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IICSA Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse

Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report

2.1 Barnardo’s

1. Barnardo’s (previously Dr Barnardo’s Homes) was founded by Thomas John Barnardo, a Victorian philanthropist who was concerned to make provision for the needs of the poor, in part by saving children from impoverished families. His thinking was radical at the time, because he did not distinguish between the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor, and instead had a policy that no destitute child should ever be refused admission to one of his homes (the “ever open door policy”). 

2. As a contemporary children’s charity, Barnardo’s works with some of the most vulnerable children and young people in the country, and in 2015-2016 supported 248,000 children, young people, parents and carers through 996 different services across the UK.

3. Barnardo’s corporate witness before the Inquiry was Sara Clarke, who is responsible, among other things, for the heritage and history of Barnardo’s, disclosures of abuse, criminal investigations, and liaison with public inquiries. Ms Clarke has extensive experience of working on issues relating to child migration and with former child migrants.[1]

2.1.1 What was Barnardo’s role in child migration?

4. Barnardo’s migrated very large numbers of children to Canada from the mid-late 1880s: 946 from 1866 to 1881 and 29,076 from 1882 to 1939. It also migrated 502 children to Australia before 1921 and 1,840 from 1921 to 1945.[2] Post-War, Barnardo’s migrated children solely to Australia, 442 in total.[3] 

5. Barnardo’s reasons for undertaking child migration were apparently a mixture of the practical and the idealistic: it eased overcrowding, was a cheaper way of maintaining children[4] and helped populate the Empire. Migration was said to confer “unspeakable blessings[5] on the children themselves. It also enabled Barnardo’s to operate its “ever open door” policy for destitute British children, because there was effectively a “back door” for some of them to leave the country.[6] Between 1947 and 1964, the number of children migrated was between 0.16% and 0.74% of those being cared for by Barnardo’s in its UK homes.[7] 

6. Barnardo’s Australia was set up in 1921 as a branch of Barnardo’s UK (based in London).[8] During the migration period, the Australian Management Committee reported to Barnardo’s in the UK, although Barnardo’s Australia formally separated from Barnardo’s UK in 1996.[9] There is some evidence of tension between the Barnardo’s New South Wales (NSW) Committee (set up to supervise the Barnardo’s schools there) and the Committee of Management in the UK, with the former wanting control and oversight, including over appointments and maintenance spending, and the latter seeking more independence from Barnardo’s UK.

7. Children were migrated by Barnardo’s to Canada in large sailing parties. From 1920 they were escorted by a Mr and Mrs Hobday. They stayed at Barnardo’s institutions in Ontario for an initial period before taking up occupation as agricultural workers or domestic servants on farms.[10] Children migrated by Barnardo’s to Australia were placed initially at Fairbridge’s Pinjarra school. In 1928 to 1929, Barnardo’s established its own farm school at Mowbray Park, near Picton, NSW. A home at Normanhurst, NSW, a home for girls at Burwood, NSW, and several smaller homes were later established.[11]

8. We did not hear any evidence during the Part 1 hearings from a former Barnardo’s child migrant. The table of additional accounts provided to the Inquiry includes two allegations in respect of the Picton school.[12] However, the experts and Barnardo’s have provided the Inquiry with information about allegations and evidence of sexual abuse of Barnardo’s child migrants in both Canada and Australia,[13] which we discuss further below.

2.1.2 What did Barnardo’s UK know about alleged sexual abuse of child migrants?

(i) Canada (1800s)

9. In or some time before 1889, Alfred Owen, who ran Barnardo’s receiving home in Canada, was convicted of sexual interference with girls in his care.[14] Barnardo’s UK became aware of this.[15] 

(ii) Picton (1955)

10. In 1955, CM-F143, a Picton housemaster, was dismissed on the grounds of suspicion of “indiscreet fondling” of boys at the school.[16] The extent to which Barnardo’s in the UK was made aware of this particular incident at the time is not clear. 

