b> 115:2,2	92:18 93:23	134:17 139:16
80:15 89:12	110:13 112:19	115:24,25	144:21	140:21 141:14
132:11	122:7,8 124:17	<b>executing</b> 115:9	<b>exploiting</b> 93:4	145:4
<b>entire</b> 108:5 140:10	129:12 131:25	<b>execution</b> 78:6	<b>explore</b> 51:12	<b>factor</b> 70:13
<b>entirely</b> 154:10	135:3 138:3	<b>executive</b> 48:17	104:1	<b>factors</b> 150:9
<b>entirety</b> 14:12	140:21 141:7	<b>exhibit</b> 14:8 19:17	<b>exploring</b> 127:15	<b>facts</b> 60:22
<b>environment</b> 12:10	142:24 145:7	47:14 77:22 94:18	128:19	<b>fade</b> 44:14
97:15 108:13	146:17 150:15	<b>exhibits</b> 75:10	<b>exporting</b> 93:4	<b>failed</b> 108:14



<b>failing</b> 110:13	19:21 20:10,16,21	<b>firstly</b> 22:20 95:8	117:13 118:3,18	<b>foundations</b> 139:8
<b>failings</b> 84:14,19	20:22 21:4,13	101:19 105:1	121:20 122:3,6,9	153:25
155:3	54:15 142:8	<b>fit</b> 27:7 28:15	123:20,22 124:12	<b>four</b> 97:10 98:23
<b>fair</b> 67:1 86:3	<b>file</b> 1:5 66:1,6 75:2	<b>flex</b> 16:16	124:24 125:20	151:3
119:18	75:3 134:8	<b>flexing</b> 121:8	126:14,18,24,25	<b>framework</b> 7:6
<b>fairly</b> 84:1 130:8	<b>file-sharing</b> 65:21	<b>flourish</b> 154:1	128:18,18 129:11	86:2
148:7	65:24 66:4	<b>focus</b> 17:12 30:12	130:6,9,13,18	<b>FRANK</b> 72:5,11
<b>fairness</b> 107:7	<b>final</b> 73:12 149:7	58:10,10,11 70:16	133:14,17,23	73:12,17,19 74:14
<b>fait</b> 92:24	<b>finally</b> 30:6 38:25	74:19 86:6 87:9	135:6 151:23	74:20
<b>Faithfull</b> 55:3	50:15 66:24	89:12 97:17 106:2	155:19	<b>fraud</b> 5:15
138:22 139:9,17	117:11 120:21	121:12 137:19,20	<b>forces'</b> 86:10	<b>friend</b> 143:21 152:8
139:24,25 140:5	124:20	<b>focused</b> 14:12	<b>fore</b> 76:14 127:22	<b>friendly</b> 48:8
140:12,15,23	<b>financial</b> 40:5	38:18,22 78:21	129:4 152:1	<b>front</b> 141:7
141:8 148:14	87:17	89:22 98:5 150:21	<b>foremost</b> 133:24	<b>frontline</b> 154:18
<b>Faithfulls</b> 153:25	<b>find</b> 7:10 14:8 23:2	<b>focusing</b> 2:12 68:19	148:1	<b>frustration</b> 102:17
<b>Falder</b> 22:8,10	24:8,8,9,14,18,19	<b>folder</b> 75:9	<b>forensic</b> 14:2	<b>full</b> 19:12 75:6
<b>falling</b> 6:16	24:19 29:10 33:14	<b>follow</b> 19:20 28:6	123:22 134:6,13	119:7 141:15
<b>familiar</b> 75:18	35:11 38:13 39:9	82:7	<b>forgive</b> 60:14 79:15	<b>fully</b> 101:8 154:23
92:23 101:8	50:10 59:4 60:15	<b>following</b> 56:18	125:22	<b>fund</b> 87:9,24 100:9
<b>family</b> 53:18 126:7	63:19 66:5 94:19	78:24 85:23	<b>form</b> 8:16 17:6	100:10
126:10 137:9	100:4 105:22	118:14 136:18	34:17 35:19 36:7	<b>fundamentally</b>
<b>fantastic</b> 68:7	122:14 129:18	<b>follows</b> 79:3	36:16 45:15 63:20	116:19
<b>far</b> 18:6 30:8 34:8	145:10	<b>forbid</b> 129:25	92:9 103:12	<b>funded</b> 33:20 54:1
37:4 46:19 63:23	<b>finding</b> 2:11 5:4	<b>force</b> 27:2,8,9,11	104:10,13 108:1	<b>funding</b> 15:23 16:9
98:24 110:7	35:5 38:10 104:11	27:14,23 28:4,11	109:8,23 140:5	33:21,22 52:7
113:23 127:18	107:24 108:9,14	28:21 71:10,10	146:12 153:1	54:2 87:3,13,21
130:22 137:16	109:8,10 123:1	78:13 90:15 93:19	<b>formal</b> 104:10	89:4 90:16,22
138:24	<b>findings</b> 103:5	118:8 119:4,11	107:24 108:9,10	91:2,3,7,13,15
<b>father</b> 59:8	110:11 123:14	123:18 125:17,23	108:12 109:8	92:5 95:11 96:9
<b>fault</b> 81:25 98:10	125:3	126:2,16 129:21	110:11 113:24	98:4,16 99:13
<b>favourably</b> 46:22	<b>fine</b> 48:20 147:14	129:22,23 131:21	152:21 153:1,17	141:9
<b>FBI</b> 17:7,12	<b>firearms</b> 6:21	133:10 134:16	<b>format</b> 95:24	<b>funds</b> 90:17
<b>features</b> 80:11	<b>first</b> 1:25 2:1 9:11	135:19 137:4	<b>forms</b> 110:14	<b>further</b> 11:7 16:23
<b>February</b> 81:16	13:3,8 22:18,24	144:22 150:1	<b>forward</b> 33:19	55:14 74:15 87:15
<b>feed</b> 149:13	26:20 31:1,9	155:4	<b>found</b> 2:7 5:18,22	91:12 100:7 104:6
<b>feelings</b> 58:20	40:24 46:7 55:12	<b>force's</b> 135:8	10:11 23:14 24:6	104:9 124:5
<b>felt</b> 95:20	58:9,22 59:14	<b>forced</b> 50:5	24:25 25:18 44:10	151:16
<b>field</b> 37:15 92:4	60:3,18 66:22	<b>forces</b> 9:5 12:22	44:10,23 47:3	<b>future</b> 15:20 16:6
110:25 136:11,12	70:16 104:23	13:7,9 15:6 16:7	60:7 108:24	63:23 91:8 99:15
136:13 139:20	106:25 114:8	17:20 18:3,15,17	114:13 123:16	102:1
<b>fieldwork</b> 122:18	133:12,24 135:18	18:21 20:6 27:6,6	124:6,8,16	
122:21 123:7	137:6,21 140:10	28:10,10,13,15,22	<b>foundation</b> 54:4	<b>G</b>
128:6	142:17 144:12	29:5,19,22 33:4	55:3 138:23 139:9	<b>gain</b> 34:16 40:4
<b>figure</b> 19:15 21:16	148:1 153:7	67:6 70:25 71:11	139:17,24 140:1	42:7 58:14
23:25	<b>first-generation</b>	71:17,21 78:13	140:12,15,23	<b>gaining</b> 34:20
<b>figures</b> 10:8 13:24	58:11 59:7	86:25 89:13 90:9	141:4,8 148:14	<b>Gamble</b> 41:25

138:3	<b>global</b> 55:19 56:25	119:11 120:18	63:5 118:12	118:25
<b>Gamble's</b> 138:14	64:10 68:25	122:6,7 123:4	137:23 138:9	<b>happy</b> 150:17,19
<b>gang-related-type</b>	<b>glove</b> 133:1	129:9 131:16	144:17	<b>hard</b> 39:22 120:2
2:16	<b>go</b> 1:10 3:16 6:15	134:24 138:10	<b>ground</b> 121:21	136:1
<b>gap</b> 123:18 125:7	14:9 22:8 28:15	143:25 144:24	123:19 125:9	<b>hardcore</b> 148:7
125:12,13	36:11 38:19 41:19	145:9,10,10,12,24	<b>group</b> 4:8 76:5,6,16	149:11
<b>gather</b> 98:4	42:6 46:13,13	146:23 147:19,21	82:6,14 83:21	<b>harder</b> 148:17,17
<b>gathered</b> 151:19	49:24 53:20 58:21	151:5 152:3	119:13 138:4	148:17
<b>general</b> 28:2 55:16	61:14 69:17 72:3	<b>good</b> 1:3,4 37:10	146:7 148:16	<b>harm</b> 21:20,23,25
65:10 129:19	73:3 77:4 86:5	43:6 124:16 133:8	<b>grouped</b> 133:20	57:24 68:19 69:21
<b>generally</b> 69:24	95:16 99:23	134:18 137:17	<b>groups</b> 41:12 42:23	70:5 106:4 111:9
76:11 88:25 89:15	100:24 103:18,20	145:1 154:17	136:24 137:11	125:1 137:17
89:25 145:7	106:21 108:3,15	155:13	<b>grow</b> 137:18,19	155:8
<b>generated</b> 151:22	109:8 110:12	<b>goodwill</b> 63:14	<b>growing</b> 16:12	<b>harmful</b> 139:4
<b>generation</b> 58:9	112:16,23,24	<b>Google</b> 3:13 148:5	65:12 109:4,5,5	140:20
59:14 127:13,17	113:21 115:15	<b>Gormley</b> 84:21	129:3 134:4	<b>hash</b> 32:1,24,25
152:11	116:21 117:3	<b>governance</b> 70:24	<b>grown</b> 127:23	33:1
<b>gentleman</b> 5:10	118:9,13 119:1,8	<b>grabbed</b> 102:8	<b>guardians</b> 49:14	<b>hasten</b> 147:11
<b>genuinely</b> 25:15	119:16 121:8	<b>grade</b> 26:9,11,13	<b>guidance</b> 36:22	<b>hate</b> 105:24 121:10
99:5 104:13	122:15 125:14	26:18 32:19	41:14 124:14	<b>hailed</b> 109:17
119:19 125:15	131:7 135:12	<b>graded</b> 26:5 32:9	136:10	<b>headlines</b> 77:11
135:9	137:23 138:6	<b>grades</b> 32:12,21	<b>guide</b> 9:6 11:6	102:8
<b>geographical</b> 18:25	140:4 141:24	<b>grading</b> 26:7 32:9	115:7	<b>hear</b> 137:10,14
<b>geography</b> 146:22	143:7 144:8,21	32:10,20	<b>guilt</b> 153:8	<b>heard</b> 27:19 50:15
<b>geolocated</b> 18:23	145:8,19 146:3,11	<b>grant</b> 87:23	<b>guilty</b> 5:22 22:15	85:6 102:20
<b>Geolocation</b> 27:3	<b>go-to</b> 76:13	<b>graphic</b> 149:10	108:24	106:18 113:21
<b>getting</b> 4:7 98:10	<b>goes</b> 18:1 29:4	<b>gratification</b> 152:7	<b>Gwynne</b> 82:21	131:25 135:3
100:14 103:24	33:19 44:22 51:15	<b>gravity</b> 154:14	83:21 85:10	137:25 154:10
112:18 126:14	66:15 78:11,25	<b>great</b> 39:22 64:21		155:1
128:4 129:5 140:7	79:22 111:25	101:24 105:7,14	<b>H</b>	<b>hearing</b> 108:25
148:18	124:12 125:8	115:19 134:12	<b>half</b> 102:19,19	156:8
<b>girl</b> 150:4	126:2 134:9 144:4	146:16	137:6	<b>heart</b> 28:25 38:2
<b>give</b> 4:25 6:8 11:10	<b>going</b> 4:3 6:23	<b>greater</b> 116:25	<b>half-reasonable</b>	83:17 114:6 144:4
34:7 36:20 73:20	16:15,15 23:18	117:1 120:17	142:8	147:22
79:10 110:12	33:8,9 41:2 51:5	<b>greatest</b> 103:10	<b>halfway</b> 91:1	<b>heaven</b> 129:24
112:8 144:19	51:25 55:5 59:15	106:4,4 118:21	<b>hamlets</b> 88:11	<b>held</b> 108:25 119:2,3
<b>given</b> 7:1 12:3	72:18 75:1 77:21	143:9	<b>hand</b> 96:4 133:1	130:25
18:11 35:8 42:6	84:12 85:9,12,13	<b>grid</b> 7:10,25 8:3,24	<b>handling</b> 155:6	<b>help</b> 2:4 5:8 24:3
50:24 62:2 82:20	87:6 89:1 90:5,8	38:4 70:3 84:11	<b>hands</b> 28:19 29:20	36:13,14 41:2
100:23 101:13	90:14 91:18 94:21	86:2 90:2	<b>happen</b> 51:3	46:10 48:11 64:11
103:2 111:7,7	95:11 96:9 97:2	<b>groom</b> 138:2	<b>happened</b> 37:23	75:18 82:1 83:3
141:1 150:15	97:23 98:3,7	<b>groomed</b> 143:20	<b>happening</b> 35:23	88:2 130:16 139:3
<b>gives</b> 40:12 116:25	100:13 104:5	144:21	103:21 137:20	139:21 140:5
129:1 153:8	107:13 109:15,25	<b>groomers</b> 144:11	144:1	143:25 144:15,16
<b>glaciers</b> 146:23	111:19 112:22	<b>grooming</b> 2:11	<b>happens</b> 30:2 46:11	<b>helpful</b> 73:12 156:1
<b>glib</b> 28:20	116:14 118:19	31:12 38:3,3,8,9	48:10 57:12	<b>helping</b> 142:4

