

Outcomes from work streams set following Lancashire Peer Review 2016:

“General silo’ed approach.”

This issue was addressed head on by the departmental restructure – which removes silo working - with the exception of discreet specialist areas of business.

The adoption of a force wide vulnerability definition and strategy and delivered through training described below, has brought the force together in its shared responsibility for dealing with vulnerability and particularly CSE.

“There appeared to be no firm links to third sector agencies and only basic statutory relationships with social services.”

A multi-agency sexual exploitation (MASE) panel has been established in the city and county attended by Police, Social Care and the Charitable/Voluntary sector. In addition there is now an established cross authority perpetrator panel with the same membership. The Police also chair the CSE Cross Authority Group (CSECAG) which provides oversight to those tactical panels and reports directly into both LCSB’s. Nottinghamshire Police have established a Working Together Team to improve our contribution to local child protection arrangements taking them beyond the basic statutory requirement.

“There are multiple referral routes that can lead to confusion and delay”

The single route for referrals across the force is now the MASH a MASH having been established in the City. This has allowed for agency referrals concerning CSE to be shared in that multi-agency co-located environment rather being routed directly to an investigative team. This also ensures that there is no delay and strategy discussions are conducted upon receipt of the information. It provides a complete clarity for referrals.

“There is a mixture of experience with not all staff PIP2 or SCAIDP trained”

All Police Officers in SEIU are either PIP2 or working toward accreditation. Both teams have sufficient tutor constables to support this. All staff are required to attend SCAIDP. Those that have yet to attend are either not PIP2 (a requirement) or were not the last time the course was made available.

The introduction of Career pathways (where experienced detective officers have been re deployed to specialist departments across the force – including SEIU) and additional recruitment have balanced the issues raised re; - experience.

“There is very little joined up working with the MFH Team”

In response to the review a new CSE Co-Ordinator and a specific MFH Co-ordinator were written into the new structure and have been recruited. Both roles are located work within the SEIU and are lined managed by the CSE DI. Both have responsibility’s re;- children at risk of CSE who go missing or are found to be at risk of CSE following a MFH episode. They also have a formalised relationship now with the force (wider) MFH team.

“Concerned was raised that the “HUB” base (Holmes House??) had lead to a disconnect from uniformed colleagues.”

SEIU are now based at an operational police station mutually accessible to response and NPT . Public Protection now fully participate in the Force DMM which has significantly improved relationships with uniformed and CID branches of the force.

“No means of enforcing CAWNS”

A CSE Disruption team has been set up consisting of Special Constables’s. One of their primary areas of responsibility is the issue of and follow up enforcement of CAWNS.

“Training”

A CSE NCALT package has since been developed re; -CSE and made available to all staff. A series of “bite size” videos have been developed and sent to every operational officer in the Force. The viewing is mandatory and has been followed up by a series of PP manager visits to ensure compliance. In 2017 senior managers within PP delivered vulnerability briefings to every team in the force which included CSE. Student Officers are required to complete a vulnerability week as part of the new starter curriculum which includes a substantial CSE input. The ICIDP and PIO courses also feature CSE inputs.

“Concerns Network” – no pro-active targeting”

The CSE Disruption team (CSEDT) has been setup to address this specific issue. Concerns network intelligence is created on NICHE and tasked where appropriate to the CSEDT for action. Once actioned the CSEDT are expected to complete an OEL detailing what action has been taken. Oversight and additional tasking is the responsibility of the SEIU DI.

“Constabulary action plan for CSE”

A CSE Action Plan has been produced incorporating recommendations from previous inspections, independent reports of national significance and the Force CSE Problem Profile. The plan works under the 4 headings of Prepare, Prevent, Protect, Pursue and is owned by the PP- Lead for Children. The problem profile has been shared widely both internally and externally among key strategic partners.

“Operational Blocker – Removal of Hi-tech Crime Team from same building as POLIT”

POLIT and DIU now co-located at FHQ

“Quality of Equipment Old and In Need of Constant Repair”

£42k has been allocated to the purchase of new equipment, software licenses and training to equip the relocated POLIT team.

“Unable to fulfil Forces CAID Commitment”

A restricted duties officer now works now commits her total number of hours to CAID and Victim ID work.

“IIOC team acts as a silo within a silo”

CEOP referrals are now routed directly to Force Intelligence for research and package development before allocation to POLIT for enforcement.