(iii) Picton and Normanhurst (1958) 

11. On 30 May 1958 Barnardo’s Australia’s Tom Price raised concerns that 23 boys mainly aged between 18 and 21 were potential victims of “serious sexual malpractices” at Picton.[17] A former sports master, two poultry farmers, a Barnardo’s old boy, a herd testing officer and two former housemasters (including the one dismissed in 1955) were suspected as perpetrators over several years. Concerns were also raised about boys at Normanhurst and boys in employment. Barnardo’s UK became aware of this.[18] 

(iv) Allegation of pre-migration abuse (1960)

12. On 25 July 1960, an allegation was made that a child in the UK had been “interfer[ing] in a homosexual way” with four other children, prior to migration by Barnardo’s. This was reported by the head of the relevant UK home to his manager on 25 July 1960.[19]

Over a period of time, Barnardo’s UK had knowledge of allegations of sexual abuse of child migrants in the UK, Australia and Canada.

2.1.3 How did Barnardo’s UK respond to what it knew?

(i) Canada (1800s)

13. Barnardo’s UK became aware of Mr Owen’s conviction in 1889 and sent out a female senior manager to investigate the facilities. A recommendation was made that locks should be put on bedroom doors and chaperones provided when girls were in vulnerable situations.[20] This tells us that, as far back as 1889, Barnardo’s had the foresight to take action in response to concerns over the sexual abuse of child migrants (even if was not described as such).

(ii) Picton (1955)

14. As indicated above, the extent to which Barnardo’s UK became aware of the issues that led to CM-F143’s dismissal from Picton in 1955 is not clear, and so there is not enough information before us to determine whether its response (if any) was appropriate. However, the decision to dismiss CM-F143 from his post as housemaster suggests that Barnardo’s Australia did not find it acceptable for someone suspected of sexually abusing children to remain in post.

15. The unified nature of the organisation, as is evidenced by the attempt to apply a common institutional framework through the Barnardo’s Book (see further below), suggests to us that the same attitude would have applied in the UK.[21]

(iii) Picton and Normanhurst (1958)

16. It appears that these issues had been reported to Barnardo’s by a third party rather than as the result of any internal monitoring system. However, Barnardo’s reported these to the NSW Child Welfare Department (CWD) and the police, leading to several prosecutions.[22] The UK High Commissioner also became aware of the issues via the Home Office on 10 July 1958, but concern was expressed that the High Commissioner had not been informed earlier.[23] As a result of the concerns, Barnardo’s UK suspended its child migration programme, in conjunction with suspensions imposed by the UK and Australian Government authorities.[24] 

17. Barnardo’s UK also sent a delegation of senior managers to Australia, including Mr Lucette (Barnardo’s UK General Superintendent). Meetings were held with the Australian authorities in late July 1958, during one of which Mr Tasman Heyes (the most senior civil servant within the Commonwealth Immigration Department) gave his assurance to Mr Lucette that he would recommend to the Minister that the ban be lifted as soon as possible (while also asking Mr Lucette if numbers of child migrants being sent from Britain could be increased).[25] 

18. Later, Mr Lucette visited Picton with Mr Wheeler (Immigration Department) and Mr Thomas (acting CWD Director). He interviewed staff and boys at Picton, and gave a positive report about the institution. Mr Price visited Barnardo’s home at Normanhurst and interviewed staff there.[26] Ms Clarke noted that Picton was a very small town and one reason for conducting the investigation quickly was out of concern for the welfare and safety of children who remained at Picton. The conclusion was that: “The present superintendents of both homes are fully alive to their responsibilities and would be likely to detect in the early stages any outbreaks of this nature.” Mr Wheeler and Mr Price also visited the police to discuss the issues in the case.[27] 

19. The CWD was very complimentary about Mr Price’s assistance (saying he had been “most cooperative and anxious to give the authorities every assistance to clear up these matters”).[28] Mr Wheeler determined after a thorough check, that there was no ongoing risk to children, no staff employed at the institution were likely to commit further offences, and there would be no purpose in the ban being continued.[29]

The suspension of migration, followed by a visit from Barnardo’s staff UK, was an appropriate procedural response, and illustrates that Barnardo’s appreciated the seriousness of the matter.