<b>helpline</b> 139:12,16 140:17	77:16,24 78:6,20 87:10,23 99:6,24 101:3 105:3	59:6,15 107:4 126:6 129:5,6,6	54:23,24 59:10 63:3,3 105:5,14 106:7 111:5	<b>inappropriate</b> 144:9
<b>Hera</b> 81:2	112:21 135:8 141:7 151:10	<b>identified</b> 5:19 8:19 13:21,22 27:4 34:11 79:14	127:15 128:23,25 129:1 132:19 134:8,12,23	<b>incident</b> 78:16 79:4
<b>hermetically-seal...</b> 132:21	<b>hidden</b> 3:23,24 5:20 99:20 100:15	131:15 139:23 140:16	<b>imagine</b> 29:13	<b>included</b> 20:21,22 21:4 80:22,23,25
<b>high</b> 9:8 10:1,2,15 10:15 11:8 21:20 21:20 30:14 44:10 69:23,25 114:15 114:15 118:24 119:4,5 120:6,9 120:25 121:6,11	<b>homes</b> 135:24	<b>identifies</b> 88:24	<b>immediate</b> 11:20 26:10 30:18 31:4	<b>includes</b> 23:25
<b>high-risk</b> 117:4,22 117:23 118:9 119:24 120:11 121:11	<b>hope</b> 30:2 40:12 49:25 75:3,9 87:2 104:6	<b>identify</b> 8:21 13:13 15:4 20:1 32:17 33:2 46:12 58:8 59:4 63:6 83:11 88:22,23 90:11,12 134:23	<b>immediately</b> 50:13	<b>including</b> 5:14,21 33:15 79:25
<b>high-tech</b> 123:21 126:3,5,12 128:8	<b>hopefully</b> 48:7	<b>identifying</b> 10:11 54:12 114:13	<b>impact</b> 32:13 53:17 79:19 80:5 88:4 90:22 91:8,23 98:22 99:20 126:7 126:9 143:9 147:17	<b>incorporated</b> 50:17 51:23
<b>higher</b> 70:4,4	<b>host</b> 37:20	<b>identity</b> 22:11 137:8	<b>impacting</b> 149:11	<b>incorrect</b> 42:2
<b>highest</b> 20:14 21:25 30:17 68:18,18 69:21,21 70:17 121:15	<b>hosted</b> 61:25 62:9 67:19	<b>illegal</b> 31:23	<b>impactive</b> 155:2	<b>increase</b> 2:17 15:24 16:18 87:17 134:2 136:6
<b>highlight</b> 19:20 44:2	<b>hosting</b> 61:22 62:3	<b>illicit</b> 6:18	<b>impacts</b> 91:14 139:19,20	<b>increased</b> 1:19 2:21 21:12 23:21 116:13
<b>highlighted</b> 80:20 83:16 84:13,19	<b>hot</b> 88:22	<b>image</b> 24:5 25:18 31:15,18,20 33:1 33:6 57:22 58:18 59:7,20 61:6 80:22 99:9 128:21 129:3 147:20 150:4,9 152:5	<b>imperative</b> 72:9	<b>increasing</b> 8:22 69:9 100:14
<b>highs</b> 118:25	<b>hourly</b> 16:4	<b>images</b> 59:13	<b>impinge</b> 55:24	<b>increasingly</b> 64:20 87:19 88:8 92:13
<b>historically</b> 64:21 78:19	<b>hours</b> 117:23 118:18 119:6 120:10,10,12 128:22 137:6	<b>imagery</b> 4:10 8:4 8:16 9:3,7 24:8,19 25:2,15 57:13 58:9,11 59:12 62:19 63:13 65:20 65:20 66:3 69:7 81:4 103:3,11 108:7 109:22 112:8 113:13 122:24 143:3 148:20 149:21 150:18	<b>implemented</b> 155:6	<b>incredible</b> 49:2
<b>hits</b> 115:20 137:7	<b>house</b> 93:13 115:13 115:15	<b>imagery</b> 4:10 8:4 8:16 9:3,7 24:8,19 25:2,15 57:13 58:9,11 59:12 62:19 63:13 65:20 65:20 66:3 69:7 81:4 103:3,11 108:7 109:22 112:8 113:13 122:24 143:3 148:20 149:21 150:18	<b>implications</b> 128:3	<b>incredibly</b> 4:8 21:21 126:20 155:2
<b>HMI</b> 84:12 128:5 151:13	<b>houses</b> 93:11	<b>images</b> 2:9,18 8:20 9:18 13:4,11 15:1 18:17 24:11,13,15 31:23,24 32:1,3,4 32:6,6,8,11,17,18 33:2 38:14 54:20	<b>importance</b> 79:18 101:14 147:2	<b>incremental</b> 42:16
<b>HMI's</b> 88:11	<b>housing</b> 36:24 37:1 37:2	<b>imageries</b> 59:13	<b>important</b> 31:3 32:2 40:19 49:16 55:25 57:15 58:14 58:15,18 60:14 62:5 89:8 116:3 132:20	<b>incriminating</b> 5:17
<b>HMIC</b> 14:6,14,16 15:8 46:18,22 84:15 122:12,16 123:2,5 124:5 125:6	<b>hub</b> 148:5	<b>imagery</b> 4:10 8:4 8:16 9:3,7 24:8,19 25:2,15 57:13 58:9,11 59:12 62:19 63:13 65:20 65:20 66:3 69:7 81:4 103:3,11 108:7 109:22 112:8 113:13 122:24 143:3 148:20 149:21 150:18	<b>impose</b> 118:23 147:14	<b>indecent</b> 4:10 5:14 8:16,20 9:3,7,18 13:4,11 15:1 18:17 24:20 25:2 25:15 57:13 59:10 62:19 63:13 65:20 66:3 81:4 103:3 103:11 105:5,14 108:7 109:22 111:5 112:8 113:13 122:24 127:15 143:3 149:21
<b>hold</b> 19:3 31:24	<b>Huckle</b> 39:17	<b>images</b> 2:9,18 8:20 9:18 13:4,11 15:1 18:17 24:11,13,15 31:23,24 32:1,3,4 32:6,6,8,11,17,18 33:2 38:14 54:20	<b>imposition</b> 109:20	<b>independent</b> 74:3 91:13
<b>holding</b> 71:17	<b>huge</b> 32:23 127:20 134:17	<b>imagery</b> 4:10 8:4 8:16 9:3,7 24:8,19 25:2,15 57:13 58:9,11 59:12 62:19 63:13 65:20 65:20 66:3 69:7 81:4 103:3,11 108:7 109:22 112:8 113:13 122:24 143:3 148:20 149:21 150:18	<b>impoverished</b> 39:18	<b>independently</b> 18:22
<b>home</b> 31:21 33:21 33:24 34:18,25 45:7 50:23 59:8	<b>hugely</b> 32:23	<b>images</b> 2:9,18 8:20 9:18 13:4,11 15:1 18:17 24:11,13,15 31:23,24 32:1,3,4 32:6,6,8,11,17,18 33:2 38:14 54:20	<b>impression</b> 121:10	<b>indicated</b> 31:5
	<b>human</b> 92:6	<b>images</b> 2:9,18 8:20 9:18 13:4,11 15:1 18:17 24:11,13,15 31:23,24 32:1,3,4 32:6,6,8,11,17,18 33:2 38:14 54:20	<b>improve</b> 12:12 62:11 88:18	<b>indicates</b> 58:12
	<b>hundreds</b> 134:10	<b>images</b> 2:9,18 8:20 9:18 13:4,11 15:1 18:17 24:11,13,15 31:23,24 32:1,3,4 32:6,6,8,11,17,18 33:2 38:14 54:20	<b>improved</b> 36:10 83:22,24 89:24	
	<b>hunter</b> 119:13 136:23	<b>images</b> 2:9,18 8:20 9:18 13:4,11 15:1 18:17 24:11,13,15 31:23,24 32:1,3,4 32:6,6,8,11,17,18 33:2 38:14 54:20	<b>improvement</b> 7:17	
	<b>Hydrant</b> 77:12	<b>images</b> 2:9,18 8:20 9:18 13:4,11 15:1 18:17 24:11,13,15 31:23,24 32:1,3,4 32:6,6,8,11,17,18 33:2 38:14 54:20	<b>improvements</b> 127:3	
	<b>I</b>	<b>images</b> 2:9,18 8:20 9:18 13:4,11 15:1 18:17 24:11,13,15 31:23,24 32:1,3,4 32:6,6,8,11,17,18 33:2 38:14 54:20	<b>inability</b> 12:4	
	<b>ICT</b> 55:19	<b>images</b> 2:9,18 8:20 9:18 13:4,11 15:1 18:17 24:11,13,15 31:23,24 32:1,3,4 32:6,6,8,11,17,18 33:2 38:14 54:20		
	<b>idea</b> 11:11 34:7,25 73:20 79:10 98:10 129:2	<b>images</b> 2:9,18 8:20 9:18 13:4,11 15:1 18:17 24:11,13,15 31:23,24 32:1,3,4 32:6,6,8,11,17,18 33:2 38:14 54:20		
	<b>identical</b> 26:1	<b>images</b> 2:9,18 8:20 9:18 13:4,11 15:1 18:17 24:11,13,15 31:23,24 32:1,3,4 32:6,6,8,11,17,18 33:2 38:14 54:20		
	<b>identification</b> 8:5 31:11,16 57:18	<b>images</b> 2:9,18 8:20 9:18 13:4,11 15:1 18:17 24:11,13,15 31:23,24 32:1,3,4 32:6,6,8,11,17,18 33:2 38:14 54:20		

<b>indication</b> 6:9 11:18	115:4,8,18,25 116:7,23 126:19 128:16 130:2 131:5	<b>inspector</b> 88:16 92:2,9 97:8 108:13 121:4 130:24,24	<b>internet-facilitated</b> 76:22	<b>involves</b> 34:3
<b>individual</b> 5:21 9:16 11:15,19 22:10,14 32:5 39:25 48:7 50:6 53:25 78:12 121:19 130:11 140:17	<b>informational</b> 24:4 24:5	<b>Inspectorate</b> 122:19 123:16	<b>interrupt</b> 92:22	<b>involving</b> 21:21
<b>individuals</b> 2:8 3:21 5:20 8:20 12:1 13:22 14:25 16:3 17:5,12,15 17:22 20:2 21:22 21:25 22:1,7 24:6 24:10 30:23,24 34:12,15,22,22 35:5,10,10 38:12 38:13 39:9 40:3 41:13 60:6 63:15 65:9 67:11 70:5 70:15 72:24 81:3 118:17 140:19	<b>informationals</b> 24:1 25:8,14	<b>inspectors</b> 96:15,16 119:6	<b>interview</b> 102:7,9 103:14 112:13	<b>issue</b> 3:6 35:18 38:23 50:8 69:4 74:6 86:22 129:22
<b>industry</b> 1:19 2:24 3:4 25:20 31:22 35:16,21 36:9,10 36:13 37:17 50:25 52:8,13 54:20,22 54:24 55:9,11,19 56:3,5,5 57:3,3,19 58:23 63:6 67:25 142:5,13,15,23 143:1,2,4	<b>informed</b> 55:21 86:23 105:3 116:7 139:15	<b>instances</b> 56:4	<b>interviews</b> 101:13	<b>issued</b> 78:5
<b>inevitably</b> 10:23 139:20	<b>informs</b> 115:23	<b>instantly</b> 104:3 117:3	<b>intrafamilial</b> 2:15	<b>issues</b> 46:12 76:3 76:10 84:19,20 86:9 90:10,15 122:3 133:23
<b>infer</b> 84:4	<b>infrastructure</b> 126:19	<b>intend</b> 100:23	<b>introduce</b> 37:24	<b>it'll</b> 78:3
<b>inflated</b> 21:7	<b>inhibit</b> 140:24	<b>intensive</b> 18:5	<b>introduced</b> 29:18	<b>IWF</b> 54:7,8,18 57:6 58:6 61:21 62:8
<b>inflicted</b> 39:20	<b>initial</b> 20:18,19,24 37:25 116:4,22 123:1	<b>intent</b> 1:11 40:13 143:24	<b>introduction</b> 78:3 78:18	<hr/> <b>J</b> <hr/>
<b>influence</b> 18:2,2	<b>initially</b> 111:2	<b>interaction</b> 45:20	<b>introductory</b> 101:20	<b>January</b> 1:1 27:22 156:9
<b>inform</b> 23:11 24:11 39:2 128:11,13	<b>inner</b> 133:4	<b>interactive</b> 45:3	<b>intrusion</b> 5:15	<b>jeopardise</b> 123:5
<b>information</b> 11:24 26:22 28:1,12 29:5 50:13 54:22 55:18 58:5,15 73:22 74:16 97:6	<b>input</b> 147:2	<b>interest</b> 17:13 25:15 95:10,15 146:16 150:6 151:16	<b>intrusive</b> 131:2	<b>Jim</b> 138:14 145:6
	<b>INQ000993</b> 44:1	<b>interested</b> 35:2 69:7	<b>invariably</b> 119:7 126:7	<b>Jim's</b> 146:17
	<b>INQ000993_051</b> 44:2	<b>interim</b> 136:9	<b>invest</b> 100:1 145:18	<b>job</b> 68:7 119:2,8 120:17 121:6
	<b>INQ001321</b> 122:14	<b>international</b> 31:13 39:1,5,24 40:10 73:1 77:11	<b>investigated</b> 138:20	<b>Johnny</b> 82:21 83:10,21 85:10 86:3
	<b>inquiring</b> 91:6	<b>internationally</b> 17:17 18:4 53:21 53:22	<b>investigating</b> 11:15 31:4 131:21	<b>Johny</b> 82:21 83:10,21 85:10 86:3
	<b>inquiry</b> 1:24 10:7 19:5 43:9 55:1,21 56:18 64:1 72:6 73:22 74:11,12,15 74:17 75:7 76:21 86:23 100:7 101:15 102:1 106:25 111:12 113:2 117:20 133:19 135:20 138:24 152:20 154:11	<b>internet</b> 1:11 3:12 9:14 23:15 33:3 34:19 35:9,19 41:10,15 42:13,23 42:25 43:2,15 54:4,12 67:21 68:13 74:15 124:14	<b>investigation</b> 9:16 11:9 13:7 14:13 14:24 19:25 20:4 20:5,23 24:15 27:23 43:15 74:15 105:17 107:19 117:19 129:15 131:23 132:3	<b>joined-up</b> 85:13 132:4 142:3
	<b>inspection</b> 14:6,11 46:18 122:16 129:8	<b>international</b> 31:13 39:1,5,24 40:10 73:1 77:11	<b>investigations</b> 11:16,17,18,23 14:1 21:21 31:13 32:4 39:1 75:16 76:5 123:21 133:7	<b>joint</b> 100:12
	<b>inspections</b> 123:10	<b>internationally</b> 17:17 18:4 53:21 53:22	<b>investigative</b> 20:19 20:20 155:8	<b>Jon</b> 7:19 81:21
		<b>internet</b> 1:11 3:12 9:14 23:15 33:3 34:19 35:9,19 41:10,15 42:13,23 42:25 43:2,15 54:4,12 67:21 68:13 74:15 124:14	<b>investigators</b> 49:1 53:20 72:17	<b>journalist</b> 102:8
			<b>investment</b> 80:25 99:15	<b>judge</b> 28:12 108:9
			<b>invigorate</b> 114:4	<b>judges</b> 134:10
			<b>invite</b> 75:2 132:15	<b>judgment</b> 11:3,6 32:11
			<b>inviting</b> 36:13	<b>judgments</b> 11:2,12 11:25
			<b>involved</b> 17:19 19:25 27:17 54:9 97:22	<b>July</b> 42:4 123:12
				<b>jurisdiction</b> 87:7
				<b>justice</b> 14:19 92:23 104:11 105:10,15 107:22 108:24 111:24 125:2 152:22
				<b>justify</b> 131:3
				<hr/> <b>K</b> <hr/>

<b>keep</b> 45:17 66:13 67:24,24 95:11 96:8 97:2 109:4 129:2 134:4	9:12 12:22 13:15 31:25 32:6,19 43:20 54:7 86:2 139:1 149:14,18	155:24	89:2,2,13,14 90:3 90:3,3,15 116:15 122:5 125:25 130:9,12 133:10 133:16 134:16 143:2	122:8 137:5
<b>Keith</b> 1:6 81:19 156:13	<b>knows</b> 144:2	<b>learned</b> 97:10	<b>levels</b> 7:23 26:23 49:8 93:14,15,20 136:3 155:14	<b>live-streaming</b> 134:25
<b>Kent</b> 9:14	<b>L</b>	<b>learning</b> 29:15 30:4 43:3 46:21 68:11 155:21	<b>liaison</b> 39:5,24	<b>lived</b> 15:4
<b>key</b> 68:5 96:4 133:14	<b>LaFave</b> 154:11	<b>leave</b> 39:8 63:13	<b>lie</b> 64:4 71:12	<b>Liverpool</b> 113:11
<b>kill</b> 136:17	<b>language</b> 84:1 88:10,11 153:3	<b>led</b> 19:18 20:19 85:15 123:2 136:13 145:19 148:23	<b>lies</b> 90:13	<b>lives</b> 102:21
<b>killed</b> 136:17	<b>laptops</b> 136:2	<b>left</b> 28:8 30:15 142:14	<b>life</b> 5:21,25 26:11 40:9 105:25 108:5 115:16 151:5	<b>living</b> 115:12,15
<b>kind</b> 61:17 78:20 104:15 138:7 139:2	<b>large</b> 126:20 146:4	<b>legal</b> 6:16 61:1	<b>lifted</b> 105:22	<b>local</b> 8:8,25 15:6 27:2 29:4 70:6,7 70:24 71:17 82:25 85:14 89:2,14 90:3,9,15 135:19 146:5
<b>kinds</b> 11:12	<b>large-scale</b> 14:24	<b>legally</b> 62:14 147:11	<b>like-minded</b> 34:22 40:4 135:6	<b>locate</b> 27:5
<b>KIRAT</b> 9:12,12 10:4,10 25:25 113:18 114:10,11 114:12 115:1,7,17 115:23 116:20,21 117:7,11 120:6	<b>larger</b> 37:9,17	<b>legislation</b> 23:2 60:10	<b>line</b> 19:20 105:16 121:4 130:14 133:8 134:7 141:5	<b>located</b> 17:14 23:5 26:25 72:12
<b>KIRAT's</b> 116:10	<b>late</b> 97:15	<b>legislative</b> 63:12	<b>lines</b> 37:10 76:3 92:17,24 93:3 94:10 97:22 103:17	<b>locations</b> 129:6
<b>knives</b> 93:20,21	<b>launched</b> 46:1,7 48:1 101:25	<b>legitimate</b> 36:5	<b>link</b> 154:17 155:13	<b>locking</b> 142:9,10
<b>knock-on</b> 105:9 124:1	<b>laurels</b> 45:15	<b>lengths</b> 134:12	<b>linked</b> 17:25	<b>logistics</b> 138:18
<b>know</b> 1:13 6:22 11:14 25:18 28:14 33:23 36:3 37:4 46:17 49:12 50:4 65:15,17 66:14 67:9 69:22 70:10 71:10 82:16 101:25 109:18 110:3 112:11,13 113:8 115:6 119:4 120:16 122:12 126:8 132:13 133:11 135:9 137:12 143:19 144:8,18 145:3 146:13,18	<b>law</b> 4:24 6:7 8:23 9:15 17:21 22:3 23:13 30:24 31:19 31:25 32:7,20 33:21 51:7 53:17 57:4,23 59:21 60:12 61:18 63:21 64:25 65:6,25 67:5,22 68:17 83:1 84:6 85:22 87:11 88:4 106:3 122:23 149:24 151:1 152:2,3	<b>lens</b> 117:6 132:11	<b>links</b> 132:24	<b>lone</b> 2:15
<b>knowing</b> 119:7	<b>layer</b> 51:18	<b>lesson</b> 146:22	<b>listed</b> 108:22	<b>long</b> 28:8 32:13 36:11 97:13,13 98:16 124:2 129:14 135:24
<b>knowledge</b> 60:22 61:5 62:16 63:10 88:18 97:1	<b>layman</b> 80:4	<b>lessons</b> 155:24	<b>listened</b> 145:6 146:16	<b>longer</b> 106:1 126:12
<b>known</b> 7:10,25	<b>layman's</b> 3:9 56:17	<b>lest</b> 140:19	<b>listening</b> 56:18 140:14	<b>look</b> 4:18 7:9 8:2 12:8 14:7 18:15 22:16 25:3 27:16 28:16 29:14 31:7 32:11,18 35:21 39:7 42:22 43:24 47:13,15 49:5,6 51:2,12,24 52:7 55:11 56:20 57:5 62:12 63:22 66:14 67:5 68:4 74:4 77:21 81:13 83:9 83:19 84:11,18 85:17 86:8 87:21 89:6 90:14 94:18 94:21 95:7 101:2 103:16 104:17,18 109:2 113:22 117:6 121:18 122:2,16 130:3
	<b>layout</b> 48:3	<b>let's</b> 137:6	<b>literally</b> 118:18	
	<b>lead</b> 75:15,20,25,25 76:4 80:14 81:23 81:24 86:24 89:11 95:10 104:4 136:13	<b>letter</b> 7:15,21 81:13 81:15,19 82:2,3,3 82:6,23 83:19 84:2,8,10 85:17 101:3,9,19,20 102:3 105:2,6 112:23,24 113:1	<b>literature</b> 113:12	
	<b>leaders</b> 123:17 154:17,20	<b>level</b> 1:18 3:15 8:8 8:10,17 12:5 18:18 19:25 20:4 21:11,24 23:20 28:22 29:4 39:19 40:6 42:6,24 43:5 65:16,16 69:5,25 70:1,4,5,6,8,8,17 71:23,25 72:16 80:13 86:10 89:1	<b>little</b> 17:9 30:12 52:11,13,25 54:6 75:13 87:21 103:20 124:5,15 149:17	
	<b>leadership</b> 76:7		<b>live</b> 2:10 6:9,13 31:12 33:7 34:1,5 34:8,13 35:2,13 47:15 119:14	
	<b>leading</b> 97:10 119:7 148:11			
	<b>learn</b> 140:22			

132:11,16 135:13 142:16 144:10 147:4 148:16 <b>looked</b> 29:9 30:3,3 31:10 62:6 72:22 115:17,17 140:10 <b>looking</b> 2:10 5:4 12:11,12 13:24 21:13 25:5,6,17 27:12,24 38:22,23 41:23 43:10,17 48:16,17 52:11 56:12 58:24 66:8 66:12,13,17 68:21 96:11 117:11 118:6,7 122:11 131:18 133:10,15 142:14 147:6,20 148:6 150:22 <b>looks</b> 20:10 75:23 81:25 148:12,23 <b>Lorin</b> 155:1 <b>lose</b> 91:21 <b>losing</b> 91:15 <b>lost</b> 91:22 <b>lot</b> 24:15 25:4,11 32:8 45:11 48:2 50:10 53:19 61:24 70:6,7,12 97:5 110:3 125:20 155:14 <b>lots</b> 118:18 127:17 142:9,10,11 <b>loud</b> 109:18 <b>love</b> 155:10 <b>loved</b> 96:7 <b>low</b> 10:1,18 61:23 62:2 107:5 109:7 112:2 114:18,23 <b>low-level</b> 69:22 <b>low-risk</b> 30:12,14 69:22 107:3,11 111:6,19 113:4 114:22 115:20 117:4,24 153:15 <b>lower</b> 70:1 107:17	<b>lower-level</b> 69:15 <b>lower-risk</b> 106:5 <b>lowest</b> 62:9 <b>Lucy</b> 55:3 138:22 139:9,17,24,25 140:5,12,15,23 141:8 148:14 153:25 <b>lunch</b> 86:15 <b>Lynne</b> 89:18	<b>manner</b> 124:18 142:20 <b>March</b> 14:17 46:19 77:8,25 89:5 90:18 95:12 140:16 <b>market</b> 93:6 <b>masquerade</b> 138:7 138:9 <b>masquerading</b> 144:24 145:3 <b>material</b> 5:15,18 17:16 23:2,3 24:9 26:18 54:12 57:7 57:9 58:3,13,21 58:22 59:17 61:2 61:22,25 62:3,19 63:6,19,20 67:18 67:25 74:9,12,18 104:23 126:20 127:11 147:10 148:22 149:11 154:4 <b>matter</b> 4:17 27:11 28:19,22 50:12 56:8 71:7 72:8,9 73:13 131:18 133:24 136:15 154:21 <b>matters</b> 65:14 76:2 76:12,14 121:19 147:6 <b>Matthew</b> 22:8,10 <b>maximum</b> 119:5 <b>mean</b> 9:8 25:17 28:20 50:25 56:4 69:23 93:2 <b>means</b> 3:15 18:24 61:24 104:11 108:22 152:25 <b>measures</b> 35:23 37:18,24 <b>mechanism</b> 51:14 52:2 59:24 60:3,4 143:12 <b>media</b> 50:17,18,24	51:23 60:2 110:3 123:23 136:22 142:21 <b>medical</b> 136:12 <b>medium</b> 10:1,18 30:14 114:18 <b>medium-risk</b> 117:24 <b>meet</b> 24:20 51:12 80:20 87:18 121:9 125:19 <b>meeting</b> 89:15 <b>meetings</b> 56:24 <b>member</b> 53:23 80:4 101:21 <b>members</b> 4:23 48:22 128:22 154:22 155:16 <b>memes</b> 24:19 <b>memorandum</b> 53:8 <b>men</b> 148:16 149:9 <b>mention</b> 41:25 <b>mentioned</b> 18:6 39:4 41:25 42:2 45:12,21 49:23 56:25 57:1 69:3 89:6 90:19 94:11 98:3 142:13 <b>merits</b> 51:24 <b>Merseyside</b> 81:22 113:11 <b>message</b> 42:17 45:7 45:18 47:9 57:19 70:1 109:25 146:3 <b>messages</b> 44:13 70:8 <b>met</b> 15:18,19 16:8 16:10 <b>methods</b> 38:23 124:23 <b>metrics</b> 100:3 <b>metropolitan</b> 88:15 93:4 <b>micro-manage</b> 130:17 <b>mid</b> 115:12	<b>mid-afternoon</b> 121:18 <b>mid-morning</b> 40:21 52:17 <b>middle</b> 19:14 <b>million</b> 41:21 87:15 87:16,24 91:18 98:4,12 128:25 137:6 <b>millions</b> 32:1 59:9 68:7 <b>mind</b> 47:20 73:23 74:14 <b>minds</b> 44:21 45:8 <b>minimise</b> 126:6 136:20 <b>minimum</b> 146:3,8 146:11 <b>Minister</b> 77:17 <b>minutes</b> 86:12 142:14 <b>misled</b> 98:9 <b>missed</b> 140:11,18 <b>Missing</b> 22:25 <b>mitigate</b> 82:9 <b>mitigating</b> 119:8 <b>mix</b> 94:3 <b>mobile</b> 93:8 123:23 136:2 <b>model</b> 92:4 93:16 93:16,17 <b>modern</b> 97:9 <b>modern-day</b> 92:6 92:16 <b>moment</b> 3:5 25:5,8 25:22 37:21 40:22 46:15 51:3 52:16 91:23 103:16 104:21 107:3 112:5 116:20 118:11,11 121:18 138:19,21 141:19 146:13 151:2 154:5 <b>money</b> 34:20,21 87:10 93:6 141:4
	<b>M</b>			

<b>monitor</b> 111:19 136:14,19 142:18 145:19	64:1 69:24 70:4 72:9 73:25 75:14 77:11 78:7,8,13	<b>NCA's</b> 7:3 14:21 40:20	50:6 58:23 62:6 67:17,25 68:2 114:6,24 121:2	15:16 18:14 19:22 20:14,18,22 77:15 85:5,7 123:2,11					
<b>monitored</b> 16:19 43:3,4 68:10 70:11 128:10	78:15,25 79:4,13 79:16,18,20 80:14 80:17 81:5,20	<b>NCA-CEOP</b> 1:10 2:18 16:6 21:17 25:24 26:5,8 30:8 39:3 45:7 53:1,4 54:7 55:17 56:14 56:24 57:18 66:4 68:6 71:19	124:18 141:17 142:20 143:15 <b>negate</b> 32:17 <b>network</b> 39:5,24 73:2 87:24 91:15 <b>networking</b> 6:4 34:3	<b>note</b> 101:11 <b>notice</b> 147:15 <b>notification</b> 16:14 <b>notwithstanding</b> 76:20 120:4 <b>NPCC</b> 7:6,16,22 13:5 75:20,21 76:11 81:22 94:5 107:10 131:7 136:13					
<b>monitoring</b> 110:25 111:18	82:5,8,18,25 83:23 84:9 85:14 85:21 86:24 88:21 88:23 89:1,11,20 90:2,11 97:16,17 104:4 117:13 118:2 133:16 134:16 135:17	<b>NCA000164</b> 7:9 <b>NCA000197</b> 14:8 <b>NCA000210</b> 19:4 <b>NCA000230</b> 17:1 <b>NCA000235</b> 47:14 <b>NCA000237</b> 81:13 <b>NCA000264</b> 4:20 <b>NCMEC</b> 2:23 3:1 22:24 23:2,7 24:14 25:6 60:10 60:13,15,25 61:14 62:15,25	<b>new</b> 15:21 29:17 35:25 36:17,17 37:2 42:3,10 48:1 66:15 68:4 83:11 115:3,4,4 127:21 135:23 147:8 <b>NGOs</b> 52:13 <b>nice</b> 115:13 <b>nine</b> 88:14 127:1 155:18,20 <b>nine-month</b> 28:4 <b>Niven</b> 1:6,8,13 3:9 4:18 10:20 12:14 22:19 52:23 55:16 69:5 70:18,23 71:15 106:6 116:10 156:13 <b>Niven's</b> 74:23 <b>no-one</b> 49:12 <b>non-governmental</b> 53:1 <b>non-recent</b> 77:13 77:19 105:21 <b>noncontact</b> 10:17 114:17 <b>noon</b> 52:19 <b>normal</b> 113:24 148:11,23,24 149:12 150:17 <b>normally</b> 41:18 <b>Norwich</b> 93:7 <b>Notarise</b> 12:23 13:1 13:15 14:18 15:2	<b>NSPCC</b> 48:15,15 48:21,22 49:20 50:11 53:3,9,25 54:2 <b>NSS</b> 79:14 <b>nucleus</b> 97:7 <b>number</b> 12:21 13:25 14:1,25 17:2 20:8 22:14 22:21 24:6,9 25:9 31:22 35:6 39:13 43:16 56:13 66:19 75:21 77:2,18 80:19 83:14 85:23 89:4 90:15,17 94:12 96:15 100:24 104:25 105:12 110:4 116:2 121:1 130:5 131:14,15,24 132:7,9 133:20 134:7 136:6,8 138:5,16,19 140:6 145:23 146:25 151:21 <b>numbers</b> 28:9 32:24,25,25 33:1 35:1,3 54:14 62:2 67:10,10 99:8 104:18 109:4 111:21,23 129:2 137:17 153:18 <b>numerous</b> 32:4					
<b>month</b> 23:24 67:9 70:7 105:4 109:3 109:4	85:21 86:24 88:21 88:23 89:1,11,20 90:2,11 97:16,17 104:4 117:13 118:2 133:16 134:16 135:17	<b>NCA000164</b> 7:9 <b>NCA000197</b> 14:8 <b>NCA000210</b> 19:4 <b>NCA000230</b> 17:1 <b>NCA000235</b> 47:14 <b>NCA000237</b> 81:13 <b>NCA000264</b> 4:20 <b>NCMEC</b> 2:23 3:1 22:24 23:2,7 24:14 25:6 60:10 60:13,15,25 61:14 62:15,25	<b>never</b> 148:2 155:11 <b>new</b> 15:21 29:17 35:25 36:17,17 37:2 42:3,10 48:1 66:15 68:4 83:11 115:3,4,4 127:21 135:23 147:8 <b>NGOs</b> 52:13 <b>nice</b> 115:13 <b>nine</b> 88:14 127:1 155:18,20 <b>nine-month</b> 28:4 <b>Niven</b> 1:6,8,13 3:9 4:18 10:20 12:14 22:19 52:23 55:16 69:5 70:18,23 71:15 106:6 116:10 156:13 <b>Niven's</b> 74:23 <b>no-one</b> 49:12 <b>non-governmental</b> 53:1 <b>non-recent</b> 77:13 77:19 105:21 <b>noncontact</b> 10:17 114:17 <b>noon</b> 52:19 <b>normal</b> 113:24 148:11,23,24 149:12 150:17 <b>normally</b> 41:18 <b>Norwich</b> 93:7 <b>Notarise</b> 12:23 13:1 13:15 14:18 15:2	<b>monthly</b> 1:18 41:18 <b>months</b> 23:23 24:25 124:1 126:15 136:23 155:16 <b>morning</b> 1:3,4,9 8:12 40:17 53:2 55:8 66:19 106:6 113:21 122:13 129:13 <b>morning</b> 99:22 <b>move</b> 12:9 22:16 28:21 93:12 <b>moved</b> 136:2,3 <b>moves</b> 12:10 41:6 <b>multi-agency</b> 67:17 <b>murder</b> 154:12 <b>Murphy</b> 7:19 81:21 <b>mustn't</b> 109:25 <b>myriad</b> 131:19	<b>nationally</b> 7:17 17:18 38:19 <b>nationally-coordi...</b> 18:8 21:2,3 <b>nationals</b> 39:14 <b>nature</b> 2:15 56:6 61:7 64:9 69:8 124:24 <b>NCA</b> 1:21,24 2:5,6 4:19 5:1 7:6,13,22 8:9,18 9:4 12:21 13:9 14:12 15:5 15:11,14 16:5,13 17:6,17 18:6,8 19:3,18 20:5 21:1 21:15 22:13 26:1 27:9,12 28:6,18 34:8,25 35:9 36:19 37:10 38:6 38:18,21 39:5 40:10,16 41:1 45:11 46:18 47:22 50:22 51:18 52:14 52:24 54:3 55:2 63:23 64:1 65:10 65:15 67:6 69:9 69:20,24,25 70:24 72:12,15,16 82:11 84:23 89:12,18 90:5 100:12 129:14,20,21 135:4 141:23	<b>N</b> N 156:11 <b>name</b> 5:10 39:16 75:6 <b>names</b> 131:20 <b>narrative</b> 97:14 98:18 <b>national</b> 8:8,10,23 8:25 9:2 13:3,8 14:7 15:25 16:17 17:23 18:2 20:1 20:20 21:4,23 22:25 28:23 33:5 36:8 38:20 39:23	<b>needed</b> 7:16 122:22 124:22 <b>needs</b> 11:19 14:2 25:20 43:1,1,2	<b>negate</b> 32:17 <b>network</b> 39:5,24 73:2 87:24 91:15 <b>networking</b> 6:4 34:3 <b>networks</b> 15:1 24:11 37:20 <b>never</b> 148:2 155:11 <b>new</b> 15:21 29:17 35:25 36:17,17 37:2 42:3,10 48:1 66:15 68:4 83:11 115:3,4,4 127:21 135:23 147:8 <b>NGOs</b> 52:13 <b>nice</b> 115:13 <b>nine</b> 88:14 127:1 155:18,20 <b>nine-month</b> 28:4 <b>Niven</b> 1:6,8,13 3:9 4:18 10:20 12:14 22:19 52:23 55:16 69:5 70:18,23 71:15 106:6 116:10 156:13 <b>Niven's</b> 74:23 <b>no-one</b> 49:12 <b>non-governmental</b> 53:1 <b>non-recent</b> 77:13 77:19 105:21 <b>noncontact</b> 10:17 114:17 <b>noon</b> 52:19 <b>normal</b> 113:24 148:11,23,24 149:12 150:17 <b>normally</b> 41:18 <b>Norwich</b> 93:7 <b>Notarise</b> 12:23 13:1 13:15 14:18 15:2	<b>note</b> 101:11 <b>notice</b> 147:15 <b>notification</b> 16:14 <b>notwithstanding</b> 76:20 120:4 <b>NPCC</b> 7:6,16,22 13:5 75:20,21 76:11 81:22 94:5 107:10 131:7 136:13 <b>NSPCC</b> 48:15,15 48:21,22 49:20 50:11 53:3,9,25 54:2 <b>NSS</b> 79:14 <b>nucleus</b> 97:7 <b>number</b> 12:21 13:25 14:1,25 17:2 20:8 22:14 22:21 24:6,9 25:9 31:22 35:6 39:13 43:16 56:13 66:19 75:21 77:2,18 80:19 83:14 85:23 89:4 90:15,17 94:12 96:15 100:24 104:25 105:12 110:4 116:2 121:1 130:5 131:14,15,24 132:7,9 133:20 134:7 136:6,8 138:5,16,19 140:6 145:23 146:25 151:21 <b>numbers</b> 28:9 32:24,25,25 33:1 35:1,3 54:14 62:2 67:10,10 99:8 104:18 109:4 111:21,23 129:2 137:17 153:18 <b>numerous</b> 32:4