20. There appears to have been considerable concern within Barnardo’s about the reputational damage of the ban and its potential to interfere with the publicity campaign for funds.[30] Ms Clarke stated that this concern was in addition to concern about the welfare of the children. The fact that Mr Price had briefed the media did not suggest that he was trying to conceal matters.[31] 

21. Professor Lynch analysed the information available to the Australian immigration authorities, the UK High Commission and the CRO to inform their consideration of whether to lift the ban.[32] He concluded that while the information given to the Australian government was accurate, it was unclear whether the UK government had been given misleading information by Mr Lucette, to the effect that offences had not taken place at Picton itself. Ms Clarke accepted this possibility.[33]

22. Professor Lynch observed that all the convictions obtained in the prosecutions were for offences outside Picton, despite evidence in at least two cases (those of Etheridge and Adams) that there had been offending at the school. This raised the possibility that the police had “managed” the offences through the criminal justice system in order to spare the embarrassment of a voluntary organisation.[34]

23. Ultimately the ban was lifted with the agreement of the Australian Immigration Minister, effective on 14 August 1958, on the condition that Picton and Normanhurst would be subject to “a most careful supervision … for a very considerable time to come”.[35] Professor Lynch also noted that discussions about closing Picton seemed to follow on from the sexual abuse issues, and seemed to inform the UK government’s rationale for lifting the ban.[36]

(iv) Allegation of pre-migration abuse (1960)

24. Upon identifying that a child was interfering with other boys, the head of the home in the UK reported the abuse to his manager, Mr Northam. Mr Northam requested further information and it was noted on the file that Mr Northam “hesitates to leave matter over until his next visit … behaviour is of a serious nature and we should refer him to [the Child Behaviour Clinic] and they will need a clearer picture of what happened.”[37] There is no further reference on the file and the child in question was restored to his family in December 1960. It was appropriate for Mr Northam to have expressed concern and recommended that further steps should be taken, but there is not sufficient information before the Inquiry to make any further findings as to the adequacy of Barnardo’s response to this allegation. 

2.1.4 Did Barnardo’s take sufficient care to protect child migrants from sexual abuse?

Selection

25. Dr Barnardo only wanted to migrate “the flower of his flock”, which Ms Clarke interpreted to mean strong, healthy children able to cope with the rigours of Empire, demonstrate resilience and take advantage of opportunities.[38] 

26. In respect of Canada, Barnardo’s implemented the recommendation of the Bondfield report that children aged under 14 should not be migrated. If a child expressed interest in migration, a medical examination would be carried out, and Department of Immigration and Colonisation officers conducted the selection.[39]

27. For Australia, a Barnardo’s official would visit UK homes, provide promotional material and interview children who were willing to migrate and appeared suitable. Barnardo’s was conscious of identifying the most suitable age for children to be migrated. The children’s previous histories were examined and medical examinations conducted. A placement committee considered whether it was in the best interests of each child to be migrated. Post-War there was a greater emphasis on obtaining consent from a parent, guardian or the Home Secretary.[40] In 1963, Barnardo’s sought to implement improved selection processes.[41] 

28. We note that in common with other organisations, there was something of a policy debate within Barnardo’s as to whether migration itself was appropriate, or contrary to the view of childcare professionals on the ground.[42] Many more children were proposed for migration than were actually sent.[43]

Barnardo’s selection processes demonstrated more thoroughness than those of other sending agencies.

Checks on placements

29. We note that pre-War, Canadian farmers who wished to house and employ Barnardo’s child migrants completed an application form and questionnaire, and provided references, and their homes (including sleeping arrangements and members of the household) were inspected.[44]

Supervision and aftercare

30. As far back as 1894, Thomas Barnardo had said the following in a letter to the Canadian Secretary of the Department for the Interior “...continued supervision should be exercised over these children after they have been placed out in the Canadian homestead; first by systematic visitation; second, by regular correspondence. Emigration in the case of young children without continuous supervision is, in our opinion, presumptuous folly and simply courts disaster”.[45] We agree with Ms Clarke that this illustrates that the principle of continued supervision through systematic visits and regular correspondence had been established by the late 1890s as good practice,[46] even if this was not always implemented in reality.