<b>nurse</b> 151:8	102:18,23 105:4	76:13 88:17 90:4	124:7,25 125:18	<b>opinion</b> 61:17
<b>nutshell</b> 31:17 66:8	105:19 108:23	92:3 131:6 151:8	125:23 131:24	95:25 102:24
83:3	<b>offend</b> 106:19	<b>officers</b> 9:1 11:1,21	132:6,16,24 133:3	<b>opportunities</b>
<b>O</b>	<b>offender</b> 29:2 30:12	15:6 26:9,19	134:24 138:2,8,9	128:20 155:9
<b>oath</b> 1:8	40:13 48:18 57:17	29:23 32:14,24	144:8,17,24 146:1	<b>opportunity</b> 48:15
<b>objectives</b> 13:12	58:7 69:22 107:5	80:25 91:21	147:18	49:10,15,16 58:8
43:3 68:12	107:25 108:24	118:23 119:1,19	<b>online-facilitated</b>	72:20 112:9
<b>obligation</b> 36:18,21	109:7,10 111:3,6	120:1 121:11	3:11 30:10 77:3	141:24 153:16
36:23 37:7 59:16	111:18,20,25	124:17 125:22,24	81:10 98:8 122:4	<b>options</b> 128:19
61:1,4,9 62:18	112:7,8 114:23	126:4 127:5 128:2	130:19 131:22	155:20
63:9,17	116:24 117:4,5	128:22 132:13,19	132:3,10	<b>order</b> 3:25 12:1
<b>obliged</b> 62:14	127:8,21 129:5	155:17	<b>online-related</b>	15:3 36:25 65:8
<b>observation</b> 65:22	137:7,7 153:4	<b>officers'</b> 11:3	138:20	78:15 79:5,9
67:2 143:18	<b>offenders</b> 2:15 9:20	<b>OHY002224</b> 77:22	<b>onwards</b> 19:8	111:8,9,23
<b>observations</b> 14:6	10:12,14,17 13:14	<b>OHY002228</b> 101:6	22:18 142:16	<b>orders</b> 111:17
21:18 63:10 84:8	13:20 18:24 23:16	<b>OHY002229</b>	<b>open</b> 3:12 4:11,14	<b>organisation</b> 41:5
96:3 125:11 132:8	30:9,15 34:4 39:7	112:24	7:2,4 62:12	53:4
132:15	64:21 66:21 67:18	<b>OHY003112</b> 94:19	<b>operate</b> 37:14 41:2	<b>organisations</b>
<b>observe</b> 10:20	68:20 69:15 103:4	<b>okay</b> 46:16 141:16	49:18 139:19	15:11 22:22 53:1
142:17	103:7,9,12,20	<b>old</b> 46:23 59:11	151:1	139:6 147:1
<b>observes</b> 64:7	104:20 106:5,11	74:13	<b>operates</b> 26:8 41:1	<b>organised</b> 64:2
65:19	106:20 107:3,11	<b>old-fashioned</b>	<b>operating</b> 21:20,23	78:15 79:3,25
<b>obtain</b> 60:22	107:17 108:4	153:3	30:10 40:1 68:23	80:2,17 81:1 85:2
<b>obtained</b> 15:3	111:14 112:17	<b>older</b> 59:12 147:20	70:5 132:21	88:14 89:10 90:7
128:7	113:4,13,14	<b>oldest</b> 26:19	<b>operation</b> 12:20,23	91:24 92:1,8,10
<b>obviously</b> 2:9 30:16	114:14,15,17	<b>OLITs</b> 125:20	13:1,2,15,15,17	93:17 94:6 99:15
57:15 59:12,14	116:14 122:24	<b>once</b> 9:25 27:3,8	14:18 15:2,15,16	<b>orientate</b> 19:11
77:10,18 91:22	124:2,7 126:10	28:10,19,21 37:23	16:7,23,24 17:4,6	<b>orientated</b> 6:10
135:3 153:6	127:22 140:3	58:3 59:16 60:9	17:10,16,19 18:12	<b>original</b> 108:16
<b>occasions</b> 34:19	142:4 153:1,15	99:22 115:2,24	18:14,25 19:22	<b>ought</b> 144:23
38:13 53:19 117:2	<b>offending</b> 4:16 5:12	116:6,23 129:20	20:14,18,25 22:12	<b>outcome</b> 145:9,15
118:8 119:10	7:2 9:22 21:12	<b>one's</b> 34:25	74:19 77:12,15	149:18,20 150:1,8
120:15 155:1	23:15 38:1 39:8	<b>ones</b> 66:15	81:2 85:5,7 98:21	150:13,24 151:10
<b>occupation</b> 97:19	39:15 59:21 61:6	<b>ongoing</b> 35:4 41:6	123:2,4,6,7,11	151:15,23
<b>occur</b> 49:2	66:22 67:3 104:12	67:14 74:5,14	<b>operational</b> 17:24	<b>outcomes</b> 28:16
<b>occurred</b> 14:24	109:23 111:4	<b>Onion</b> 4:13 64:15	26:13 70:25 71:2	29:8 104:1 151:24
<b>offence</b> 6:3 13:21	112:3,9 127:21	<b>online</b> 2:19 6:11,20	71:7,8,8,20 76:7	<b>outline</b> 79:22
24:13 50:9 103:5	138:20 139:3,21	7:18 23:8,10	82:25 133:8	<b>outlined</b> 79:3
103:17 108:16	140:24 153:11	31:12 33:12 34:4	<b>operations</b> 15:19	112:21 113:2
149:22,24 151:2	<b>offer</b> 154:1	38:3,3,7,9 41:4	18:5,8 21:3,3,9	<b>outrage</b> 24:12
153:4,7	<b>office</b> 31:21 33:21	44:3 46:21 49:4	53:15,16,20 69:6	<b>outraged</b> 24:7
<b>offences</b> 5:13 23:5	33:24 77:24 87:10	49:15,18,18 67:2	69:9 90:12 137:11	<b>outset</b> 14:11 44:7
23:11 25:18 39:14	87:23 99:6,24	80:1 81:4 82:12	137:12	79:2 86:22
65:9 68:22 69:17	118:10 141:7	82:15 84:16 87:1	<b>operator</b> 51:6,15	<b>outside</b> 65:14
79:24 101:24	151:10	87:13 97:6 98:13	<b>operators</b> 37:13	108:11 113:24
	<b>officer</b> 32:10,18	106:19 122:12	141:5	<b>overall</b> 10:20 98:2



116:10 <b>overlooked</b> 28:7 <b>overseas</b> 23:13 <b>oversee</b> 130:21 <b>overseeing</b> 76:1 133:6 <b>overseen</b> 128:1 131:13 <b>oversight</b> 28:23 76:7 129:10,21,23 130:1 <b>overview</b> 5:1 64:5 <b>overwhelmed</b> 141:23 145:13 <b>overwhelmingly</b> 98:13 <b>owe</b> 109:5 <b>Owens</b> 89:18 <b>owner</b> 51:5,6	26:7 27:19 31:15 39:2 40:12,19 46:17 47:15 50:15 58:1 62:13 64:11 66:19 70:20,22 77:1 81:11 83:4 92:14 100:23 112:20 114:11 128:11,14 130:16 131:25 133:21 135:14 137:25 138:11 139:15 140:21 149:16 152:15,16 156:17 <b>papers</b> 76:15,18 <b>paragraph</b> 1:25 2:13 3:6 4:21 6:12 9:11 10:9 17:2,3 22:18 31:8 40:23 44:3 55:12 56:12 57:11 59:22 60:15,18 <b>paragraphs</b> 14:16 <b>paramount</b> 32:14 38:1 <b>parent</b> 50:2 <b>parenting</b> 144:6 <b>parents</b> 23:10 41:3 41:9 49:13 127:19 <b>Parliament</b> 101:21 <b>part</b> 4:8 11:9 14:13 34:11 41:22 45:16 46:9,14 63:1 64:23 67:21 72:15 73:6 74:14 89:10 89:23 90:5 91:17 94:1 97:15 98:17 110:18 116:5 123:1 133:11 149:5,13,14 150:18 153:13 <b>particular</b> 4:21 17:13 18:23,24 26:25 27:4 29:12 29:13,16 30:5	32:25 35:4,16 48:3,3 58:4 65:1 76:4,16 81:9 84:6 87:12 89:17 90:10 91:3 92:17 93:5 94:22 95:9 97:14 105:16 110:5 114:9 122:5 129:11 148:11 151:25 <b>particularly</b> 89:22 115:13 <b>partner</b> 54:3 127:15 <b>partners</b> 31:22 40:11 52:8 57:19 79:21 <b>parts</b> 16:12 73:7,8 <b>passion</b> 138:14 <b>passionately</b> 103:18 126:9 <b>password</b> 3:16 <b>Pausing</b> 84:15 <b>pay</b> 80:9 <b>paying</b> 89:9 <b>payment</b> 34:5 <b>PC</b> 135:25 <b>peers</b> 143:7 144:18 <b>people</b> 3:19 4:2 13:10 23:9 24:11 34:20 35:1 41:9 41:14,17 42:8,9 44:11,22,23 47:3 48:19 49:10 50:4 50:12 64:17 65:3 67:9,24 68:6,20 68:24 69:2,7,13 72:23 75:19 84:13 90:7,16 93:5,21 94:2 106:3,13 108:12 110:4 112:25 127:12 132:19 134:22 135:24 136:17 140:20 141:25 142:9,10,11 144:5	144:7 145:18 146:21 147:10 152:4,12 <b>perceive</b> 91:7 <b>perceived</b> 108:11 <b>perception</b> 109:21 <b>perfect</b> 128:4 <b>perfectly</b> 150:17 <b>perform</b> 95:13 <b>performance</b> 70:10 <b>performed</b> 85:19 96:3 120:7 <b>period</b> 28:8 32:13 42:16 124:3 140:15 <b>periods</b> 14:22 15:9 19:8 <b>permeates</b> 132:6 <b>permission</b> 36:25 <b>perpetrate</b> 138:9 <b>perpetrator</b> 59:5 <b>perpetrators</b> 43:11 43:19 125:1 139:2 <b>person</b> 4:3 58:12 58:13 114:23 115:20 117:1,4 143:20 145:4,9 153:6 <b>person's</b> 135:18 <b>personally</b> 106:13 <b>persons</b> 77:14 <b>perspective</b> 43:21 93:19 96:20 98:2 137:2 138:11 141:3 143:8 <b>phases</b> 42:16 <b>phenomenon</b> 149:13 <b>Phil</b> 84:21 <b>phone</b> 127:9 <b>phones</b> 93:8 123:23 136:2 <b>phrase</b> 25:12 51:19 92:24 132:5 145:1 <b>pick</b> 31:8 124:14 131:18 146:4	<b>picking</b> 46:24 47:12 <b>picks</b> 57:12 <b>picture</b> 46:17 83:7 83:12 99:7,17 113:22 115:4,22 <b>piece</b> 44:5 45:6 <b>pieces</b> 43:16 <b>pillar</b> 8:15 22:16 89:23 <b>pillars</b> 7:7 31:7,11 67:8 86:8 <b>pilots</b> 87:4 <b>place</b> 7:22 11:23 16:10 23:6 29:14 29:25 30:25 31:6 32:4,10 35:8,15 35:20,22,23 37:4 37:18,21 47:25 52:1,3 53:16 56:24 58:23 60:3 63:4,7 65:12 66:6 66:22 67:22 70:11 70:16 71:5 77:9 77:15 80:1,14,21 84:24 88:9,19 90:17 93:13 98:16 100:15 104:23 110:10 113:8 119:16 120:2 127:24 129:7 134:6,21 136:11 137:10,21,23 141:20,22 143:5 144:11 150:8 153:24 <b>placed</b> 13:25 16:22 147:4 <b>places</b> 68:23 105:14 <b>placing</b> 105:6 116:17 <b>plan</b> 88:21 <b>planning</b> 36:25 94:24 95:2,22 <b>plans</b> 80:12 91:8 128:2
<b>P</b>				
<b>pace</b> 50:7 <b>package</b> 155:18,23 <b>packages</b> 20:3,6 <b>paedophile</b> 101:24 119:12 136:23 <b>paedophiles</b> 104:5 104:7 <b>page</b> 14:9 19:14 43:25 44:1,2 47:16 49:24 50:1 50:23 78:3,22 79:1 83:19,20 85:17,20 91:1 95:17 106:24,25 114:8 122:15 123:15 124:5,20 124:20 133:12,17 135:8 139:22 142:16 <b>pages</b> 47:24 48:4 48:14 49:11 54:15 90:24 138:25 <b>Palmer</b> 126:8 132:1 <b>panel</b> 11:11 14:8 17:9 18:11 24:3				

<p><b>platform</b> 57:13,16 58:4 59:24 60:2 63:18 65:24</p> <p><b>platforms</b> 23:4 34:4 35:14 37:9 56:14 57:8 58:16 59:2 60:9 65:21 66:4,13</p> <p><b>play</b> 12:7 42:11 67:23 68:5,9 84:23 87:3</p> <p><b>Playpen</b> 17:14</p> <p><b>pleaded</b> 22:15</p> <p><b>please</b> 1:5,10 4:18 5:1 7:3,9 8:2,15 9:10 12:25 14:7 14:10 17:9 19:4 19:18 22:20 24:3 26:7 31:8 39:2 40:23,25 43:14 44:1,3 47:13 52:23,25 55:9,11 56:20 57:11 58:1 64:11 66:24 75:6 75:13 77:22,22 81:12 94:18 101:1 101:2 107:19 123:14 138:24 139:22 142:16 149:8</p> <p><b>plus</b> 103:2</p> <p><b>pm</b> 52:22 86:17,18 86:20 121:23,24 122:1 156:7</p> <p><b>point</b> 4:1 27:14 30:25 42:18,18,21 45:10,15 48:24 58:22 60:14 64:25 65:1 92:19 97:25 102:6 110:6 116:21 126:11 130:13 142:2 148:18 153:13 154:9,10</p> <p><b>point'</b> 101:23</p> <p><b>pointing</b> 19:24</p>	<p><b>points</b> 40:6 85:23 113:9</p> <p><b>police</b> 5:13 9:4 11:12 15:6,11 32:10,14,23 49:17 56:3 66:20,25 71:16,20,23 72:1 75:15 78:13 79:20 80:9,14 81:22 84:20 86:24 87:9 87:11 88:15 89:11 100:8,10 101:22 102:2,6,14 104:4 105:3,7 109:21 111:16 117:19 120:5,8,19 123:17 124:6 135:19 137:21,22 141:22 141:22 143:5 146:14 150:1 151:7 153:14 154:13,20 155:3</p> <p><b>policies</b> 76:9</p> <p><b>policing</b> 7:23 8:25 13:25 28:6 31:22 32:3 38:21 49:2 76:9 77:6 78:2,5,9 78:21 79:11 80:3 80:7,11,12,18 81:17 83:1 84:10 98:21,24 102:1 121:7 124:23 138:11 139:19 141:3 143:12 155:15</p> <p><b>policing's</b> 77:2</p> <p><b>policy</b> 107:10 118:2 136:10</p> <p><b>POLIT</b> 131:24</p> <p><b>POLITs</b> 125:20</p> <p><b>pop</b> 24:7</p> <p><b>pop-up</b> 48:14 50:1</p> <p><b>porn</b> 148:5</p> <p><b>pornographic</b> 147:10 149:11</p> <p><b>pornography</b> 148:7</p>	<p>148:13,16,17</p> <p><b>port</b> 135:18</p> <p><b>portal</b> 3:3 23:8 143:12</p> <p><b>portfolio</b> 75:23,25 75:25 76:4 98:19 112:15 113:10</p> <p><b>portrayed</b> 59:2</p> <p><b>pose</b> 21:25 103:9 106:4,14 109:13 110:1 116:9 141:25</p> <p><b>posed</b> 74:6 82:9,15 94:23 101:16 116:9 118:21 119:9 121:9</p> <p><b>posited</b> 138:5</p> <p><b>position</b> 1:17 4:9 7:5 9:4 10:10 13:22 62:11 72:6 100:4 107:10 125:8 128:13</p> <p><b>positions</b> 77:14 94:17</p> <p><b>positive</b> 36:9 46:4,4 46:5 49:21 55:17 66:10 97:24 98:2 125:4 129:7 130:15</p> <p><b>positively</b> 88:4</p> <p><b>possessing</b> 9:17</p> <p><b>possession</b> 32:7</p> <p><b>possible</b> 26:12,16 59:15 85:7 107:21 109:6 110:8 130:22 132:12,20</p> <p><b>possibly</b> 48:8 62:5 146:10</p> <p><b>post</b> 89:4 95:21</p> <p><b>posts</b> 15:22,24</p> <p><b>potential</b> 37:1 40:12 79:19 114:3 124:24 138:1 145:20 154:6</p> <p><b>potentially</b> 23:15 29:10,17 32:16</p>	<p>38:15 48:18 51:19 52:7 55:10 57:23 58:7,12 66:7 69:12,15 84:4 94:13 107:6,16 119:22 124:3 125:6 129:13 132:6 138:4 140:24 149:10 150:14 153:9</p> <p><b>power</b> 71:9,14 147:13</p> <p><b>powerful</b> 127:10 155:2</p> <p><b>powers</b> 71:3 82:11 147:8</p> <p><b>practicable</b> 60:24 119:10,20</p> <p><b>practical</b> 88:2</p> <p><b>practicalities</b> 145:8 145:14</p> <p><b>practically</b> 96:2 142:25</p> <p><b>practice</b> 57:20 88:23 123:19 124:16</p> <p><b>practise</b> 55:21</p> <p><b>practitioners</b> 136:12</p> <p><b>precise</b> 129:17</p> <p><b>predict</b> 12:5 116:15</p> <p><b>prediction</b> 10:8,21 10:24 116:11</p> <p><b>Prepare</b> 40:20 141:18</p> <p><b>prepared</b> 43:22 105:25 132:23 141:15</p> <p><b>present</b> 48:5 76:17 83:7 99:6,17 100:17 110:9 121:15 137:18 145:11</p> <p><b>presentation</b> 49:25 82:19 83:18 85:11</p> <p><b>presented</b> 20:17</p>	<p>28:1 83:12 110:8 136:21 146:25</p> <p><b>presents</b> 136:4</p> <p><b>press</b> 101:13</p> <p><b>pressing</b> 33:25 83:22</p> <p><b>pressures</b> 120:4</p> <p><b>pretty</b> 84:24</p> <p><b>prevalent</b> 2:11</p> <p><b>prevent</b> 36:1,2 52:12,23 66:21 67:18,21,25 80:25 81:6 88:17 91:21 92:3 139:21 141:18 147:12,13 147:19</p> <p><b>preventative</b> 134:20</p> <p><b>prevented</b> 58:24</p> <p><b>preventing</b> 139:11 144:23 145:2</p> <p><b>prevention</b> 26:14 35:23 38:1 68:2 87:1 111:9 136:10 136:14</p> <p><b>previous</b> 50:16</p> <p><b>previously</b> 13:13 60:1 71:4 115:6</p> <p><b>primary</b> 58:11 67:21</p> <p><b>Prime</b> 77:17</p> <p><b>principle</b> 153:5</p> <p><b>prior</b> 47:25 84:9 115:24</p> <p><b>priorities</b> 58:2 71:12 72:8,14</p> <p><b>prioritisation</b> 9:5 9:15 10:4 11:13 30:7,16 31:4,5 115:23 131:3</p> <p><b>prioritise</b> 9:9,23 30:13,22</p> <p><b>prioritised</b> 26:12 26:15,22 57:17</p> <p><b>prioritising</b> 30:9 31:1</p>
--	--	---	--	--

<b>priority</b> 12:2 16:1 16:20 35:10 59:6 69:20 73:5 79:9 96:19 109:24 123:18 125:7	<b>production</b> 5:14 <b>products</b> 35:18,21 35:25 36:4,15 42:8 67:19 68:3,4	<b>proposition</b> 55:16 <b>prosecute</b> 39:14 65:8	<b>providing</b> 38:14 112:19 146:5	110:16
69:20 73:5 79:9 96:19 109:24 123:18 125:7	42:8 67:19 68:3,4 <b>professional</b> 29:22 102:24 155:22	<b>prosecuted</b> 22:15 39:12 40:9 150:5	<b>provoke</b> 107:16	<hr/> <b>Q</b> <hr/>
<b>prison</b> 103:7,13 112:8	<b>professionally</b> 106:14	<b>prosecuting</b> 67:24	<b>prude</b> 148:24	<b>qualified</b> 53:10,11
<b>prisons</b> 104:20	<b>professionals</b> 41:18	<b>Prosecution</b> 102:22 104:19 105:7 108:18	<b>PSHE</b> 154:2	<b>quality</b> 147:2
<b>privacy</b> 34:25	<b>profile</b> 127:21 131:8	<b>protect</b> 15:23 22:11 40:20 44:22 45:9 57:1,23 125:1 135:1 141:18 154:3	<b>PTF</b> 100:13	<b>qualms</b> 93:22
<b>private</b> 37:20	<b>profiles</b> 88:22	<b>protected</b> 13:19	<b>public</b> 2:25 3:3 4:24 23:8 60:21 75:23,24 77:14 78:15 79:5 80:5 83:24 131:9 137:19 150:6 151:16 154:24	<b>quarterly</b> 70:11 128:17 130:3
<b>proactively</b> 62:18 63:12	<b>programme</b> 44:4 44:10,20 45:17 46:20 108:2 110:21 111:7 135:4,7	<b>protecting</b> 123:17	<b>publication</b> 77:25 125:15	<b>queried</b> 51:21
<b>proactivity</b> 62:22 63:2,5	<b>progress</b> 33:13 37:22	<b>protection</b> 29:1,1 29:23 37:21 61:19 75:15,24,24 76:5 76:13,14 86:24 121:2 138:15	<b>publicise</b> 56:6	<b>question</b> 10:23 70:21 91:22 94:23 116:9 128:16 135:9 136:16
<b>probably</b> 103:2 119:23 130:23	<b>progressed</b> 29:7	<b>protective</b> 37:18	<b>publicity</b> 101:12	<b>questioned</b> 65:18
<b>problem</b> 1:15 33:12 34:7 36:14,14 38:7 43:20 65:11 66:7 67:1,14 69:1 72:13 73:19 88:22 93:2 98:8 100:21 100:25 111:1,2 135:18 140:8 147:22 148:20 149:17	<b>progressing</b> 28:17	<b>proud</b> 41:5	<b>publicly</b> 65:17 69:10	<b>questions</b> 48:12 70:18,22 74:21 101:16 112:19 131:7 152:13,14 152:16 156:2,17 156:23
<b>problems</b> 44:20 84:5 89:7 118:5 122:4	<b>progression</b> 67:5 130:21	<b>provide</b> 3:23 10:7 11:18 16:3,14 25:20 32:11 41:8 49:7,19 53:24 55:13 60:20 64:17 69:12 73:21 76:6 124:13	<b>purpose</b> 142:7	<b>Quick</b> 49:10
<b>procedure</b> 150:25	<b>project</b> 5:3 73:15 73:24 74:4,5	<b>provided</b> 3:20 15:22,23 16:20 19:5 29:11 37:3 39:6 54:23 55:1 63:25 64:1 67:20 82:24 94:15,18 111:12 116:22 117:20 140:14	<b>purposes</b> 152:7,8	<b>quickly</b> 9:6 37:22 49:11 88:8 108:22 109:1
<b>process</b> 24:16,16 26:21 29:14 30:17 32:21 41:20 46:21 49:7 51:8 113:25 113:25 119:14 134:13 138:6 152:22 153:2,17	<b>projects</b> 87:4	<b>providers</b> 37:5 63:16 142:20 143:15,16 145:23	<b>purse</b> 18:19 40:17 54:9 66:20 81:5,8 81:9 82:8 83:23 84:9 85:21 128:15 129:11 130:2 131:12 134:18 136:15 141:16 151:16	<b>quite</b> 12:19 20:13 38:14 84:23 102:20 103:9 105:9 131:9 146:11 149:10 155:13
<b>procedures</b> 150:25	<b>proliferation</b> 132:2 143:3	<b>provides</b> 22:4 41:11,13 63:17 72:25	<b>pursuing</b> 1:10 152:21	<b>quoted</b> 102:5
<b>processes</b> 3:16 11:21 29:17 30:20 51:4	<b>promote</b> 56:13,14 143:16		<b>put</b> 5:7 7:21 12:20 21:19 35:22 56:17 65:12 75:2 77:25 79:8 80:13 83:7 86:1 88:13 107:19 109:18 111:25 120:18 121:21 123:4 134:6,20 139:7 140:1,13 141:7 148:3,5 150:8,13 152:19 153:24	<b>quoting</b> 1:16
<b>produced</b> 58:4 64:23	<b>promoted</b> 42:20 68:1		<b>putting</b> 70:12 84:24	<hr/> <b>R</b> <hr/>
<b>product</b> 12:9 36:17 37:2 42:3,10 46:1 48:6 63:18,18 64:24	<b>promptly</b> 124:17			<b>raise</b> 110:18 155:14
	<b>pronounced</b> 16:24			<b>raised</b> 45:5 65:14 132:1 142:19
	<b>proper</b> 21:24			<b>ran</b> 13:15
	<b>properly</b> 10:14 152:19			<b>range</b> 6:19,22
	<b>proportion</b> 44:11			<b>rape</b> 76:2 102:18 102:23 103:16 105:19 112:15
	<b>proportionality</b> 72:21			<b>rapes</b> 108:19
	<b>proposal</b> 107:10 138:18			<b>rate</b> 10:8,21 11:8 12:16 116:11
	<b>propose</b> 1:13 107:18			<b>rationale</b> 56:8

88:18 <b>re-abused</b> 106:8 <b>re-evaluate</b> 117:5 <b>reach</b> 41:20 <b>reached</b> 68:7 97:24 101:22 102:6 <b>reaching</b> 68:8 <b>react</b> 28:14 <b>reaction</b> 46:2,4 <b>read</b> 19:6 61:21 78:23 112:24 122:7 <b>reads</b> 82:3 <b>ready</b> 48:19 148:13 <b>real</b> 84:19 98:23 104:3 118:5 121:12 134:5 136:4 137:1,2 147:17 148:20 <b>realise</b> 144:1 <b>realistic</b> 12:14 69:12 143:25 <b>realistically</b> 69:21 <b>reality</b> 12:18 45:25 45:25 66:25 70:14 73:6 123:19 125:8 <b>really</b> 25:2 46:4 49:21 55:11 58:17 83:7,16,17 84:13 89:14,16,19 90:5 90:6,13 97:25 99:7 104:22 125:16 126:18 128:21 129:4,7 131:2,13,14 132:13,14,20 133:8,8 134:15 136:5 138:17 140:6 142:3 145:20 147:21,24 148:1,21 149:2,4 152:2,9 155:2,2 155:25 <b>reason</b> 20:16 27:19 32:2 49:16 85:20 <b>reasonable</b> 144:25	<b>reasonably</b> 60:24 119:9 <b>reasoning</b> 29:15 <b>reasons</b> 49:11 56:9 118:14 133:9 <b>reassure</b> 66:12 74:8 <b>reassured</b> 130:13 <b>reassuring</b> 47:2 <b>recall</b> 41:24 44:13 83:18 85:10 129:12 138:3 <b>receive</b> 3:2 24:22 42:24 104:13 154:24 <b>received</b> 2:22 40:9 44:12,15,24 47:4 60:9 91:11 96:5 136:21 <b>receiving</b> 103:4 <b>recognise</b> 104:3 118:20 <b>recognised</b> 88:9 <b>recognition</b> 96:18 <b>recommendation</b> 83:20 122:22 <b>recommendations</b> 124:9 <b>reconvene</b> 156:6 <b>record</b> 69:10 140:13 150:2,20 <b>recorded</b> 150:20 151:14 <b>recording</b> 40:2 <b>records</b> 31:24 105:6 <b>recover</b> 32:5 <b>recovered</b> 32:3 <b>reduce</b> 25:5 68:14 <b>reduced</b> 96:13 <b>refer</b> 5:10 23:25 32:24 34:11 <b>reference</b> 2:1 8:13 22:24 43:22 44:1 49:23 54:14 73:14 78:1 79:6 82:11 90:24 101:6	111:13 123:16 131:19 <b>references</b> 54:24 100:20 <b>referral</b> 2:24 24:14 26:25 27:1,8,10 28:7,20 129:14 <b>referrals</b> 1:18 2:17 2:20,22,25 3:4 8:4 22:17,21,23 23:4 23:7,14,17,21,24 24:23 25:1,23 26:5,9 27:4 30:6 60:16 61:12,15 130:4,4,6,7,14 131:16 134:1 <b>referred</b> 3:7,23 4:13 24:18 27:3 53:2 71:4 73:14 75:11 <b>referring</b> 51:17 84:15 115:21 <b>refers</b> 81:12 129:20 <b>reflect</b> 128:14 <b>reflected</b> 73:5 <b>reflecting</b> 21:10 62:7 <b>reflection</b> 104:2 <b>reform</b> 114:4 <b>refresh</b> 41:23 <b>regard</b> 4:19 14:5 39:3 55:14 66:23 114:5,7 118:2 <b>regarded</b> 23:17 24:21 <b>regarding</b> 62:8 <b>regardless</b> 58:25 111:21 <b>region</b> 41:16 54:16 67:12 87:14 <b>region's</b> 88:16 <b>regional</b> 8:8 9:1 29:4 70:5,8 80:17 81:1 82:25 85:14 88:13,22 89:2,6,8 89:10,13 90:3,7	91:6,11,24 92:1,8 94:6 96:20 <b>register</b> 108:4 112:1 <b>registered</b> 13:19 108:3 109:9 <b>regular</b> 6:15 35:12 41:24 64:23 <b>regularly</b> 16:19 57:18 66:17 <b>regulate</b> 142:18 146:11 <b>regulation</b> 37:4 <b>regulator</b> 147:14 <b>regulatory</b> 63:11 <b>rehabilitation</b> 103:8,12 108:1 109:9 <b>rehabilitative</b> 110:19 <b>reinforced</b> 82:18 <b>reinforces</b> 57:18 <b>reinforcing</b> 45:17 <b>reiterate</b> 103:24 <b>relate</b> 86:9 <b>related</b> 150:10 <b>relates</b> 3:10 23:15 50:10 60:12 63:1 <b>relating</b> 38:12 105:4 121:20 122:3 <b>relation</b> 1:14 3:11 5:11,25 6:2,20 7:1 7:4,6,17,18 8:17 9:3 18:17 19:2 21:7,16 22:17 31:19 35:13 37:9 37:13 38:6,25 43:5 45:4 47:10 49:20 50:1 54:19 55:2 56:2,20 57:12 59:11,23 63:8 64:12 65:16 67:2 69:4 73:17 76:22 79:12 87:25 95:12,18 100:8,19	105:13 114:9,17 128:8 129:25 135:5 153:15 <b>relationship</b> 36:9 44:15 56:11 57:2 71:1,2,9,19,21,22 72:1 148:12,23 149:23 150:17 152:6 <b>relationships</b> 42:13 55:17 <b>released</b> 124:2 <b>relevant</b> 41:13 42:9 46:3,8 <b>reliable</b> 114:24 <b>reliance</b> 134:17 <b>religiously</b> 11:5 <b>rely</b> 16:2 <b>remain</b> 4:14 151:12 <b>remainder</b> 6:17 <b>remained</b> 15:25 <b>remaining</b> 155:20 <b>remains</b> 45:8 <b>remarked</b> 124:5 <b>remedy</b> 141:3 <b>remember</b> 44:11 79:15 <b>remind</b> 7:12 17:2 117:21 <b>remit</b> 76:20 <b>remote</b> 60:21 <b>remove</b> 57:15 143:12 <b>removing</b> 56:21 57:5 <b>renew</b> 50:22 51:22 <b>repeated</b> 58:16 <b>replaced</b> 66:7 <b>replicated</b> 92:4 <b>report</b> 3:2 14:16,17 15:14 23:2,10 43:10 44:25 46:19 47:5,22 48:9,10 48:10,16,19 49:12 49:17,24 50:12 51:5 60:7,10,10
--	--	---	---	--