31. In Canada, siblings who asked to be placed close together were accommodated where possible; there was an attempt to visit children every nine to twelve months; contact with their families was promoted; and the Toronto headquarters became a base for former child migrants to write to or visit.[47] Prior to their placement, children were provided with two stamped postcards to enable them to contact the Canadian manager with news of their arrival and information about conditions, and were issued with guidelines describing the agreement to be signed between Barnardo’s, the child and their host.[48]

32. In Australia, Barnardo’s set up an operational manager who oversaw the work in NSW, supported by the NSW Committee, which sent regular reports to the UK.[49] The Barnardo’s Book (first published in 1944, but the 1955 version of which we considered[50]) was sent to all Barnardo’s homes in the UK and Australia. It applied to overseas operations, guidance on visits, regular reporting and inspection of the homes, and invested that responsibility for aftercare in the manager in Australia.301

33. For example, monthly reports were prepared by each home’s superintendent and submitted to the Barnardo’s Australia director, minutes of monthly meetings of the NSW Committee were sent to the UK, reports were prepared on the progress and achievements of the migration scheme by Council members in London following visits to Australia and reports on the children were prepared at six-monthly, nine-monthly and yearly frequencies.[51]

The Inquiry accepts Professor Lynch’s analysis that these reports “seem to indicate quite a detailed and empathic understanding of children’s experiences, of their kind of future motivations and their experiences of current placements. The contents of those aftercare reports suggest a good...one-to-one conversation with the children involved.”[52]

34. However a memorandum dated August 1963 from Barnardo’s Deputy General Superintendent to the UK Management Committee:

a. expressed concern that Superintendents and Executive Officers of Barnardo’s would not have information about children after they had gone to Australia; 

b. noted that the Migration Department did not have capacity to read the “lengthy” reports received on each child from Australia, “except in a few instances where action at this end is called for”, such that the general Barnardo’s principle of “continuity and concern for the individual child” was not operating in its migration work; and

c. accepted that consideration of the reports “would help to create greater confidence in our migration policy.”[53]

It is regrettable that Barnardo’s UK required regular reports but did not then ensure that they were all fully read in the UK. However we are satisfied that these reports would have been read by Barnardo’s representatives in Australia, and there was a system for actioning any concerns, including reporting to the UK as appropriate.

Conditions generally

35. The Barnardo’s Book also included directions on child safety and welfare.[54] There is evidence that Barnardo’s children were placed at the Belmont Home and Normanhurst before they were approved by the UK government.[55] Generally, though, when receiving institutions were reviewed, the conditions at Barnardo’s homes and the organisation’s attitude compared favourably with those found elsewhere:

a. in 1951, the NSW CWD noted that John Moss was not impressed with Fairbridge but was “reasonably satisfied” with conditions at Barnardo’s Homes;[56]

b. in 1958, the CWD wrote to the Department of Immigration that compared with Fairbridge, “Dr Barnardo’s Homes … act very promptly when any matter is brought under notice....It is a pity Fairbridge does not adopt the same approach”;[57] and

c. positive comments were made about Barnardo’s in the Ross report, and unlike other organisations, there was no criticism of Barnardo’s in the confidential addendum.

36. Barnardo’s adopted the recommendations in the Ross report and the WGPW report to the extent that they were not already part of Barnardo’s practice.[58]

37. Ms Clarke accepted that in 1956 Mr Price had written a report that was very critical of the conditions at Picton, and that in 1967, a report by Barnardo’s Ms Dyson contained some criticism about slowness of information about individual children getting to Australia ahead of the child being placed.[59] Overall though she stated that Barnardo’s had sought to address such concerns and complied with the expectations set out in the outfits and maintenance agreements between the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and Dr Barnardo’s Homes.[60]

Conclusion

Barnardo’s apparently appreciated the risk of sexual abuse to child migrants, given the steps they implemented in respect of the placement of girls in Canada after the conviction of Mr Owen in 1889, and the evidence that they stopped migration of girls between 13 and 17 post-War because of problems of isolation and “vulnerability” experienced by pre-War female child migrants in that age group.[61]

Barnardo’s demonstrated a willingness to meet the expectations of the time, and implemented a system aimed at achieving this.