60:24 61:5,10,21 62:15,25 63:9 68:24,25 77:10 84:15 88:6 118:12 122:12,15 123:12 123:15,25 124:12 124:20 125:10,14 144:2,14,20,21 151:14 <b>reported</b> 23:3 59:17 60:11 61:2 62:24 <b>reporting</b> 3:3 23:8 37:19 49:15 51:4 51:8,14 52:2 59:24 60:3,4 63:21 134:7 135:7 <b>reports</b> 3:2 49:4,5 52:4 53:13 61:14 77:18 102:15 105:17,19,20 151:21 <b>represent</b> 76:15,17 <b>representative</b> 76:18 <b>represents</b> 5:6 <b>reputational</b> 84:20 <b>request</b> 16:8 74:12 82:8 133:18 <b>requested</b> 56:6 73:22 <b>requests</b> 56:10,13 <b>require</b> 3:24 16:15 49:8 73:3 78:16 147:9 <b>required</b> 8:7 11:7 60:23 63:6 65:8 73:11 78:9 <b>requirement</b> 26:14 63:12 77:7 78:2,5 78:21 79:11 80:3 80:7,11,12 81:17 84:10 <b>requirements</b> 110:20 151:13 <b>requiring</b> 142:23	147:15 <b>rescue</b> 13:12 <b>research</b> 43:8,16,22 44:5,9,22 45:6 46:23 83:9,10 113:8 148:8 <b>resilience</b> 73:10 95:14 134:21 142:4 144:5,7,15 147:3 <b>resilient</b> 154:3 <b>resolve</b> 140:20 <b>resource</b> 16:5,16,17 16:18,19 18:5 21:11 25:4,22 39:6,7,23 41:23 49:3 52:6 70:12 72:16 73:3,4 80:13 138:2 <b>resources</b> 41:8,9 42:15 68:18 73:10 86:25 118:20 120:18 121:8 <b>resourcing</b> 86:22 <b>respect</b> 41:24 76:16 80:10 95:22 132:14 154:18 <b>respective</b> 7:23 8:3 8:13 96:6 117:13 128:9 130:18 131:20 135:6 <b>respects</b> 105:8 <b>respond</b> 9:6 28:14 84:22 117:14,21 117:22 142:19 145:25 <b>responded</b> 124:17 <b>responding</b> 8:18 61:19 133:18 <b>responds</b> 117:22 <b>response</b> 7:3,18,20 8:7,23,25 13:3 15:21 28:6 30:25 31:19 38:20 40:17 52:12 76:2,12 77:9,13 78:17	80:13,16 81:9 82:8 83:23,24 84:6,9 85:2,4,5,12 85:14,19,21,22 87:1,11 88:13,16 89:16,21,24 90:2 94:13 95:8 97:11 100:1 101:4,7,9 112:21 113:1 122:23 126:1 132:12 141:13,16 142:3,7 145:11 <b>responses</b> 76:10 80:21 91:12 94:15 95:7,16 96:5 110:7 134:5 <b>responsibilities</b> 75:20 76:20 <b>responsibility</b> 8:9 30:19 54:11 80:15 84:25 97:9 <b>responsible</b> 51:17 71:16 75:19 76:1 76:7,10 86:25 120:13 131:21 145:24 <b>rest</b> 108:5 <b>result</b> 6:1 7:12,21 12:15 46:11 65:25 74:16 111:5 115:9 122:21 151:4 155:10 <b>resulted</b> 17:21 151:22 <b>results</b> 13:2,16 17:11 18:21 70:6 128:12 131:10 <b>retain</b> 74:9 <b>retained</b> 58:4 <b>retaining</b> 74:18 <b>return</b> 52:18 86:16 121:23 <b>returns</b> 27:12,17 <b>revictimised</b> 58:19 59:1 <b>review</b> 12:6 24:24	26:21 29:16 47:25 113:12,15 114:12 <b>reviewed</b> 25:23 27:4 <b>reviewing</b> 12:11 <b>reward</b> 40:5 <b>Richard</b> 39:17 <b>right</b> 4:5 5:23 6:20 12:8 18:7 19:15 21:24 25:24 33:4 42:6,24 46:3 49:19 55:7,16 62:20,21 67:11 70:23 71:15 87:23 89:1 93:18 101:11 102:15 107:12 113:24 117:12 118:24 122:20 139:14,15 143:13 149:12 153:10 155:13 <b>rightfully</b> 24:7 <b>rightly</b> 84:23 103:9 131:9 <b>rise</b> 22:5 <b>risen</b> 23:23 <b>risk</b> 9:14,25 10:15 10:18 11:20 12:5 21:23 25:25 26:23 30:7,14,18 69:23 69:25 83:24 102:7 106:4 107:3,5,17 109:7,20 110:2 112:2 113:5,18 114:5,6,15,18,24 115:1 116:4,16 117:11,14 118:6,7 118:15 119:9 120:6,9,14,16 121:1,6,15 124:3 134:24,25 155:8 <b>risk-based</b> 114:1 <b>risk-taking</b> 44:16 <b>risks</b> 30:18 134:22 137:3 146:19 <b>Robert</b> 75:4,8	156:19 <b>robust</b> 8:22 30:24 59:24 60:3 85:12 <b>rock</b> 120:2 <b>ROCU</b> 92:11 95:13 95:17,20 96:21 141:23 <b>ROCUs</b> 90:11 94:15 95:6 96:2,6 96:8,13,14,17 97:2 <b>role</b> 52:12 55:9 67:23 68:5,9 76:12 81:9 84:23 84:25 87:3 90:4 91:13 94:24 95:2 95:11,13,15,18,23 129:10,25 <b>roles</b> 96:1,2 <b>rolled</b> 155:16 <b>room</b> 119:12 <b>rooms</b> 137:22 143:6 <b>Rotherham</b> 77:10 88:6 <b>round</b> 51:1 <b>round-table</b> 36:12 <b>Router</b> 4:13 64:15 <b>routes</b> 93:8 <b>run</b> 16:7 123:8 135:4 139:12,16 <b>running</b> 8:2 14:19 15:15 96:21 100:19 106:17 110:19,25 119:14 120:13 142:23 <b>rushed</b> 50:5
<hr/> <b>S</b> <hr/>				
<b>sadly</b> 5:21 <b>safe</b> 41:10,15 42:25 68:12 <b>safeguard</b> 59:4 68:25 79:21 <b>safeguarded</b> 13:18 124:19				

<p><b>safeguarding</b> 17:24 67:12 72:7 90:10 90:13 116:18 125:18 131:23 137:3 138:15</p> <p><b>safeguards</b> 108:8 137:10</p> <p><b>safely</b> 143:7</p> <p><b>safety</b> 34:18 37:24 42:23 44:4,13 53:13 124:14</p> <p><b>salutary</b> 109:14</p> <p><b>sanction</b> 108:10 113:24 120:23</p> <p><b>sanctum</b> 133:5</p> <p><b>satisfaction</b> 34:17</p> <p><b>saturation</b> 101:23 102:6</p> <p><b>saved</b> 68:15,16</p> <p><b>saw</b> 28:14 77:17 85:14</p> <p><b>saying</b> 11:4,5 57:21 59:18 72:13 105:8 105:24 106:2 112:16 120:5</p> <p><b>says</b> 47:2 78:4 79:23 82:23 99:18 100:18 101:21</p> <p><b>scale</b> 1:14,23 4:16 35:1 40:12 43:20 67:2 82:24 83:8 87:18 98:20,25 99:7 100:21,23,25 101:23 122:4 124:24 127:11 129:2 139:19 147:18 149:16 153:21,23</p> <p><b>scenario</b> 155:12</p> <p><b>scene</b> 126:4</p> <p><b>school</b> 45:22,22,25 144:6 146:6 147:1</p> <p><b>schools</b> 41:19 42:20 42:21 146:25 154:2</p> <p><b>SCOLT</b> 131:23</p>	<p><b>SCOLTs</b> 125:21</p> <p><b>scope</b> 15:10 35:13 153:9</p> <p><b>scores</b> 9:25</p> <p><b>Scout</b> 146:6</p> <p><b>screen</b> 7:9 43:25 47:16 63:25 77:24 136:1</p> <p><b>sea</b> 127:20</p> <p><b>search</b> 3:13 33:1 59:10 62:19 63:12</p> <p><b>second</b> 1:16 10:5 16:25</p> <p><b>Secretary</b> 77:16 78:20</p> <p><b>Secretary's</b> 78:6</p> <p><b>section</b> 39:13 44:18 86:13 107:8 149:9</p> <p><b>Sections</b> 147:9</p> <p><b>secure</b> 7:19 31:23 39:25 64:18 132:17</p> <p><b>secured</b> 87:14,22 87:23 124:17</p> <p><b>securing</b> 17:20</p> <p><b>security</b> 78:16 79:4 79:13,16 136:3</p> <p><b>see</b> 4:7 19:8,16 22:24 27:7 30:4 42:7,12 45:24 46:2 47:17 48:9 49:6,9,25 51:24 62:7 64:25 65:6 66:6,8,12,15 70:6 71:15 78:18 79:2 79:5 81:15 82:10 83:19 85:20 91:19 96:2,4 97:20 101:19 102:13,20 102:22 103:1,3,8 108:23 112:25 118:5 123:25 130:9 133:14 147:17</p> <p><b>seeing</b> 92:15,17 93:16,18,22,24</p>	<p>102:11,13 103:12 103:20 110:9 112:14 128:24 149:1,10</p> <p><b>seek</b> 36:22 37:5 38:12 55:20 58:7 107:16 139:3,21 142:5 144:2</p> <p><b>seeking</b> 6:2 40:4</p> <p><b>seemingly</b> 129:14</p> <p><b>seen</b> 8:3 18:21 28:5 81:2,4,11 89:23 99:1 110:5 140:5 148:12</p> <p><b>seize</b> 126:21</p> <p><b>seized</b> 13:18</p> <p><b>Select</b> 112:22</p> <p><b>selection</b> 122:9 138:17</p> <p><b>self-help</b> 139:7 154:1</p> <p><b>self-reporting</b> 143:16</p> <p><b>send</b> 28:19 70:1</p> <p><b>sending</b> 127:15</p> <p><b>senior</b> 71:23 123:17 131:6 154:20</p> <p><b>sense</b> 104:3</p> <p><b>sensible</b> 52:16 122:11 132:9</p> <p><b>sensitive</b> 38:23 124:18</p> <p><b>sent</b> 64:25 103:13</p> <p><b>sentence</b> 103:25 112:6</p> <p><b>sentences</b> 40:9 103:6</p> <p><b>sentencing</b> 22:10 109:16</p> <p><b>sentiments</b> 151:24</p> <p><b>separate</b> 117:17 154:10</p> <p><b>serious</b> 9:22 26:10 26:14 30:9 64:2 67:22 78:14 79:3 79:25 80:2 85:2</p>	<p>90:7 93:17 97:21 99:15 102:18,23 103:17 105:19 108:19 109:16,23 111:18</p> <p><b>seriously</b> 109:20</p> <p><b>serve</b> 51:9</p> <p><b>service</b> 2:24 29:11 37:3 49:19 57:13 63:16,18 74:11 84:20,22 87:11 88:15 96:13 102:14 103:5 104:15,19 105:7 108:6,18 109:7,11 120:19 141:22,22 146:5 151:6,18 153:14 154:13,25 155:3</p> <p><b>service's</b> 76:2</p> <p><b>services</b> 3:18,19,21 3:24,24 5:16,20 35:19,22,24 36:1 36:4,15 57:9 60:21,21 64:19,22 64:24 65:3,7 66:14 67:19 96:22 99:20 100:15 154:21</p> <p><b>set</b> 38:4 74:10 78:2 78:7 85:10,18 93:13 103:14 148:25 151:13</p> <p><b>sets</b> 115:4,4</p> <p><b>setting</b> 75:9</p> <p><b>seven</b> 48:22 53:11 117:23 155:20</p> <p><b>sex</b> 13:13,19,21 103:2,7 104:20 108:3 109:9 112:7 112:17 146:20</p> <p><b>sexting</b> 149:14</p> <p><b>sexual</b> 1:12 3:11 6:20,23 17:13 30:10 39:13 41:4 54:10 56:21 57:14</p>	<p>60:23 64:6 69:8 69:17 76:23 77:3 77:6,13 78:1 79:6 79:12,22,24 80:23 81:11 82:12,16 87:2,25 88:7,20 88:21 93:24 94:1 94:9 102:18,23 103:17 105:19 108:19 111:9,14 122:5 124:8,21 130:19 139:11 144:14 147:18 148:18 150:18 152:7,8</p> <p><b>sexuality</b> 127:16</p> <p><b>sexually</b> 144:11</p> <p><b>shape</b> 45:15 63:20</p> <p><b>share</b> 2:9 8:20 9:3 17:15 42:11 138:14</p> <p><b>shared</b> 15:10 95:6 150:4</p> <p><b>shares</b> 120:23</p> <p><b>sharing</b> 8:4,16 9:7 13:4,10 14:25 66:1,6 134:23</p> <p><b>Sharpling</b> 70:21,23 71:7,15,19 72:4 152:15,17 153:13 154:9 156:1</p> <p><b>Sharpling's</b> 84:12 85:4 129:8</p> <p><b>sheer</b> 28:9 134:1</p> <p><b>sheet</b> 151:22</p> <p><b>shifted</b> 99:2</p> <p><b>shifts</b> 110:23</p> <p><b>short</b> 28:18 52:21 63:25 86:19 107:18 121:25 129:22 132:4 141:3 149:20</p> <p><b>show</b> 18:1 117:2</p> <p><b>showed</b> 83:12</p> <p><b>shown</b> 58:18</p> <p><b>sifting</b> 25:21</p>
---	---	--	--	--

<b>signed</b> 96:8	<b>slight</b> 129:1	<b>space</b> 133:3	<b>stark</b> 82:24 83:4,13	<b>stone</b> 105:22
<b>significant</b> 11:17	<b>smaller</b> 37:13,14,16	<b>spans</b> 6:19	83:13	<b>stop</b> 35:23 67:15
12:19 19:1,25	<b>smart</b> 127:9,12	<b>speak</b> 72:21 121:21	<b>start</b> 8:15 58:23	81:7 104:22 111:5
20:4,13 21:16	<b>Snapchat</b> 42:1,2	121:22	115:5 122:11	137:20 139:16
25:3,9 54:3,17	<b>social</b> 6:4 48:25	<b>speaking</b> 58:17	133:16 141:11	140:17
59:20 67:23 68:9	49:5 50:17,18,24	91:4 121:4 131:10	<b>started</b> 18:15,21	<b>stopped</b> 66:10,11
72:16 83:25 92:15	51:23 53:9,10,11	142:25	89:19 99:3 122:18	<b>stopping</b> 69:8
125:16 126:18	53:19 60:2 142:21	<b>specialist</b> 126:3	<b>starting</b> 44:3 55:11	<b>storage</b> 64:8
131:13,14 134:15	151:8	<b>specific</b> 6:10 27:13	97:20	<b>story</b> 155:19
136:6,21 140:6	<b>societies</b> 93:23	76:6 108:14	<b>starts</b> 9:10 19:12	<b>straight</b> 134:9
142:18 145:21	<b>society</b> 99:20	<b>specifically</b> 151:10	23:22 48:11	<b>straightaway</b> 11:19
149:5	109:19 143:11	<b>specifics</b> 76:22	<b>state</b> 84:9	<b>strand</b> 52:24
<b>significantly</b> 2:20	149:9	<b>spectre</b> 110:18	<b>stated</b> 9:15 72:6	<b>strangers</b> 134:24
11:8 21:1 47:24	<b>soft</b> 104:5	<b>spectrum</b> 109:16	123:18	<b>strategic</b> 54:10
47:24 89:24 151:5	<b>solely</b> 14:12 98:5	111:15 120:14	<b>statement</b> 1:16,25	64:1 77:6 78:1,5
<b>signs</b> 132:17	<b>solution</b> 144:16	<b>spend</b> 52:10 138:21	2:2 4:19 6:8,12	78:21 80:3,6,10
<b>silos</b> 94:8,8,9	154:8	142:13	9:11 17:1 22:19	81:16 82:5,18
<b>silos</b> 92:21	<b>solve</b> 36:14	<b>spending</b> 25:21	31:8,9 40:24	84:10 88:24 91:25
<b>similar</b> 20:24 26:1	<b>solved</b> 36:15 67:14	<b>spent</b> 25:11 40:16	55:12 60:15,18	94:3 95:9 130:8
29:8 61:7	<b>somebody</b> 30:23	<b>spheres</b> 92:18	73:14 90:23,25	130:15
<b>Simon</b> 18:20 75:2,4	48:13 118:10	<b>spoke</b> 53:14 54:19	91:2 106:25 107:8	<b>strategy</b> 79:16
75:8 156:19	136:16 144:8	128:7	111:12 114:8	99:16 104:22
<b>simple</b> 93:1 107:19	151:14 152:6	<b>spoken</b> 2:9 58:20	133:12,13 138:25	141:14,20,21
127:9	<b>son</b> 154:12	67:10 95:4 98:7	142:17	153:24
<b>simply</b> 66:25 96:7	<b>soon</b> 26:12,16	106:9 126:8	<b>statements</b> 55:13	<b>stream</b> 89:4 141:9
132:22 148:18	60:24 119:9	<b>spokesperson</b>	75:10	<b>streamed</b> 119:15
151:15	<b>sophisticated</b> 68:20	76:11	<b>States</b> 2:24 23:1	137:5
<b>Sir</b> 7:19 81:21	90:6 99:4 146:24	<b>sponsored</b> 33:24	60:11,16 62:14	<b>streaming</b> 2:10
<b>sit</b> 45:14 96:7	<b>sophistication</b>	<b>spotlight</b> 83:7	<b>station</b> 109:21	31:12 34:1,5,8
110:15	87:20 126:1	<b>spots</b> 88:22	<b>stations</b> 49:17	35:2,14,15
<b>site</b> 17:14,14,16,25	<b>sorry</b> 44:1 61:14	<b>SPR</b> 77:20	<b>statistics</b> 1:14	<b>streamline</b> 134:13
42:7 50:24 57:14	92:25 98:9,9	<b>spread</b> 93:17	23:18 114:8	<b>streamlined</b> 25:7
58:4 60:7 134:14	113:11 130:4	<b>SPRs</b> 78:21	150:22 151:19	107:18 134:6
<b>sites</b> 4:9 5:4,6 6:4,9	135:10 141:12	<b>Squad</b> 97:17	<b>stats</b> 126:13,24	<b>strength</b> 41:7,7
6:14,14,24 23:3	142:10	<b>square</b> 141:15	<b>statutory</b> 78:6	<b>stress</b> 108:21
34:14 35:24 51:3	<b>sort</b> 61:22 63:5,19	<b>staff</b> 53:3,23	<b>stay</b> 41:10	149:13
60:6 62:3 68:1	111:1	128:23 131:4	<b>step</b> 15:5 69:18	<b>strong</b> 84:1
<b>sitting</b> 121:11	<b>sorts</b> 11:20 128:19	132:13,19 154:22	116:3 153:7	<b>structure</b> 91:25
<b>situation</b> 20:24	<b>sought</b> 121:15	155:17	<b>stepchild</b> 59:9	152:10 155:8
154:14	<b>sound</b> 28:18	<b>stage</b> 27:1 48:13	<b>steps</b> 27:9 65:11	<b>structures</b> 96:15
<b>six</b> 91:12	<b>source</b> 36:2 134:4	<b>stages</b> 20:24 37:25	66:21 97:24 116:2	<b>struggling</b> 102:14
<b>sixpence</b> 97:13	<b>sources</b> 11:24	<b>stand</b> 9:12 141:15	<b>sticking</b> 44:21	102:24 111:18
<b>size</b> 21:17	22:21	<b>standard</b> 146:3,8	90:16	<b>studies</b> 95:25
<b>skilled</b> 118:16	<b>South</b> 95:9	146:12	<b>stimulation</b> 148:19	<b>study</b> 135:25
<b>slavery</b> 92:6,16	<b>south-east</b> 95:17,19	<b>standards</b> 43:4	<b>sting</b> 119:14,16	<b>style</b> 124:22
94:3,8 97:9,22	95:23	<b>staple</b> 127:5	137:4	<b>subject</b> 43:4 111:8