However, the failure to read the reports received in the UK about children it migrated was regrettable.

Generally the system Barnardo’s had in place to take sufficient care to protect the child migrants from risks, including of sexual abuse, was more robust than those adopted by many of the other institutions.

2.1.5 What has Barnardo’s done in the post-migration period?

38. We heard evidence of the following allegations of sexual abuse of children prior to their migration from the UK by Barnardo’s:

a. in 2001, a former child migrant disclosed abuse in the UK to Barnardo’s Australia, but did not wish to give further details;[62]

b. in 2001, a former child migrant alleged physical and sexual abuse in the UK by peers pre-migration to Australia;[63]

c. in 2002, Barnardo’s extracted information recorded on an Historic Abuse Form of an allegation by a child migrant known as CM-A40 that his peer was a victim of assault while in Leicester prior to migration by a male member of staff, who was later convicted of offences against boys;[64]

d. in 2003, a former child migrant alleged in his autobiography that a woman at Ifield Hall in Sussex would punish him by pinching and squeezing his private parts;[65]

e. In 2014, a former child migrant disclosed in his unpublished autobiography that he was repeatedly sexually abused in 1951, aged eight by an older boy at a home in Hove;[66] and 

f. in a 2014 PhD manuscript it is recorded that a former child migrant disclosed to a PhD researcher that he was the subject of “abuse” in Annesley England by an older boy and “unsavoury acts” by a Master.[67] 

39. Barnardo’s’ response to these allegations has been, respectively: (a) the information was recorded on the historic abuse database; (b) the allegations were reported to police; police were unable to proceed with the investigation and ongoing support was provided by Barnardo’s; (c) the information was recorded on the historic abuse database; (d)-(f) Barnardo’s states that it has been unable to identify the abusers and no further responses are recorded.

40. In respect of allegations of post-migration sexual abuse concerning Barnardo’s, we heard evidence that:

a. two former child migrants made allegations of sexual abuse after their arrival in Canada;

b. child migrants who were not named by Mr Price have self-identified as victims of sexual abuse at Picton;and

c. in 1988, two former child migrants disclosed on a television programme, sexual abuse by a housefather, Victor Holyoak, at Hartwell House (a home in Kiama, south of Sydney) in the 1960s.[68] 

41. Barnardo’s’ response to these allegations has been, respectively:

a. to provide regular contact with After Care and a visit by the Head of After Care to Canada to talk about his experience of care; in respect of the second former child migrant, she had passed away before the Class Action in Canada was discontinued and Barnardo’s did not have contact with her family;[69] 

b. in respect of one of these, contact by Barnardo’s Australia’s CEO who made an unsolicited, unreserved apology to him and gave him some information about the subsequent trial and conviction of the perpetrators and Barnardo’s role therein;[70] others passed away or did not have authority to access records; and

c. initially, the provision of counselling, assistance with legal advice and support as well as an offer to meet with staff and discuss Barnardo’s current child protection policy; information was passed to the police and Victor Holyoak was arrested, prosecuted and convicted.[71] 

In these specific examples, Barnardo’s UK responded adequately to the allegations made.

42. In 2010, Martin Narey, the then CEO of Barnardo’s, issued a public apology in response to the apology given by then Prime Minister Gordon Brown. In her written evidence to us, on behalf of Barnardo’s, Ms Clarke recognised the “significant and irrevocable damage” done to some individuals by the child migration programme.

She accepted that “the policy of child migration was misguided and wrong” but stated that “it was not seen as wrong at the time”, and was done with good intentions and in accordance with government policies. Ms Clarke apologised further during the hearing. She stated that Barnardo’s has made efforts to try to understand the history, has faced up to its historical obligations to child migrants and has sought to mitigate adverse impacts.[72] She also explained that Barnardo’s UK (and Barnardo’s Australia) had contributed to previous inquiries and endorsed the recommendations made.[73]