133:24	96:21	107:1 122:14	61:21 99:8,9	126:19 127:16,18
<b>submissions</b> 126:12	<b>supervision</b> 138:7	133:17	148:14 155:1	128:3 136:1
<b>submitted</b> 91:18	<b>supply</b> 93:7,7	<b>table</b> 51:1	<b>talked</b> 64:19 109:3	145:17
<b>subsequent</b> 55:13	<b>support</b> 16:4,5	<b>tackle</b> 18:22 38:22	134:2	<b>teenage</b> 149:10
<b>subsequently</b> 11:25	17:20 34:23 42:24	65:12,25 85:9	<b>talking</b> 47:21 50:19	<b>teenagers</b> 39:21
60:11	49:8 66:11 72:25	87:15 92:5,12,20	63:2,3,4 106:7	149:21
<b>substantial</b> 14:25	72:25 73:2 87:10	94:7 98:8	133:25 146:23	<b>tell</b> 17:9 98:15
20:23	121:7 141:8	<b>tackled</b> 78:12	153:17	<b>ten</b> 15:21 91:11
<b>substantially</b> 23:21	<b>supported</b> 37:17	<b>tackling</b> 18:18	<b>tanker</b> 97:12	<b>tens</b> 31:25
116:13	<b>supportive</b> 82:4	87:12 89:21 96:18	<b>target</b> 21:24 22:6	<b>tension</b> 57:21
<b>success</b> 11:8 12:16	<b>supports</b> 16:1,13	140:1	39:9 121:15	<b>tentacles</b> 93:17
18:12 61:24	<b>suppose</b> 120:1	<b>take</b> 1:13 11:23	141:25 145:25	<b>termed</b> 47:9 56:15
137:12	<b>sure</b> 46:8 80:11,12	20:6 21:13,14	<b>targeted</b> 5:18	81:10 83:22 95:10
<b>successes</b> 18:5,6	80:19 107:13	26:24 27:6 29:25	<b>targeting</b> 35:5,9	<b>terms</b> 2:8 3:10
19:1	120:22 145:14	30:25 32:4 35:15	69:23,25 81:3	15:13 45:20 46:9
<b>successful</b> 10:11	146:14 152:8,18	35:20,21,22 36:22	93:11 121:14	47:23 56:17 61:22
98:15 114:13	<b>surprise</b> 92:14	48:17,20 49:5,7	<b>tasked</b> 27:24	65:10 71:5 72:13
<b>succinctly</b> 133:21	<b>surrounding</b>	51:2,12,24,25	<b>Taskforce</b> 57:1	72:15,22 87:6
<b>sudden</b> 137:8	145:23	53:16 54:13,13	<b>tasking</b> 71:3,5 82:5	88:2 93:1 95:6
<b>suffered</b> 6:1	<b>suspect</b> 5:11 44:25	56:24 57:22 59:5	<b>taught</b> 42:16	97:5,16 99:11
<b>sufficient</b> 69:6,11	100:20 121:17	59:17,19 60:8	<b>teach</b> 145:25 146:1	107:1,20 110:11
84:5	135:19 138:3	67:7 69:18,18	146:1	113:23 126:7
<b>sufficiently</b> 19:9	151:15	71:5 76:11 78:23	<b>teacher</b> 146:22	127:11,13,16,18
<b>suggest</b> 44:14	<b>suspected</b> 9:17	80:1 90:7 91:23	<b>teachers</b> 41:8,19	128:15,17,22
112:22	14:25	97:23 98:1 108:21	46:5 146:1	130:17 131:11,13
<b>suggested</b> 45:2 79:8	<b>suspects</b> 13:19	109:14 127:25	<b>teaching</b> 42:12,15	134:1 135:23
103:22 132:4	116:14	128:14 133:21	43:5	136:5 137:2 145:9
<b>suggesting</b> 7:16	<b>suspects'</b> 15:3,6	135:13 144:11	<b>team</b> 21:17 27:24	148:13 155:8
<b>suggestion</b> 66:24	<b>suspended</b> 103:6	152:9 154:4	53:12 68:6 102:23	<b>terrorism</b> 78:14
110:1 113:3 138:1	123:6	<b>taken</b> 11:3 23:6	118:9 125:18	79:3
138:4,10,12	<b>sworn</b> 75:4 156:19	27:9 29:17 32:10	129:15 131:23,24	<b>test</b> 24:24 42:8
144:22 146:7	<b>system</b> 14:20 26:7	45:7 50:18 54:17	131:24 132:6,24	<b>text-based</b> 45:3
<b>suggestions</b> 114:4	29:10 32:9 92:23	54:21,24 57:9	132:24	<b>thank</b> 33:25 52:18
<b>suggests</b> 8:24 26:23	102:22,22 103:15	58:15 59:7,20	<b>teams</b> 53:15 119:7	70:18,23 72:4
<b>suicide</b> 136:8,9,14	105:10 107:7,22	66:21 77:9,15	130:19,23 131:19	73:12 74:20,23,24
<b>suicides</b> 136:5,6	110:13,17,17	80:15 86:1 95:15	132:2,9	81:25 82:4 86:16
138:19	111:24 135:7	107:2 113:8	<b>tech</b> 72:18 137:21	152:17 154:9
<b>summarise</b> 1:15	<b>systematic</b> 113:12	118:12 127:24	154:4	156:1,2,3
12:25 31:17 77:5	113:15	129:7 131:16	<b>technical</b> 74:6	<b>Thanks</b> 156:6
<b>summarised</b> 83:4	<b>systems</b> 74:3,3,4	152:25 154:18	129:1	<b>theft</b> 127:6
125:4		<b>takes</b> 21:8 29:14	<b>techniques</b> 22:2,11	<b>theme</b> 106:16
<b>summary</b> 8:16 17:6	<b>T</b>	48:7 63:4 97:11	35:11 66:5	124:15 142:23
133:13	<b>tab</b> 4:20 7:11 14:9	109:19 127:25	<b>technologies</b>	<b>themes</b> 66:19
<b>superintendent</b>	17:1 43:14 47:14	137:23	135:23	133:20,22
133:6	77:23 81:14 90:24	<b>takeup</b> 94:16	<b>technology</b> 55:18	<b>thereabouts</b> 50:20
<b>superintendents</b>	94:20 101:7,7	<b>talk</b> 38:20 57:4	64:8,12 73:1,17	<b>they'd</b> 118:10



<p><b>thing</b> 72:5</p> <p><b>things</b> 12:9 104:25 115:5 121:20 129:7 138:16 143:8</p> <p><b>think</b> 1:16 2:17,21 5:9,22 6:11 7:13 9:25 10:7 12:17 16:10 18:1 19:24 23:20 24:24 33:4 33:15,21 37:16,22 37:25 39:4,10 40:19 41:20 43:8 47:16,25 48:23 50:19 53:11 54:3 54:15 55:24 56:12 58:17 59:16,22 60:13,18 61:21,21 62:1,5,9,10,13 67:16 69:11,14 70:8,21 72:12 73:14,19,21 75:14 85:6 86:3 87:22 88:8,10 89:24 90:23 91:6,11 96:16,24 98:24 99:23 100:21 104:23 106:2 107:5,18 108:12 109:5 110:13 111:12 115:19 116:2,7,25 117:3 117:6,12 118:1 119:18,19 120:11 120:22 121:10 122:6,10,21 123:5 125:19 127:14 128:24 129:12 131:8,10 132:21 133:2,18 135:11 135:17 137:15 139:8,15 141:12 143:2,4,11 144:4 144:22 145:1,7,12 145:20 146:7,16 146:18 147:24</p>	<p>148:11 149:2,4,5 153:8,13,19 154:5</p> <p><b>thinking</b> 69:9 70:23 71:15 132:4</p> <p><b>thinks</b> 140:19</p> <p><b>Thinkuknow</b> 40:25 41:7 42:10 43:7,9 43:23 44:9,12,15 44:18,24 45:1,4 46:20 47:4 135:4</p> <p><b>third</b> 4:19 6:8 90:23 111:12</p> <p><b>thought</b> 12:3 66:10</p> <p><b>thoughts</b> 110:7</p> <p><b>thousands</b> 25:1 32:18 46:6 59:9 140:22</p> <p><b>threat</b> 2:5 5:2,5 7:7 8:17,19,22 12:9 13:4 18:16,18,22 21:23 22:16,17 26:11 31:7,11 33:17 35:1,13,17 38:4 64:6 65:13 65:19,21 67:9 79:13,18 80:3,20 82:9,15 83:8,15 84:6 85:9,12 86:8 87:12,13,15,19,20 88:7,25 89:15,22 89:25 90:6 92:6 92:11,12,15,16,20 94:7 96:23 98:13 98:14,20 99:1,2 99:21 103:10 106:15 117:1 118:21 121:9 125:19 140:2 141:13,25 155:8</p> <p><b>threats</b> 2:7 7:23 8:3 8:6,13 16:2 34:10 77:18 78:7,10,12 78:14,20 79:1,2,4 79:8,10 83:12,14</p> <p><b>three</b> 19:13 23:23 24:25 42:15 92:18</p>	<p>118:25 125:17 126:15,16 148:6 151:3</p> <p><b>threshold</b> 24:21 115:21</p> <p><b>THRIVE</b> 155:5</p> <p><b>Thursday</b> 156:9</p> <p><b>tie</b> 114:21</p> <p><b>ties</b> 105:1</p> <p><b>time</b> 6:14 8:7 13:8 23:19 24:12 25:11 28:8 32:13 33:16 33:19 35:20 40:16 41:6 42:17 44:14 48:20 50:19 51:19 51:21 52:11 58:18 59:1,20 77:16 78:8 79:11 81:15 84:21 86:14 97:11 97:23 98:1 99:2 99:22 101:12 103:1,4,16 104:21 106:6 110:12 112:5 116:20 118:11 123:7 124:2 127:25 136:16 141:19 142:25 146:13 151:2 154:5 155:6</p> <p><b>timely</b> 142:19</p> <p><b>times</b> 77:2 94:12 104:16 112:13</p> <p><b>timescales</b> 117:15</p> <p><b>Tink</b> 126:8 132:13 132:14</p> <p><b>Tink's</b> 133:1</p> <p><b>tissues</b> 115:14</p> <p><b>today</b> 1:4 67:7 85:16 125:12 156:5</p> <p><b>today's</b> 23:20</p> <p><b>told</b> 43:7</p> <p><b>tomorrow</b> 156:6</p> <p><b>tonight</b> 148:4</p> <p><b>tool</b> 9:5,10,12,14,15 9:19,23 10:4,24</p>	<p>11:1,5,8,13,22 12:2,3,15,20 30:16 32:23 33:17 33:20 113:5,18,19 113:22 114:10,25 115:23 116:10,15 116:17,20 117:7</p> <p><b>tools</b> 30:7,20 31:5 107:4 117:12</p> <p><b>top</b> 8:2 83:20 85:20 94:21 123:15 139:22</p> <p><b>topic</b> 66:24 117:17 120:21 137:25 149:7</p> <p><b>TOR</b> 3:19 4:12 65:3</p> <p><b>total</b> 2:21 151:21</p> <p><b>totality</b> 88:24 89:15 89:25 92:20 99:18 118:7</p> <p><b>touched</b> 59:23 64:15,16</p> <p><b>town</b> 93:10</p> <p><b>towns</b> 88:11 93:6</p> <p><b>toxic</b> 112:11,14</p> <p><b>trace</b> 4:3</p> <p><b>traced</b> 4:2</p> <p><b>track</b> 130:5</p> <p><b>traditional</b> 97:14 127:22</p> <p><b>trafficking</b> 53:24 92:6 93:9 97:18</p> <p><b>train</b> 41:17,19</p> <p><b>trained</b> 18:15 29:23 41:17 48:25 132:23 134:10</p> <p><b>trainer</b> 41:20</p> <p><b>training</b> 42:24 44:12,16,20,24 47:4 138:6 145:23 145:24 146:6,8 154:2 155:11,18</p> <p><b>transformation</b> 87:9 100:8,10 127:23</p>	<p><b>transformed</b> 64:9</p> <p><b>transmitted</b> 24:13</p> <p><b>travel</b> 92:1 94:4 98:1 130:15 155:5</p> <p><b>travelling</b> 40:13</p> <p><b>Treasury</b> 99:6,25 100:2</p> <p><b>treat</b> 111:21</p> <p><b>treatment</b> 104:13 108:2 110:20 111:7</p> <p><b>trend</b> 103:17 130:14</p> <p><b>triage</b> 126:2,4 134:14</p> <p><b>trial</b> 102:20 106:1</p> <p><b>trials</b> 103:3 108:22</p> <p><b>tried</b> 136:17</p> <p><b>trouble</b> 55:8</p> <p><b>true</b> 2:20 6:21 17:8 61:1 98:19,20,22</p> <p><b>truly</b> 73:5 85:9</p> <p><b>trust</b> 13:23 56:11 119:1</p> <p><b>truth</b> 104:6,9,9</p> <p><b>try</b> 9:19 12:4,17 38:7 41:2 43:16 45:7 56:17 59:3 65:12 66:5,21 87:18 126:4 134:19 139:7,20 139:21 140:1 141:3 149:20</p> <p><b>trying</b> 37:23 44:22 45:9 46:10 84:13 100:11 103:14 110:24 112:10 134:6,13,25 136:19 140:20,22</p> <p><b>turn</b> 1:4 2:1 7:3 31:7 40:15,23 43:14 47:16 55:9 63:22 86:21 96:24 97:11,12 99:25 100:13 118:18 119:12 121:4</p>
---	--	--	--	--