43. The support provided by Barnardo’s UK to former child migrants alleging sexual abuse can be summarised as follows:

a. from 1988, it has had a safeguarding lead and from 1999, a Historical Abuse Implementation Plan, part of which involved a review of all cases where there had been a disclosure of abuse;

b. it has an Aftercare Department called Making Connections (and Barnardo’s Australia has a similar service), which, since 1985, has given access to files for 722 Canadian and 1,226 Australian child migrants, and has worked actively with the former child migrants to assist them in exploring their personal histories;

c. it conducts a careful assessment for any former child migrant wishing to access their information so that they have proper support as to the kind of language used in the records and its context; and

d. it has two honorary child migrants on its council of old boys and girls (and Barnardo’s Australia makes similar provision).[74] 

44. Furthermore, Barnardo’s Australia is in contact with many former child migrants, and provides counselling, guidance and referral, record retrieval, assistance with reunions/travel arrangements, a magazine and welfare support to those in need; as well as responding to enquiries from non-Barnardo’s child migrants seeking access to their records. Some disclosures of sexual abuse have been made by former child migrants to Barnardo’s Australia. In relation to one of these disclosures, an unsolicited, unreserved apology was made and information given to him about the trial and conviction of the perpetrator.[75]

45. In terms of financial reparations:

a. a Canadian class action brought in 2002, on behalf of all Barnardo’s child migrants sent to Ontario, was investigated by Barnardo’s for over two years (without it filing a Defence) and was then discontinued in 2004, by the claimants’ lawyers; 

b. as a result of a further action brought in Canada in 2005, damages of CAD $50,000 and CAD $20,000 were paid for sexual abuse to one former child migrant and another’s estate;

c. in response to two requests for reparations made by separate individuals, one was offered a settlement prior to mediation but ultimately received only his costs of attending and another was not offered a settlement and did not attend mediation;

d. another former child migrant was paid compensation of AUD $20,000 on 11 October 2006; and

e. Barnardo’s UK does not have a policy on reparations; each case is considered on its own merits.[76]

The apologies made by Barnardo’s UK recognised the serious damage done to child migrants. They have made efforts to provide support and reparations on an individual basis. However they have not proactively paid compensation to former child migrants alleging sexual abuse.

References

Footnotes

  1. Clarke 13 July 2017 11/16; 11/22; 12/4; BRD000120_008 [4.7]-[4.9], [4.12]; _009 [4.15]
  2. Clarke 13 July 2017 11/16; 11/22; 12/4; BRD000120_008 [4.7]-[4.9], [4.12]; _009 [4.15]
  3. Clarke 13 July 2017 12/8-9. Although Barnardo’s “formal” child migration programme is said to have ended in 1965, a small number migrated with parents/foster parents or to join family after that date (BRD000120_008 [4.11]; BRD000120_026 [7.13]; BRD000034_048-049) and there is some evidence to suggest that Barnardo’s was still attempting to migrate children after 1965: BRD000034_049-050; Lynch 11 July 2017 57/24; Constantine 13 July 2017 58/3-15.
  4. EWM000005_029 [2.3.1].
  5. BRD000081_002.
  6. Clarke 13 July 2017 16-17; BRD000120_018 [5.2], [5.3]; BRD000068_002; EWM000005_029 [2.3.1].
  7. Clarke 13 July 2017 14, 1-16
  8. BRD000120_005 [3.15].
  9. Clarke 13 July 2017 10; BRD000120_005 [3.16].
  10. Clarke 13 July 2017 31; BRD000120_016.
  11. Clarke 13 July 2017 31/12-32/21.
  12. INQ001259.
  13. BRD000120_026-041 [8.2]-[8.29].
  14. Clarke 13 July 2017 30/1-8; BRD000120_038.
  15. Clarke 13 July 2017 30/1-8; BRD000120_038.
  16. BRD000105_002.
  17. BRD000105_001.
  18. Lynch 11 July 2017 5/4-15-6/24; BRD000120_030; BRD000105_001-002; EWM000445_009.
  19. BRD000120_028.
  20. Clarke 13 July 2017 30/1-8; BRD000120_038 [8.25].
  21. See Ms Clarke’s evidence to similar effect: Clarke 13 July 2017 59/6-16.
  22. Lynch 11 July 2017 5/4-15-6/24; BRD000120_029-031; BRD000105_001-002; EWM000445_009
  23. EWM000283_103-104 (a closed National Archive file of correspondence concerning events at Picton, which was obtained by the Inquiry). The UK government’s response to these issues is considered further in section 3.12 below.
  24. Lynch 11 July 2017 7/1-12; BRD000120_031, [8.15].
  25. EWM000005_150 [9.2.4].
  26. EWM000445_009 [9.2].
  27. Lynch 11 July 2017 10-12; Clarke 13 July 2017 55/9-11; 57/6-16; 58/20-24; 65/9-23; BRD000120_034.
  28. Clarke 13 July 2017 55/21-25; BRD000121_001.
  29. Lynch 11 July 2017 12-13.
  30. EWM000005_150 [9.2.4]; EWM000445_010 [9.2.4].
  31. Lynch 11 July 2017 9/24; 10/22-24; 28-29; Clarke 13 July 2017 57/17-20; 64/2-18. The Australian immigration authorities also appeared concerned about potentially adverse press coverage about institutions to which children were being sent: Lynch 11 July 2017 26.
  32. EWM000445_011, [9.2.6].
  33. Lynch 11 July 2017 14-20; 33/2-16; EWM000283_104; Clarke 13 July 2017 60-61.
  34. Lynch 11 July 2017 18/14-20; 20/4-19.
  35. Lynch 11 July 2017 23/20-23; BRD000120_34; BRD000127_001.
  36. Lynch 11 July 2017 29-30.
  37. BRD000120_028; BRD000104_001.
  38. Clarke 13 July, 14-15.
  39. Clarke 13 July 2017 27/22-25; 28/3-14; BRD000120_013-014.
  40. Clarke 13 July 2017 17-19; 21/1-5; 22/4-15; 50/19-25; BRD000120_013-014; BRD000070_001-002
  41. BRD000165_001.
  42. Clarke 13 July 2017 89-90.
  43. Clarke 13 July 2017 12-13. For example, in 1954, only 22 of 664 nominated children were migrated: BRD000120_15.
  44. BRD000120_012.
  45. Clarke 13 July 2017 34-35; BRD000120_019.
  46. Clarke 13 July 2017 34-35.
  47. Clarke 13 July 2017 47-49.
  48. BRD000236.
  49. BRD000194_004; Clarke 13 July 2017 42-43.
  50. BRD000085; BRD000169_001.
  51. Clarke 13 July 2017 45.
  52. Lynch 11 July 2017 46/4-11.
  53. Lynch 11 July 2017 54-55; EWM000445_006-007
  54. Clarke 13 July 2017 39/15-22; BRD000085_001, 002, 003.
  55. Lynch 11 July 2017 50-52
  56. INQ000155.
  57. INQ000125.
  58. Clarke, 13 July 2017 46/8-25; BRD000198_013.
  59. Albeit that there was a suggestion in the evidence that Barnardo’s was keen that Ms Dyson’s visit was not critical (the minutes from the May 1967 meeting state in respect of her upcoming visit that “on no account must she give the impression of finding fault with Australian methods”: BRD000177).
  60. Clarke 13 July 2017 36-39; BRD000225_001.
  61. Clarke 13 July 2017 25/17-19; 11 July 2017 45/3-16.
  62. BRD000120_027-028; BRD000103.
  63. BRD000120_028; BRD000104.
  64. BRD000120_026-027; BRD000099.
  65. BRD000120_027; BRD000100.
  66. BRD000120_027; BRD000102.
  67. BRD000120_027; BRD000101.
  68. BRD000120_035, _036, _037 and EWM000445_008.
  69. BRD000120_037, 038.
  70. BRD000120_035.
  71. BRD000120_037.
  72. Clarke 13 July 2017 6-7; 69/12-21; 80/15-25; 91-92; BRD000120_002.
  73. Clarke 13 July 2017 69/2-11; 73-74.
  74. Clarke 13 July 2017 71-73; 79-80.
  75. Clarke 13 July 2017 66-67; 72/11-16; BRD000120_044-048.
  76. Clarke 13 July 2017 74/18-23, 74-76; 78/12-23; BRD000120_048-050.
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