122:2 137:11 138:25 144:13 153:9 <b>turning</b> 22:17 52:23 <b>turns</b> 99:18 <b>two</b> 2:12 13:12 21:9 26:16 87:16 89:17 91:12 94:22 96:1 98:17 99:13 102:19,19 118:25 126:16 133:8,25 140:19 143:8 148:6 155:1,19 <b>type</b> 32:14 38:1 115:21 146:20 <b>types</b> 1:23 2:5	<b>understand</b> 14:23 15:24 33:16 42:17 56:19 57:20 58:2 59:6 69:24 71:22 78:24 98:24 99:21 100:17 101:18 106:8 107:13,20 112:11 114:3,16 115:5 124:24 130:17 133:1 134:22 143:18 144:7,20 147:1,3 148:2 150:1 154:9 154:14 <b>understandable</b> 4:23 <b>understandably</b> 102:21 <b>understanding</b> 1:23 5:5 53:8 57:3 71:25 88:19 90:4,8 98:20,21 98:22,25 100:14 120:4 155:15 <b>understands</b> 30:13 90:5 122:17 143:24 150:13 <b>understood</b> 68:12 152:19 <b>undertake</b> 11:21 87:5 108:1 153:14 153:20 <b>undertaking</b> 123:22 <b>undertook</b> 128:6 <b>undoubtedly</b> 119:23 <b>unfortunately</b> 126:22 137:15 <b>unhelpful</b> 149:3 <b>unilaterally</b> 96:8 <b>unique</b> 32:25 49:1 128:25,25 <b>unit</b> 15:23 16:2,10 16:13,14 72:24 91:25 103:8	111:13 <b>United</b> 2:24 23:1 60:11,16 <b>units</b> 27:15 29:24 74:1 80:18 88:14 89:10 91:6,11 92:2,8 94:6 97:16 111:16 112:7 120:13 123:21 128:8 <b>University</b> 113:11 <b>unknown</b> 13:13 <b>unprecedented</b> 93:20 <b>unquestionable</b> 36:6 <b>unusual</b> 126:17 <b>update</b> 135:14 <b>updating</b> 73:17 <b>uplift</b> 131:13,14 140:6 <b>uploaded</b> 58:3,24 68:1 <b>uploading</b> 40:3 58:13 67:18 <b>urgent</b> 26:13 <b>URLs</b> 54:14 <b>USA</b> 60:20 <b>USB</b> 5:16 <b>use</b> 3:13,15,19,22 4:25 6:25 9:5 11:1,5,5,6 12:20 15:13 30:17,21 33:1 35:8 36:23 38:15,23 64:7,8,9 64:12 65:3 93:8 94:12 115:7 125:16 126:1 132:5 145:1 152:5 153:16 <b>useful</b> 33:17 <b>user-ability</b> 46:9 <b>user-friendly</b> 47:23 <b>users</b> 4:12 142:19 143:16 <b>utilise</b> 25:4	<b>utmost</b> 22:3 <hr/> <b>V</b> <hr/> <b>v</b> 148:4 <b>value</b> 42:5 51:13 <b>values</b> 32:1 <b>van</b> 126:2 <b>variety</b> 3:25 5:17 6:21 11:24 48:11 49:11 56:9 72:19 74:1,2 <b>various</b> 7:23 16:12 22:21 60:1 73:7 75:10,19 87:4 89:7 94:14 99:8 <b>varying</b> 94:16 106:22 123:21 <b>vast</b> 30:1 61:12 <b>veracity</b> 113:5 <b>verification</b> 148:4 149:4 <b>version</b> 10:5,10 12:6 45:23 48:2 114:12 <b>versions</b> 128:25 <b>victim</b> 8:4 31:11,16 50:6 57:17 58:8 59:1,4,6,14 68:15 68:16 106:8 127:8 129:4 <b>victims</b> 5:19 38:14 43:18 47:7 58:17 58:20 68:17 102:17,18,20 103:18 105:24 106:9 108:23 109:5 110:12,14 112:15 131:15 132:12 <b>video</b> 38:15 <b>videos</b> 33:15 42:7 63:3 <b>view</b> 20:13 21:14 28:4,25 35:20 36:10 57:9 65:5 69:1 72:15 78:7	84:1 93:18 99:9 104:22 107:14 109:14,19 113:13 128:23 132:23 134:11 142:15 148:10 152:18 154:19 <b>viewed</b> 46:21 58:19 106:7 107:11 108:7 134:8 <b>viewers</b> 103:11 <b>viewing</b> 81:4 105:5 105:14 109:22,23 111:5 122:24 132:18,19 <b>views</b> 48:4 63:10 106:22 107:1,5 113:9 <b>vigilantes</b> 137:16 137:23 <b>vile</b> 132:19 <b>vilified</b> 104:16 <b>violence</b> 75:23,24 93:14,20 <b>violent</b> 111:14 112:17 127:7 <b>viral</b> 24:5 <b>virtual</b> 56:25 124:22 <b>volume</b> 8:4 21:22 22:17,22 23:6,17 61:12 62:8 102:14 102:25 103:16 127:11 130:4,4,14 131:16 134:1 141:24 153:21,23 <b>volumes</b> 9:8 25:2 109:2 126:20 131:11 134:4 <b>voluntarily</b> 36:21 37:6 <b>voluntary</b> 53:6 71:4 <b>volunteers</b> 138:5 <b>vulnerabilities</b> 98:6 <b>vulnerability</b> 27:15
--	---	---	--	--

76:3,19 89:22 155:9,17 <b>vulnerable</b> 93:10 93:12,23	29:20 <b>wasn't</b> 6:6 18:12 50:18 85:3 132:4 135:24 <b>watch</b> 34:13 54:4 <b>watched</b> 144:10 <b>watching</b> 75:18 80:5 140:14 <b>way</b> 1:15,17 18:22 20:16 25:7 27:25 34:16 36:11 45:8 45:15,18 48:8 64:16 67:1,4 72:13,15 73:13 77:5 94:8 95:5 97:13 113:4 116:12 117:19 132:10 134:19 137:3 138:1,5 <b>ways</b> 12:3 25:5 80:19 <b>we're</b> 59:18 142:9 <b>we've</b> 59:23 <b>weakest</b> 154:17 155:13 <b>weakness</b> 141:12 <b>weaknesses</b> 141:13 <b>wealth</b> 116:22 <b>weapons</b> 6:22 <b>web</b> 3:12,14 4:11 4:14,17,25 5:9,12 6:10,16 7:1,3,4 17:14 40:1 54:14 72:18 99:19 <b>webmail</b> 64:16 65:4 <b>website</b> 4:4,4 36:17 36:18 40:25 41:1 41:8 42:1,2,11 43:23 45:2 50:24 51:6,8,13,15 112:24 147:20 <b>websites</b> 4:6,7 37:14 50:18,19 51:9,23 54:13 56:22 60:2 142:21 <b>Wednesday</b> 1:1	<b>weeding</b> 25:11 <b>week</b> 76:24 91:19 106:18 122:8 131:25 <b>weeks</b> 126:17 136:23 <b>welcome</b> 135:13,15 <b>welfare</b> 32:14 132:12 138:18 <b>well-known</b> 37:12 <b>went</b> 15:8 33:7 39:18,18 105:5 115:11 128:5 143:11 <b>weren't</b> 45:13 <b>whatsoever</b> 115:15 <b>whichever</b> 60:12 63:1 <b>whilst</b> 21:15 30:13 37:5 77:23 78:12 79:13 96:23 124:3 134:3 151:14 152:2 <b>wide</b> 76:20 <b>widely</b> 139:1 <b>wider</b> 11:22 19:16 42:18,18 55:19 73:3 83:1 <b>window</b> 59:21 <b>wish</b> 55:24 87:4 120:23 <b>wishing</b> 43:6 51:13 77:4 <b>withdrew</b> 74:25 156:4 <b>witness</b> 9:11 22:18 31:9 74:25 75:1 156:4 <b>woman</b> 5:25 147:20 <b>won</b> 137:15 <b>wonder</b> 86:12 101:2 <b>wondered</b> 154:19 <b>wondering</b> 5:7 12:25 47:20 133:21	<b>word</b> 83:13 94:12 104:2 107:23 <b>wording</b> 84:7 <b>words</b> 64:9 <b>work</b> 10:24 14:2 16:1,5,20 18:3,16 18:21 20:19,20 22:5 25:20 31:18 32:15 33:13 35:4 35:15 36:8 39:2 39:22 40:10,16,20 43:6 45:11 48:21 48:22,25 49:18,20 51:10 52:24,25 53:3,9,9,10,11,12 53:15 54:6,8,20 54:21,22 55:2,5 55:10,22 56:7,19 56:20 71:5 72:18 73:6 74:16 75:19 81:2 84:12 85:4 86:4,10 89:10 97:5 102:25 110:17,24 123:22 131:8 132:14,16 133:1 136:10 138:22 139:12 140:23 152:1 <b>worked</b> 17:7 36:10 53:22 56:5 139:25 151:9 <b>worker</b> 151:8 <b>workers</b> 48:25 49:5 53:10,11,19 <b>working</b> 16:1 22:13 25:6 39:24 54:1 54:19 74:7 76:5,6 76:16 89:13 92:3 94:4 110:5 125:24 151:20 <b>works</b> 47:18,21 114:11 <b>workshop</b> 36:12 <b>workshops</b> 51:25 <b>world</b> 34:13 51:10 62:10 63:1 124:22	125:23 153:25 <b>worried</b> 139:13 <b>worries</b> 148:21 <b>worst</b> 113:17 <b>worth</b> 19:24 62:13 104:24 <b>worthy</b> 48:24 51:2 <b>wouldn't</b> 16:16 47:20 56:11 118:23 130:12 <b>writing</b> 78:8 82:7 <b>written</b> 81:19 101:3 101:20 <b>wrong</b> 98:10 137:13 150:19 <b>wrote</b> 7:15 81:21
<hr/> <b>X</b> <hr/>				
X 156:11				
<hr/> <b>Y</b> <hr/>				
<b>year</b> 19:13,22 36:12 87:17 89:5 90:18 102:3,19 112:16 140:10 <b>years</b> 21:5,12 22:14 33:9 39:17 44:7 59:11,11 74:13 87:16 89:4,18 97:10 98:17,23 99:13 102:19 125:18 127:25 151:3,18 <b>yesterday</b> 1:8 27:20 41:24 50:15 56:25 66:18 67:10 72:22 137:25 146:17 150:15 <b>yesterday's</b> 82:5 <b>young</b> 23:9 39:17 39:20,20 41:9,14 42:8,9 44:11,23 47:3 93:4,21 134:21 144:5,7 149:9,9 150:4 152:12				

<b>young-person-fri...</b> 45:3 <b>Yvette</b> 101:21	<b>140</b> 17:24 <b>15</b> 87:15 148:3 <b>15-/16-year-olds</b> 150:16 <b>152</b> 156:23 <b>153</b> 40:23 <b>16</b> 148:3 <b>16.3</b> 10:24 <b>16/'17</b> 41:21 <b>163</b> 2:1 <b>17</b> 18:13 126:25 <b>170</b> 20:11,15 21:15 <b>173</b> 55:12 <b>174</b> 56:12 59:22 <b>18</b> 4:21 81:14 <b>18-box</b> 7:10,25 8:24 38:4 70:3 84:11 86:2 90:1 <b>18-year-old</b> 143:21 <b>18/'19</b> 87:17 <b>180</b> 57:11 <b>19/'20</b> 87:17	77:9,17 <b>2014/15</b> 19:8,21 20:14 21:7 <b>2015</b> 7:5 14:17 23:22 46:19,19,22 77:5,8,20,25 81:16 82:18 87:22 123:12 125:15 <b>2015/16</b> 16:23 20:8 21:7 <b>2016</b> 18:12 20:10 23:23 24:25 48:1 140:16 <b>2016/17</b> 20:15 21:7 21:14 <b>2016/2017</b> 18:9 <b>2017</b> 2:21 20:10 27:22,25 42:4 64:2 140:16 147:9 <b>2018</b> 1:1 156:9 <b>21</b> 122:14 140:9 141:1 149:18,20 150:1,13,24 151:10,15,23 <b>22</b> 40:9 <b>24</b> 1:1 117:23 118:18 119:5 120:10,12 137:6 <b>25</b> 142:16 156:9 <b>26</b> 81:16 <b>280</b> 17:22 <b>29</b> 114:8 <b>29/30</b> 39:17	<b>35</b> 14:16 138:25 139:22 <b>35-year-old</b> 143:21 <b>38</b> 25:1,18 126:24 <hr/> <b>4</b> 47:11 77:23 78:3 <b>4,553</b> 140:17 <b>4.06</b> 156:7 <b>40</b> 133:12,17 <b>400</b> 105:4 <b>42</b> 87:7 <b>420</b> 109:3 <b>426</b> 67:9,11 70:7 <b>43</b> 106:24 <b>44</b> 1:25 2:13 106:25 <b>44,000</b> 140:11 <b>45</b> 6:17 <b>451</b> 20:8 <b>48</b> 17:3 119:6 120:10,12 <b>49</b> 43:25 44:1,2 <hr/> <b>5</b> 541:12 95:17 101:7 <b>5.9</b> 41:21 <b>50</b> 103:2 126:14 <b>51</b> 3:6 <b>518</b> 13:18 <b>52</b> 113:16 <b>53</b> 113:16 <b>55</b> 6:15 60:18 <b>550</b> 67:13 <hr/> <b>6</b> 6101:7 122:15 <b>60,000</b> 54:16 <b>60s</b> 115:12 <hr/> <b>7</b> 741:12 78:22 79:1 124:20 <b>7,000</b> 41:16 42:19 45:12,13 <b>70</b> 156:17 <b>70,000</b> 54:16	<b>700</b> 1:19 134:2 <b>72</b> 39:13 <b>73</b> 10:17 114:18 <b>74</b> 103:3,24 <b>75</b> 156:19,21 <b>787</b> 13:17 <hr/> <b>8</b> 814:9,9 41:12 42:10 45:21 <b>8-</b> 42:12 <b>80,000</b> 2:22 <b>83.7</b> 10:21 116:11 <b>88</b> 9:11 <hr/> <b>9</b> 9113:16 <b>9,685</b> 13:18 <b>9.1</b> 128:24 <b>90</b> 10:9 <b>90s</b> 97:15 <b>917</b> 19:21 <b>917451170</b> 19:15 <b>96</b> 22:18 <b>97</b> 10:14 12:19 114:14
<b>0</b> <b>0.1</b> 61:23 62:10 <hr/> <b>1</b> <b>1</b> 8:15 26:11 74:14 107:1 113:17 133:17 151:20 156:13,15 <b>1,000</b> 72:17 <b>1,500</b> 138:5 <b>1.5</b> 87:24 <b>10</b> 113:17 <b>10-year-olds</b> 42:12 <b>10,000</b> 155:16,17 <b>10.30</b> 1:2 156:6,9 <b>100</b> 12:13,16 116:12 <b>107</b> 13:19 31:8 <b>10s</b> 41:12 42:10 45:21 <b>11</b> 41:12 94:20 <b>11-</b> 148:7 <b>11.48</b> 52:20 <b>12</b> 47:14 52:19 124:1 <b>12-</b> 148:7 <b>12-month</b> 127:1,2 <b>12.06</b> 52:22 <b>12.56</b> 86:18 <b>120</b> 17:22 <b>13</b> 41:12 43:14 <b>13-</b> 148:7 <b>135</b> 128:25 <b>139</b> 13:22 <b>14</b> 117:24 147:9 148:3 155:16 <b>14-plus</b> 41:12 <b>14-year-old</b> 148:8	<b>2</b> <b>2</b> 1:5 10:10 12:6 17:1 22:16 26:13 75:2 83:19 90:24 114:12 <b>2,655</b> 140:18 <b>2.00</b> 86:17,20 <b>2.55</b> 121:24 <b>20</b> 5:19 6:12 48:25 53:12 147:9 <b>20-plus</b> 53:12 <b>200</b> 67:15 <b>2006</b> 1:21 67:7 <b>2007</b> 67:7 <b>2009</b> 44:6 45:10,14 50:19 <b>2012</b> 78:6 84:12 122:19 <b>2012/13</b> 128:6 134:2 <b>2013</b> 73:25 84:12 125:15 <b>2014</b> 13:3,16 33:7	<b>3</b> <b>3</b> 4:20 26:18 47:16 75:3 85:17 90:24 90:24 <b>3,500</b> 23:24 <b>3.10</b> 121:23 <b>3.14</b> 122:1 <b>30</b> 87:16 91:18 98:4 98:12 117:25 <b>30,000</b> 6:13 <b>34</b> 14:16 138:25 <b>3408</b> 90:24	<b>7000</b> 54:16	